Criminal Law - Registration of FIR – Duty of Police – Section 154 CrPC – FIR Must Be Registered – Petitioners alleged failure of police to act upon complaints disclosing cognizable offences related to hate speech – Held: Police is bound to register an FIR if a cognizable offence is disclosed – However, if police fails to do so, remedy lies under Sections 190 and 200 CrPC before a Magistrate – No writ under Article 32 maintainable for such purpose [Paras 1, 3, 5, 7].

Criminal Procedure – Alternative Remedy – Complaint to Magistrate under Sections 190 and 200 CrPC – Writ Not Maintainable – Supreme Court reaffirmed that the proper course in case of police inaction is to approach the Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure – Petitions under Article 32 seeking direction to police to register FIR are not maintainable – View reaffirmed from earlier cases like AIIMS Employees' Union, Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre, and Hari Singh [Paras 5–7].

Conflict in Precedent – Harmonisation – Ramesh Kumari vs. AIIMS and Others – No Conflict – Petitioners cited Ramesh Kumari to support their claim for direct registration of FIR through writ – Held: Ramesh Kumari only affirms the duty of police to register FIR in case of cognizable offences – It does not address the procedural remedy for police inaction, which remains governed by Chapter XV of CrPC [Para 7].

Sanction for Prosecution – Role of Government – Section 196 CrPC – Petitioners alleged delay in granting sanction for prosecution – Held: It is for the concerned government to consider and decide on the issue of sanction – Directed that appropriate decision be taken within 3 months of receipt of order [Para 8(3)].

Decision – Writ Petitions Dismissed – Alternate Remedies Directed – Supreme Court declined to issue writ under Article 32 for directing registration of FIRs – Held: Petitioners to follow statutory remedy under CrPC – Direction issued to concerned government to decide sanction issue within three months – No opinion expressed on merits [Para 8].

Army Service – Discharge under Rule 13 – Section 22 vs. Section 20 of Army Act – Validity of Discharge – Appellant, found guilty of misconduct during court of inquiry, was discharged by competent authority citing Section 20 – It was contended that punishment could only be imposed after court-martial under Section 63 – Held: Discharge order valid under Section 22 and Rule 13(3); wrong citation of Section 20 does not vitiate order as long as correct power exists – Discharge held to be administrative and non-punitive in nature [Paras 18-20].

Natural Justice – Opportunity to Defend – Adequate Compliance – Appellant given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses during court of inquiry but did not avail – Show cause notice issued before discharge – Response found unsatisfactory by competent authority – Held: Principles of natural justice duly followed – No violation found [Paras 19-20].

Court of Inquiry – Use of Evidence – Permissible Scope – Appellant argued that inquiry evidence could not be used without court-martial – Held: Court of inquiry was held for fact-finding under Rule 177 – Not equivalent to court-martial – Evidence used for administrative discharge, not punitive action – Therefore, permissible [Paras 13, 21].

Wrong Quotation of Legal Provision – Effect – Discharge order cited Section 20 instead of Section 22 – Held: So long as power to discharge exists and is exercised by competent authority, mere wrong reference does not vitiate the order – Discharge upheld [Para 20].

Relief – Appeal Dismissed – Supreme Court affirmed High Court Division Bench judgment upholding discharge – Held: No perversity or illegality in findings – Appeal devoid of merit – Dismissed without costs [Para 22].

PIL - Section 158(6), Motor Vehicles Act – Mandatory compliance by police – Directions issued to ensure prompt forwarding of accident reports to Claims Tribunals and insurers.

Motor Accident Claims – Compliance with Section 158(6) MV Act – Mandatory Reporting by Police – Non-compliance addressed – Section 158(6) imposes a statutory duty on the police to report accident details involving death or bodily injury to the Claims Tribunal and insurer within 30 days – Writ petition filed highlighting widespread neglect of this obligation across States and Union Territories – Held: Language of the statute is mandatory, non-compliance unjustified – All States/UTs directed to ensure strict implementation, with periodical checking and accountability for defaulting officers [Paras 1, 3, 7, 9-10].

Interpretation of 'As Soon As' – Mandatory Promptitude in Reporting – The phrase “as soon as” in Section 158(6) denotes a requirement of urgency and reasonable dispatch – Compliance must be contemporaneous with police report of accident – Held: The expression mandates prompt action and cannot be interpreted loosely – Delays in such reporting lead to inflated or fraudulent claims and hinder justice [Paras 7-8].

False Claims – Preventive Mechanism – Early Reporting to Insurer – If police reports are promptly sent to insurers and tribunals, false and exaggerated claims can be curbed – Delayed filing hampers verification and adds to pendency – Court endorses petitioners’ plea that enforcement of Section 158(6) will streamline adjudication, improve claim settlement, and reduce fraudulent litigation [Para 6].

Direction to States and Union Territories – Compliance Monitoring – Inspector Generals of Police and Department of Transport to ensure compliance – Failure to act as per statute shall result in disciplinary action against erring officers – Periodic verification and central oversight mandated to ensure uniform compliance nationwide [Para 10].

Decision – Writ Petition Allowed – Directions issued to all States and Union Territories to enforce compliance with Section 158(6) and Rule 150/Form 54 – Inspector General and Transport Departments to conduct checks and initiate action for non-compliance – Petition disposed of with these directions [Paras 10-11].

Civil Law – Military Lease – Nature and duration – Lease in perpetuity vs tenancy at will – The 1921 deed allowed the lessee to “hold the land for ever” subject to an unconditional right of resumption by the lessor on one month’s notice and with no consideration payable – Held: Not a grant in perpetuity; at best a tenancy at will/permissive occupation terminable at the lessor’s will – Absence of consideration and an absolute resumption clause militate against perpetuity [Paras 7-9].

Court Auction – Sale certificate – Need for registered conveyance – Section 17(2)(xii), Registration Act – Where property is sold in court auction and sale is confirmed, title vests in purchaser on confirmation; the sale certificate evidences title and no further deed is required – Registered sale certificate of 29.08.1941 validly conveyed the lessee’s interest – High Court erred in holding otherwise [Para 10].

Transfer Conditions in Lease – Notice/consent – Distinction between inter vivos transfers and devolution by operation of law – Condition IV (inter vivos transfers) alone attracted voiding consequence for want of prior notice/consent – Condition V (succession/operation of law, including court auction) required post-event intimation but prescribed no nullifying sanction – Auction sale not void for want of notice/consent [Para 11].

Possession – Alleged forcible dispossession in September 1975 – Proof and contemporaneous conduct – Plaintiff failed to prove forcible dispossession; contemporaneous correspondence (1976–1981) admits “resumption” under lease and seeks only compensation for structures – Plea of force raised belatedly in 1984/1987 notices held afterthought – Relief of possession refused [Paras 12-17].

Limitation – Suit filed on 21.08.1987 – On facts, dispossession/resumption occurred well before 1975; even otherwise, claim barred – Only possible dispute related to compensation/arbitration under lease, not sought in suit and, in any case, stale by 1987 [Paras 17-18].

Outcome – Declaration of title rightly refused by Trial Court (unchallenged) – High Court’s dismissal of suit for possession sustained though for partly different reasons – Appeal dismissed; dismissal of suit affirmed [Paras 12, 19-20].

Entertainment Tax – Discrimination Based on Language – Article 14 Violation – Andhra Pradesh levied 24% entertainment tax on Hindi films while levying only 10% on Telugu films – Held: Classification based solely on language is arbitrary – No reasonable nexus with object of taxation – Violates Article 14 of the Constitution – Impugned notification struck down [Paras 3, 18, 25-27].

Constitutional Challenge – Taxing Statute Not Immune – While State has wide latitude in taxation, it must still comply with Article 14 – Classification must be reasonable and non-arbitrary – Absence of explanation for higher tax on Hindi films failed constitutional scrutiny [Paras 10-14, 25].

Article 351 – No Justiciable Right Under Part III – Argument that tax violated Article 351 (promotion of Hindi) rejected – Held: Article 351 is not enforceable under Article 32 as it does not form part of Part III rights [Para 8].

Directive Principles and Taxation – Social Values and Article 38 – Court emphasized that taxation must serve constitutional values including equality and social justice – Held: Classification that disturbs social fabric or promotes regional or linguistic division cannot be upheld [Paras 15-16].

Tax Must Be Reasonable – Proportionality and Good Governance – Even in taxation, arbitrariness is not permitted – Tax must be equitable and proportionate – Hostile discrimination in fiscal policy invites constitutional invalidation [Paras 20-22, 24].

Decision – Levy Struck Down – Different tax rate on Hindi films struck down – Taxpayer entitled to same rate as Telugu films – Writ Petition allowed with costs [Para 27].

Service Law - Disciplinary Proceedings – Continuation after Superannuation – Regulation 20(3)(iii), Punjab National Bank Service Regulations – Validity Affirmed – Disciplinary proceedings initiated before retirement can continue after superannuation by virtue of legal fiction under Regulation 20(3)(iii) – Employee deemed to be in service until conclusion of proceedings – Held: Dismissal order valid [Paras 11–14].

Dismissal and Pension – Forfeiture of Benefits – Regulation 22, Punjab National Bank Pension Regulations – Dismissal entails forfeiture of entire past service – Employee not entitled to pensionary benefits where dismissal imposed – No requirement of additional order under Regulation 43 or 48 – Held: Appellant ineligible for retiral dues except CPF contribution [Paras 16–17].

Judicial Review – Substitution of Punishment – Scope of High Court’s Power – High Court erred in substituting dismissal with order of withholding retiral benefits – Unless punishment is shown to be illegal or shockingly disproportionate, interference not warranted – Held: High Court committed manifest error [Paras 18, 21].

Misconduct – Reckless Lending, Loss of Confidence – Grave Charges Justify Dismissal – Bank Manager found guilty of reckless lending, misuse of authority, disbursing loans through middlemen, and causing financial loss exceeding Rs. 1.14 crores – Such misconduct amounts to breach of trust and justifies dismissal – Once confidence lost, reinstatement impermissible – Held: Dismissal justified [Paras 20–21].

Decision – Civil Appeal No. 971 of 2007 (employee’s appeal) dismissed – Civil Appeal No. 975 of 2007 (Bank’s appeal) allowed – Dismissal upheld – No order as to costs [Para 22].

Service Law – Premature Termination - Statutory Appointment – Applicability of Doctrine of Pleasure – Tenure Protection Under Special Statute – Termination Set Aside – The respondent’s appointment as Chairperson, NCTE was terminated by the Union of India citing the doctrine of pleasure under Article 310 – The Court held that the post was governed by a special statute and could only be terminated according to the procedure in Sections 5 and 6 of the NCTE Act – Respondent had not incurred any statutory disqualification – Held: The appointment was not at the pleasure of the President, and the termination was invalid [Paras 5, 16–18, 21–22].

Statutory Interpretation – Casus Omissus and Judicial Legislation – Court Cannot Supply Legislative Omissions – Appellants contended that the Act was silent on disciplinary action for past misconduct and sought judicial intervention to fill the gap – Held: The statute clearly defined grounds for removal – No scope for judicial supply of omission under Article 142 – Interpretation must respect legislative intent and statutory completeness [Paras 7–8, 22–26].

Deputation vs Statutory Appointment – Nature of Service – Not a Deputation Post – Government claimed respondent was on deputation from the State of Uttar Pradesh – Held: Though the respondent held a lien with the parent department, the NCTE appointment was through independent statutory selection for a fixed term – The arrangement could loosely be called deputation, but not in the conventional sense – Tenure could not be curtailed arbitrarily [Paras 27–28].

Exercise of Article 142 – Power Cannot Override Express Statutory Provisions – Union of India urged invocation of Article 142 to uphold termination – Held: Article 142 cannot be used to defeat or override statutory mandates – The remedy lies with the legislature, not the judiciary [Paras 10, 34–35].

Decision – Appeal Dismissed – Termination Quashed – Supreme Court upheld Delhi High Court’s order restoring the respondent to his post – Held: Termination contrary to the NCTE Act – Respondent entitled to all dues as per law – No costs imposed [Para 37].

Recovery Proceedings – Liability of Guarantor – Distinction from Principal Debtor – Section 29 SFC Act – Recovery Proceedings Upheld – The appellant contended that guarantor’s liability cannot be enforced unless the mortgaged property of the principal debtor is first exhausted – Held: Since the principal debtor company was already wound up and official liquidator appointed, proceedings against guarantor were valid and distinguishable from Pawan Kumar Jain case [Paras 2, 4, 6].

Effect of Winding Up – Limitation on State Financial Corporation’s Powers – Section 29 SFC Act – SFC’s unilateral right under Section 29 is curtailed once company is under winding up – SFC cannot realize mortgaged property without official liquidator’s consent – If liquidator does not consent, SFC must seek directions from Company Court – Liquidator too must act only under Court’s supervision [Paras 9–11].

One Time Settlement – Failure to Honour – Appellant had proposed but failed to honour one-time settlement – Such conduct frustrates recovery process – Court observed that recalcitrant defaulters’ cases must be dealt with sternly [Paras 7–8].

Decision – Appeal Dismissed – High Court’s decision dismissing writ petition upheld – Recovery proceedings against guarantor sustained – Costs made easy [Para 12].

Service Law – Seniority – Retrospective Promotion – Legality – Held: Promotees cannot claim seniority from a date prior to their actual appointment to the cadre. Appellants, who were promoted as Assistant Conservator of Forests (ACFs) in 2002, were retrospectively given seniority from 1994. Respondents, appointed directly in 1996, challenged this retrospective promotion. Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision that retrospective seniority was illegal, as the appellants were not borne in the cadre prior to 2002. Seniority begins only from the date of entry into the cadre, not from when vacancy arises or when promotion becomes due [Paras 3, 9, 12-14].

Quota System – No 50:50 Quota in Unamended Rule 5 – Retrospective Interpretation Rejected – Clarificatory Argument Denied. Appellants contended that their delayed promotion violated an implied 50:50 quota between promotees and direct recruits. However, the Court held that Rule 5 (prior to 1999 amendment) only referred to filling "substantive vacancies from time to time" and did not fix cadre-based quota. The 1999 amendment introducing a 50:50 quota was prospective in nature, not clarificatory or retrospective [Paras 8-11].

Seniority – Fortuitous Appointments – Not Applicable to Respondents. Argument that respondents' direct recruitment in 1996 was in excess of quota and hence "fortuitous" was rejected. As there was no cadre quota in force at the time, their appointments were valid and entitled to seniority [Paras 6-9].

Seniority – Working Under Direct Appointees for Years – Relevant Factor. Appellants had worked under the direct recruits from 1996 to 2002 as Range Forest Officers. Granting them seniority over respondents would disrupt service structure and create unfairness. Court refused to upset settled seniority after such long duration [Para 15].

Conclusion – Appeal Dismissed. Supreme Court upheld High Court’s judgment; retrospective promotions quashed; no costs awarded [Paras 15-16].