Facts:

Two cases involving dependents of deceased employees.

Employees sought compassionate appointments after the death of the breadwinners.

Introduction of the Family Benefit Scheme in the NJSC Tripartite Agreement of 1989.

The High Court held that the Family Benefit Scheme precludes compassionate appointments.

Issues:

Interpretation of the Family Benefit Scheme in the NJSC Tripartite Agreement.

Constitutional obligation of the Steel Authority of India regarding compassionate appointments.

Impact of the 1989 Agreement on existing welfare measures.

Held:

The High Court's reliance on the Family Benefit Scheme to deny compassionate appointments was not justified.

The Steel Authority of India, as an authority under Article 12, is obligated to act in accordance with constitutional principles of social and economic justice.

The concept of social justice is crucial, and denial of compassionate employment opportunities goes against constitutional philosophy.

The introduction of the Family Benefit Scheme does not negate the existing obligation for compassionate appointments.

The Court directs the Steel Authority of India to provide compassionate employment to the appellants.

Facts:

Appellant and respondent were brothers involved in a dispute over a flat leased by MHADA.

MHADA evicted unauthorized occupants, and appellant's claim was later regularized.

Respondent challenged eviction order, leading to a writ petition (Writ Petition No. 5072/98).

Conciliator (Justice H. Suresh) appointed to resolve the dispute.

Issues:

Legality of the conciliator's actions in drawing up a settlement agreement without party signatures.

The Court's consideration of the settlement agreement as final without adherence to statutory procedures.

Held:

The court found that the conciliator failed to follow proper procedures and that the settlement agreement, not signed by the parties, should not have been considered final and binding. The order confirming the settlement agreement was set aside, and the court directed a fresh consideration of the writ petition.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the order dated 6.10.1999. The settlement agreement dated 31.8.1999 filed by Justice H. Suresh before the High Court was also set aside. The High Court was directed to dispose of the Writ Petition afresh on merit in accordance with the law. Parties to bear their own costs.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over land originally recorded in the name of Nanda Oraon, a Scheduled Tribe member.

Nanda Oraon executed a registered surrender deed in 1942, leading to the landlord obtaining possession.

The land was settled permanently in favor of Satish Chandra Baul.

Part of the land was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, and the rest was sold to various individuals.

Appellant claims adoption by Sukhi Oraon, succeeding to the property rights.

Issues:

Validity of the surrender deed executed in 1942.

Appellant's claim as the adopted son of Sukhi Oraon.

Applicability of Section 71A of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act.

Held:

The Special Officer, after an inquiry, ordered the first respondent to restore possession to the appellant.

High Court allowed the first respondent's writ petition, stating that Section 71A did not apply unless there was a transfer of raiyati interest by a Scheduled Tribe member.

High Court held that the surrender in 1942 was valid, and previous permission from the Deputy Commissioner was not required.

The High Court rejected the appellant's claim of forcible dispossession and adoption.

The Court dismissed the appeals, considering subsequent developments, including criminal proceedings against the appellant, as serious concerns undermining his claims.

Facts:

The Plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for declaration and possession, which was dismissed.

An appeal against the decree's dismissal was also unsuccessful.

The Plaintiff then filed a second appeal before the High Court.

The High Court, without framing substantial questions of law, allowed the second appeal and decreed the suit.

Issues:

Whether the High Court, in a second appeal, is required to frame substantial questions of law under Section 100(4) of the CPC.

The adequacy of legal grounds for setting aside the High Court's judgment.

Held:

The court acknowledges that, as established in previous rulings, the High Court must frame substantial questions of law under Section 100(4) of the CPC to gain jurisdiction for deciding a second appeal on merits.

The High Court's failure to frame any substantial question of law is deemed a sufficient ground to set aside the judgment under appeal.

The matter is remanded to the High Court, with instructions to decide the appeal only after framing a substantial question of law relevant to the case.

Final Result : Allowed

Facts:

Appellants are inhabitants of Khajuri, Tehsil Jagadari, District Yamuna Nagar, Haryana.

"Charand" land vested in the Gram Panchayat.

Appellants filed a writ petition opposing leasing out of Charand land by Gram Panchayat.

Issues:

Whether the reservation of Charand land for Gram Panchayat income violates Article 31A.

Whether the land could vest in Gram Panchayat without compensating proprietors.

Legality of Charand land reservation under Section 5 of the Act.

Alleged contravention of grazing rights of proprietors and non-proprietors.

Held:

The High Court, relying on precedent (Khushi Puri's case), held Charand land falls under "Shamilat deh" as defined in the Act.

Gram Panchayat empowered to use the land for specified purposes, including leasing out for cultivation, as per Rule 3(2).

Distinction between Charand land and shamilat deh rejected. The High Court's decision affirmed, stating no violation of Article 31A.

Appellants' delay in legal action noted. The court finds the appeal without merit and dismisses it without costs.

Facts:

The appellant, a Mistry working in a village, was found guilty of raping an infant child of one and a half years. The incident took place when the appellant visited the victim's house and assaulted her, leading to criminal charges.

Issues:

Whether the trial court's decision to sentence the appellant to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment was adequate, considering the victim's age and the gravity of the offense. The court must determine if there are extenuating circumstances justifying the enhancement of the sentence to life imprisonment.

Held:

The trial court and the High Court both found the appellant guilty of raping a one-and-a-half-year-old child. The trial court, while acknowledging some reformation in the accused during custody, justified the 10-year sentence based on the heinous nature of the crime and the age of the victim.

The appellate court, considering the possibility of enhancement, issued a notice to the appellant. The appellant's counsel, Mr. Seeraj Bagga, argued against enhancement, presenting extenuating circumstances such as the reformation of the accused during custody and the impact on his family.

The court, taking a holistic view, emphasized the severe psychological and physical impact of rape on the victim. Acknowledging the extenuating circumstances presented by the defense, especially the fact that the appellant's daughters are of marriageable age, the court decided not to enhance the sentence to life imprisonment.

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and the notice for the enhancement of the sentence was recalled.

Facts:

The appellant, Dalbir Singh, drove a bus that caused the death of a cyclist.

The incident occurred on 4th July 1994 in Bhiwani.

The trial court convicted the appellant under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC, sentencing him to three months and one year of imprisonment, respectively.

Issues:

Whether the appellant is entitled to the benefit of probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

Held:

The court emphasized the importance of maintaining a deterrent element in sentencing, especially for drivers found guilty of rash driving.

The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and sentences imposed by the lower courts.

The court held that the nature of the offense under Section 304A IPC, involving death by rash or negligent driving, does not merit the benefit of probation under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

The court noted that the word "expedient" in Section 4 of the PO Act implies suitability and appropriateness to the end in view, considering the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offense.

The appellant's plea that he was not the driver and that the accident was due to the negligence of the cyclist was rejected.

Facts:

Two companies engaged in real estate entered agreements for the sale of flats/apartments. They filed Form 37-I before the Appropriate Authority seeking no objection for registration. The Authority pointed out defects, requiring a revised form within 15 days. The revised form was filed after 15 days and rejected.

Issues:

Is the 15-day period in Rule 48L mandatory?

Was the rejection of Form 37-I justified based on the purported non-furnishing of requisite particulars?

Held:

The court held that the 15-day period in Rule 48L is not mandatory. The Appropriate Authority erred in deeming Form 37-I not to have been furnished after 15 days. As no order for purchase by the Central Government was made within three months, the Authority must issue a no objection certificate.

The court emphasized that Form 37-I was in order, and rejection on the grounds of non-furnishing of particulars was inappropriate. Form 37-I is a composite form, and not all particulars are necessary for every transaction. The Authority must either order purchase or issue a no objection certificate.

The court clarified that the provisions do not require multiple agreements or filings. Once an order is made under Section 269 UD, no further Form 37-I is needed. The Appropriate Authority must make a final decision based on the whole agreement.

The court stressed the historical setting of Chapter XX-C, indicating its use in cases of tax evasion through undervaluation. The Authority must focus on fair market value and avoid irrelevant considerations.

The court distinguished between an "agreement for transfer" and Form 37-I, noting that the latter is the foundation for jurisdiction. The Agreement can be changed, but Form 37-I cannot be altered after filing.

Facts:

The appellant's father was a tenant of a specified land for about 50 years.

Landlords initiated proceedings for resumption of half of the land in 1967, partly allowed in 1968.

Despite the order, landlords didn't take possession, appealing for the resumption of the entire land.

The Act was amended in 1974, introducing Section 44.

Issues:

Whether the appellant can claim occupancy rights under Section 44 despite a previous order allowing partial resumption.

Held:

The Tribunal and High Court based their decisions on the earlier order and did not consider the implications of Section 44.

Section 44 states that all lands held by tenants, even those against whom resumption orders were issued, stand transferred to and vest in the State Government.

The rights of the landlords vested absolutely in the State Government, and tenants were entitled to rights and privileges under the Act.

Despite the order in favor of landlords, they had not taken possession, and the Tribunal and High Court had erroneously rejected the appellant's claim under Section 44.

The appeal is allowed, setting aside the decisions of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court and the Tribunal.

The appellants are entitled to the conferment of rights on the entire land under Section 44 read with Section 45 of the Act.