Facts:

A land dispute existed between the deceased (Devi Prasad) and the appellant (Devraj) and his brother Dinda.

On June 26, 2006, Devi Prasad was intercepted, beaten, and killed by the appellant and others.

The body of the deceased, along with the motorcycle, was thrown below Rakhet Pulia.

The appellant appealed against the High Court's judgment that convicted him under Section 302 IPC.

Issues:

Validity of relying on hostile witnesses.

Sufficiency of injuries caused by the appellant for the death of the deceased.

Whether the evidence supports the theory of an accident.

Held:

The Court reiterated principles from Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana and Khujji v. State of M.P. regarding the admissibility of evidence given by hostile witnesses.

The Court found that even though witnesses were declared hostile, their evidence regarding the assault by the appellant remained unshaken and reliable.

The Court rejected the theory of an accident, citing evidence about injuries, the position of the motorcycle, and the manner in which the body was found below Rakhet Pulia.

The Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was responsible for the homicidal death of the deceased.

The Court dismissed the appeal, stating that the findings of the lower courts were neither perverse nor contained any illegality that rendered them unreliable.

Facts:

ETOILE CREATIONS, a proprietorship firm, and SARL DANSET DECO had a business relationship since 2000.

A 'Buyers Agreement' was executed on 18.10.2012, governing the supply of home furnishing and upholstery products.

Disputes arose, including non-payment of outstanding amounts, order cancellations, and violations of agreement clauses.

Legal notices and arbitration proceedings were initiated by ETOILE CREATIONS.

Issues:

Whether disputes arising from the 'Buyers Agreement' fall within the scope of the arbitration clause (Clause 14).

Whether the appointment of a sole arbitrator is warranted under Section 11(5) read with Section 11(9) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Held:

The Court, after considering the facts and the existence of an arbitration agreement in Clause 14 of the 'Buyers Agreement,' allowed the petition under Section 11(5) read with Section 11(9) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Mr. Justice Kailash Gambhir, a Former Judge of the Delhi High Court, was appointed as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes. The arbitrator was given the authority to consider claims, counterclaims, and other contentions, and to determine his own fee. Each party was directed to bear its own costs. The petition, is accordingly, allowed.

Facts:

Sukh Ram, a Gram Sewak, was accused of forging signatures and thumb impressions on loan applications under a government scheme.

Loans were meant for poor individuals for livestock and small businesses.

Villagers denied their signatures on loan documents.

Charges included offenses under Sections 468 and 471 IPC.

Handwriting expert's opinion favored the prosecution.

Issues:

Validity of signatures and thumb impressions on loan applications.

Competency of the Executive Magistrate to take specimen signatures during investigation.

High Court's reliance on oral evidence and handwriting expert opinion.

Held:

The Court, after considering the facts and circumstances, upheld Sukh Ram's guilt under Sections 468 and 471 IPC. The High Court's decision to reverse the acquittal was justified. Despite objections based on legal technicalities, the Court considered the opinion of the handwriting expert and oral evidence from villagers denying their signatures.

Dismissed of all appeals. Cancellation of bail, and direction for Sukh Ram to serve the remaining sentence.

Facts:

The appellants challenged the final order of the Gauhati High Court in an Arbitration Petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The order appointed a former Judge as the arbitrator, alleging that the appellants forfeited their right to appoint railway officers as arbitrators under clause 64(3)(a)(ii) of the agreement.

Issues:

Whether the Judge correctly interpreted clause 64(3)(a)(ii) of the agreement?

Whether the Section 11 application was premature?

Whether the appointment of a former judge as arbitrator was warranted?

Held:

The Court found in favor of the appellants, setting aside the impugned order. The respondent contractor was given the option to serve a fresh notice for arbitration within a month. If the contractor served the notice, the Railways were directed to send a panel of names within 60 days for the constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal as per the agreement. The contractor was granted the liberty to pursue further remedies if the Railways failed to send the panel within the stipulated time.

The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned order.

Facts:

The appellant imported goods falling under Tariff Sub-Heading 2208.10 during the financial years 1993-94 and 1994-95.

Customs authorities provisionally assessed the goods at a specified rate of duty.

Appellant claimed discrepancy in the prescribed rates and the budget proposals announced by the Finance Minister for the respective years.

Appellant sought notifications under Section 25(1) and (2) to rectify the alleged errors.

Issues:

Whether the budget proposals were duly passed and approved by Parliament.

Whether the Court can direct the Central Government to issue a notification under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act.

Whether the goods in question fall under the category of alcoholic beverages.

Whether there is discrimination in issuing notifications under Section 25(1) for the appellant's goods.

Held:

Budget Proposals and Legislative Will: The Court held that budget proposals are not legislative enactments but reflections of the government's financial policy. The Finance Act, duly passed by Parliament, constitutes the authoritative expression of legislative will, and the Court cannot scrutinize the correctness of the collective expression of legislative will.

Power to Issue Notifications: The Court emphasized that the power to issue notifications under Section 25(1) rests with the Central Government based on public interest. The Court cannot direct the executive branch to issue notifications unless discrimination is proven.

Classification of Goods: The Court refrained from deciding whether the compound alcoholic preparations fall under alcoholic beverages, leaving it to the appropriate forum for resolution.

Discrimination: The appellant failed to establish discrimination in the issuance of notifications for his goods under Section 25(1), and the Court found no rational basis for differentiation.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal (Civil Appeal No. 944 of 2016) arising from a Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.1633 of 2015. The dispute centers around a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the parties, where the appellant, Bunga Daniel Babu, is aggrieved.

Issues:

The maintainability of a consumer complaint under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The MOU does not explicitly establish a joint venture, and the appellant is contended to be neither a partner nor a co-adventurer.

The appellant lacks control over the construction, does not actively participate in the business, and is entitled only to a specific constructed area.

Held:

The Division Bench, consisting of Dipak Misra and N.V. Ramana, JJ., concluded that the MOU did not indicate a joint venture. As the appellant was not a partner or co-adventurer, lacked control over the construction, and had a limited entitlement to a specific area, the appellant was deemed a consumer under Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The extent of the area did not affect this classification. Consequently, the judgments passed by the National Commission and State Commission were set aside.

Decision: The matter was remitted to the State Commission for re-adjudication, with specific directions to treat the appellant as a consumer under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Facts:

Mrs. Santosh Singh, an advocate-on-record, filed a writ petition under Article 32, expressing concern about the degradation of moral values in society, specifically within the education system.

Mrs. Singh argued that the current education system failed to instill the true purpose of education, which, according to her, is to produce a good human being.

She contended that moral science should be made a compulsory subject in the school curriculum from classes I to XII.

Issues:

Whether the court has the jurisdiction to mandate the inclusion of moral science as a separate subject in the school curriculum.

Whether the petitioner's grievances about the degradation of moral values can be addressed through the judicial process.

Held:

The court dismissed the writ petition, holding that issues involving the structure and content of education, including the inclusion of moral science as a separate subject, are beyond the scope of judicial review. The court emphasized that it lacks the expertise to dictate the form and manner in which values should be inculcated and that such matters fall within the domain of educational policymakers. The judiciary is not a panacea for all social issues, and remedies for perceived grievances must be sought through competent authorities responsible for educational policies.

Facts:

The appellant's land was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

An agreement for compensation was reached on 27.2.2003, and the appellant received the consolidated amount, including additional amounts and solatium, without protest.

The appellant subsequently claimed interest under Section 34 from the date of possession (15.2.2001) until the date of payment (27.2.2003).

Issues:

Whether, after accepting the agreed compensation without protest, the appellant can claim interest under Section 34.

The impact of the agreement on the appellant's right to claim additional amounts.

Held:

The Court held that the appellant, having accepted the agreed compensation without protest and explicitly agreeing not to claim any additional amounts, including interest, was not entitled to claim interest under Section 34. The Court emphasized that the agreed compensation amount was accepted expeditiously, and equitable considerations did not favor the appellant. The Court referred to its judgments in Daya Shamji Bhai and Sangappa Dyavappa Biradar, reinforcing that the right to seek enhancement is lost when compensation is accepted without protest.

Facts:

Marico Industries Ltd., the respondent, challenged the imposition of entry tax on its products, Mediker and Starch (Revive), by the Additional Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Indore. The High Court, in a writ petition, considered the classification of Mediker as a medicinal product and questioned the applicability of entry tax on Starch (Revive), which is used in the production of other articles.

Issues:

Whether Mediker is to be considered a medicinal product or a hair shampoo for the purpose of entry tax.

Whether Starch (Revive) is liable for entry tax, considering its use in the production of other articles.

Held:

Classification of Mediker: The court held that Mediker, being an anti-lice treatment with medicinal properties, is not a hair shampoo. The active ingredients and purpose of Mediker were considered, and the court concluded that it qualifies as a drug and, therefore, is not subject to entry tax.

Entry Tax on Starch (Revive): The court rejected the imposition of entry tax on Starch (Revive), emphasizing that there was no evidence presented by the revenue to establish it as a chemical. The common parlance test and the absence of proof led to the conclusion that Starch (Revive) is not a chemical and, hence, not liable for entry tax.

The appeal is devoid of any substance and deserves to be dismissed.