Criminal Writ - Habeas Corpus - Preventive Detention – Right to Representation – Failure to Inform – Violation of Article 22(5) – Context of detention order passed by District Magistrate under NSA – Held: Article 22(5) of the Constitution confers two distinct rights: the right to be informed of the grounds of detention and the right to be afforded the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the order. This right extends to making a representation specifically to the Detaining Authority (here, the District Magistrate) as long as the authority retains the power to revoke the order (within 12 days under NSA). In this case, the grounds of detention only informed the petitioner of his right to represent to the State Government, Central Government, and the Advisory Board, conspicuously omitting the Detaining Authority. This failure to inform the detenue of his right to represent to the authority that passed the order renders the detention illegal and vitiates the order. [Para 34]

Preventive Detention – Delay in Disposal of Representation – Unexplained Delay – Fatal to Detention – Context of 12 days delay by District Magistrate in forwarding representation to State Government – Held: The personal liberty of a citizen is paramount, and authorities are constitutionally mandated to deal with representations against preventive detention with a sense of urgency. The record showed that the petitioner submitted his representation on 23.09.2025, but the District Magistrate only forwarded it to the State Government on 05.10.2025. The affidavit filed by the authorities failed to provide any explanation whatsoever for this 12-day delay. Relying on established precedents, the Court held that such unexplained delay in processing the representation violates the constitutional safeguards under Article 22(5) and is fatal to the continued detention of the petitioner. [Paras 35, 39]

Decision: Writ Petition allowed. Detention order set aside. Detenue directed to be set at liberty. [Para 41]

Constitutional Law – Resignation by Legislator – Inaction by Chairman – Writ maintainable – Petitioner, a Member of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council, submitted resignation on 23.11.2024 – Chairman failed to act upon it for over nine months – Held: Under Article 190(3)(b) and Rule 190 of the Council Rules, the Chairman is duty-bound to verify only voluntariness and genuineness of resignation and render a decision within reasonable time – Inaction held arbitrary and violative of Article 14 [Paras 26, 56, 64, 68]

Discretionary Power – Limits on Constitutional Functionaries – No absolute discretion – Discretion under Article 190(3)(b) and Rule 190 must align with constitutional standards – Use of term “may” in Rule 190(2) interpreted as “must” in light of constitutional intent and Parliamentary debates – Chairman cannot indefinitely delay action on resignation – Time beyond a month unreasonable [Paras 24, 29-33, 60-63]

Judicial Review – Legislative Procedure – Limited scope of interference – Courts may not decide voluntariness/genuineness but may intervene against prolonged delay – Held: Chairman’s prolonged inaction offends Wednesbury reasonableness and constitutional morality – Judicial review available on grounds of arbitrariness [Paras 24, 39, 44, 64-66]

Legislative Practice – Timeline for inquiry into resignation – Based on debates during 33rd Constitutional Amendment, inquiry into voluntariness/genuineness must be completed preferably within a fortnight or, at most, a month – Chairman’s call for personal interaction after one year held unjustified – Court directed completion of process within four weeks [Paras 53, 55, 68]

Decision: Writ Petition allowed – Chairman directed to complete inquiry into petitioner’s resignation and render a decision within four weeks – Inaction held illegal, arbitrary, and violative of Article 14.

Service Law – Seniority – Determination of Inter-se Seniority – Direct Recruits vs. Promotees – Recruitment Year vs. Date of Appointment – Held: Seniority cannot be reckoned from the date of occurrence of vacancy or initiation of recruitment process unless expressly provided by rules – It must be reckoned from the date of substantive appointment/entry into the cadre – The judgment in K. Meghachandra Singh (2020), which overruled N.R. Parmar (2012), is binding – Direct recruits appointed later cannot claim seniority over promotees appointed earlier, even if the vacancies pertained to an earlier year. [Paras 12, 18-19]

Precedent – Binding Nature – Reference to Larger Bench – Held: The fact that the decision in K. Meghachandra Singh has been referred to a larger bench in Hariharan (2022) does not stay its operation or dilute its binding nature – Subordinate courts and Tribunals must follow the existing law declared by the Supreme Court until it is overruled – Administration of justice cannot be put on hold awaiting a larger bench decision. [Para 20]

Seniority – Retrospective Application – Held: An employee not borne in the cadre cannot be given seniority retrospectively to affect those validly appointed in the meantime – Petitioners (Direct Recruits) appointed in 2017 cannot claim seniority over Promotees appointed in 2016, despite vacancies relating to 2015/2016. [Para 19]

Decision: Writ Petitions dismissed. Tribunal order upholding the seniority list based on K. Meghachandra Singh affirmed.

Civil Law – Remand of Case – Order 41 Rule 23A CPC – Failure to Appreciate Evidence Independently – Context of Trial Court decreeing a suit for possession solely based on a previous judgment (Ex. PX) without independent findings on title – Held: The Trial Court committed a material procedural error by failing to record independent findings on the core issue of title (Issue No. 1). Instead of discussing the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties, the Trial Court relied exclusively on a previous judgment (Ex. PX) concerning the same land. Since Ex. PX was subsequently set aside by the Appellate Court, the entire foundation of the Trial Court's decree collapsed. The Lower Appellate Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction to set aside the decree and remand the matter for a fresh decision, as the Trial Court had effectively failed to apply its judicial mind to the pleadings and evidence on record. A wholesale remand is permissible and necessary when the Trial Court has not decided material issues on their own merits. [Paras 14-15]

Decision: Appeal dismissed. Case remanded to Trial Court. [Para 16]

Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 – Section 12 – Bail to Child in Conflict with Law (CCL) – Gravity of Offence vs. Statutory Mandate – Held: While the alleged offence (RPG attack on Police Station) is grave, Section 12 mandates bail as a rule for juveniles, irrespective of the nature of the offence (bailable or non-bailable) – Bail can only be denied if there are reasonable grounds to believe that release would bring the person into association with known criminals, expose them to moral/physical danger, or defeat the ends of justice – Mere apprehension by the State without material evidence on record regarding such association or danger is insufficient to deny bail. [Paras 8, 10]

Bail – Parity and Academic Career – Held: Co-accused (adults) facing similar charges were granted bail – Continued detention of juveniles would serve no purpose and adversely affect their academic career (one appellant being a B.A. student) – No criminal antecedents shown apart from the instant case – Appeals allowed; bail granted. [Paras 9-10]

Decision: Appeals allowed. Impugned orders set aside. Appellants ordered to be released on bail.

Criminal Law – Section 406 IPC – Stridhan – Effect of Divorce by Mutual Consent – Complainant filed case for recovery of Stridhan after divorce – Held: Once the marriage is dissolved by a decree of divorce by mutual consent based on a settlement, and no liberty is reserved to continue criminal proceedings, the wife is estopped from continuing proceedings against the husband. No dispute survives. Acquittal upheld. [Paras 16-18]

Criminal Law – Appeal against Acquittal – Scope of Interference – Held: The High Court will interfere with an acquittal only if the judgment is patently perverse, based on misreading of evidence, or if the conclusion is one no reasonable person could reach. The Trial Court's view was reasonable and supported by Supreme Court precedents. [Paras 11-12]

Decision: Appeal dismissed. [Para 21]

Tenancy Law - Rent Control Act – Co-owner’s Right to Evict Tenant – Ownership Dispute – Tenant’s Purchase of Co-owner’s Share – Tenant claimed ownership by virtue of sale deed dated 15.12.2016 executed by landlord’s sister (co-owner) after eviction petition was filed – Held: Sale pendente lite hit by doctrine of lis pendens – No merger of tenancy under Section 111(d) TPA unless entirety of lessor’s and lessee’s rights vest in one person – Purchase of one co-owner’s undivided share does not extinguish tenancy – Eviction maintainable by any co-owner without consent or NOC from others [Paras 19–23, 25–26].

Delhi Rent Control Act – Section 14(1)(e) – Bona Fide Requirement – Maintainability by One Co-owner – Landlord need not obtain prior consent or affidavit of other co-owners to file eviction – Petition by one co-owner valid unless another co-owner actively opposes – Mere impleadment application under Order I Rule 10 CPC by co-owner does not constitute objection [Paras 25–27].

Transfer of Property – Section 111(d) – Merger Doctrine – Effect of Partial Transfer – Tenant acquiring interest from one co-owner does not result in merger of lease and ownership – Ownership remains joint until partition by metes and bounds – Tenant continues to be bound by original tenancy [Paras 20–22].

Lis Pendens – Sale During Pendency of Eviction Proceedings – Sale deed executed by co-owner in favour of tenant during subsistence of eviction petition voidable and subject to outcome of pending proceedings – Transaction lacks bona fides where tenant aware of litigation and proceeds without disclosure to court [Paras 28–29].

Landlord–Tenant Relationship – Estoppel Against Denial of Title – Tenant, having admitted tenancy in written statement and deposition, estopped from disputing landlord’s title – ARC not competent to adjudicate ownership title disputes in eviction proceedings [Paras 24–25].

Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction – Section 25B(8), Delhi Rent Control Act – High Court’s interference confined to exceptional cases of jurisdictional or procedural error – Findings of ARC based on proper appreciation of law and evidence upheld – No ground for interference made out [Paras 30–31].

Decision: Revision dismissed – Eviction order dated 13.08.2024 upheld – Stay on execution vacated – Tenant directed to hand over possession of two shops (6’4” x 10’6” and 6’10” x 14’5”) at property No. 6165/1, Basti Regar, Dev Nagar, Karol Bagh, New Delhi – Benefit of six months under Section 14(7) of DRC Act held to have lapsed [Paras 31–33].

Criminal Law – Quashing of FIR – Section 528 BNSS – Scope of Judicial Interference – Petition sought quashing of FIR alleging that the petitioner, as Channel Head of Zee Rajasthan, extorted money and threatened vendors with adverse news coverage – Held: Allegations in FIR prima facie disclose cognizable offences – Court cannot evaluate evidence or conduct a “mini-trial” at FIR stage – Investigation must proceed unhindered – Quashing power to be exercised sparingly and in rare cases [Paras 9–11, 13–18].

Media Ethics – Abuse of Position by Journalist – Extortion and Coercion – FIR alleged that petitioner misused company’s platform to solicit money through threats of defamatory broadcasts – Such acts, if proven, constitute gross abuse of media authority and harm to public trust – Allegations require full investigation and cannot be nullified as employer-employee dispute [Paras 7.1–7.2, 22–23].

Freedom of Press – Limits and Responsibility – Court reiterated that press freedom is integral to democracy but carries duty of fairness, accuracy, and integrity – “Freedom of Press is imperative for a functioning democracy; however, misuse of such freedom through coercion or blackmail cannot be tolerated” [Preface; Paras 7–9].

Bhajan Lal Principles – Applicability – Case does not fall within any of the exceptional categories enumerated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 – Allegations not absurd, improbable, or mala fide on their face – Investigation must determine truth of allegations [Paras 2.1–2.4, 23].

Judicial Review – Stage of Investigation – Precedents Cited – Reaffirmed principles in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 407; Kaptan Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 9 SCC 35; Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 3 SCC 104; Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191 – High Court’s interference limited to cases where FIR does not disclose any cognizable offence [Paras 10–20].

Decision: FIR No. 257/2025 discloses cognizable offences – Investigation to continue uninhibited – Petition for quashing dismissed – Petitioner at liberty to approach Investigating Officer for fair-investigation concerns; IO to act as per law and issue notice under Section 35 BNSS if required [Paras 22–25].

Service Law – Wrongful Pay Fixation – Recovery – Group-D staff performing Group-C duties granted higher pay scale since 2004 – Recovery directed after 10–14 years – Applying Syed Abdul Qadir and Rafiq Masih – Held: Recovery from Group C/D employees, long-delayed and without misrepresentation, is inequitable and arbitrary; impugned memo/order quashed; refunds directed [Paras 23-26].

Service Law – Excess Payment – No Misrepresentation – Petitioners appointed as Rent Collectors (Group-D) but made to discharge Group-C duties due to staff shortages – Municipality granted Group-C scale from 01.08.2004, increments also paid – Held: Excess payment was not a result of any misrepresentation or fraud by petitioners; higher scale was granted by competent authorities and enjoyed for over a decade [Paras 3-8, 13].

Recovery of Excess Salary – Applicability of Supreme Court Precedents – Court relied on Syed Abdul Qadir, Rafiq Masih, and Jogeswar Sahoo – Laid down exceptions where recovery is impermissible: (i) employees in Group C/D; (ii) payments continued over five years; (iii) employees made to work on higher posts; (iv) recovery causing hardship – Held: Present facts squarely covered by all three conditions—recovery impermissible [Paras 15-18, 23-24].

Equity & Hardship – Long-Delayed Recovery – Petitioners received higher scale for 10–14 years; recovery initiated only in 2013/2017 after decades – Such recovery would be iniquitous, harsh, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 – Particularly because many petitioners were near retirement or had retired; hardship outweighs employer’s right to recover [Paras 23-24].

Refund of Amounts Recovered – Court invoked parity principle – Employees who had already refunded excess amounts must be reimbursed, following Syed Abdul Qadir which mandated refund of amounts earlier recovered by mistake – Directed refund within three months [Para 25].

Administrative Action – Legal Validity – Memo dated 27.05.2013 of Director of Local Bodies and Order dated 01.11.2017 of Chairman, Tarakeswar Municipality directing recovery and re-fixation of pay held illegal and set aside – Orders inconsistent with binding Supreme Court law and principles of fairness [Para 26].

Decision – WPA allowed – Impugned memo and order quashed – No recovery to be made; any recovered amounts to be refunded; all connected applications disposed; interim orders vacated [Paras 26-30].