Facts:

The appellant (Amyra Dwivedi's mother) filed a petition for custody of her child. The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, dismissed the custody petition but granted the appellant visitation rights under specific conditions.

Issues:

Whether the granted visitation rights were in the best interest of the child's welfare.

The adequacy and appropriateness of the conditions under which the visitation was allowed.

Held:

The Supreme Court expressed dissatisfaction with the granted visitation rights. The Court reiterated the principle that the welfare of the child is of paramount consideration in custody matters, as established in the case of Yashita Sahu v. State of Rajasthan, (2020) AIR SC 577 (Para 4).

The Court emphasized that visitation rights should facilitate a comfortable and natural interaction between the child and the visiting parent. It noted that such an atmosphere could not be created in the office of the District Legal Services Authority, where the visitation was initially directed to take place (Para 5).

Based on the child's circumstances and needs, the Court issued revised directions for visitation and contact rights. These included specific timings, weekends, festivals, summer vacations, and provisions for school functions.The Court granted the appellant the right to attend school functions and participate in the child's education. The school was instructed to recognize her as the child's parent and afford her the same privileges as other parents (Para 6).

The Court acknowledged the appellant's right to seek custody under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, and allowed for potential adjustments in visitation rights during the custody petition's pendency (Para 7).

Facts:

The dispute arises from a practice in Punjab where government agencies allocate paddy for custom milling to rice mills, which then supply processed rice to FCI. Quality issues led to an investigation by the CBI, resulting in blacklisting and recommendations for banning defaulting rice millers from the allocation process. In response, the defaulting millers allegedly leased their mills to new entities to evade the ban. These lease agreements were unregistered.

Issues:

Whether the new lessees of blacklisted rice mills are entitled to allocation of paddy for custom milling, given the unregistered lease agreements and the attempt to evade blacklisting.

Held:

The Supreme Court rules that the unregistered lease agreements do not satisfy the requirements of Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act, 1908, and therefore cannot be accepted as evidence of a valid transfer of possessory rights. The Court acknowledges the FCI's argument that these agreements were likely executed to escape liabilities and, while the question of intent is a factual one, the High Court should not have opined on the legal sufficiency of the lease deeds. The Court holds that even if a proprietorship/partnership firm takes over a defaulting mill, it cannot claim allocation of paddy without settling the previous liabilities. Consequently, the Court sets aside the High Court's decision and dismisses the writ petitions filed by the respondent-lessees. However, it grants them the liberty to pay dues with penalty/interest of the original rice millers and seek allocation of paddy after obtaining a 'No Dues Certificate' from the original millers.

Facts:

The case revolved around the conflict between the Pharmacy Council of India (PCI) and the All India Council of Technical Education (AICTE) regarding their jurisdiction and authority over matters related to pharmacy education. The main issue was to decide whether the provisions of the Pharmacy Act, 1948 or the AICTE Act, 1987 would prevail in the regulation of pharmacy education, including course approvals, education standards, qualification criteria, and professional conduct.

Issues:

Which statute would take precedence in the context of pharmacy education: the Pharmacy Act, 1948 or the AICTE Act, 1987?

Should the Pharmacy Council of India (PCI) or the All India Council of Technical Education (AICTE) have jurisdiction over matters related to pharmacy education?

Held:

The court held that the Pharmacy Act, 1948 is a specialized law exclusively governing pharmacy and is a comprehensive code pertaining to the regulation of pharmacy education and practice. This Act prevails over the AICTE Act, 1987, which is a general law dealing with technical education and institutions. (Para 15)

The court pointed out that the Pharmacy Act, 1948 covers all aspects of pharmacy education, including course approvals, eligibility criteria for students and teachers, examination standards, registration, and more. It is a comprehensive legislation intended to ensure seamless regulation of the profession. Therefore, the Pharmacy Act, being a special law, takes precedence in the field of pharmacy education. (Para 13.2)

The Pharmacy Act has established the Pharmacy Council of India (PCI) as an autonomous statutory authority to regulate pharmacy education and practice. The PCI is composed of experts in the field of pharmacy and related subjects. On the other hand, the AICTE Act designates only one member from the field of pharmacy, making the PCI more suitable to regulate pharmacy education effectively. (Para 16)

It was emphasized that the existence of two regulators, PCI and AICTE, in the same field would lead to conflict and confusion. This is undesirable and unhealthy for the education sector and institutions. Given that the PCI comprises experts in pharmacy, it is in the best interest of pharmacy education that the PCI retains jurisdiction in the field. (Para 17)

Consequently, the court ruled that in the realm of pharmacy education, particularly concerning the recognition of pharmacy degrees and diplomas, the Pharmacy Act, 1948 shall prevail. The norms and regulations set by the PCI under the Pharmacy Act must be adhered to by institutions providing pharmacy education. (Para 21)

FACTS:

The erstwhile partnership firm, M/s. Chetak Enterprises, had an agreement with the Government of Rajasthan for road construction and toll collection. The firm was converted into a private limited company under Part IX of the Companies Act before the commencement of the relevant assessment year. The partnership firm had communicated its intention of conversion to the Chief Engineer, and the agreement with the government was executed with this understanding. The company was granted registration, and its properties were vested in it as per Section 575 of the Companies Act.

ISSUES:

• Whether the conversion of the partnership firm into a company met the conditions set by Section 80-IA, including:

• Whether the assessee fulfilled the condition of sub-Section (4)(i)(a) of Section 80-IA regarding ownership by a registered company.

• Whether the assessee fulfilled the condition of sub-Section (4)(i)(b) of Section 80-IA regarding entering into an agreement with the government.

HELD:

The Court analyzed the legal implications of the conversion of the partnership firm into a private limited company and the effect of the agreement with the government. It observed that the company's memorandum of association clearly indicated its intent to continue the partnership business and acquired its assets, movables, immovables, rights, debts, and liabilities. The agreement executed with the government was effectively transferred to the company after conversion. The Court concluded that the conditions of sub-Section (4)(i)(a) and (b) of Section 80-IA were met, as the company was owned by a registered company and had a valid agreement with the government for developing and maintaining the infrastructure facility.

In view of the above, the appeal stands dismissed.

Facts:

The dispute arose from a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Mankastu Impex Private Limited (Appellant) and AirVisual Limited (Respondent). The MOU pertained to the sale and distribution of air quality monitoring products. The arbitration clause in the MOU stated that disputes would be resolved through arbitration administered in Hong Kong.

Issues:

Whether the parties' choice of Hong Kong as the place of arbitration also signified the seat of arbitration?

Whether the laws of India or Hong Kong would govern the arbitration proceedings and judicial review of the award?

Held:

The Court delved into the interpretation of the arbitration clause and the related clauses in the MOU. It noted that the arbitration clause stated that disputes would be "referred to and finally resolved by arbitration administered in Hong Kong." This phrase indicated the parties' agreement that the arbitration proceedings would be seated in Hong Kong, and the laws of Hong Kong would apply.

The Court emphasized the distinction between the "place of arbitration" and the "governing law" in the MOU. While the MOU was governed by Indian laws, the arbitration proceedings were seated in Hong Kong as explicitly mentioned in the arbitration clause.

The Court further referenced the importance of the seat of arbitration, which determines applicable laws, arbitration procedure, and judicial review. It noted that the term "place of arbitration" was used to indicate the seat, which indicated the intention of the parties to have Hong Kong as the seat of arbitration.

The Court addressed the argument that Clause 17.1 of the MOU specified the laws of India and New Delhi courts having jurisdiction. It held that this did not affect the application of Hong Kong law to the arbitration proceedings since the parties had chosen Hong Kong as the seat.

As per the Court's interpretation, Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was not applicable in this case, as the seat of arbitration was in Hong Kong. The Indian courts lacked jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11(6).

Facts:

The prosecution's case revolved around the complainant's report of his three minor children going missing. The accused was seen with the children near their school. The accused was subsequently found missing from his house and village. His location was traced using mobile phone records, leading to his discovery in the house of another individual. The accused eventually led the police to the recovery of the deceased bodies and their school bags.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution successfully proved the involvement of the accused in the murder of the three minor children based on circumstantial evidence?

Whether the sentencing of the accused to death was appropriate given the circumstances of the case?

Held:

Issue 1: The court found that the prosecution effectively established the accused's enmity with the father of the deceased children through witness testimonies. The accused was last seen with the children before they went missing, and the recovery of the bodies based on information provided by the accused further implicated him. (Para 16, 18, 19, 20)

Issue 2: The court considered both aggravating and mitigating circumstances for sentencing. Mitigating factors included the accused's emotional disturbance due to personal issues, lack of criminal antecedents, and family circumstances. The only aggravating circumstance pointed out was the brutal nature of the crime. The court decided to convert the death sentence into life imprisonment, considering the accused's mental state at the time of the crime and the overall balance of circumstances. The court also directed that there should be no remission of the sentence until the accused completes 25 years of imprisonment. The present appeal is partly allowed to the aforesaid extent. (Para 24, 25.4, 25.5, 25.6, 26)

Facts:

The appellant, Suborno Bose, was involved in proceedings related to a complaint under Section 16(3) of the FEMA Act initiated by the Enforcement Directorate. A show-cause notice was issued to the appellant based on allegations of contravention of various provisions of the FEMA Act in relation to foreign exchange transactions.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, as the Managing Director of the company in question, was liable for the contraventions alleged against the company. Additionally, the court had to interpret the relevant provisions of the FEMA Act, FEMA Regulations, and guidelines to decide on the matter.

Held:

The court examined the provisions of Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the FEMA Act, along with related regulations and guidelines. Section 10(5) required authorized persons to ensure that transactions involving foreign exchange do not contravene provisions of the FEMA Act or related rules. Section 10(6) deemed certain circumstances to be contraventions, including failure to use foreign exchange for the intended purpose, not surrendering it within the specified period, or using it for unauthorized purposes.

The court concluded that the contravention under Section 10(6) was a continuing offense, and that even though the appellant became the Managing Director of the company after the alleged contravention took place, he was responsible for taking corrective actions upon assuming office.

The court emphasized that the requirement to surrender foreign exchange within a specified period was a civil obligation, and the appellant's awareness of the contravention meant he should have taken steps to rectify it.

Accordingly, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed

Facts:

The petitioner participated in the revival bid for Super Bazar, investing Rs. 504 crores. The bid was accepted, and the winding-up order was suspended. The petitioner's management period saw the issuance of summons under the Employees' Provident Fund Act, followed by a committee's report indicating issues with the revival scheme's implementation.

Issues:

The petitioner's conduct in reviving Super Bazar, its claims for a refund of the investment amount, adherence to winding-up principles and statutory provisions, and the priority of claims in the distribution of assets.

Held:

The court discusses the purpose of appointing an auditor to verify income and expenditure, and it highlights that the petitioner's conduct lacked genuine efforts for revival.( Para 26 and 27)

The court clarifies that the petitioner is accountable for its management period and should be held to account based on the verification by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG).( Para 30)

The court emphasizes the importance of adhering to statutory provisions and winding-up principles, rejecting the petitioner's claim for a full refund of investment.( Para 31)

The court references Section 11 of the Employees' Provident Fund Act, highlighting the priority of payment of dues towards employees' provident fund in winding-up proceedings.( Para 33)

The court concludes that the CAG's verification is final and binding, and the liquidator must evaluate claims based on statutory priorities.( Para 34)

The court directs the liquidator to evaluate claims in accordance with statutory priorities and addresses the claims of the EPFO and the Union Government.( Para 35)

The contempt petitions shall stand dismissed.

Facts:

The case pertains to a dispute regarding the application of pay upgradation benefits under the MACP Scheme. The respondents were granted beneficial pay upgradation under the MACP Scheme but sought the benefit of Grade Pay from the next promotional hierarchy based on the former ACP Scheme.

Issues:

The distinction between the MACP and ACP Schemes, the intent behind the introduction of the MACP Scheme, and the interpretation of relevant terms within the MACP Scheme.

Held:

The MACP Scheme was recommended by the Sixth Central Pay Commission to address disparities caused by varying promotional hierarchies across departments. The objective was to ensure uniform benefits for employees irrespective of their existing hierarchical positions within their organizations or cadre (Para 9, 26).

The terms used in the MACP Scheme, specifically "placement in the immediate next higher Grade Pay in the hierarchy of the recommended revised pay bands," do not include the term "Grade Pay in the next promotional post." The argument that the benefit of the MACP Scheme is tied to the promotional post is inconsistent with the language and intent of the scheme (Para 27).

The MACP Scheme and ACP Scheme have distinct features. While both aim to provide relief against stagnation, the MACP Scheme offers financial upgradations at regular intervals, without requiring traditional promotions, and aims to incentivize efficiency despite the lack of promotions (Para 27).

The expert body, the Sixth Central Pay Commission, recommended the MACP Scheme after comprehensively examining issues, representations, and disparities arising from different promotional hierarchies (Para 28, 29).

Raj Pal's case, cited as precedent, was dismissed on technical grounds and thus should not have been considered a valid precedent for the present case (Para 42).

Law declared by the Supreme Court is binding as a precedent. A principle laid down by the court after examining the matter on merits constitutes the binding precedent. The court criticized the reliance on Raj Pal's case without assessing its merits (Para 44, 51).

The government accepted the recommendations of the Sixth Central Pay Commission and introduced the MACP Scheme to address stagnation and anomalies caused by varying promotional hierarchies (Para 28, 29).

Decision: The impugned orders were set aside, and the court ruled in favor of the Union of India and others. The court emphasized that the MACP Scheme's implementation should not be interfered with, as it was based on expert recommendations and accepted by the government (Para 35).

The court distinguished Raj Pal's case (Decision of Supreme Court dated 15.04.2013 in SLP (C) No. CC 7467 of 2013), noting that it did not examine the overall features of the MACP Scheme and was dismissed on procedural grounds (Para 42, 45).