Dispensing with Departmental Inquiry Without Material is Arbitrary: Supreme Court Sets Aside Dismissal of Delhi Police Constable

“Mere Presumption Cannot Replace Evidence”, Supreme Court of India reiterated that the extraordinary power under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution, which allows dismissal of a government servant without departmental inquiry, cannot be exercised on mere assumptions or presumptions. The Court held that such power must be supported by objective material showing that conducting an inquiry was not ‘reasonably practicable’.

Supreme Court  set aside the dismissal of a Delhi Police constable, holding that the disciplinary authority had mechanically invoked Article 311(2)(b) without any substantive evidence of threat or intimidation to witnesses. The Court directed reinstatement with continuity of service and 50% back wages.

Background of the Case

The appellant Manohar Lal, a constable in the Delhi Police Special Cell, was dismissed from service on 18 July 2017 by the Deputy Commissioner of Police. The dismissal was ordered without conducting a departmental inquiry, invoking clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution.

The department relied on a preliminary enquiry report, which suggested that holding a departmental inquiry might not be “reasonably practicable” due to the possibility that the appellant or his associates could threaten or intimidate witnesses or tamper with evidence.

The dismissal order was upheld by the Appellate Authority, the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), and subsequently by the Delhi High Court, which refused to interfere with the disciplinary authority’s decision.

Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court challenging the dismissal as arbitrary and contrary to constitutional protections under Article 311.

Legal Issues Before the Court

The principal question before the Supreme Court was:

“Whether the disciplinary authority was justified in invoking Article 311(2)(b) to dismiss the appellant without conducting a departmental inquiry.”

The appellant argued that: “Article 311(2) guarantees that a civil servant cannot be dismissed without an inquiry unless the case strictly falls within the exceptions provided in the second proviso.”

It was further argued that the reasons cited by the department—possible intimidation of witnesses—were speculative, particularly because the appellant was already in judicial custody when the dismissal order was passed.

The State, however, contended that the nature of the allegations and the preliminary inquiry findings justified bypassing the normal disciplinary procedure.

Court’s Observations on Article 311(2)(b)

The bench referred extensively to the Constitution Bench judgment in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) to explain the scope of Article 311(2)(b).

The Court emphasized: “A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily… or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry.”

It clarified that the phrase “not reasonably practicable” does not mean mere inconvenience. Instead, the authority must demonstrate real and compelling circumstances preventing the conduct of an inquiry.

The Court further reiterated that: “The satisfaction recorded by the disciplinary authority must be based on objective material and not on mere belief or presumption.”

Lack of Material to Justify Dispensing with Inquiry

Upon examining the preliminary enquiry report, the Supreme Court found that the conclusions regarding intimidation or threats were not supported by any concrete evidence.

The Court noted that: “None of the witnesses in their statements indicated that they were threatened, intimidated, or traumatised by the appellant.”

The Court also highlighted a crucial fact: the appellant was in custody between 29 June 2017 and 14 October 2017, whereas the dismissal order was passed on 18 July 2017.

Therefore, the Court held:

“Without indicating any instance of intimidation, traumatising, threatening or persuading the complainant or witnesses from inside the jail, the belief or presumption recorded by the disciplinary authority is not sufficient to invoke Article 311(2)(b).”

The Court concluded that the disciplinary authority had failed to apply its mind and merely relied on presumptions recorded in the preliminary inquiry report.

Judgment and Directions of the Court

Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that the dismissal order and the subsequent decisions of the CAT and the High Court were legally unsustainable.

The Court ruled:

“The order dispensing with the regular procedure of inquiry is arbitrary and consequently the order of dismissal of the appellant is liable to be quashed.”

Accordingly, the Court directed that:

“the appellant shall forthwith be reinstated with continuity of service.”

However, considering the pendency of the criminal case against the appellant, the Court restricted back wages and held that he would be entitled to only 50% of the wages for the period between dismissal and reinstatement.

The Court also clarified that the authorities remain free to initiate disciplinary proceedings in accordance with law if they deem it appropriate.

The judgment serves as a significant reaffirmation of the constitutional safeguard under Article 311, emphasizing that dismissal of a government servant without inquiry is an exceptional measure that must be supported by clear, objective, and legally sustainable reasons.

By holding that “mere presumption cannot replace material evidence”, the Supreme Court reinforced the principle that procedural fairness and natural justice remain central to disciplinary actions against public servants.

Date of Decision: 6 March 2026