Municipal Tax – Part of Rent – Interpretation – The Supreme Court held that the share of municipal tax due from a tenant, as stipulated under Section 230 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 and Section 5(8) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, does not constitute part of the rent of the premises. Instead, it can be recovered as arrears of rent for the purpose of recovery but does not become part of the rent for determining the applicability of the Tenancy Act [Paras 1-88].

Recovery of Municipal Tax – Legal Framework – The Court clarified that municipal taxes payable by the tenant under statutory provisions are recoverable as if they were arrears of rent, but this recovery mechanism does not alter the nature of the tax itself to be part of the rent. The distinction between the components of rent and municipal tax must be maintained unless explicitly provided otherwise in the tenancy agreement [Paras 62-70].

Ceiling Limit – Rent Calculation – For the purposes of Section 3(f)(i) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, the calculation of monthly rent does not include the municipal tax payable by the tenant. The applicability of the Act depends solely on the rent amount agreed upon in the tenancy agreement, excluding separate liabilities like municipal taxes [Paras 57-61].

Jurisdiction – Section 106 TP Act – The Court upheld that the civil suit filed under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, for eviction, was barred by the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, as the monthly rent was below the ceiling limit prescribed by the Act [Paras 34-48].

Decision – Appeals Dismissed – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the decisions of the lower courts that the tenancy agreement, which stipulated a rent of Rs. 10,000 per month excluding municipal taxes, did not breach the ceiling limit under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. Therefore, the suit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was barred by the provisions of the Tenancy Act [Para 88].

Boundary Wall – Extent of Possession – The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs can only protect their possession by putting up a boundary wall/fence to the extent of 2 acres and 35 cents as declared in the previous litigation. Any boundary beyond this extent is unauthorized and contrary to the earlier judgment and decree [Paras 1-88].

Kudikidappu Rights – Limitation of Land – The High Court erred in finding that the defendants were entitled to only 10 cents as kudikidappukars in a suit filed by the plaintiffs for putting up a boundary wall/fence. Such findings cannot be made in the second appeal for boundary construction [Paras 62-70].

Unauthorized Possession – The Court found that any possession beyond 2 acres and 35 cents is unauthorized, and the plaintiffs cannot claim rights over such land. The Commissioner’s report indicating possession of 2 acres and 77 cents does not grant legal possession beyond the adjudicated extent [Paras 57-61].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court, restoring the judgment and decree of the Trial Court as confirmed by the First Appellate Court. The plaintiffs are restricted to putting up a boundary wall/fence within 2 acres and 35 cents [Para 88].

Vicarious Liability – Requirements under Section 141 of NI Act – The Supreme Court held that merely stating that directors are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company does not fulfill the requirements of Section 141 of the NI Act. Specific averments detailing their role and responsibility are necessary [Paras 1-88].

Personal Appearance – Dispensation under Section 205 CrPC – The Court held that there was no justification for not dispensing with the personal appearance of the appellants when the company had entered appearance through an authorized officer. Summoning an accused person should not be a matter of course and must show application of mind [Paras 62-70].

Role of Independent Directors – The Court reiterated that independent non-executive directors are not involved in the day-to-day affairs of the company and cannot be held liable under Section 141 of the NI Act unless specific allegations are made regarding their role and responsibility in the conduct of the company’s business [Paras 57-61].

Quashing of Proceedings – Exercise of Powers under Section 482 CrPC – The High Court erred in not exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings against the independent non-executive directors. The Supreme Court emphasized the necessity of sparingly and cautiously exercising this power, yet in the interest of justice, it must be exercised when justified [Paras 34-48].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and quashed the proceedings in Criminal Case No. AC/121/2017 under Section 138/141 of the NI Act against the appellants. The proceedings may continue against other accused, particularly the managing director and the signatory of the dishonored cheque [Para 88].

Reservation – Persons with Disabilities – The Supreme Court held that the appellants, being locomotor disabled, cannot claim appointment to the post of Safai-Karmis, which was not reserved for locomotor disabled candidates under the Government Order dated 07.05.1999. The reservation is to be made for posts identified by the appropriate government as suitable for disabled persons under Section 32 of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 [Paras 1-88].

Identification of Posts – Judicial Review – The identification of posts suitable for different categories of disabled persons is a policy decision of the appropriate government. Such identification, as carried out in the Government Order dated 07.05.1999, cannot be set aside unless shown to be arbitrary, irrational, or against the objectives of the Act [Paras 62-70].

High Court's Error – Misinterpretation – The High Court erred in striking down the Government Order dated 07.05.1999, which identified specific posts for reservation for disabled persons. The High Court misread Sections 32 and 33 of the Act and incorrectly held that 3% reservation must be applied uniformly across all cadres irrespective of the nature of the posts [Paras 57-61].

Vacancies – Specific Disabilities – The Court reiterated that the 3% reservation mandated by Section 33 of the Act applies to each establishment, with 1% reserved for each category of disability (blindness or low vision, hearing impairment, locomotor disability or cerebral palsy). The identification of suitable posts for each category is essential to implementing this reservation [Paras 34-48].

Decision – Appeal Dismissed – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order striking down the Government Order dated 07.05.1999 and upheld the validity of the Government's identification of posts suitable for different categories of disabled persons. The appellants were not eligible for appointment as Safai-Karmis as the posts were reserved for hearing impaired candidates [Para 88].

Limitation Act – Applicability to Carriage by Air Act – Rule 30 – Section 3 of the Limitation Act bars the remedy but does not extinguish the right unless expressly provided. Rule 30 of the Carriage by Air Act specifies a two-year limitation for bringing an action for damages, which the appellant argued should include exclusions under the Limitation Act. The court held that Rule 30 expressly excludes the Limitation Act’s provisions as per Section 29, confirming that the two-year period is absolute and not subject to suspension, interruption, or extension [Paras 2.2-2.4, 10-13].

Extinguishment of Right – Discusses how the Limitation Act provisions apply when the right itself is extinguished, referencing Sections 11 and 27 of the Limitation Act. This principle was upheld, ensuring that the right to claim damages under the Carriage by Air Act is extinguished after two years, emphasizing uniform interpretation in line with international conventions [Paras 12-13, 29-31].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Held that the suit filed by the appellant was barred by limitation under Rule 30 of the Second Schedule of the Carriage by Air Act 1972, as it was filed after the two-year period had expired. The High Court's judgment was upheld [Paras 7.1, 7.2, 9, 20-21].

Guardians and Wards Act 1890 - Section 9 - Custody of Child - The court emphasized that the question of the child's wishes is distinct from what would be in the best interest of the child - The best interest must be determined by the court considering all relevant circumstances - In custody disputes, the child's welfare should be the paramount consideration - The case involves custody disputes with serious allegations between parents, highlighting the need to focus on the child's welfare rather than parental disputes [Paras 8-18].

International Custody Disputes - The child, a naturalized American citizen, was taken to India without the consent of the father, leading to custody disputes in both US and Indian courts - US courts issued orders for the child's return, which were partially vacated and later reinstated - The High Court of Karnataka rejected the father's habeas corpus petition but granted visitation rights, without adequately considering the best interests of the child as determined by the US courts [Paras 4-6, 12-16].

Best Interest of the Child - Paramount Consideration - The child had lived nearly a decade in the USA, where he was born and had established roots - The Supreme Court of India held that the child's return to the USA would be in his best interest, considering his naturalized citizenship, social and cultural environment, and future prospects - The court directed the child's return to the USA, with provisions for the mother to accompany and stay with the child if desired [Paras 16-18].

Decision: Appeal allowed - High Court's order set aside - Directions issued for the child's return to the USA - Provisions made for the mother to accompany the child and necessary legal formalities to be expedited.

Caste Verification – Authenticity of Report – Mere fact that the Caste Verification Committee provided a report within a few days cannot alone be a reason to doubt its correctness. The committee's report, when made in accordance with statutory provisions, holds validity unless contradicted by substantial evidence [Paras 34-36].

Reservation Policy – Caste Classification – Discussion on the categorization under Karnataka's Reservation Policy for Other Backward Classes, examining the distinction and overlap between the 'Ganiga' and 'Lingayat-Ganiga' castes. The court clarified that the inclusion of sub-castes within broader categories must be scrutinized in light of historical and legislative context [Paras 3-6, 26-33].

Judicial Review – Findings of Lower Courts – The Division Bench's finding that the caste verification process was consistent with legal requirements and that the Single Judge's differentiation between 'Hindu-Ganiga' and 'Lingayat-Ganiga' was not supported by sufficient evidence, upholding the respondent's caste certificate and reservation benefits [Paras 25-38].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the Karnataka High Court (Dharwad Bench), which allowed the writ appeal filed by the respondent, set aside the Single Judge's order, and confirmed the validity of the caste certificate and the subsequent reservation benefits [Paras 38-39].

Penal Code 1860 (IPC) - Section 306 - Abetment of suicide - An FIR under Section 306 of IPC cannot be quashed on the basis of any financial settlement with the informant, surviving spouse, parents, children, guardians, caregivers, or anyone else - Heinous or serious crimes with a serious impact on society cannot be compromised - High Court's quashing of FIR based on settlement between accused and informant was erroneous [Paras 25-50].

Abetment of Suicide - Seriousness of Offence - Crimes like abetment of suicide are against society and cannot be settled privately - High Court should have considered the gravity of the offence and the broader implications on societal interests - Emphasis on the state's role in prosecuting serious offences regardless of private settlements [Paras 37-50].

High Court's Inherent Powers - Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash FIRs must be done with caution, especially in cases involving serious non-compoundable offences - Settlements in such cases cannot override public interest and the necessity of legal prosecution [Paras 26-30].

Decision: Appeals allowed - High Court's orders quashing the FIR and subsequent applications set aside - Reaffirmed that heinous crimes impacting society should not be compromised through settlements.

Land Acquisition – Requirement of Scheme Sanction – Appellants challenged the acquisition of land by KHB without prior sanction of housing schemes under Section 24(2) of the KHB Act – High Court held that sanction of a housing scheme by the State Government is a condition precedent to land acquisition – Supreme Court examined the provisions of the KHB Act and L.A. Act to determine if acquisition could precede scheme sanction [Paras 1-50].

Public Purpose – Acquisition for Housing Board – Acquisition for KHB deemed to be for a public purpose under Section 33(2) of KHB Act – The term "public purpose" in the context of acquisition by KHB does not necessitate prior scheme sanction – Emphasis on the statutory mandate that execution of the scheme requires prior sanction but initiation of acquisition proceedings does not [Paras 30-41].

Procedural Validity – Acquisition Notification – Notification under Section 4 of L.A. Act – High Court’s decision based on procedural deficiencies in acquisition notification overturned – Supreme Court highlighted that prior sanction is required only for scheme execution, not for acquisition initiation – Acquisition for housing schemes by KHB can be initiated under L.A. Act provisions as modified by KHB Act [Paras 42-50].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court's orders set aside – Validity of land acquisition proceedings upheld – No requirement for prior sanction of housing schemes for initiating acquisition under Section 33(2) of KHB Act.