250 BNSS | 60-Day Discharge Period Is Procedural, Does Not Extinguish Accused's Right To Seek Discharge: Gujarat High Court

"Right to seek discharge is not extinguished automatically upon expiry of sixty days; rather, the remedy becomes subject to the Court's discretion " Gujarat High Court has ruled that the sixty-day period prescribed under Section 250(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 for filing discharge applications is procedural in nature and does not extinguish the substantive right of an accused to seek discharge.

Justice P. M. Raval, while allowing a batch of criminal revision applications filed by the Directors, CEO and medical practitioners of Khyati Hospital, Ahmedabad, held that the statutory period regulates the remedy and not the underlying right, which is intrinsically connected with the guarantee of fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Background of the Case

The applicants were arraigned in an FIR registered at Vastrapur Police Station, Ahmedabad alleging that they entered into a criminal conspiracy to derive pecuniary advantage under the Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana. The prosecution alleged that patients were induced to undergo angiography and angioplasty procedures without medical necessity, misleading medical records were prepared, and two patients died as a consequence. Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed for offences under Sections 105, 110, 336(2), 336(3), 340(1), 340(2), 318 and 61 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and the case was committed to the Sessions Court.

The applicants filed discharge applications under Section 250 BNSS beyond the prescribed sixty-day period from the date of committal, with the maximum delay being approximately 140 days. The Sessions Court rejected their applications for condonation of delay and declined to entertain the discharge applications.

Legal Issues and Arguments

The primary question before the Court was whether the sixty-day period under Section 250(1) BNSS operates as a substantive bar extinguishing the right to seek discharge or merely as a procedural regulation triggering the prosecution to crystallise its case at the threshold.

Senior Counsel Mr. Mihir Joshi argued that Section 250(1) confers upon the accused a right to prefer a discharge application within sixty days to trigger the prosecution to open its case, but failure to exercise this right within the stipulated period does not extinguish the substantive right. He contended that discharge is intrinsically connected with the fair trial guarantee under Article 21.

Senior Counsel Mr. Nirupam Nanavati further contended that the committal order was vitiated due to non-compliance with Section 230 BNSS, as certain documents not forming part of the original charge-sheet papers were furnished by the prosecution only at the stage of hearing discharge applications.

The Public Prosecutor opposed the revisions, contending that Section 250 prescribes a clear limitation period introduced to expedite criminal trials and that law of limitation is founded upon public policy which cannot be diluted.

Court's Observations and Judgment

"An accused may prefer an application for discharge within sixty days, but beyond 60 days does not extinguish his right to seek discharge where delay is satisfactorily explained"

The Court observed that the Legislature has consciously introduced a defined time frame to promote expeditious Sessions trials and if accused persons were permitted to file discharge applications at any stage without reference to limitation, the statutory prescription would be rendered nugatory.

"Even if the accused does not prefer an application for discharge, the Court is duty bound to apply its judicial mind before framing of the charge and if no sufficient material for framing of charge is found, the Court has to discharge the accused"

However, the Court held that limitation provisions ordinarily regulate the remedy and not the underlying defence. The right to seek discharge is not extinguished automatically upon expiry of sixty days but becomes subject to the Court's discretion in condoning delay upon sufficient cause being shown.

"Section 250(1) of the BNSS regulates the procedure and it does not extinguish the right to seek discharge. It also does not exclude the judicial discretion in appropriate cases where delay is not attributable to the accused"

Addressing the contention regarding non-supply of documents, the Court noted that committal proceedings are administrative in nature and not adjudicatory on merits. The Court held that unless failure of justice is shown, committal cannot be declared void for every procedural lapse.

"If the prosecution seeks to rely upon additional documents beyond the charge-sheet record, such materials must ordinarily be brought on record in accordance with law and furnished to the accused before being relied upon. However, such subsequent supply, by itself, would not retroactively invalidate the committal unless prejudice affecting fair trial is established"

The Court found that the Sessions Judge erred in adverting to the merits of the case while deciding condonation of delay. Relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector, the Court observed that merits of the case are not to be examined while deciding condonation.

"Criminal jurisprudence must reconcile expeditious trial with fairness. A rigid and technical approach in the present facts would defeat substantial justice"

The Court quashed the impugned orders, condoned the delay in filing discharge applications, and directed the trial Court to decide the discharge applications afresh on merits after ensuring complete supply of all documents relied upon by the prosecution and after affording full opportunity of hearing to both sides.

Conclusion

The Gujarat High Court allowed all the criminal revision applications, holding that the sixty-day period under Section 250(1) BNSS is procedural and does not extinguish the accused's right to seek discharge where delay is satisfactorily explained.

Date of Decision: 5th March, 2026