Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the selection process for the post of Principal in Degree Colleges and Post Graduate Colleges in Uttar Pradesh. The Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980, and the corresponding Regulations, especially Regulation 6, govern the selection procedure. The Commission is accused of non-compliance with Regulation 6, altering selection norms, and potentially favoring certain candidates.

Issues:

Alleged non-compliance with Regulation 6 by the Commission.

Changes in selection norms, potentially favoring certain candidates.

Adherence to the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980.

Held:

The Regulation 6 grants the Commission substantive power to call for interviews and determine the ratio of candidates to vacancies. The Commission initially set norms but later altered them, allowing all candidates to participate. Serious allegations of favoritism were made, casting doubt on the integrity of the selection process.

The Commission's varying of cut-off index norms raised serious concerns, leading to the participation of ineligible candidates in the interview process. The High Court rightly frowned upon such inconsistent practices by the Commission, emphasizing the need for an honest approach in selection matters.

The High Court found serious discrepancies in the selection process, including the induction of Commission members with questionable qualifications. The Commission's deviation from consistent norms and the participation of ineligible candidates raised substantial doubts about the overall fairness of the selection.

The Court rejected the contention that withdrawal of earlier writ petitions without reservation should estop the petitioners from filing the present writ petition. The withdrawal occurred before the interview, and subsequent challenges were permissible after the declaration of results.

The High Court's detailed examination of qualifications and experience of certain candidates led to a factual finding that they did not fulfill the minimum requirements. The Court dismissed the appellant's contention that further examination of documents was necessary, upholding the High Court's findings.

The High Court, considering serious breaches of regulations and discrepancies in the selection process, set aside the entire selection. The application of the rule of reservation by the Commission, contrary to this Court's precedent, was also noted as a flaw in the selection.

Facts:

The appellants were charged with committing a bank robbery.

Identification of the appellants by eyewitnesses was a crucial aspect of the case.

The appellants were tried by a Court Martial and were convicted.

Issues:

Credibility of the identification by eyewitnesses (PW-14 and PW-18).

Validity of the evidence provided by the Fingerprint Expert (PW-15).

Applicability of the benefit of doubt to one of the appellants (DK Singh).

Claim for reinstatement by the acquitted appellant (DK Singh).

Held:

Identification of Appellants: The tribunal disbelieved the identification of appellants AK Singh and UK Singh by PW-14 and PW-18, but the Supreme Court differed, finding that the bank personnel could have seen the culprits during the robbery and accepted the identification.

Fingerprint Evidence: While there were lapses in the prosecution regarding the recovery of weapons, the Supreme Court held that these lapses should not result in acquittal and upheld the fingerprint evidence presented by PW-15, linking AK Singh and UK Singh to the crime.

DK Singh's Acquittal: The tribunal acquitted DK Singh due to doubts about identification and the recovery of weapons. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the acquittal was not an honorable one, especially considering the credible identification of DK Singh by PW-14 and PW-18.

Reinstatement Claim by DK Singh: The Supreme Court emphasized that acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle reinstatement, particularly if the acquittal is based on the benefit of doubt. DK Singh, having been granted the benefit of doubt, cannot claim reinstatement or other consequential benefits.

Facts:

The petitioner alleged that Mis. Utsav violated the Supreme Court's order by outsourcing the manufacturing of HSRPs. The petitioner further claimed that the scheme was not implemented in its true spirit.

Issues:

The alleged violation of the Supreme Court's order, outsourcing of manufacturing, and non-implementation of the HSRP scheme.

Held:

The court took cognizance of the contempt petition based on the petitioner's claims of Mis. Utsav outsourcing HSRP manufacturing, which was in violation of the Supreme Court's order.( Paragraph 14)

Mis. Utsav had secured tenders for manufacturing HSRPs in multiple states by forming Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) with entities like Mis. Linkpoint and Mis. Rosmerta.( Paragraph 22)

The judgment discussed the Type of Approval Certificate (TAC) and Conformity of Production (CoP) requirements for HSRP manufacturers, emphasizing compliance with Rule 50 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989.( Paragraph 23)

The court highlighted the lack of certification for Mis. Rosmerta's manufacturing unit in Assam and identified a prima facie violation of Rule 50 and court orders.( Paragraph 25)

The contempt proceedings against Mis. Utsav were not pursued, leaving it to the respective states to take action for any violations. The State of Madhya Pradesh terminated the Concessionaire Agreement, and the Delhi Government issued a show cause notice to Mis. Rosmerta.( Paragraphs 27-28)

Concerns were raised about Mis. Utsav's control over the HSRP manufacturing process and the illegal sale of HSRPs by consortium partners. Directions and guidelines were issued for the proper implementation of the HSRP scheme.( Paragraphs 30, 34)

Facts:

The government had established a permanent machinery for arbitration in 1989 to settle commercial disputes between public sector enterprises (PSE) and government departments.

The dispute between the parties was referred to the Permanent Machinery for Arbitration in 1993/1994.

An arbitrator made an award, which was challenged by MIS. NORTHERN COALFIELD LTD. through a filed suit.

Issues:

Whether the requirement of permission from the Committee on Disputes (COD) was necessary for the suit to proceed.

The dissolution of COD and its impact on the procedural requirements.

The legal character of a government-owned company and its right to seek redress.

Held:

Commercial disputes between public sector enterprises were settled through arbitration by government officers or empowered government agencies. The Permanent Machinery for Arbitration was established in 1989 outside the framework of the Arbitration Act, 1940.( Para 14)

The High Court rejected the appellant's suit based on the absence of permission from COD. However, the Supreme Court held that the dissolution of COD negated the necessity for such clearance, making the rejection unsustainable.( Para 23-24)

An arbitral award under the Permanent Machinery of Arbitration may not be legally enforceable in court if not accepted by both parties. In the present case, the appellant did not accept the award, and the dispute continued.( Para 25)

Remedies available to the government on the administrative side cannot substitute legal remedies. The right of the appellant to demand adjudication was recognized, leading to the referral of the matter to a sole arbitrator.( Para 27)

The matter is referred to a sole arbitrator for the adjudication of all outstanding disputes between the two corporations, considering the impracticality of a lengthy and expensive trial.( Para 25, 27)

In the result we allow this appeal.

FACTS:

The accident occurred on 16.09.2008 involving a three-wheeler and a truck.

Legal representatives of the deceased individuals filed claim petitions seeking compensation against the owner, driver, and insurer of the offending vehicle (truck).

The MACT awarded compensation, holding the insurance company liable as the driver had a valid driving license.

The High Court partially allowed the appeals, reversing the MACT's award, citing the absence of a valid driving license.

ISSUES:

Whether the insurance company is liable for compensation.

Validity of the driver's license and its admissibility as evidence.

HELD:

The High Court erred in exonerating the insurance company from liability. The Tribunal correctly held the insurance company liable as the driver had a valid license, and the vehicle was insured.( Paragraph 14)

The High Court failed to consider that the driver filed a photocopy of his license, which was proved without objection from the insurance company. The lack of evidence from the insurance company regarding the license's validity was highlighted.( Paragraph 15)

The Tribunal's finding that the driver possessed a valid license was correct, and the insurance company failed to prove otherwise. The High Court's reversal was unwarranted.( Paragraph 19)

The High Court should have acknowledged that the driver proved the validity of the license, and the insurance company, having not objected during the trial, had no right to raise concerns later.( Paragraph 22)

The insurance company is held liable to pay the compensation awarded by the Tribunal and enhanced by the High Court, jointly and severally with the driver and owner of the offending vehicle.( Paragraph 23)

REFERRED CASES:

Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Premlata Shukla, (2007) 13 SCC 476

Facts:

Kantilal Mohanlal Mehta entered into a lease agreement with the State of Gujarat for bauxite mining in 1964.

The state reserved and later de-reserved certain areas for bauxite mining in 1964 and 1978.

Conditions were sought by the state from the central government regarding mining, including setting up industrial units for captive consumption.

The Central Government granted permission for de-reservation and imposition of conditions in 1980.

The lessee applied for permission to sell/export bauxite, which was granted but subsequently rejected for non-compliance with conditions.

Legal proceedings ensued, involving the High Court and the Central Government.

Issues:

Whether the state has the power to impose conditions, including setting up a captive plant, at the time of renewing a mining lease.

Whether the central government's permission granted in 1980 is applicable to the respondent's mining lease.

The legality of the state's resolution dated 04.02.2005 regulating the sale/export of bauxite.

Held:

Power to Impose Conditions at Renewal: The renewal of a mining lease is a fresh grant, and the state has the power to impose conditions, including setting up a captive plant. The Central Government's permission obtained in 1980 supports this authority (Paragraphs 25-28).

Applicability of Central Government's Permission: The central government's permission for de-reservation and conditions in 1980 applies to the respondent's mining lease, even though their mines were not affected by the initial reservation. Any other interpretation would lead to discrimination (Paragraphs 30-32).

Legality of State's Resolution: The resolution dated 04.02.2005 regulating the sale/export of bauxite is valid and necessary to protect the state's interests. The lessees' focus on export without establishing captive plants jeopardizes the state's goals (Paragraph 14).

Facts:

The appellant and respondents entered into an MoU.

Disputes arose regarding the execution of the MoU.

Respondents sent a letter appointing an arbitrator as per the MoU.

Appellant did not respond; respondents filed an application under Section 11(5) and 11(6).

Appellant denied executing the MoU, alleging it to be forged.

Issues:

Validity and genuineness of the MoU.

Whether the Chief Justice or designate should decide the validity of the MoU or leave it to the arbitrator.

Held:

The Court held that the High Court erred in not deciding the validity and genuineness of the MoU itself. Referring to previous judgments, the Court emphasized that the Chief Justice or designate must decide the existence of an arbitration agreement, and this question should not be left to the arbitrator. The direction for the arbitrator to decide the legality and validity of the MoU was set aside. The case was remanded for the designated Judge to decide these questions based on pleadings and evidence. The appeal succeeds and is allowed.

Facts:

The Law Commission of India, in its 14th Report dated 26th September 1958, advocated a restrained approach towards granting special leaves to appeal. Subsequent reports and cases addressed the need for structural reforms, including the establishment of a Constitutional Division within the Supreme Court. The petitioner sought a mandamus to consider the representation and implement the suggestion of the Constitution Bench in Bihar Legal Support Society's case for establishing National/Regional Courts of Appeal.

Issues:

The liberal grant of special leave affecting the prestige of High Courts, the need for Constitutional Division, the increasing burden on the Supreme Court, and the suggestion of setting up National/Regional Courts of Appeal.

Held:

The Supreme Court acknowledged the need for structural reforms and referred the questions to a Constitutional Bench for an authoritative pronouncement.

The Court emphasized the importance of exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 with caution and discretion.

The possibility of establishing Regional Courts of Appeal, as suggested by the petitioner, was considered in the context of improving access to justice and reducing the burden on the Supreme Court.

The Court recognized the challenges posed by the increasing backlog of cases and the need for comprehensive re-appraisal of the role of the Supreme Court.

The Court refrained from making a final decision on the proposed reforms and recommended further examination by a Constitutional Bench.

Facts:

Mulin Sharma, the appellant, was employed as an Assistant Teacher in Rangsina High School, Karbi, Anglong District, Assam.

Allegedly, due to differences with the Headmistress, the appellant was forced to sign a resignation letter under compulsion and was not paid salary from 23.05.1998.

The appellant filed a series of representations and a Writ Petition seeking action against the forced resignation.

The Deputy Commissioner held the resignation was voluntary, and it was accepted with effect from 16.10.2003.

The appellant's plea for back wages and denial of service led to litigation.

Issues:

Whether the resignation was voluntary.

Entitlement of back wages.

Wrongful denial of service.

Reinstatement and consequential benefits.

Held:

The resignation tendered by the appellant was not voluntary.

The appellant is not entitled to back wages due to lack of evidence proving unemployment during the relevant period (23.05.1998 to 16.08.1999).

The appellant should be reinstated in service and granted all consequential benefits.

The appellant is awarded Rs. 25,000 for the wrongful denial of service.

The discretionary power of awarding back wages is emphasized, and it is noted that each case depends on its own facts.