(1)
RAJESHBHAI MULJIBHAI PATEL AND OTHERS ETC. ........ Vs.
STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER ETC. ........Respondent D.D
10/02/2020
Facts: The case involved appellant No.3, Hashmukhbhai Ravjibhai Patel, who filed a criminal case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against accused Yogeshbhai Muljibhai Patel. The dispute arose from the issuance of four cheques and the authenticity of related receipts. Appellant No.3 alleged that the cheques were issued to repay a debt but were dishonored. Accused Yogeshbhai claim...
(2)
STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS ........ Vs.
VIRENDRA KUMAR AND OTHERS ........Respondent D.D
10/02/2020
Facts: The Board decided to implement the 6th Pay Commission Report from January 1, 2006, and issued an order dated December 8, 2008, excluding its applicability to the employees of local bodies and public enterprises. Various orders and regulations were issued in this regard. Several writ petitions were filed challenging these orders, including one seeking to quash an order dated May 5, 2015, reg...
(3)
ATMA RAM ........ Vs.
CHARANJIT SINGH ........Respondent D.D
10/02/2020
Facts:On October 12, 1994, an agreement was made between the appellant (Atma Ram) and the respondent (Charanjit Singh) for the sale of land and factory premises.The sale consideration was fixed at Rs. 4,38,000, and an earnest money of Rs. 1,00,000 was paid.The petitioner claimed that when the date for specific performance of the contract arrived, the respondent disclosed that there was pending lit...
(4)
ARUN SINGH & OTHERS ........ Vs.
STATE OF U.P. THROUGH ITS SECRETARY & ANOTHER ........Respondent
Sections, Acts, Rules, and Articles mentioned:
Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC)
Section 493 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)
Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act
Section 8(2) of the Dowry Prohibition Act
Section 320 of the CrPC
Subject:
This quashing of criminal proceedings based on compromise, specifically addressing charges under Section 493 of the IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
Headnotes:
Facts:
The case involved allegations of deceit, dowry demands, and the filing of a First Information Report (FIR). The complainant filed an FIR against the appellants under Section 493 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The appellants challenged the charge sheet before the High Court under Section 482 CrPC.
Issues:
Whether the High Court's refusal to quash the charge sheet based on a compromise between the parties was justified.
Whether the allegations in the FIR constituted an offense under Section 493 IPC.
Whether the charges under Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act should be quashed.
Held:
The Court affirmed the well-established principle that the power to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC is distinct from the power to compound offenses under Section 320 CrPC. Quashing is based on considerations of the ends of justice and prevention of abuse of process, while compounding is governed by specific provisions.
To establish an offense under Section 493 IPC, the Court clarified that there must be evidence of a man deceitfully inducing a woman, not lawfully married to him, to believe she was lawfully married and inducing cohabitation based on this deception. The FIR lacked sufficient allegations to support this offense.
Regarding the charges under Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the Court noted specific allegations of a dowry demand of Rs. 5 lakhs in the FIR. As these allegations disclosed a cognizable offense under the Act, the charges should not be quashed.
Conclusion: The charge sheet was quashed in relation to the offense under Section 493 IPC, but the charges under Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act were allowed to proceed. The appeal was dismissed in part.
Referred Cases:
Amrawati & another vs. State of U.P., 2004 (57) ALR 290
Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab., (2012) 10 SCC 303
Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh vs. State of U.P., 2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC)
Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466
Parbatbhai Aahir & Others vs. State of Gujarat & Others., (2017) 9 SCC 641
Ram Chandra Bhagat vs. State of Jharkhand, (2013) 1 SCC 562
JUDGMENT
Krishna Murari, J. - Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment and order dated 24.11.2016 passed by the High Court[1] dismissing the petition filed by the appellants under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short 'the CrPC) challenging the charge sheet filed against them. The High Court while rejecting Section 482 CrPC petition directed the accused appellants to surrender before the Court concerned within 30 days from the date of order and in case they do so within the stipulated period and apply for bail the same was liable to be considered and decided in view of law laid down by full bench of High Court in case of Amrawati & another vs. State of U.P., (2004) 57 ALR 290 affirmed by this court in Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh vs. State of U.P., (2009) 3 ADJ 322 (SC)
[1] High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
3. Shorn of unnecessary details the brief facts which led to the filling of this appeal can be summarised as under:-
Respondent No. 2 lodged First Information Report with Police Station Izzat Nagar, District Bareilly under Section 493 I.P.C. read with Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against the appellants herein which was registered as case crime No. 431 of 2014. The allegations made in the F.I.R. were that Respondent No.-2 approached Appellants with the proposal of marriage of his daughter Jyoti with Appellant No.-1. On 30th June, 2013 the appellants visited the house of Respondent No.-2 and after meeting his daughter the proposal was finalised. On 21.07.2013, ring ceremony was performed and date of marriage was scheduled for 19.11.2013. Thereafter, Appellant No.-2 started visiting the house of complainant/respondent no.-2. frequently and misleading his daughter Jyoti that now since the marriage is finalised and only ceremony of 'feras' remains to be performed took her for outings on various occasions. On 16.08.2013 appellant No.-2 induced Jyoti to his room and established physical relationship with her. However, subsequently thereto the appellant started making demand of dowry of Rs. 5 Lakh. A complaint in this regard was made before Mahila Thana but no action was taken. On coming to know that marriage of Appellant No.-2 was settled with some other girl for a handsome amount of dowry, the First Information Report was being lodged.
4. The matter was investigated by the concerned Police Station and a charge sheet was filed against the appellants, which was challenged before the High Court by way of petition under Section 482 CrPC.
5. The case set up by the appellants before the High Court was that behaviour of the complainant and his family members changed after the date of marriage was fixed and they refused to share the expenses of marriage, which was settled between the parties to be shared equally. Further, a demand of Rs. 10 Lakhs was made from the appellants with a threat to implicate them in a false case in case the demand was not fulfilled. It was further pleaded that Appellant No.-2 made an application under Section 156(3) CrPC before the ACJM against the complainant and his other family members. During the pendency of proceedings under Section 156(3) CrPC a complaint was made by Respondent No.-2 in the Mahila Thana. The inspector in charge of Mahila Thana summoned both the parties where the dispute between them was compromised. In view of the compromise arrived, the appellants did not press the application under Section 156 (3) CrPC. However, the Complainant-Respondent No.-2 filed the First Information Report after about 10 months of the compromise.
6. The High Court finding that there was no justification for quashing the charge sheet dismissed the petition.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the High Court has failed to appreciate and consider that the fresh criminal action can not be launched on the basis of the same cause of action, which was already settled 10 months back by way of compromise which was acted upon by both the parties.
8. Learned counsel further submits that the High Court has failed to consider and appreciate that the allegations as contained in the First Information Report even if taken on the face value and assumed to be correct in entirety, do not prima-facie disclose commission of any offence, much less a cognizable offence. It is also submitted on behalf of the appellants that the High Court did not appreciate and consider the fact at all that the allegations in the F.I.R., prima-facie, do not constitute commission of any offence and dismissed the 482 petition without adverting itself to this aspect of the matter.
9. Learned counsel for the respondent refuting the arguments advanced on behalf of appellants submitted that the First Information Report was filed under Section 493 of the Indian Penal Code (in short the "I.P.C.") read with Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and both the aforesaid offences are non-compoundable in nature and thus could not have been compromised. The allegations made in the First Information Report were found to be substantiated on investigation and thus a charge sheet filed by the Police and the High Court rightly dismissed the petition for quashing of the same.
10. We have considered the rival submissions and perused the facts on record.
11. The offence under Section 493 is non-compoundable. Similarly, the offence under Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is also non-compoundable, in view of Section 8(2) of the said Act, which provides that every offence under this Act, shall be non-bailable and non-compoundable.
12. Though the offence in question are non-compoundable but the power of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC of the Court to quash the proceedings in such offences is well recognised by various decision of this court and the issue is no longer res Integra. Reference may be made to the observations of Three Judge Bench of this Court in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab., (2012) 10 SCC 303
"Quashing of offences or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of the offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking the power of compounding of offence given to a Court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offence, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the Court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceedings or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimately consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.
B.S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji to illustrate the principle that High Court may quash the criminal proceedings or F.I.R. or complaint in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and Section 320 does not limit or effect the powers of the High Court under Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing criminal proceedings in B.S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji this Court has compounded the non-compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so. There does exists the distinction between compounding of an offence under Section 320 and quashing of a criminal case by a High Court in exercise of inherent power under Section 482. The two powers are distinct and different although the ultimate consequence may be the same viz. acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the indictment.
13. Another Three Judge Bench of this Court in Parbatbhai Aahir & Others vs. State of Gujarat & Others., (2017) 9 SCC 641After analysing the precedents on, the above issue has summarised the broad principles in paragraph 15 of the reports as under: -
15. "The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:-
(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Power to quash Under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
(iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction Under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
(vi) In the exercise of the power Under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance."
14. In another decision in the case of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 it has been observed that in respect of offence against the society it is the duty to punish the offender. Hence, even where there is a settlement between the offender and victim the same shall not prevail since it is in interests of the society that offender should be punished which acts as deterrent for others from committing similar crime. On the other hand, there may be offences falling in the category where the correctional objective of criminal law would have to be given more weightage than the theory of deterrent punishment. In such cases, the court may be of the opinion that a settlement between the parties would lead to better relations between them and would resolve a festering private dispute and thus may exercise power under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the proceedings or the complaint or the FIR as the case may be.
15. Bearing in mind the above principles which have been laid down, we are of the view that offences for which the appellants have been charged are in fact offences against society and not private in nature. Such offences have serious impact upon society and continuance of trial of such cases is founded on the over ridding effect of public interests in punishing persons for such serious offences. It is neither an offence arising out of commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or such similar transactions or has any element of civil dispute thus it stands on a distinct footing. In such cases, settlement even if arrived at between the complainant and the accused, the same cannot constitute a valid ground to quash the F.I.R. or the charge sheet.
16. Thus the High Court cannot be said to be unjustified in refusing to quash the charge sheet on the ground of compromise between the parties.
17. The next issue which arises for consideration is whether the allegations made in the F.I.R constitute commission of an offence. As already stated hereinabove, the appellants have been charged with Section 493 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
Section 493 reads as under:-
" Cohabitation caused by a man deceitfully inducing a belief of lawful marriage. - Every man who by deceit causes any woman who is not lawfully married to him to believe that she is lawfully married to him and to cohabit or have sexual intercourse with him in that belief, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
18. A plain reading of the Section goes to show that in order to constitute an offence under this D.D
10/02/2020
Facts: The case involved allegations of deceit, dowry demands, and the filing of a First Information Report (FIR). The complainant filed an FIR against the appellants under Section 493 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The appellants challenged the charge sheet before the High Court under Section 482 CrPC.Issues:Whether the High Court's refusal to quash the charge sheet b...
(5)
BHARTI AXA GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. ........Appellant Vs.
PRIYA PAUL AND ANOTHER ........Respondent D.D
07/02/2020
Facts:
The case pertains to a claim filed by the respondent, Priya Paul, following an aviation accident resulting in her son's death. The appellant-insurer, Bharti AXA General Insurance, rejected the claim, arguing that the deceased was flying in a motorized glider for sightseeing, which they believed was not covered by the insurance policy.
Issues:
Whether the motorize...
(6)
KALINDI DAMODAR GARDE (DEAD) BY LRS. ........ Vs.
MANOHAR LAXMAN KULKARNI AND OTHERS ........Respondent D.D
07/02/2020
Facts: Laxman was given in adoption to Saraswati on 2nd November, 1935. At the time of his adoption, he had three sons, Gangadhar, Dattatraya, and Manohar. After adoption, Laxman and his wife, Padmavati, joined Saraswati's family along with their three sons. A daughter, Kalindi, was born to Laxman and Padmavati in 1938. Laxman was excluded from the partition of his natural family's prope...
(7)
INFINITY INFOTECH PARKS LIMITED ........ Vs.
SHIVA JUTE MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED THROUGH CHIEF EXECUTIVE (AUTHORISED SIGNATORY) AND ANOTHER ........Respondent D.D
07/02/2020
Facts:The respondent occupied the 16th floor of a building since February 1, 2012, without paying any lease rent, maintenance charges, electricity charges, or other dues.The appellant claimed lease rent of Rs. 7,29,240 from February 1, 2012, to December 2, 2019, which the respondent did not seriously dispute.Disputes arose over the maintenance charges, with the respondent arguing that they should ...
(8)
C.S. VENKATESH ........ Vs.
A.S.C. MURTHY (D) BY LRS. AND OTHERS ........Respondent D.D
07/02/2020
Facts: The case involves a dispute between C.S. Venkatesh (the appellant) and A.S.C. Murthy (the plaintiff), who filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement of reconveyance concerning a property in Bangalore. The plaintiff also sought a declaration that a sale deed executed by him in favor of the defendants was null and void. The plaintiff's claim was based on the contention that th...
(9)
INFINITY INFOTECH PARKS LIMITED ........Appellant Vs.
SHIVA JUTE MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED THROUGH CHIEF EXECUTIVE (AUTHORISED SIGNATORY) AND ANOTHER ........Respondent D.D
07/02/2020
Facts:
The respondent occupied the 16th floor of a building since February 1, 2012, without paying any lease rent, maintenance charges, electricity charges, or other dues.
The appellant claimed lease rent of Rs. 7,29,240 from February 1, 2012, to December 2, 2019, which the respondent did not seriously dispute.
Disputes arose over the maintenance charges, with the respondent arguing that ...