Sales Tax – Refund or Transfer of Tax – The Central Sales Tax Appellate Authority found the sales of buses by Tata Motors through RSO Vijayawada to APSRTC as inter-state sales, making them liable for central sales tax in Jharkhand. However, the tax had been paid to Andhra Pradesh treating the sale as a stock transfer. Prior to Section 22(1B) insertion in the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, no provision existed for the Appellate Authority to direct refund or transfer of tax. The court directed Andhra Pradesh to transfer the central sales tax amount to Jharkhand upon verification of payment proof, enabling Jharkhand to adjust it against Tata Motors' tax liability [Paras 3-5].

Decision – Appeal Disposed Of – The court directed the State of Andhra Pradesh to transfer the central sales tax paid by Tata Motors on the sales transaction to the State of Jharkhand upon submission and verification of payment proof. This exercise should be completed within three months [Para 5-6].

Municipal Law – Shifting of Crematorium – Appeal against the High Court’s refusal to modify an earlier order directing the shift of a crematorium at Village Masoodpur to Kishangarh – The crematorium at Masoodpur has been in existence for over 100 years – Residential colonies in Vasant Kunj came into existence post-1990 – Supreme Court held that mere subsequent settlement of residents cannot be a ground to shift the crematorium – A conscious decision by the Municipal Corporation’s Standing Committee not to close the crematorium due to lack of danger to health and public interest – Appeal allowed, earlier High Court order modified [Paras 1-6].

Obligatory Functions – Section 42(f) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 – Duty of Municipal Corporation to regulate places for the disposal of the dead – Maintenance of such places is an obligatory function – Crematorium cannot be closed unless conditions in Section 391 are satisfied, and it is found offensive or dangerous to health – Standing Committee decision upheld by Supreme Court [Paras 5.3].

Public Interest – Modernisation of Crematorium – While not shifting the crematorium, the Municipal Corporation directed to modernise it to a modern electric crematorium – Such modernization in larger public interest for the village and surrounding residents – Exercise to be completed within twelve months [Paras 5.3, 6].

Decision – Appeal allowed – High Court’s judgment refusing to modify earlier order set aside – Order dated 03.12.2003 modified to retain the crematorium at Village Masoodpur – Direction issued to modernise the crematorium into a modern electric facility within twelve months – No costs [Paras 6].

Education – Appointment of Vice Chancellor – Appeal against the legality of appointment – The appointment of Dr. Rajasree M.S. as Vice Chancellor of APJ Abdul Kalam Technological University was challenged for non-compliance with UGC Regulations and the University Act – Supreme Court held that the Search Committee was not duly constituted as per UGC Regulations and that only one name was recommended instead of a panel – Appointment deemed illegal and void ab initio – Writ of quo warranto issued [Paras 1-9].

UGC Regulations – Overriding Effect – UGC Regulations, being subordinate legislation, have an overriding effect over conflicting state legislation – Any appointment contrary to UGC Regulations is void ab initio – State Acts must align with UGC Regulations, and until then, the UGC Regulations prevail [Paras 7-8].

Search Committee – Constitution and Recommendations – UGC Regulations mandate a Search Committee to recommend a panel of 3-5 names for the appointment of a Vice Chancellor – The Search Committee in this case recommended only one name, which is contrary to UGC Regulations and Section 13(4) of the University Act – Such appointments are illegal and void [Paras 8-8.10].

Doctrine of Repugnancy – Conflict between State and Central Legislation – In case of conflict between State legislation and UGC Regulations (Central legislation), UGC Regulations prevail – Appointment of Vice Chancellor must comply with UGC Regulations even if State Act prescribes different criteria [Paras 8.4-8.5].

Decision – Appeals allowed – High Court’s judgment dismissing the writ petition and refusing to issue writ of quo warranto set aside – Writ petition allowed – Writ of quo warranto issued – Appointment of respondent as Vice Chancellor quashed as illegal and void ab initio – No costs [Paras 9].

Education – Admission to Postgraduate Dental Course – Appeal against High Court’s decision quashing cancellation of admissions – Students admitted by private institutions after the official deadline and without informing the Directorate – Supreme Court held that such admissions were illegal and violated prescribed procedures – The last date for admissions was 31.05.2018 before 4:30 p.m. – Any admissions after this were backdoor and not permissible – High Court’s order protecting illegal admissions set aside – Appeal allowed [Paras 1-13].

Counselling Process – Compliance with Admission Schedule – Admissions to be made through counselling by the Directorate – Private institutions required to inform Directorate of vacant seats – Admissions granted unilaterally by colleges after deadline without intimation invalid – Supreme Court reiterated that deadline extensions are not permissible even if seats remain vacant – Procedures must be followed strictly [Paras 8-10].

Undue Sympathy – Misplaced Sympathies – High Court’s interim orders allowing students to continue studies were misplaced – Allowing students to complete courses would perpetuate illegality and undermine academic discipline – Supreme Court emphasized that adherence to rules outweighs sympathetic considerations in academic matters [Paras 11-12].

Decision – Appeals allowed – High Court’s judgment quashing cancellation of admissions set aside – Communication dated 6.6.2018 by Directorate annulling admissions restored – Writ petitions by original students dismissed – No costs [Paras 13-14].

Land Reforms – Constitutional Validity – The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 50(a) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, which governs the succession of agricultural land holdings. The court ruled that the Act is a special law dealing with agricultural land tenures and falls under Entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, thus not repugnant to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (a general law) governed by Entry 5 and 7 of List III. Consequently, Article 254 of the Constitution does not apply [Paras 15-20].

Amendments – Retrospective Effect – The court held that the repeal of Section 4(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, does not have retrospective effect. The rights to succession crystallized before the amendment remain unaffected. The 1954 Act, being a special law on agricultural land, remains unaffected by the amendment to the 1956 Act [Paras 21-26].

Gender Discrimination – Ninth Schedule – The court dismissed arguments regarding gender discrimination, emphasizing that the 1954 Act is protected under Article 31(B) by being part of the Ninth Schedule, thus immune to challenges based on fundamental rights [Para 28].

Decision – Appeal Dismissed – The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the 1954 Act governs the succession of agricultural land in Delhi and is constitutionally valid. The appeal against the High Court's decision was found to lack merit [Para 30].

Writ Jurisdiction – Availability of Alternative Remedy – The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the assessment order, bypassing the statutory remedies available under the MVAT Act and CST Act. The court emphasized that judicial prudence requires the exhaustion of statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction, especially in revenue matters where the statutes provide a hierarchy of appeals [Paras 6-10].

Statutory Remedies – Disputed Facts – The court highlighted that there were serious disputed facts regarding the date of the assessment order, which necessitated recourse to the statutory appeal process rather than direct intervention by the High Court under Article 226. The proper forum for resolving such disputes is the statutory appellate authority provided under the relevant tax statutes [Paras 7-9].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court, directing the respondent-assessee to avail the statutory remedy of appeal within four weeks. The appellate authority was instructed to decide the appeal on merits, without raising any questions of limitation, subject to compliance with other statutory conditions [Para 10].

Religious Freedom – Sikh Gurdwaras – The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Haryana Sikh Gurdwara (Management) Act, 2014, which is similar to the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925. The Act allows the Haryana Committee, constituted under Section 3, to manage the affairs of Gurdwaras and their properties within the State of Haryana. The court found that the Act does not violate Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution since the management of religious affairs is left in the hands of the Sikh community alone, preserving their religious rights [Paras 1-27].

Inter-State Corporations – Legislative Competence – The court held that the Haryana Act falls within the legislative competence of the Haryana State Legislature under Entry 32 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. It was not necessary for the Act to fall under Entry 44 of List I, which pertains to inter-state corporations [Paras 28-30].

Transitional Provisions – The court explained that Sections 72 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966, and Sections 3 and 4 of the Inter-State Corporation Act, 1957, were transitional provisions to facilitate the functioning of inter-state bodies after the reorganisation of States. These provisions did not preclude the State Legislature from enacting laws for the management of Gurdwaras within its territory [Paras 31-34].

Decision – Writ Petitions Dismissed – The court dismissed the writ petitions, upholding the Haryana Sikh Gurdwara (Management) Act, 2014, and affirming the legislative competence of the State of Haryana to enact such a law [Para 35].

Arbitration Law – Stay of Arbitral Award – The Supreme Court held that once an application under Section 36(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is filed for stay of the operation of the arbitral award, the court is empowered to impose conditions as it deems fit. This may include furnishing security covering the entire amount of the award, including interest. The court is required to record reasons in writing while granting such a stay [Paras 2-3, 28-30].

Interim Relief – Section 9 vs. Section 36 – The court discussed the interplay between interim measures under Section 9 and applications for stay of awards under Section 36(2). It was clarified that there is no hard and fast rule that an application made earlier in point of time must be heard before a later application, particularly when both relate to the same arbitral award. The court emphasized the wide jurisdiction under Section 9 to grant interim measures, including securing the amount in dispute [Paras 21-24, 33-34].

Decision – Appeals Dismissed – The court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court’s order directing the appellant to deposit the awarded amount as a condition for stay. The court requested the High Court to expedite the disposal of the pending application under Section 34 for setting aside the award, preferably within three months [Para 37].

Insolvency Law – Limitation – The Supreme Court held that for the purpose of limitation, the relevant date is the date on which the right to sue accrues, which is the date when a default occurs. The Court emphasized that the condition precedent for condonation of delay in filing an application or appeal is the existence of sufficient cause. The existence of sufficient cause for delay would depend on the facts of each case, and there cannot be any straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting the explanation furnished by the appellant for the delay [Paras 11-17].

Limitation Act – Exclusion of Time – The Court explained that the date of enforcement of the IBC and/or the date on which an application could have first been filed under the IBC are not relevant in the computation of limitation. It is the date on which the right to sue accrues that matters. The fact that an application for initiation of CIRP was filed within three years from the date of enforcement of the relevant provisions of the IBC is inconsequential if the right to sue had accrued much earlier [Paras 18-19, 28].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – The Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the NCLAT, which had incorrectly interpreted the limitation period for filing applications under the IBC. The Court held that the initiation of winding-up proceedings in the Madras High Court would not save limitation for initiation of proceedings for CIRP under the IBC in the NCLT. The judgment, however, does not prevent the respondent from pursuing any other remedy in accordance with law [Paras 29-31].