Facts:

In 1959, 'DKR' and 'ID' were recorded as owners of Plot No.473 in revenue records. In 1970, the plot was divided, and Plot No.473-B1 was owned by 'KN', Plot No.473-B2 by 'PM', and Plot No.473-B3 by 'DKR' and 'ID'. Plot No.473-B4 was a vacant plot of land shown as an internal private road in possession of 'DKR', 'ID', 'KN', and 'PM'. In 1979, a Town Planning Scheme was sanctioned, and the final plot (No.473) was divided into five parts, with the road measuring 444.14 sq. mtr. shown to be owned by PMC. 'ID' executed a registered trust deed transferring Plot No.473-B3 and the internal road to the appellant trust. The appellant requested the State Govt. to correct the wrong entry in PMC's name, but it was rejected. The appellant filed a writ petition, which was dismissed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in its interpretation of Section 88 of the Regional and Town Planning Act?

Whether the respondents had a public duty under Section 91 to modify the scheme and show the private road as property of its legitimate owners?

Whether the modification proposed involved a substantial alteration, as held by the High Court?

Held:

The High Court failed to consider the relevant provisions of the Regional and Town Planning Act, and it did not address the question of how PMC was shown as the owner of the internal road without any basis in the records. The High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition without applying its mind to the relevant facts and documents.

The private road in question was never acquired by PMC or the State Government, and it did not belong to PMC at any point. The respondents had a public duty under Section 91 to modify the scheme and show the private road as property of its legitimate owners, based on the property records and the Arbitrator's Award.

The deletion of PMC's name as the owner of the private road is not a substantial alteration but a correction of an erroneous recording. Section 88 cannot be read in isolation, and it must be read in conjunction with Sections 125 to 129 relating to compulsory acquisition, as well as Sections 59, 69, and 65.

Decision: The judgment and order of the High Court are set aside, and the appeal is allowed in favor of the appellant trust. The respondents are directed to modify the scheme to show the private road as the property of its legitimate owners based on the property records and the Arbitrator's Award.

Facts:

In 1959, 'DKR' and 'ID' were recorded as owners of Plot No.473 in revenue records. In 1970, the plot was divided, and Plot No.473-B1 was owned by 'KN', Plot No.473-B2 by 'PM', and Plot No.473-B3 by 'DKR' and 'ID'. Plot No.473-B4 was a vacant plot of land shown as an internal private road in possession of 'DKR', 'ID', 'KN', and 'PM'. In 1979, a Town Planning Scheme was sanctioned, and the final plot (No.473) was divided into five parts, with the road measuring 444.14 sq. mtr. shown to be owned by PMC. 'ID' executed a registered trust deed transferring Plot No.473-B3 and the internal road to the appellant trust. The appellant requested the State Govt. to correct the wrong entry in PMC's name, but it was rejected. The appellant filed a writ petition, which was dismissed by the High Court.

Issues:

• Whether the High Court erred in its interpretation of Section 88 of the Regional and Town Planning Act?
• Whether the respondents had a public duty under Section 91 to modify the scheme and show the private road as property of its legitimate owners?
• Whether the modification proposed involved a substantial alteration, as held by the High Court?

Held:

The High Court failed to consider the relevant provisions of the Regional and Town Planning Act, and it did not address the question of how PMC was shown as the owner of the internal road without any basis in the records. The High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition without applying its mind to the relevant facts and documents.

The private road in question was never acquired by PMC or the State Government, and it did not belong to PMC at any point. The respondents had a public duty under Section 91 to modify the scheme and show the private road as property of its legitimate owners, based on the property records and the Arbitrator's Award.

The deletion of PMC's name as the owner of the private road is not a substantial alteration but a correction of an erroneous recording. Section 88 cannot be read in isolation, and it must be read in conjunction with Sections 125 to 129 relating to compulsory acquisition, as well as Sections 59, 69, and 65.

Decision: The judgment and order of the High Court are set aside, and the appeal is allowed in favor of the appellant trust. The respondents are directed to modify the scheme to show the private road as the property of its legitimate owners based on the property records and the Arbitrator's Award.

Facts:

The dispute arises from the reorganization Scheme, which led to the re-description of the post of Telephone Operators as RTOs. The new post carried a higher pay scale and required specialized training. The reorganization introduced an element of selection criteria, including a minimum of 5 years of service. The question was whether the appellants, who were Telephone Operators seeking deployment as RTOs, were entitled to the benefits of the ACP Scheme.

Issues:

Whether the consequence of the reorganization Scheme amounts to a promotion rather than a mere re-description of the post.

Whether the appellants are entitled to the benefits of the ACP Scheme considering the eligibility criteria and specialized training for the RTO post.

Held:

The reorganization resulted in not only a re-description but also a much higher pay scale and specialized training, making it a promotion. The higher pay scale was not available to all employees who met the eligibility conditions without undergoing a selection process.

The ACP Scheme aims to address genuine stagnation and hardship faced by employees due to lack of promotional avenues. Considering the triple criteria of minimum 5 years of service, specialized training, and higher financial emoluments, the appellants are not entitled to the benefits of the ACP Scheme.

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeals, affirming that the benefits of the ACP Scheme do not apply to the appellants. The High Court was right in interfering with the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal.

Facts:

The parties entered into an agreement with a clause (Clause 16B) conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the Court at Delhi for any dispute related to the franchise agreement.

The plaintiff presented the suit at Gurgaon, which was not a court having jurisdiction according to the exclusive jurisdiction clause.

The defendant raised the objection regarding territorial jurisdiction based on the exclusionary clause in the agreement but was rejected initially.

Issues:

• Whether the suit should proceed de novo or continue from the stage where it was pending at the time of the return of the plaint.
• Whether the objection regarding exclusionary jurisdiction should be upheld.

Held:

The parties, by agreement, can confer exclusive jurisdiction on one court among multiple courts having jurisdiction over a dispute. Clause 16B of the agreement clearly indicates exclusive jurisdiction for disputes concerning the franchise agreement lies with the court at Delhi.

The High Court, in its revision order, intended the return of the plaint under Order VII Rules 10 and 10A CPC, and not continuation of the suit at Gurgaon. The suit should proceed de novo.

The law laid down in the *Modern Construction case, which allows de novo trial, is not in contradiction with **Joginder Tuli case.

Order VII Rule 10-A was introduced to avoid serving summonses on defendants when the plaint is returned after the defendant's appearance in the suit. The proceeding commences de novo under Order VII Rule 10 and Rule 10-A.

In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the appellant's failure to raise the objection initially and the completion of pleadings and evidence, led the Court to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 and Article 142 of the Constitution and not set aside the impugned order.

Decision: The Court held that the suit shall proceed de novo due to the existence of an exclusionary jurisdiction clause in the agreement between the parties. The objection raised by the defendant is upheld, and the impugned order of the High Court is not set aside to ensure substantial justice between the parties. The appeal stands disposed of.

FACTS:

The appellant, Gangadhar alias Gangaram, was convicted under the NDPS Act for the recovery of 48 Kgs 200 gms of cannabis (ganja) and sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment.

The lower courts held the appellant to be the owner of the house from where the contraband was recovered, rejecting his defense that he had sold the house to a co-accused.

The appellant produced a sale agreement (Exhibit P.28) for the property in question promptly after the recovery of the contraband.

The police investigation was flawed, defective, and incomplete, leading to confusion regarding ownership and possession of the house.

ISSUES:

• Whether the appellant's claim of selling the house to the co-accused was genuine and whether the prosecution had proven his conscious possession of the house where the contraband was recovered.

HELD:

The police investigation was flawed, and the appellant's defense seemed plausible. It was questionable why the appellant, residing in his new house for 15 years, would identify his own erstwhile house as belonging to the accused and implicate himself.

The appellant promptly produced a sale agreement (Exhibit P.28) for the property, but the police failed to investigate its genuineness or verify the panchayat records, which could have established ownership and possession of the house accurately.

The appellant's conviction was based on his name being recorded as the owner of the house in the voters' list of 2008, ignoring the subsequent sale agreement (Exhibit P.28) executed on 12.06.2009. The prosecution did not prove that the sale agreement was a fabricated document.

The nature of the evidence did not establish the appellant's conscious possession of the house as required by the NDPS Act to attribute presumption against him regarding the recovery of the contraband. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case pertains to Writ Petition (Civil) No. 55 of 2019 filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The petition challenges the Constitutional (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019, which introduced Clause (6) in Articles 15 and 16, enabling reservation for economically weaker sections. The petitioners contend that this amendment violates the basic structure of the Constitution and is contrary to the principles laid down in the Indra Sawhney case.

Issues:

• whether the amendment to Articles 15 and 16 is ultra vires the Constitution and whether it affects the basic structure of the Constitution.

Held:

The Court observed that the questions raised in this case involve substantial questions of law concerning the interpretation of the Constitution. Therefore, in accordance with Article 145(3) of the Constitution and Order XXXVIII of Supreme Court Rules, the matter is to be heard by a Constitution Bench comprising five judges.

Decision: The Court referred the matter to a Constitution Bench of five judges to determine the constitutionality of the amendment to Articles 15 and 16 and its impact on the basic structure of the Constitution.

FACTS:

The appellant, Gangadhar alias Gangaram, was convicted under the NDPS Act for the recovery of 48 Kgs 200 gms of cannabis (ganja) and sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment.

The lower courts held the appellant to be the owner of the house from where the contraband was recovered, rejecting his defense that he had sold the house to a co-accused.

The appellant produced a sale agreement (Exhibit P.28) for the property in question promptly after the recovery of the contraband.

The police investigation was flawed, defective, and incomplete, leading to confusion regarding ownership and possession of the house.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellant's claim of selling the house to the co-accused was genuine and whether the prosecution had proven his conscious possession of the house where the contraband was recovered.

HELD:

The police investigation was flawed, and the appellant's defense seemed plausible. It was questionable why the appellant, residing in his new house for 15 years, would identify his own erstwhile house as belonging to the accused and implicate himself.

The appellant promptly produced a sale agreement (Exhibit P.28) for the property, but the police failed to investigate its genuineness or verify the panchayat records, which could have established ownership and possession of the house accurately.

The appellant's conviction was based on his name being recorded as the owner of the house in the voters' list of 2008, ignoring the subsequent sale agreement (Exhibit P.28) executed on 12.06.2009. The prosecution did not prove that the sale agreement was a fabricated document.

The nature of the evidence did not establish the appellant's conscious possession of the house as required by the NDPS Act to attribute presumption against him regarding the recovery of the contraband. The appeal is allowed.

REFFERED CASES:

Gopal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2002) 9 SCC 595

Noor Aga vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417

Facts:

The parties entered into an agreement with a clause (Clause 16B) conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the Court at Delhi for any dispute related to the franchise agreement.

The plaintiff presented the suit at Gurgaon, which was not a court having jurisdiction according to the exclusive jurisdiction clause.

The defendant raised the objection regarding territorial jurisdiction based on the exclusionary clause in the agreement but was rejected initially.

Issues:

Whether the suit should proceed de novo or continue from the stage where it was pending at the time of the return of the plaint.

Whether the objection regarding exclusionary jurisdiction should be upheld.

Held:

The parties, by agreement, can confer exclusive jurisdiction on one court among multiple courts having jurisdiction over a dispute. Clause 16B of the agreement clearly indicates exclusive jurisdiction for disputes concerning the franchise agreement lies with the court at Delhi.

The High Court, in its revision order, intended the return of the plaint under Order VII Rules 10 and 10A CPC, and not continuation of the suit at Gurgaon. The suit should proceed de novo.

The law laid down in the *Modern Construction case, which allows de novo trial, is not in contradiction with **Joginder Tuli case.

Order VII Rule 10-A was introduced to avoid serving summonses on defendants when the plaint is returned after the defendant's appearance in the suit. The proceeding commences de novo under Order VII Rule 10 and Rule 10-A.

In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the appellant's failure to raise the objection initially and the completion of pleadings and evidence, led the Court to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 and Article 142 of the Constitution and not set aside the impugned order.

Decision: The Court held that the suit shall proceed de novo due to the existence of an exclusionary jurisdiction clause in the agreement between the parties. The objection raised by the defendant is upheld, and the impugned order of the High Court is not set aside to ensure substantial justice between the parties. The appeal stands disposed of.

Facts:

The case pertains to Writ Petition (Civil) No. 55 of 2019 filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The petition challenges the Constitutional (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019, which introduced Clause (6) in Articles 15 and 16, enabling reservation for economically weaker sections. The petitioners contend that this amendment violates the basic structure of the Constitution and is contrary to the principles laid down in the Indra Sawhney case.

Issues:

whether the amendment to Articles 15 and 16 is ultra vires the Constitution and whether it affects the basic structure of the Constitution.

Held:

The Court observed that the questions raised in this case involve substantial questions of law concerning the interpretation of the Constitution. Therefore, in accordance with Article 145(3) of the Constitution and Order XXXVIII of Supreme Court Rules, the matter is to be heard by a Constitution Bench comprising five judges.

Decision: The Court referred the matter to a Constitution Bench of five judges to determine the constitutionality of the amendment to Articles 15 and 16 and its impact on the basic structure of the Constitution.