Facts:

The appellant-accused was convicted for offenses under Section 498A, Section 304B, Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, and Section 3 and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and additional sentences of 5 years and 3 years. During the appeal's pendency before the High Court, the appellant sought bail under Section 389 of the CrPC. The High Court granted bail without recording any specific reasons, which was challenged in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to grant bail without recording reasons was appropriate.

Whether there were compelling reasons justifying the grant of bail, given the conviction and sentences imposed.

Held:

Section 389 of the CrPC allows for the suspension of execution of a sentence and granting of bail during the pendency of an appeal. In the present case, the offenses were not bailable, and the sentences included life imprisonment, making the bail application more critical.( Para 26)

The appellate court should exercise its discretion judiciously while considering bail applications under Section 389. It must assess whether there are substantial doubts about the conviction's validity and whether there is a risk of unreasonable delay in the appeal's disposal.( Para 27)

While the detailed examination of the merits of the case may not be required, the court must exercise its jurisdiction based on well-established principles and not as a matter of course.( Para 32)

The court highlights the distinction between pre-trial bail and post-conviction bail. Post-conviction bail requires strong and compelling reasons to justify it, and such reasons must be recorded in the order granting bail under Section 389(1) of the CrPC.( Para 36)

In considering an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail, the appellate court should not re-assess the evidence considered by the trial court and take a different view.( Para 39)

The High Court's casual grant of bail without recording any reasons was inappropriate, as it ignored the evidence relied upon by the trial court.( Para 41)

The court upholds the evidence presented in the trial court, supporting the cruelty and harassment related to dowry, and finds no apparent infirmity in the judgment.( Para 42)

Facts:

The land in question was categorized as 'banjar' land with 'shora,' and the Gram Panchayat sought to lease it to make it fit for cultivation by removing the 'shora.' The respondents claimed to be lessees of the land, and the revenue records indicated their possession and cultivation. The appellants alleged that the respondents obtained the lease in collusion with the ex-Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha.

Issues:

Whether the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court were obtained by fraud.

Whether the respondents obtained the lease in collusion with the ex-Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha.

Held:

The judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court on September 28, 1989, in the reference proceedings under Sections 30 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, became final and was not challenged in any appeal. The subsequent separate suit filed by the appellants, alleging fraud in obtaining the decree, lacked sufficient evidence and particulars of fraud, and hence, the fraud was not established. Therefore, the High Court's decision to set aside the decree was unwarranted. (Para 11)

The plea of collusion between the respondents and the ex-Pradhan was vague, and there were no specific particulars of how the fraud was played. Fraud needs to be pleaded and proved with cogent evidence. As there was no credible evidence to establish the alleged collusion, the High Court's decision to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment of the Civil Court was not justified. (Para 12)

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the judgment of the Civil Court, holding the respondents entitled to compensation for the land in question. The Court also rejected the appellants' claim that the decree was obtained by fraud due to lack of substantial evidence. The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 53A, was discussed in the context of the defense raised under it. (Para 12)

Facts:

The land in question was categorized as 'banjar' land with 'shora,' and the Gram Panchayat sought to lease it to make it fit for cultivation by removing the 'shora.' The respondents claimed to be lessees of the land, and the revenue records indicated their possession and cultivation. The appellants alleged that the respondents obtained the lease in collusion with the ex-Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha.

Issues:

• Whether the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court were obtained by fraud.
• Whether the respondents obtained the lease in collusion with the ex-Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha.

Held:

The judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court on September 28, 1989, in the reference proceedings under Sections 30 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, became final and was not challenged in any appeal. The subsequent separate suit filed by the appellants, alleging fraud in obtaining the decree, lacked sufficient evidence and particulars of fraud, and hence, the fraud was not established. Therefore, the High Court's decision to set aside the decree was unwarranted. (Para 11)

The plea of collusion between the respondents and the ex-Pradhan was vague, and there were no specific particulars of how the fraud was played. Fraud needs to be pleaded and proved with cogent evidence. As there was no credible evidence to establish the alleged collusion, the High Court's decision to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment of the Civil Court was not justified. (Para 12)

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the judgment of the Civil Court, holding the respondents entitled to compensation for the land in question. The Court also rejected the appellants' claim that the decree was obtained by fraud due to lack of substantial evidence. The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 53A, was discussed in the context of the defense raised under it. (Para 12)

Facts:

The judgment does not provide specific facts of the case. Instead, it discusses the interpretation and application of relevant sections and provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Issues:

• Whether the amended provisions of Section 6(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, confer the status of a coparcener on daughters, born before or after the amendment, in the same manner as sons, with equal rights and liabilities.
• Whether the right of a daughter to claim coparcenary is retroactive or operates only from the date of the amendment.
• Whether a plea of oral partition can be accepted to claim rights under Section 6(5) of the Act.
• Whether the enlargement of a daughter's rights affects the rights of other relatives under Section 6(1) of the Act.
• Whether the provisions of Section 6(5) recognize partitions effected through a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908, or by a decree of a court.

Held:

The amended provisions of Section 6(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, confer the status of a coparcener on the daughter born before or after the amendment, in the same manner as a son, with equal rights and liabilities.

The right of a daughter to claim coparcenary is retroactive, and the provisions are deemed to have been in force from the date of the amendment, i.e., 09.09.2005. However, any disposition, alienation, or partition that took place before 20.12.2004 shall not be invalidated.

A plea of oral partition cannot be accepted as a statutory recognized mode of partition. It must be supported by public documents and partition must be conclusively evinced, similar to a decree of a court, to be accepted.

The amendments to Section 6(1) do not affect the rights of other relatives mentioned in the proviso to Section 6 as it stood before the amendment.

The provisions of Section 6(5) recognize partitions only if they are effected by a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908, or by a decree of a court. Other forms of partition, including oral partition, are not recognized under the Explanation to Section 6(5).

Facts:

The judgment does not provide specific facts of the case. Instead, it discusses the interpretation and application of relevant sections and provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Issues:

Whether the amended provisions of Section 6(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, confer the status of a coparcener on daughters, born before or after the amendment, in the same manner as sons, with equal rights and liabilities.

Whether the right of a daughter to claim coparcenary is retroactive or operates only from the date of the amendment.

Whether a plea of oral partition can be accepted to claim rights under Section 6(5) of the Act.

Whether the enlargement of a daughter's rights affects the rights of other relatives under Section 6(1) of the Act.

Whether the provisions of Section 6(5) recognize partitions effected through a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908, or by a decree of a court.

Held:

The amended provisions of Section 6(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, confer the status of a coparcener on the daughter born before or after the amendment, in the same manner as a son, with equal rights and liabilities.

The right of a daughter to claim coparcenary is retroactive, and the provisions are deemed to have been in force from the date of the amendment, i.e., 09.09.2005. However, any disposition, alienation, or partition that took place before 20.12.2004 shall not be invalidated.

A plea of oral partition cannot be accepted as a statutory recognized mode of partition. It must be supported by public documents and partition must be conclusively evinced, similar to a decree of a court, to be accepted.

The amendments to Section 6(1) do not affect the rights of other relatives mentioned in the proviso to Section 6 as it stood before the amendment.

The provisions of Section 6(5) recognize partitions only if they are effected by a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908, or by a decree of a court. Other forms of partition, including oral partition, are not recognized under the Explanation to Section 6(5).

Facts:

The case involves employees working in various groups at the Department of Space (SDSC SHAR), including drivers, technical attendants, nursing attendants, technicians, office attendants, and more. The Department of Space has its own service rules that classify civil posts into four groups - 'A,' 'B,' 'C,' and 'D,' based on pay scale and job description.

Issues:

• Whether the 1993 Rules apply to the Government servants covered by the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, and whether the classification of posts based on job description is permissible for the purpose of forming service associations.

Held:

The Court held that the 1993 Rules are applicable to Government servants to whom the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 are applicable. The classification of posts in groups 'A,' 'B,' 'C,' and 'D' under the Department of Space's service rules is considered a 'distinct category.' Further sub-classification based on job description is not permissible under recruitment and conduct rules, as it would defeat the purpose of the 1993 Rules. Allowing distinct service associations for each job description would lead to groupism and disrupt the functioning of the Joint Consultative Machinery (JCM).

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal and upheld that the ISRO Drivers Association or any other group based on job description cannot claim recognition as a distinct category for forming a service association under the 1993 Rules.

Facts:

The case involves employees working in various groups at the Department of Space (SDSC SHAR), including drivers, technical attendants, nursing attendants, technicians, office attendants, and more. The Department of Space has its own service rules that classify civil posts into four groups - 'A,' 'B,' 'C,' and 'D,' based on pay scale and job description.

Issues:

Whether the 1993 Rules apply to the Government servants covered by the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, and whether the classification of posts based on job description is permissible for the purpose of forming service associations.

Held:

The Court held that the 1993 Rules are applicable to Government servants to whom the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 are applicable. The classification of posts in groups 'A,' 'B,' 'C,' and 'D' under the Department of Space's service rules is considered a 'distinct category.' Further sub-classification based on job description is not permissible under recruitment and conduct rules, as it would defeat the purpose of the 1993 Rules. Allowing distinct service associations for each job description would lead to groupism and disrupt the functioning of the Joint Consultative Machinery (JCM).

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal and upheld that the ISRO Drivers Association or any other group based on job description cannot claim recognition as a distinct category for forming a service association under the 1993 Rules.

Facts:

In 1959, 'DKR' and 'ID' were recorded as owners of Plot No.473 in revenue records. In 1970, the plot was divided, and Plot No.473-B1 was owned by 'KN', Plot No.473-B2 by 'PM', and Plot No.473-B3 by 'DKR' and 'ID'. Plot No.473-B4 was a vacant plot of land shown as an internal private road in possession of 'DKR', 'ID', 'KN', and 'PM'. In 1979, a Town Planning Scheme was sanctioned, and the final plot (No.473) was divided into five parts, with the road measuring 444.14 sq. mtr. shown to be owned by PMC. 'ID' executed a registered trust deed transferring Plot No.473-B3 and the internal road to the appellant trust. The appellant requested the State Govt. to correct the wrong entry in PMC's name, but it was rejected. The appellant filed a writ petition, which was dismissed by the High Court.

Issues:

• Whether the High Court erred in its interpretation of Section 88 of the Regional and Town Planning Act?
• Whether the respondents had a public duty under Section 91 to modify the scheme and show the private road as property of its legitimate owners?
• Whether the modification proposed involved a substantial alteration, as held by the High Court?

Held:

The High Court failed to consider the relevant provisions of the Regional and Town Planning Act, and it did not address the question of how PMC was shown as the owner of the internal road without any basis in the records. The High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition without applying its mind to the relevant facts and documents.

The private road in question was never acquired by PMC or the State Government, and it did not belong to PMC at any point. The respondents had a public duty under Section 91 to modify the scheme and show the private road as property of its legitimate owners, based on the property records and the Arbitrator's Award.

The deletion of PMC's name as the owner of the private road is not a substantial alteration but a correction of an erroneous recording. Section 88 cannot be read in isolation, and it must be read in conjunction with Sections 125 to 129 relating to compulsory acquisition, as well as Sections 59, 69, and 65.

Decision: The judgment and order of the High Court are set aside, and the appeal is allowed in favor of the appellant trust. The respondents are directed to modify the scheme to show the private road as the property of its legitimate owners based on the property records and the Arbitrator's Award.

Facts:

The appellants filed an appeal against an order of the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal. However, there was a delay of 45 days in filing the appeal. The High Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay and the appeal.

Issues:

whether the delay of 45 days in filing the appeal can be condoned under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Held:

The Court held that Chapter XII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is a beneficial legislation intended to protect the rights of victims affected in road accidents. The Act provides procedures for filing claims, passing awards, and preferring appeals, including limitation periods for filing appeals. The delay of 45 days was properly explained by the appellants, and the strict approach taken by the High Court was deemed hyper-technical and not sustainable.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, condoned the delay, and remanded the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits.