Facts:

The case involves a Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 20525 of 2011. The petitioner, Avtar Singh, challenged certain aspects related to service law, specifically concerning appointment, verification of antecedents, and the termination of employees based on the alleged misrepresentation or suppression of information.

Issues:

The importance of truthful information in the verification process, the recourse available to the employer in cases of suppression or false information, the declaration of concluded and pending criminal cases by employees, and the termination of services based on misrepresentation.

Held:

Importance of Truthful Information and Recourse for Suppression or False Information The court held that candidates must provide accurate information regarding criminal convictions, arrests, or pending criminal cases. The employer has the discretion to take different actions based on the nature of the case, including ignoring the lapse, canceling candidature, or terminating services. The severity of the conviction or acquittal is a crucial factor in decision-making.

Declaration of Concluded and Pending Criminal Cases The court emphasized that even if an employee truthfully declares a concluded criminal case, the employer retains the right to consider antecedents and may choose not to appoint the candidate. In cases of pending criminal cases of trivial nature, the employer may, at its discretion, appoint the candidate subject to the decision of the case.

Termination Based on Misrepresentation or Suppression Termination is not automatic, and various aspects need to be considered. For confirmed employees with protection under Article 311(2), a due inquiry must be conducted before termination. The case of obtaining an appointment on the basis of forged documents has a different effect on eligibility compared to the verification of antecedents for suitability.

Discretionary Power of the Employer and Consideration of Acquittal The court highlighted the discretionary power of employers to condone lapses and the different standards applicable to higher officials/higher posts. Even in cases of acquittal, the employer has the right to consider fitness, taking into account the nature of the offense and the circumstances of the case.

Decision: The court concluded that suppression of material information presupposes the suppression of matters that genuinely matter, not every technical or trivial matter. Employers have the power to exercise reasonable and objective judgment, considering the nature of the post and the impact of suppression on suitability.

Facts:

The power of the Supreme Court to transfer cases within or outside the State of Jammu and Kashmir, considering the absence of specific enabling provisions in the Central and State Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedures.

Issues:

Whether the Supreme Court has the authority to transfer cases in the absence of relevant provisions in the Jammu and Kashmir legal codes and how access to justice is intertwined with the right to life guaranteed under Article 21.

Held:

The concept of 'access to justice' is recognized as an invaluable human right, linked to the right to life and supported by international declarations and covenants. The denial of access to justice affects the quality of human life, making it an integral facet of Article 21.

Access to justice is considered part of the right guaranteed under Article 14, ensuring equality before the law and equal protection for citizens and non-citizens.

The essence of access to justice involves the need for an adjudicatory mechanism, convenient accessibility, speedy adjudication, and affordability for the disputants.

The absence of specific provisions in the Central or State Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedures for Jammu and Kashmir does not diminish the Supreme Court's power to direct transfers if essential for the interest of justice.

The Supreme Court's powers under Article 32 and 142 can be invoked to direct transfer, preventing the violation of the fundamental right to access justice under Article 21.

Decision: The Supreme Court has the authority to direct the transfer of cases involving access to justice from a court in the State of Jammu and Kashmir to a court outside the state or vice versa, utilizing its powers under Articles 32 and 142.

Facts:

Disputes arose in a construction contract.

Arbitration was conducted as per Clause 29 of the contract.

The Addl. Housing Commissioner passed an award rejecting the respondent's claims.

The respondent filed an application under Section 11 for arbitrator appointment, which was rejected by the High Court.

The respondent later filed objections under Section 34(2) along with an application under Section 14 seeking exclusion of time.

Issues:

Whether the objection under Section 34(2) was condonable in aid of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

Held:

The Court noted the limitation period under Section 34(3) and cited Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., emphasizing that an application filed beyond the prescribed period would not be in accordance with Section 34(3). (Para 12)

The Court affirmed the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, as established in State of Goa v. Western Builders and Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department. (Para 14)

The Court held that the respondent's actions did not exhibit due diligence or good faith, and the proceedings under Section 11 for arbitrator appointment were distinct from objections under Section 34. (Para 18)

The High Court's decision was deemed a grave error, and both orders were set aside. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.( Para 20)

Facts:

The case involves G.T. Venkataswamy Reddy and the State Transport Authority, among others.

The dispute centers around the increase in the number of trips of vehicles under existing permits upon the publication of an approved scheme.

Issues:

Whether the variation of a permit, specifically for increasing the number of trips or vehicles, can be granted after the publication of an approved scheme.

The interpretation of Sections 57(8), 68D, and 68FF in relation to the freezing effect on permits in areas covered by approved schemes.

Held:

A close reading of Section 57(8) mandates treating an application for the variation of a stage carriage permit, aiming to increase trips or vehicles, as an application for a new permit. Compliance with the rigorous procedures of sub-sections (1) to (7) is essential for such applications (Para 38, 39).

The requirement for public and personal hearings underscores the seriousness with which applications for variation should be considered, given their significant impact on the operation of vehicles in the relevant route (Para 40).

Section 68B establishes that Chapter IV-A supersedes inconsistent provisions in Chapter IV. Once a scheme under Section 68D is approved, Section 68FF freezes permits in the covered area or route, and any alteration or modification can only occur through Section 68E (Para 43).

The formulation of a scheme under Section 68D aims to provide an efficient, adequate, economical, and properly coordinated road transport service. Once approved, existing operators must adhere to the restrictions outlined in Section 68FF (Paras 44, 45).

Section 68FF restricts the grant of permits in areas covered by approved schemes, and any variation applied for must be considered within the framework of Section 68E. An increase in trips or vehicles under existing permits amounts to the grant of a new permit, not permissible under Section 68FF (Paras 46, 47).

Legal propositions affirm the superseding effect of Chapter IV-A, equating the grant of variation under Section 57(8) to a new permit. The freezing effect of Section 68FF prohibits the grant of new permits or variations in areas covered by approved schemes (Para 50).

Facts:

The case involved multiple appellants convicted at a single trial for various offenses. The central issue pertained to the application of Section 31 and the possibility of awarding consecutive life sentences.

Issues:

Whether consecutive life sentences could be awarded for a series of murders tried in a single trial.

Applicability of Section 31 in cases of life imprisonment.

Whether the court could direct life sentence and term sentences to run consecutively.

Held:

Section 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is applicable only when a person is convicted at one trial for two or more offenses. The court can sentence the offender to punishments for the committed offenses, and these sentences can run consecutively unless the court directs otherwise. The section does not necessitate sending the offender for trial before a higher court solely based on the aggregate punishment.( Paragraph 7)

Imprisonment for life is a sentence for the remainder of the offender's life unless commuted or remitted by a competent authority. Section 31(1) allows consecutive running of sentences only if they are not life sentences. Consecutive life sentences would be anomalous and irrational, given that humans have only one life to live.( Paragraph 17)

Section 427(2) of the Cr.P.C. carves out an exception to the general rule, recognizing that in the case of life sentences for two distinct offenses separately tried and proved, the sentences cannot be directed to run consecutively.( Paragraph 20)

Section 31(2) deals with situations where the court awarding consecutive sentences is not competent to award the aggregate punishment. This provision is not applicable to cases tried by the Sessions Court, and it does not forbid a direction for consecutive running of sentences awardable by the Court of Session.( Paragraph 25)

The court has the power to direct the order in which sentences will run. It can legitimately direct that the prisoner undergo the term sentence before the commencement of his life sentence. However, the converse is not true, as directing the life sentence to start first would imply that the term sentence runs concurrently.( Paragraph 32)

Facts:

Pragati Mahila Mahavidyalaya appointed respondent No.1 as a part-time Lecturer in Geography on a temporary basis.

The appointment was for a fixed period, and a termination order was issued on 31.03.1998.

Respondent No.1 challenged the termination through legal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the appointment was temporary and governed by the relevant statutes.

The legality of the termination and the nature of the appointment.

Held:

The Court, referring to the Hindustan Education Society case (1997) 5 SCC 152, emphasized the temporary nature of the appointment. The High Court's decision was deemed legally unsustainable as it failed to consider the relevant provisions of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and reinstated the Tribunal's decision. The termination order dated 31.03.1998 was upheld as legal.

Facts:

The Court appointed a committee to inquire into the workings of the BCCI, with the committee recommending various reforms to enhance transparency and efficiency.

Issues:

The recommendations made by the committee, including changes to BCCI membership, upper age limits for office bearers, ineligibility of ministers and government officials, financial oversight, and other structural reforms.

Held:

The committee's task was inquisitorial, involving hearing stakeholders and making recommendations for the improvement of BCCI without adjudicating on any final rights. The court found the committee's procedures adherent to principles of natural justice and no legal flaw in the process.( Para 44-45)

The court clarified that Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution, guaranteeing the right to form associations, is applicable only to citizens, and the committee's recommendations did not interfere with the composition of State Associations.( Para 52-53, 60-61)

The court upheld the "One State One Vote" recommendation, converting certain clubs to associate membership, considering it necessary for the structural streamlining of BCCI.( Para 62-63)

Regarding the "One State One Vote" recommendation for Maharashtra and Gujarat, the court proposed a rotational membership approach to balance historical perspectives and regional representation.( Para 64-65)

The court found the recommendation for an upper age limit of 70 for office bearers reasonable, citing alignment with the National Sports Development Code of India.( Para 66-68)

The court upheld the committee's recommendation that ministers and government officials should be ineligible for posts in State Associations or the BCCI, emphasizing the need to prevent conflicts of interest.( Para 69-72)

The court accepted the committee's recommendation for nominees of the Accountant General and the Comptroller & Auditor General (C&AG) to bring transparency and financial oversight into State Associations and the BCCI.( Para 74-76)

The court supported the formation of a Players' Association, including financial support, as a reasonable idea to involve players in the management of the game.( Para 79-80)

The court suggested that bringing BCCI under the Right to Information Act and legalizing betting in cricket should be examined by the Law Commission.( Para 82-83)

The court addressed concerns about commercial exploitation in broadcasting and recommended that the BCCI ensures an uninterrupted broadcast for viewers.( Para 84-86)

The court referred back to the Committee to re-examine the induction of IPL franchisee nominees in the Governing Council due to potential conflicts of interest.( Para 87-88)

The court found reasonable the committee's recommendations for term limits, cooling-off periods, and disqualification grounds for office bearers.( Para 89)

The court supported the committee's recommendation to overhaul existing committees for institutionalizing administrative affairs.( Para 90-91)

Facts:

Respondent No.3, Shirish Dhopeshwarkar, filed O.P. No.552 of 1988 before the Special Tribunal, Ranga Reddy District, for declaration of title and recovery of land.

Special Tribunal allowed the application but dismissed the claim for compensation.

Appeals were filed, leading to a remand for fresh disposal and further proceedings.

Issues:

Title disputes involving Respondent No.3 and appellants.

Allegations of land grabbing under the Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982.

Appellants' failure to implead themselves in the Special Court proceedings.

Claims of procedural lacunae by the appellants.

Held:

The Special Tribunal and Special Court concurred in establishing the title of Respondent No.3.

Appellants failed to present adequate evidence of their title and possession.

Appellants did not implead themselves in a timely manner, and their claim of procedural lacunae was rejected.

High Court upheld the decisions of the lower forums, dismissing the writ petition and review petition filed by the appellants.

The ground of non-compliance with procedural requirements was considered inconsequential to the merits of the case.

These appeals are accordingly dismissed.

Facts:

The insertion of Section 12(1B) in the SEBI Act on January 25, 1995, led to the creation of two categories of persons: proviso and non-proviso.

The proviso category involved those who commenced activities before January 25, 1995, while the non-proviso category consisted of those who hadn't commenced activities by that date.

The Collective Investment Regulations came into force on October 15, 1999.

Issues:

Interpretation of Section 12(1B) and its implications on individuals falling into the proviso and non-proviso categories.

Compliance with the Collective Investment Regulations, specifically Regulation 5 and other relevant sections.

Held:

The court held that the non-proviso category was barred from commencing collective investment activities without obtaining a certificate of registration from 'the Board'.

The court emphasized the mandatory nature of Section 12(1B) and the penal consequences of its contravention.

The court clarified the distinctions between the proviso and non-proviso categories, specifying the obligations and permissions for each.

Decision: The court concluded that the proceedings initiated against certain respondents were flawed, citing deficiencies in the complaint, lack of disclosure of offense particulars, and improper categorization of the accused. The court quashed the proceedings against the respondents.