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by Deepak Kumar
14 March 2026 8:02 AM
"When a father who is expected to be a shield, a guardian, a moral compass, becomes the source of the most severe violation of a child's bodily integrity and dignity, the betrayal is not only personal but institutional." – Bombay High Court
In a searing judgment that leaves no room for mitigation in cases of incestuous sexual violence, the Bombay High Court on March 9, 2026 dismissed the appeal of a father convicted of repeatedly raping his own minor daughter, affirming his sentence of rigorous imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life and holding that once a court convicts an accused under Section 376(2) IPC and awards life imprisonment, there is no judicial discretion left — the sentence mandatorily means imprisonment for the rest of the convict's natural life.
A Division Bench of Justice Manish Pitale and Justice Shreeram V. Shirsat, speaking through Justice Pitale, upheld the conviction of the appellant Mohammad Shahjad Amir Hasan Shaikh under Section 376(2)(f) IPC and Sections 6 and 9(n) read with Section 10 of the POCSO Act, as recorded by the Special POCSO Court, Greater Bombay in POCSO Case No. 485 of 2018.
Background of the Case
The prosecution case arose from a statement given by the victim — the biological daughter of the appellant — to the police on July 27, 2018, after she gathered courage during a 'Police Didi' counselling program conducted in her school. She disclosed that since she was ten years old, her father had been touching her inappropriately, and that over the three months preceding her statement, he had physically and sexually assaulted her on at least four occasions, the last being on July 21, 2018. The Special POCSO Court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life. Aggrieved, the appellant filed the present appeal before the High Court.
Legal Issues
The appeal raised four principal questions: whether the prosecution had proved the victim's minority at the time of the offences; whether the victim's testimony was of sterling quality sufficient to sustain conviction without corroboration; whether the theory of false implication — that the victim concocted the allegations due to anger over her studies being discontinued — was credible; and whether the absence of fresh physical injuries in the medical examination falsified the victim's account.
Court's Observations and Judgment
"An Admitted Fact Need Not Be Proved — The Father Himself Stated His Daughter Was A Minor"
The Court first addressed the elaborate challenge to the proof of minority. The appellant's counsel argued that the ossification test report, which placed the victim's age between 17 and 18 years, entitled him to the benefit that the upper limit — 18 years — be taken, thereby excluding POCSO's application. The Court decisively rejected this argument by pointing to a fact that demolished the entire edifice of the defence: the appellant himself, as father, had filed an affidavit at the time of the victim's school admission stating her date of birth as February 15, 2002. More compellingly, in his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC, the appellant specifically admitted in response to direct questions that his daughter's date of birth was February 15, 2002 and that she was not 18 years of age.
"The appellant himself admitted that his daughter was a minor at the time of the incidents. An admitted fact need not be proved by the prosecution."
The Court marshalled an authoritative line of Supreme Court precedents — Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra, Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of M.P., Shah Nawaz v. State of UP, Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, State of M.P. v. Anoop Singh, and Rishipal Singh Solanki v. State of UP — to hold that school records and documentary evidence must be given primacy over ossification or medical tests for determination of age. The original admission register of the municipal school, produced before the Court by the school principal PW7, recorded the victim's date of birth as February 15, 2002 at Serial No. 8492 — an entry made on the basis of the father's own statement at the time of admission. The Court held that this document, being a public and official document maintained in the discharge of official duty, fully satisfied the requirements of Section 35 of the Evidence Act and was credible evidence of the victim's date of birth.
"Ossification test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination. A mechanical view based solely on medical opinion cannot be adopted when credible documents are available."
The Court roundly rejected the argument that the ossification report's upper limit of 18 years should be adopted, observing that in the face of the father's own admission and the public school record, there was no necessity to even look at the ossification report — let alone allow it to override the credible documentary record.
"To Disbelieve A Minor Victim Of Sexual Assault, When There Is No Apparent Reason To Doubt Her Version, Would Amount To Adding Insult To Injury"
Turning to the quality of the victim's testimony, the Court found PW1's evidence to be "steadfast." She had given graphic details of the manner in which she suffered physical and sexual abuse at the hands of her own father, described how the process started when she was only ten years old, identified at least four incidents in the three months preceding the FIR, and her account could not be shaken in cross-examination. Relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Manga Singh, the Court reiterated the settled position that the sole testimony of the prosecutrix is sufficient to convict if it inspires confidence, and that minor contradictions or small discrepancies cannot justify its rejection.
The defence had argued that incidents were impossible given that a family of seven was living in a 10 ft. x 10 ft. room, and that the wooden plank described in the spot panchanama was too small for the alleged acts. The Court found that the prosecution had placed on record circumstances showing that there were occasions when the appellant and his daughter were alone together in the room, and the defence's spatial argument was rejected as an attempt to construct an alibi from domestic poverty.
"The testimony of a victim of sexual assault is to be treated on par with the evidence of an injured witness."
The Court also found that the evidence of PW3 (the school principal), PW4 (the counsellor who conducted the 'Police Didi' program) and PW5 (the social worker) sufficiently corroborated the victim's version and explained in a natural and believable manner how the victim gathered the courage to air her grievance — although the Court was clear that the sole testimony of PW1 was itself enough to prove guilt.
"It Would Be Far-Fetched To Accept That Discontent Over Studies Would Prompt A Daughter To Make Such Drastic Allegations Of Repeated Rape Against Her Own Father"
The Court gave short shrift to the theory of false implication built on the evidence of the appellant's wife and mother-in-law. The defence theory was that since the appellant had decided to discontinue the victim's studies after the elder sister had entered into a love marriage, the victim became angry and concocted false rape allegations. The Court acknowledged that children do get angry when parents discipline them — but found it wholly far-fetched that such discontent could prompt a daughter to make "such serious, drastic and far-reaching allegations of repeated rape against her own father."
On the medical evidence, the Court noted that the last alleged assault was on July 21, 2018 and the FIR was registered on July 27, 2018 — a week's gap. PW2, the examining doctor, had herself stated in cross-examination that generally one week is required for healing of a hymenal injury. This sufficiently explained the old hymenal tears. In any event, the Court reiterated the settled principle that ocular evidence always prevails over medical evidence.
"The Law Cannot Condone Such Acts Under The Guise Of Rehabilitation Or Reform"
On the question of sentence, the Court held that even if the prosecution's case on minority were to be disbelieved — which it was not — the conviction under Section 376(2)(f) IPC was independently sustainable because the appellant, being the biological father of the victim, was unquestionably a person in a position of trust and authority towards her, and that relationship alone attracted the provision regardless of the victim's age.
On the mandatory nature of the sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life, the Court relied on the post-2013 amended Section 376(2) IPC and this Court's own ruling in Jagannath Pandurang Waghare v. State of Maharashtra to hold that once a court awards life imprisonment under Section 376(2), no discretion remains — the statute itself mandates that such imprisonment means imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life. Relying powerfully on the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement in Bhanei Prasad @ Raju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, the Court declared that incestuous sexual violence by a parent is a distinct category of offence that "tears through the foundational fabric of familial trust" and must invite the severest judicial condemnation.
"To entertain a plea for leniency in a case of this nature would not merely be misplaced — it would constitute a betrayal of the Court's own constitutional duty to protect the vulnerable."
The Bombay High Court's judgment delivers a powerful and legally precise affirmation of the principles governing POCSO prosecutions: that a father's own admission of his child's date of birth — whether in a school affidavit or in a Section 313 CrPC statement — is the best possible evidence of minority and cannot be overridden by an ossification test; that a minor victim's sterling testimony needs no corroboration; and that when the perpetrator of rape is the very parent who should have been the child's protector, the law will speak in a voice that is, in the Court's words, "resolute and uncompromising."
Date of Decision: March 9, 2026