Service Law – Voluntary Retirement – Withdrawal After Acceptance – Rule 66(5) of Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1986 – Petitioner, a Medical Officer, sought voluntary retirement effective 4 July 2023, later attempted to withdraw it before acceptance and again after retirement alleging depression – Retirement duly accepted by competent authority – Held: Once resignation/voluntary retirement is accepted and comes into effect, employee ceases to be in service and cannot seek reinstatement – Doctrine of locus poenitentiae applies only before effective retirement date – No procedural illegality found [Paras 5–8, 17–18].

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Mental Disability – Applicability to Voluntary Resignation – Petitioner’s contention that her depression constituted “mental illness” under Section 2(5) of the Act raised for first time in writ petition – No medical certificate or contemporaneous evidence of disability produced – Held: Plea of disability cannot be raised belatedly to nullify valid retirement – Authorities had no obligation to infer mental incapacity absent medical record [Paras 9–11, 17].

Administrative Tribunal – Scope of Judicial Review – Concurrent Findings – Tribunal rightly held that resignation was validly processed – High Court refused to reappreciate factual findings in absence of perversity or illegality [Paras 8, 18].

Disabilities Act – Section 47 and 20 – Non-Applicability – Remedy Before Commissioner – Court held that if petitioner genuinely claimed protection as a disabled person, she ought to have approached the Commissioner under Disabilities Act – Failure to do so confirmed that plea was afterthought following dismissal before Tribunal [Paras 21].

Writ Jurisdiction – No Direction Contrary to Statutory Rules – High Court reiterated that it cannot direct authorities to act in violation of service rules – State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra (1996) 9 SCC 309 applied [Para 19–20].

Precedents Distinguished – Bhagwan Dass v. Punjab State Electricity Board (AIR 2008 SC 990), Kunal Singh v. Union of India (AIR 2003 SC 1623), and Geetaben Ratilal Patel v. District Primary Education Officer (AIR 2013 SC 3092) held inapplicable as those cases involved established disabilities existing during service; petitioner’s claim arose post-retirement [Paras 13–15].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – No ground to interfere with MAT order – Rule discharged – No costs [Para 22].

Rent Law – Fair Rent Fixation – Retrospective Operation – Equitable Relief – Arrears – Tenant Surrender – Delay in Proceedings – Tenant cannot be burdened with arrears at newly fixed fair rent retrospectively from 2013 when rent control proceedings prolonged for over a decade – Appellate Court had fixed Rs.32,000/month with 5% annual increase from 2014 onwards – Held: Direction to pay arrears at a rate 150 times higher than existing rent would result in grave prejudice – Rent to be paid at Rs.25,000/month from 24.02.2021 (date of Rent Controller’s order) and Rs.32,000/month from 18.03.2024 (Appellate Court’s order) – Arrears from 2013 to 2021 not recoverable in rent control proceedings but liberty left to landlord to pursue civil remedy – Modification granted to ensure balance of interests [Paras 1, 2, 5, 6].

Rent Control – Public Policy – Delay in Adjudication – Effect – Rent control statutes intended to protect both landlord and tenant – Proceedings that linger for more than 10 years cannot be used to justify oppressive financial burdens – Held: Rent control litigation cannot be permitted to function as an instrument of oppression due to systemic delays – Tenant’s act of surrender during pendency cannot be overlooked [Paras 3, 5, 6].

Limitation – Civil Suit for Arrears – Cause of Action – Landlord’s claim for arrears from 2013 onwards to be decided in civil suit – Court refrains from deciding limitation issue in rent control proceedings [Para 4].

Decision: Order of Appellate Authority modified – Landlord entitled to claim arrears only from 24.02.2021 at Rs.25,000/month and from 18.03.2024 at Rs.32,000/month with 5% increase – Revisions disposed of accordingly.

Criminal Law – Anticipatory Bail – Forgery and Fraud – The High Court considered an anticipatory bail application by an accused (accused No. 3) in a case involving alleged forgery of documents, fraudulent land transactions, and tampering with revenue records (7/12 extracts) related to ancestral land. The transactions in question dated back to 2003-2011, while the FIR was lodged in 2025, raising significant questions about delay. The court examined the impact of registered documents, rectification deeds, statutory permissions granted by the Sub-Divisional Officer, and prior civil settlements on the bona fides of the delayed FIR. It also assessed the necessity of custodial interrogation given the applicant's cooperation and the release of co-accused on bail, and the relevance of the applicant's criminal antecedents. The court distinguished the present case from the Supreme Court's ruling in Pratibha Manchanda by noting that the documents here were registered and publicly accessible for years, unlike the concealed forged documents in Pratibha Manchanda. The court concluded that while the allegations of forgery were serious, the substantial delay, public nature of the transactions, and the applicant's cooperation weighed in favor of granting anticipatory bail with stringent conditions. [Paras 1, 30-34, 38-39, 44-47, 52-54, 56-57, 59-62, 65-66, 69]

Criminal Procedure – Anticipatory Bail – Delay in lodging FIR – The court noted a substantial delay of 12 to 15 years in lodging the FIR concerning transactions that were registered and part of public records since 2003-2011. This delay, coupled with the existence of registered instruments, statutory permissions granted after inquiry, and prior civil settlements involving the same property and parties, raised serious questions about the bona fides of the prosecution. The court emphasized that such prolonged inaction, especially when civil remedies were pursued, militates against the genuineness of the grievance and suggests the criminal law might be invoked to unsettle concluded civil matters. [Paras 35, 38-39, 44-47]

Criminal Law – Evidence – Public Records and Civil Adjudication – The court highlighted that the impugned transactions involved registered conveyance and rectification deeds, which were part of the public record for over a decade. Furthermore, statutory permission under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act was granted by the Sub-Divisional Officer after due inquiry, carrying a presumption of regularity. The existence of civil disputes, settlements, and confirming deeds related to the same property indicated that interested parties had acknowledged and acted upon these transactions. While civil adjudication does not entirely bar criminal prosecution for forgery, these factors are crucial in assessing the bona fides of a delayed FIR. [Paras 35-37, 45-46, 52]

Criminal Procedure – Anticipatory Bail – Custodial Interrogation – The court reiterated that custodial interrogation is not a routine requirement and must be justified by the investigating agency demonstrating its indispensability for eliciting information not otherwise obtainable. In this case, the applicant had cooperated with the investigation, produced documents, and co-accused purchasers had already been granted bail. The prosecution failed to identify any specific recovery or circumstance that exclusively hinged on the applicant's custodial presence, leading the court to conclude that non-custodial measures with stringent conditions could adequately safeguard the investigation. [Paras 42-43, 58-62, 65-66, 69]

Criminal Procedure – Anticipatory Bail – Criminal History – The applicant had a chequered history with several registered cases. However, the court emphasized the need for a qualitative assessment rather than merely counting the number of cases. It noted that in many cases, the applicant had been acquitted, FIRs quashed, or summary reports filed, indicating that the antecedents did not conclusively establish an inclination to evade law or obstruct investigation. The court held that antecedents are a relevant factor but not an absolute bar to anticipatory bail, warranting suitable protective conditions instead of outright rejection. [Paras 18, 28, 63-64, 67-68]

Criminal Law – Precedent – Forgery and Delay – The court carefully considered the Supreme Court's judgment in Pratibha Manchanda, which held that delay in lodging an FIR is not material in cases of clear forgery involving public documents, especially when the complainant had no prior knowledge of collusive civil proceedings and clandestine transactions. However, the High Court distinguished the present case, noting that here, the impugned documents (conveyance, rectification deeds) were registered and publicly accessible for years, and civil suits had been instituted. Unlike Pratibha Manchanda where the forged document was concealed for decades, the transactions here were visible and engaged with by the family, thus making the substantial delay a significant factor. [Paras 26, 29, 50-54]

Decision: – Anticipatory bail granted – Subject to stringent conditions to ensure cooperation with investigation, prevent tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses, and restrict movement. The High Court granted anticipatory bail to the applicant, Shyamsundar Radhyesham Agarwal, in connection with Crime Register No. 559 of 2025. The applicant is to be released on a personal bond of Rs. 50,000 with two local sureties of Rs. 50,000 each. Conditions include furnishing residential address, cooperating with the investigation, making himself available for questioning, producing all relevant documents, not inducing/threatening witnesses, not tampering with evidence, not leaving the trial court's jurisdiction without permission, reporting to the investigating officer weekly, and submitting his passport. The court also clarified that the order does not affect the civil rights of the parties. [Paras 69-73]

Consumer Law – Dismissal for Non-Prosecution – Restoration – Writ Jurisdiction – Complaint filed before State Consumer Commission dismissed for non-prosecution – Single Judge set aside dismissal relying on Sections 38(2)(c) and 49 of Consumer Protection Act, 2019, holding the Commission was bound to decide on merits even in absence of complainant – Held: Single Judge erred in entertaining writ petition under Article 226 – Alternative remedy under Section 58(1)(b) before National Commission was available – Writ appeal allowed, judgment set aside [Paras 3-6, 8.2, 9].

Writ Jurisdiction – Alternative Remedy – Scope – Availability of remedy before National Commission bars writ under Article 226 – Court reiterates that statutory mechanism cannot be bypassed merely because order is erroneous or jurisdictionally flawed – Cites Supreme Court decision in Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2510 – Held: Entertaining writ despite statutory remedy violates settled principles of judicial review [Paras 5.2, 8, 8.1].

Consumer Protection – Appeal vs. Revision – Statutory Remedy – Dismissal of complaint not appealable under Section 51 – However, remedy of revision under Section 58(1)(b) remains available – Held: Even if dismissal was for non-prosecution, revision before National Commission could have addressed alleged jurisdictional irregularity [Paras 5.1, 8].

Decision: Writ Appeal allowed – Judgment of learned Single Judge set aside – Respondents granted liberty to approach National Commission within 30 days – Time spent in High Court proceedings to be excluded for limitation purposes [Para 9].

Criminal Law – Prohibitory Order – Section 163 BNSS (erstwhile Section 144 Cr.P.C.) – Legality of ex-parte order restricting a Pontiff's entry into a district – Held: Order quashed for being disproportionate, lacking emergent justification for its ex-parte nature, and violating fundamental rights, especially when based on a prior order clarified by the Apex Court not to be a basis for fresh restrictions [Paras 18-19].

Criminal Procedure – Prohibitory Order – Section 163 BNSS (erstwhile Section 144 Cr.P.C.) – Nature and Scope – Held: The power under Section 163 BNSS (akin to Section 144 Cr.P.C.) is remedial and preventive, intended for urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger requiring immediate prevention or speedy remedy; it is not to be used to suppress legitimate expression or democratic rights, and must be exercised bona fide, reasonably, with application of mind, and employing the least intrusive measures, balancing rights and restrictions. Repetitive orders are an abuse of power. [Paras 12.2, 12.5, 12.6, 12.7, 13.10, 15]

Criminal Procedure – Prohibitory Order – Ex-parte Orders – Justification for – Held: Ex-parte orders under Section 163(2) BNSS (erstwhile Section 144(2) Cr.P.C.) are justified only in genuine emergencies where circumstances do not permit timely service of notice; the Magistrate must record material facts, reasons for urgency, and why notice could not be issued, as a mere statement of necessity is insufficient, and failure to provide a pre-decisional or post-decisional hearing when time permits renders the order illegal. [Paras 12.2, 12.5, 13.3, 13.4, 13.7, 13.8, 14, 17]

Criminal Procedure – Prohibitory Order – Duration and Proportionality – Held: Orders under Section 163 BNSS (erstwhile Section 144 Cr.P.C.) are temporary, not permanent or semi-permanent, with a maximum duration of two months by a Magistrate; the restraint must be minimal, commensurate with the object, and proportionate to the apprehended threat, not exceeding the constraints of the particular situation in nature or duration; a blanket order debarring entry into an entire district for two months when the event was for three days is excessive and disproportionate. [Paras 12.4, 12.5, 12.6, 13.3, 13.11, 14, 16, 17, 19]

Constitutional Law – Judicial Review – Scope of – Held: Orders passed under Section 163 BNSS (erstwhile Section 144 Cr.P.C.), though executive/administrative, are amenable to writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/32 of the Constitution if they violate fundamental rights; judicial review focuses on the decision-making process, interfering only if the order is patently without jurisdiction, vitiated by mala fides, based on no material, or suffers from manifest arbitrariness, and not to substitute the court's opinion for that of the competent authority. [Paras 12.3, 12.5, 12.6, 13.5, 13.8, 14]

Constitutional Law – Fundamental Rights – Freedom of Movement, Speech, and Religion – Restrictions on – Held: The fundamental rights to free movement (Article 19(1)(d)), speech and expression (Article 19(1)(a)), and to profess and propagate religion (Articles 25, 26) are subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(5) in the interest of public order; however, such restrictions must be least intrusive, justified by objective and concrete material facts, and not based on mere subjective impression, surmises, or exaggerated susceptibilities, as the State has a duty to protect these rights. [Paras 8, 9, 12.5, 12.6, 13.7, 13.8, 14, 17]

Precedent – Application of Apex Court Clarification – Held: The Apex Court's clarification that a previous prohibitory order should not form the basis for passing fresh orders must be strictly adhered to; relying solely on a prior dismissed writ petition and the Apex Court's non-interference order as the exclusive foundation for a new restrictive action, especially when the Apex Court explicitly stated it should not be a basis for externment from other districts, constitutes a blatant violation and suggests an absence of other material against the petitioner. [Paras 2.1, 4, 8, 9, 18]

Decision – Writ Petition – Quashing of Prohibitory Order – Held: The writ petition is allowed, and the prohibitory order dated 04.11.2025 is quashed; the order failed the tests of constitutionality and legality, being disproportionate, lacking emergent justification for its ex-parte nature, and violating fundamental rights, particularly as it was based on a prior order clarified by the Apex Court not to be a basis for fresh restrictions; all consequential actions taken or to be taken pursuant to the impugned order also stand obliterated. [Paras 19, 20]

Land Revenue – Correction of RoR – Natural Justice – Order recalling rent fixation and altering RoR passed by Additional Tahasildar without issuing notice or hearing the recorded tenants – Held: Violates settled principles of natural justice; order quashed; matter remanded for fresh hearing [Paras 4-6, 8].

Record of Rights – Correction without Notice – Audi Alteram Partem – Additional Tahasildar recalled earlier rent-fixation order and restored land to previous status without issuing notice to petitioners whose names already stood recorded in RoR – Held: Any correction of RoR affecting rights of recorded tenants must mandatorily be preceded by notice and opportunity of hearing – Impugned order passed in violation of natural justice and thus unsustainable [Paras 3-6].

Revenue Proceedings – Rent Fixation – Petitioners had valid rent receipts and RoR entries pursuant to Tahasildar’s order dated 16.07.2019 – Subsequent suo motu recall by Additional Tahasildar on 03.02.2020 without hearing the petitioners held arbitrary and contrary to law – Order deserves to be quashed [Paras 2-4, 6].

Natural Justice – Mandatory Compliance – Court reiterated that any order affecting vested rights in land records cannot be passed behind the back of the recorded persons – Absence of notice renders order void for breach of natural justice – Hearing is indispensable whenever RoR correction affects existing entries [Para 5].

Decision – Writ petition allowed – Impugned order dated 03.02.2020 quashed – Matter remitted to Additional Tahasildar for fresh adjudication after granting opportunity of hearing to all concerned – Proceedings to be completed preferably within two months from appearance of parties [Paras 7-9].

Criminal Law – Prohibitory Order – Section 163 BNSS (erstwhile Section 144 Cr.P.C.) – Legality of ex-parte order restricting a Pontiff's entry into a district – Held: Order quashed for being disproportionate, lacking emergent justification for its ex-parte nature, and violating fundamental rights, especially when based on a prior order clarified by the Apex Court not to be a basis for fresh restrictions [Paras 18-19].

Criminal Procedure – Prohibitory Order – Section 163 BNSS (erstwhile Section 144 Cr.P.C.) – Nature and Scope – Held: The power under Section 163 BNSS (akin to Section 144 Cr.P.C.) is remedial and preventive, intended for urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger requiring immediate prevention or speedy remedy; it is not to be used to suppress legitimate expression or democratic rights, and must be exercised bona fide, reasonably, with application of mind, and employing the least intrusive measures, balancing rights and restrictions. Repetitive orders are an abuse of power. [Paras 12.2, 12.5, 12.6, 12.7, 13.10, 15]

Criminal Procedure – Prohibitory Order – Ex-parte Orders – Justification for – Held: Ex-parte orders under Section 163(2) BNSS (erstwhile Section 144(2) Cr.P.C.) are justified only in genuine emergencies where circumstances do not permit timely service of notice; the Magistrate must record material facts, reasons for urgency, and why notice could not be issued, as a mere statement of necessity is insufficient, and failure to provide a pre-decisional or post-decisional hearing when time permits renders the order illegal. [Paras 12.2, 12.5, 13.3, 13.4, 13.7, 13.8, 14, 17]

Criminal Procedure – Prohibitory Order – Duration and Proportionality – Held: Orders under Section 163 BNSS (erstwhile Section 144 Cr.P.C.) are temporary, not permanent or semi-permanent, with a maximum duration of two months by a Magistrate; the restraint must be minimal, commensurate with the object, and proportionate to the apprehended threat, not exceeding the constraints of the particular situation in nature or duration; a blanket order debarring entry into an entire district for two months when the event was for three days is excessive and disproportionate. [Paras 12.4, 12.5, 12.6, 13.3, 13.11, 14, 16, 17, 19]

Constitutional Law – Judicial Review – Scope of – Held: Orders passed under Section 163 BNSS (erstwhile Section 144 Cr.P.C.), though executive/administrative, are amenable to writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/32 of the Constitution if they violate fundamental rights; judicial review focuses on the decision-making process, interfering only if the order is patently without jurisdiction, vitiated by mala fides, based on no material, or suffers from manifest arbitrariness, and not to substitute the court's opinion for that of the competent authority. [Paras 12.3, 12.5, 12.6, 13.5, 13.8, 14]

Constitutional Law – Fundamental Rights – Freedom of Movement, Speech, and Religion – Restrictions on – Held: The fundamental rights to free movement (Article 19(1)(d)), speech and expression (Article 19(1)(a)), and to profess and propagate religion (Articles 25, 26) are subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(5) in the interest of public order; however, such restrictions must be least intrusive, justified by objective and concrete material facts, and not based on mere subjective impression, surmises, or exaggerated susceptibilities, as the State has a duty to protect these rights. [Paras 8, 9, 12.5, 12.6, 13.7, 13.8, 14, 17]

Precedent – Application of Apex Court Clarification – Held: The Apex Court's clarification that a previous prohibitory order should not form the basis for passing fresh orders must be strictly adhered to; relying solely on a prior dismissed writ petition and the Apex Court's non-interference order as the exclusive foundation for a new restrictive action, especially when the Apex Court explicitly stated it should not be a basis for externment from other districts, constitutes a blatant violation and suggests an absence of other material against the petitioner. [Paras 2.1, 4, 8, 9, 18]

Decision – Writ Petition – Quashing of Prohibitory Order – Held: The writ petition is allowed, and the prohibitory order dated 04.11.2025 is quashed; the order failed the tests of constitutionality and legality, being disproportionate, lacking emergent justification for its ex-parte nature, and violating fundamental rights, particularly as it was based on a prior order clarified by the Apex Court not to be a basis for fresh restrictions; all consequential actions taken or to be taken pursuant to the impugned order also stand obliterated. [Paras 19, 20]

Taxation Law - Customs – Adjudication after Remand – Cross-Examination – Tribunal directed that all six relied-upon witnesses be made available for cross-examination – After remand, three witnesses appeared and were cross-examined, deposing in favour of petitioners – Three others failed to appear despite four opportunities – Adjudicating authority relied only on statements of non-appearing witnesses and ignored evidence of appearing witnesses – Held illegal and contrary to settled principles [Paras 1–2, 8].

Section 138-B, Customs Act – Relevancy of Statements – Clause (b) mandates cross-examination before statement can be used – Clause (a) applies only where non-availability is proved (death, inability, being kept out of the way, unreasonable delay, etc.) – Adjudicating authority must record a specific finding of impossibility of securing witness – Further, assessee must be confronted with such statement with opportunity to rebut – Held: Mandatory procedure not followed; reliance on untested statements impermissible [Paras 9–11].

Natural Justice – Denial of Cross-Examination – Statements of witnesses who were never tested through cross-examination cannot be used to fasten liability without satisfying strict conditions of Section 138-B(1)(a) – Absence of reasons, absence of findings on non-availability, and non-confrontation render the order unsustainable – Ignoring cross-examined witnesses’ testimony held violative of fair play [Paras 10–12].

Tribunal’s Remand Directions – Compliance – Tribunal remanded matter solely to permit cross-examination of all six witnesses – Post-remand proceedings had to evaluate both categories of witnesses: (i) three produced and cross-examined, and (ii) three unproduced – Adjudicating authority failed to apply correct approach as laid down in Section 138-B – Held: Directions not properly understood or applied [Paras 6–12].

Judicial Review – Scope – High Court clarifies correct legal approach under Section 138-B – Adjudicating authority must first attempt to secure presence of witness; if presence cannot be secured, must record finding; next, must confront assessee with statement; then must evaluate statement with corroboration – None of these steps were followed – Impugned order quashed [Paras 10–12].

Decision: Petition allowed – Impugned order dated 18.03.2025 set aside – Matter remanded to adjudicating authority for fresh adjudication strictly in accordance with law and Court’s directions – To be completed within 12 weeks – All issues kept open [Para 13].

Negotiable Instruments – Dishonour of Cheque – Presumption under Section 139 NI Act – Complainant claimed accused borrowed Rs.5,40,000/- and issued cheque for Rs.2,50,000/- in partial discharge – Cheque dishonoured with remark “payment stopped by drawer” – Complainant relied on promissory note and supporting witness – Held: Initial presumption under Section 139 arises, but accused successfully rebutted it by establishing preponderance of probability that the cheque was not issued in discharge of alleged debt – Acquittal by trial court upheld [Paras 3–14].

Cheque Dishonour – Defence Evidence – Accused claimed cheque was issued for earlier loan of Rs.2,50,000/- and was later repaid – Accused relied on variations in handwriting/ink on cheque and promissory note, and testimony of his brother – Court found the defence plausible – Letter stopping payment on cheques predates dishonour – Held: Defence raised sufficient doubt about complainant’s version – Rebuttal of presumption under NI Act proved by defence evidence [Paras 12–14].

Criminal Appeal – Scope of Interference with Acquittal – Appeal against concurrent findings of acquittal by trial and sessions court – High Court found no perversity in appreciation of evidence – Held: View taken by trial court is reasonable and supported by evidence – No ground to interfere in acquittal under Section 378 CrPC [Paras 14–15].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Acquittal of respondent/accused confirmed – Trial court’s finding that presumption under NI Act was rebutted and complainant failed to prove legally enforceable debt upheld.