Facts:

Various individuals working as Record Clerks and Office Assistants in Erode District sought promotion to the post of Junior Bailiff without insisting on the educational qualification of passing SSLC. They relied on a previous High Court order dated 22.07.2009 and the fact that vacancies arose before the enactment of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants (Conditions of Service) Act, 2016.

Issues:

Whether the previous High Court judgment from 2009 remains relevant after the enactment of the 2016 Act.

Whether the petitioners can claim promotion without fulfilling the prescribed essential qualification.

The impact of Section 68 of the 2016 Act on the applicability of Special Rules.

Held:

The Court noted that after the implementation of the Shetty Commission and the Tamil Nadu V Pay Commission recommendations, claiming promotion to the post of Junior Bailiff without the prescribed qualifications was not permissible (Para 13).

The petitioners could not rely on the government's failure to amend Statutory Rules or the previous High Court judgment of 2009. Changes in nomenclature and pay scales had occurred since the judgment, and these changes could not be ignored (Para 14).

The argument that vacancies arose in 2015, before the enactment of the 2016 Act, was not relevant. The 2016 Act replaces the General Rules for the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Services but does not override Special Rules. Section 68 of the Act clarifies that Special Rules prevail if inconsistent with the Act (Para 18).

The Court pointed out that both the petitioners and the High Court overlooked Section 68. The reliance on Section 20(2) of the 2016 Act was not fully correct, as it merely explains the concept of "minimum general educational qualification" in Special Rules (Para 19).

FACTS:

The appeal arises from an order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) dated 7 October 2016. The Union of India, through the Secretary in the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, and Safdarjung Hospital challenged the order of the NCDRC. The complaint alleged medical negligence against Sarvodaya Hospital and Safdarjung Hospital.

ISSUES:

Whether Safdarjung Hospital's treatment falls within the purview of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Whether NCDRC has the authority to reverse the finding on maintainability.

Whether Safdarjung Hospital was negligent in its treatment of the complainant's child.

HELD:

The Court emphasized that whether a hospital's services are truly "free of charge" under the Consumer Protection Act requires a factual foundation. Safdarjung Hospital did not adequately challenge the factual basis of the finding in the lower courts regarding its liability.( Paras 9-12)

The Court questioned whether NCDRC can exercise certain powers in revisional proceedings that are normally reserved for appellate courts.( Para 13)

The Court upheld the NCDRC's judgment due to the relatively small compensation amount but clarified that the judgment should not be treated as precedent for future cases involving Safdarjung Hospital. The question of Safdarjung Hospital's "free of charge" status is left open for an appropriate case.( Para 14)

DECISION: The appeal is dismissed, affirming the NCDRC's judgment. The payment of Rs 2 lakhs in compliance with the NCDRC's order shall be made to the original complainant within two months from the date of this order.

REFERRED CASES:

Indian Medical Association vs. V P Shantha, (1995) 6 SCC 651.

Facts:

The appellant was the Chairman and Managing Director of a company (CDBL) which was transferred to a group (SWC) under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The appellant received a non-competition fee of Rs. 6.6 crores through a Deed of Covenant for refraining from manufacturing or marketing activities related to Indian Made Foreign Liquor. The Assessing Officer considered this a tax evasion scheme.

Issues:

Whether the non-competition fee is taxable under Section 28(ii)(a) of the Income Tax Act?

Whether the fee should be considered part of the sale consideration for transfer of shares?

Held:

The High Court's substantial question of law did not address taxability of the non-compete fee under provisions other than Section 28(ii)(a). The High Court's finding that the amount was part of the sale consideration contradicted Section 260-A(4) and the principle of commercial expediency.( Para 14)

The Court affirmed that commercial expediency must be judged from the assessee's viewpoint, and the Income Tax Department cannot question amounts agreed upon between parties at arm's length.( Para 15)

The non-compete fee was paid only to the appellant due to his expertise in the liquor business. The amount was determined through negotiations. The restrictive covenant for 10 years was aimed at preventing competition.( Para 17)

The reasons given by the Assessing Officer and the minority judgment of the Appellate Tribunal contradicted established judgments, emphasizing that revenue should not question commercial decisions.( Para 18)

The Court referred to various cases including Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait, Biswanath Ghosh v. Gobinda Ghosh, CIT v. Walchand & Co., J.K. Woollen Manufacturers v. CIT, CIT v. Panipat Woollen & General Mills Co. Ltd., Shahzada Nand & Sons v. CIT, S.A. Builders Ltd. v. CIT, Hero Cycles (P) Ltd. v. CIT, and Guffic Chem (P) Ltd. v. CIT to support the principle of commercial expediency.( Para 19)

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the taxability of income earned by Samsung Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. (the Respondent), a South Korean company, through its Project Office in Mumbai, India. The income tax authorities attributed a portion of the company's revenues earned outside India as taxable income, leading to a legal challenge.

Issues:

whether the Mumbai Project Office qualified as a PE under Article 5 of the DTAA.

The court also addressed the burden of proof and the applicability of relevant judgments.

Held:

In considering the applicability of Article 5(1) of the India-Korea DTAA, the court emphasizes that for a fixed place to qualify as a PE, it must be an establishment "through which the business of an enterprise" is wholly or partly carried on. Furthermore, only profits attributable to a PE can be taxed. The court concludes that the Mumbai Project Office does not meet the criteria of a PE under Article 5(1) of the DTAA. Instead, it falls under Article 5(4)(e) as a solely auxiliary office, acting as a liaison between the company and its client.

The court criticizes the lower tribunal's findings that the Mumbai office was involved in core project execution and rejects their argument that the mere mode of maintaining accounts cannot determine the character of a permanent establishment. The court also rejects the assertion that the onus of proving the Project Office's status as a PE rests on the company, citing precedent.

Therefore, the court dismisses the appeal and upholds the High Court's decision that the Mumbai Project Office is not a Permanent Establishment under the India-Korea DTAA, rendering the attributed income not subject to taxation in India.

Facts:

An advertisement was issued for various posts in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, including the position of Labour Welfare Superintendent. The essential qualifications required were a recognized university degree and a post-graduate degree/diploma in fields like Social Work, Labour Welfare, Industrial Relations, Personnel Management, or any other allied subject.

Issues:

Whether the first respondent, who held an MBA degree, fulfilled the eligibility criteria for the post of Labour Welfare Superintendent based on the subjects studied during the MBA program.

Held:

The Court held that the MBA degree held by the first respondent did not align with the specified disciplines or qualify as an allied subject. Studying certain subjects within the MBA program did not automatically fulfill the eligibility requirements. The Tribunal and the High Court erred in affirming the first respondent's eligibility. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgments, and dismissed the first respondent's application before the Central Administrative Tribunal.

Facts:

The appellant company sought a customized incentive package for establishing a cement plant. A Pre-Board of Infrastructure Development and Investment Institution (BIDI) meeting recommended applying the cement package and the 2003 Scheme to the company. However, before the company's request could be decided, the State Government deleted certain clauses from the Scheme. The company requested the withdrawal of the deletion, and the State responded that the company would be eligible for concessions as per the 2003 Scheme. The company also entered into an MOU with the State, established the cement plant, and obtained an Entitlement Certificate for subsidy. Later, doubts arose about the subsidy decision, and the State revised the subsidy and demanded repayment.

Issues:

Whether the company was entitled to 75% subsidy under the 2003 Scheme?

Whether the Doctrine of Contemporanea Expositio applies in this case?

Whether the Principle of Promissory Estoppel is applicable?

Held:

The application of the company was considered before certain clauses were deleted from the Scheme. The company's claim for 75% subsidy was based on the deleted clauses, but the policy changed after those deletions. As the policy of granting 75% subsidy was not in existence when the company's application was considered, it was entitled only to 50% subsidy. The excess 25% subsidy had to be refunded by the company.

The Doctrine of Contemporanea Expositio is not applicable in this case, as the contemporaneous understanding of a provision cannot be followed if it is clearly erroneous.

The Principle of Promissory Estoppel is not applicable because no conscious decision was taken to extend 75% subsidy to the company, and the revisions were made due to erroneous decisions.

Decision: The company is liable to refund the excess subsidy of 25% with interest at 12% per annum.

Facts:

The case revolves around the remission of sentences under Article 161 of the Constitution. The appellant sought the remission of his sentence based on a policy framed by the executive, where certain norms were laid down for granting remissions. However, the relevant material was not presented before the Governor, and the appellant contended that the benefit had been conferred by the executive itself, in accordance with the established policy.

Issues:

Whether a policy framework can be established for granting remissions under Article 161, where certain norms or criteria are set, without requiring individual case material to be placed before the Governor?

Whether such a policy framework can override the requirements of Section 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure?

Held:

The Supreme Court, citing previous decisions of larger Benches, highlighted the necessity of placing relevant material before the Governor when exercising the power of remission under Article 161. It referenced the Maru Ram case, which emphasized the need for government rules to guide the exercise of pardon powers. Considering the observations in Maru Ram, the Court found that the norms established by the policy were appropriate. However, due to the question of whether a policy framework could replace the requirement of placing individual case material before the Governor, the Court referred the matter to a larger Bench. The larger Bench would decide whether a policy-based approach for remissions could be valid under Article 161 and if it could override the provisions of Section 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Facts:

The case revolves around an incident where over-mining led to the collapse of a hill adjacent to a national highway, resulting in the death of a woman and her daughter. The NGT imposed penalties and compensation on the NHAI and those involved in the mining activities. The NGT also issued directions prohibiting development and construction within 100 feet of hills.

Issues:

The scope and jurisdiction of the NGT under relevant acts.

Liability of the NHAI and others for environmental damage and loss of life due to over-mining.

Validity of the NGT's directions regarding development and construction near hills.

Held:

The court clarified that the NGT's jurisdiction is not only limited to cases of harm caused by the violation of enactments listed in the first schedule. Section 15(4) grants the NGT the power to direct compensation concerning damage to public health, property, and the environment. The tribunal's jurisdiction under Section 17 also extends to compensation claims resulting from an activity's adverse impact. Therefore, the NGT's jurisdiction is broader than previously understood (Para 36-44).

The NHAI's responsibility for maintaining the highway and its failure to address the risks were highlighted. The NHAI, as well as the party conducting the mining, were held liable for compensation. The court deemed the NGT's directions for compensation and restitution justified (Para 65-67).

The NGT's directions regarding development and construction near hills were found procedurally flawed. These directions lacked scientific basis and expert opinion, rendering them arbitrary. Consequently, these directions were set aside (Para 76-90).

Facts:

The plaintiffs had sold a property to respondent no.1 through a registered sale deed in 2009. The purchaser issued cheques for the payment of the sale consideration. Subsequently, the purchaser sold the property to respondent nos. 2 and 3 in 2013. In 2014, the plaintiffs filed a suit seeking cancellation of the sale deed, alleging non-payment of sale consideration and the use of 'bogus' cheques.

Issues:

Whether the suit was barred by limitation?

Whether a valid cause of action was disclosed in the plaint?

Whether the omission of the date of the registered sale deed in the prayer was intentional?

Held:

The Trial Court noted that the plaintiffs had acknowledged payment in the sale deed and that the suit was filed after the limitation period. The High Court upheld this finding.

The Court referred to legal precedents and held that even if the entire sale consideration was not paid, it would not be a ground for cancellation of the sale deed. The plaintiffs failed to establish a valid cause of action for cancellation.

The Court found that the omission of the sale deed's date in the prayer was deliberate to mislead the court on the issue of limitation. The plaintiffs failed to prove that the suit was within the limitation period.