Criminal Law – Maintainability of Second Application under Section 482 CrPC – Earlier application challenging summoning order and entire proceedings was withdrawn to pursue remedy of discharge – Trial Court dismissed discharge application as not maintainable in complaint case – Held: Second application maintainable due to change in circumstances – First application not decided on merits – Bar of res judicata not attracted in criminal proceedings – Principles clarified by Supreme Court in Muskan Enterprises, Anil Khadkiwala, and Bhisham Lal Verma cases [Paras 3–21].

Defamation – Summoning Order – Corporate Employer’s Use of “Absconding” in Show Cause Notices – Complaint under Section 500 IPC filed by former employee alleging defamatory content – Held: Use of term “absconding” in employment context not defamatory per se – Show cause issued in good faith over unauthorized absence – Covered under Seventh Exception to Section 499 IPC – Proceedings found to be malicious and driven by service dispute – Summoning order quashed [Paras 23–51].

Employer-Employee Dispute – Criminal Complaint Based on Service Grievance – Complainant issued show cause notices for unauthorized leave – Received full and final settlement – Instead of approaching labour or civil forum, filed criminal complaint – Court holds such recourse is misuse of process – Complaint lacks ingredients of criminal defamation – Entire proceedings quashed under Bhajan Lal principles [Paras 27–51].

Judicial Powers – Exercise of Section 482 CrPC – High Court reiterates caution against mechanical issuance of summons – Summoning accused is serious matter – Magistrate must apply judicial mind to preliminary evidence – Complaint devoid of prima facie case liable to be quashed [Paras 37–39, 48].

Decision: Applications allowed – Orders dated 06.09.2025, 18.10.2025, and 17.02.2025 set aside – Entire proceedings in Complaint Case No. 9669 of 2024 quashed qua applicants – Trial Court to be informed [Para 51].

Religious Institution – Classification under Endowments Act – Notification – Appellants challenged inclusion of Yogananda Ashramam as a public religious institution under Section 6(c)(ii) of A.P. Endowments Act – Evidence showed that Ashramam was established and maintained by founders' family without any public endowment, offerings, or public access – Court found that management was always with the family and public participation was minimal and not as of right – Held: Ashramam not a public religious institution within meaning of Section 2(23) – Notification quashed [Paras 10–22, 26–28]

Natural Justice – Publication under Section 6(c)(ii) – Procedure – Court held that no notice was given to appellants before notification enlisting Ashramam as public religious institution – Violation of principles of natural justice – Held: Notification issued without following Sections 43, 44, and income assessment under Section 65 – Procedurally flawed and legally unsustainable – [Paras 23–25, 28]

Specific Endowment – No Dedication of Property – Settlement deed did not indicate any dedication of property or income for public religious or charitable use – No evidence of specific endowment as per Section 2(25) – Held: Absence of endowment defeats classification as religious institution or temple – [Paras 21–22]

Legal Precedents – Private Religious Institutions – Followed precedents in VVVRK Yechendra v. State of A.P. and Miryala Narayana v. State of A.P. – High Court reiterated that publication under Section 6 must follow registration and hearing of affected parties – Held: Classification made in violation of binding procedural requirements and liable to be struck down – [Paras 23–25]

Decision: Appeal allowed – Gazette Notification under Section 6(c)(ii) dated 13.07.2000 quashed – Order of Deputy Commissioner dated 25.08.2009 in O.A. No. 42 of 2001 set aside – Ashramam held to be a private institution – No order as to costs – Pending miscellaneous petitions closed.

Constitutional Law – Resignation by Legislator – Inaction by Chairman – Writ maintainable – Petitioner, a Member of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council, submitted resignation on 23.11.2024 – Chairman failed to act upon it for over nine months – Held: Under Article 190(3)(b) and Rule 190 of the Council Rules, the Chairman is duty-bound to verify only voluntariness and genuineness of resignation and render a decision within reasonable time – Inaction held arbitrary and violative of Article 14 [Paras 26, 56, 64, 68]

Discretionary Power – Limits on Constitutional Functionaries – No absolute discretion – Discretion under Article 190(3)(b) and Rule 190 must align with constitutional standards – Use of term “may” in Rule 190(2) interpreted as “must” in light of constitutional intent and Parliamentary debates – Chairman cannot indefinitely delay action on resignation – Time beyond a month unreasonable [Paras 24, 29-33, 60-63]

Judicial Review – Legislative Procedure – Limited scope of interference – Courts may not decide voluntariness/genuineness but may intervene against prolonged delay – Held: Chairman’s prolonged inaction offends Wednesbury reasonableness and constitutional morality – Judicial review available on grounds of arbitrariness [Paras 24, 39, 44, 64-66]

Legislative Practice – Timeline for inquiry into resignation – Based on debates during 33rd Constitutional Amendment, inquiry into voluntariness/genuineness must be completed preferably within a fortnight or, at most, a month – Chairman’s call for personal interaction after one year held unjustified – Court directed completion of process within four weeks [Paras 53, 55, 68]

Decision: Writ Petition allowed – Chairman directed to complete inquiry into petitioner’s resignation and render a decision within four weeks – Inaction held illegal, arbitrary, and violative of Article 14.

Advocates – Suspension from Practice – Ex Parte Order – Principles of Natural Justice Violated – Bar Council of U.P. passed an order suspending petitioner for 10 years from practicing law on the allegation of bigamy – Petitioner argued he was not served notice or given opportunity of hearing – Court found that notice dated 17.02.2025 fixed appearance on 10.03.2025, but the order was passed prematurely on 23.02.2025 – Held: Suspension order passed in violation of natural justice – Quashed with liberty to issue proper notice and pass a reasoned order [Paras 3, 17–19].

Moral Turpitude – Allegation of Bigamy – Absence of Conviction – Whether acts of bigamy constitute moral turpitude in absence of conviction considered – Petitioner relied on Raj Kishor Yadav case – Court held moral turpitude must be tested contextually and cannot be presumed without adjudication – Distinguished Madras High Court judgment in P. Mohanasudaram which involved a conviction – Held: Without conviction, bigamy allegation alone cannot justify professional suspension [Paras 4–6, 13–16].

Alternative Remedy – Maintainability of Writ – Despite availability of appeal under the Advocates Act, writ petition entertained due to denial of natural justice – Held: Writ maintainable in exceptional circumstances where procedure is blatantly violated [Para 11].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Impugned order dated 23.02.2025 quashed – Bar Council directed to issue a fresh notice and pass a reasoned order in accordance with law within 12 weeks from the date of judgment.

Criminal Writ - Habeas Corpus - Preventive Detention – Right to Representation – Failure to Inform – Violation of Article 22(5) – Context of detention order passed by District Magistrate under NSA – Held: Article 22(5) of the Constitution confers two distinct rights: the right to be informed of the grounds of detention and the right to be afforded the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the order. This right extends to making a representation specifically to the Detaining Authority (here, the District Magistrate) as long as the authority retains the power to revoke the order (within 12 days under NSA). In this case, the grounds of detention only informed the petitioner of his right to represent to the State Government, Central Government, and the Advisory Board, conspicuously omitting the Detaining Authority. This failure to inform the detenue of his right to represent to the authority that passed the order renders the detention illegal and vitiates the order. [Para 34]

Preventive Detention – Delay in Disposal of Representation – Unexplained Delay – Fatal to Detention – Context of 12 days delay by District Magistrate in forwarding representation to State Government – Held: The personal liberty of a citizen is paramount, and authorities are constitutionally mandated to deal with representations against preventive detention with a sense of urgency. The record showed that the petitioner submitted his representation on 23.09.2025, but the District Magistrate only forwarded it to the State Government on 05.10.2025. The affidavit filed by the authorities failed to provide any explanation whatsoever for this 12-day delay. Relying on established precedents, the Court held that such unexplained delay in processing the representation violates the constitutional safeguards under Article 22(5) and is fatal to the continued detention of the petitioner. [Paras 35, 39]

Decision: Writ Petition allowed. Detention order set aside. Detenue directed to be set at liberty. [Para 41]

Civil Law - Specific Performance – Readiness and Willingness – Conduct of Plaintiff – Held: The plaintiff-appellants took divergent stands at different stages: initially claiming part of the land was acquired, then claiming the agreement was cancelled, and subsequently asserting the plot was not identifiable. Such contradictory stands negate the plea of readiness and willingness to perform the contract. The defendant-respondent was proven to be present at the Sub-Registrar’s office with necessary documents, whereas plaintiffs failed to perform their part. [Paras 8-9].

Concurrent Findings of Fact – Scope of Interference under Section 100 CPC – Held: Both the Trial Court and First Appellate Court concurrently found that the plaintiffs were not ready and willing. In the absence of any reliable evidence to the contrary or any substantial question of law, the High Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact. [Paras 8-9].

Decision: Appeal dismissed. Pending applications disposed of. [Para 9].

Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 – Section 3 – Reproductive Autonomy and Consent – Held: The right to make reproductive choices is a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. The consent of the pregnant person is paramount in decisions regarding termination of pregnancy. Under Section 3(4)(b), no pregnancy shall be terminated except with the consent of the pregnant woman. Even in cases of minors, where guardian consent is required, the opinion of the minor must be considered. The State or the Court cannot interfere with the personal choice of a pregnant person to continue the pregnancy. [Paras 6-9]

Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) – Applicability in Absence of Consent – Held: The SOP laid down by the Division Bench (in WP No. 5184/2025), which mandates forwarding the victim to the District Court/Medical Board and subsequently to the High Court for pregnancies exceeding 24 weeks, is not required to be carried out in cases where the prosecutrix/victim does not give consent for the same. No direction for medical termination can be issued against the victim's will. [Paras 3, 10]

Decision: PUD (Paper Under Disposal) disposed of. Copy of order sent to the concerned trial court. [Paras 11-12]

Service Law – Seniority – Determination of Inter-se Seniority – Direct Recruits vs. Promotees – Recruitment Year vs. Date of Appointment – Held: Seniority cannot be reckoned from the date of occurrence of vacancy or initiation of recruitment process unless expressly provided by rules – It must be reckoned from the date of substantive appointment/entry into the cadre – The judgment in K. Meghachandra Singh (2020), which overruled N.R. Parmar (2012), is binding – Direct recruits appointed later cannot claim seniority over promotees appointed earlier, even if the vacancies pertained to an earlier year. [Paras 12, 18-19]

Precedent – Binding Nature – Reference to Larger Bench – Held: The fact that the decision in K. Meghachandra Singh has been referred to a larger bench in Hariharan (2022) does not stay its operation or dilute its binding nature – Subordinate courts and Tribunals must follow the existing law declared by the Supreme Court until it is overruled – Administration of justice cannot be put on hold awaiting a larger bench decision. [Para 20]

Seniority – Retrospective Application – Held: An employee not borne in the cadre cannot be given seniority retrospectively to affect those validly appointed in the meantime – Petitioners (Direct Recruits) appointed in 2017 cannot claim seniority over Promotees appointed in 2016, despite vacancies relating to 2015/2016. [Para 19]

Decision: Writ Petitions dismissed. Tribunal order upholding the seniority list based on K. Meghachandra Singh affirmed.

Civil Law - Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Reconstruction Of Record - Non-Availability Of Trial Court Record - Effect On Appeal - Held: The destruction of the Trial Court's record does not automatically warrant the dismissal of the appeal or affirmation of the Trial Court's decree. Where reconstruction is not fully possible due to non-cooperation of respondents, the Appellate Court can proceed based on available documents, pleadings, and the judgment under challenge. A party cannot take advantage of their own wrong in failing to cooperate with reconstruction.

Indian Contract Act, 1872 - Section 16 - Undue Influence - Fiduciary Relationship - Burden Of Proof - Held: A fiduciary relationship exists between an elder brother and a younger brother where the latter reposes confidence in the former. Where a transaction (Relinquishment Deed) appears unconscionable and is between parties in a fiduciary relationship, the burden of proof shifts to the beneficiary (dominant party) to prove the transaction was not induced by undue influence. Inducing a younger brother to execute a deed to "save family honor" against a sister's partition suit constitutes undue influence.

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 92 - Parol Evidence - Sham Documents - Held: The bar under Section 92 (excluding oral evidence to contradict written terms) does not apply when a party pleads that the document was a "sham" and was never intended to be acted upon. Oral evidence is admissible to prove that a transaction recorded in a document was a paper transaction meant to serve a collateral purpose (frustrating a third party's suit) and was not intended to be enforced between the signatories.

Muslim Law - Relinquishment Of Share - Spes Successionis - Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 - Section 6(A) - Held: A "Dastbardari" (Relinquishment Deed) cannot be valid if the beneficiary (transferee) denies the title/share of the transferor in the first place. One cannot relinquish a right that is not admitted to exist. Furthermore, under Section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act and Muslim Law, the transfer of spes successionis (chance of succession) is void ab initio. A renunciation of a chance of succession is not valid.

Estoppel - Validity Of Sham Document - Held: A document obtained through undue influence and proven to be a sham (executed solely to defeat a sister's claim in a separate suit) creates no estoppel against the executor. Such a document, which was never acted upon or produced in the relevant partition suit for decades, cannot be enforced.

Decision: Appeal allowed. Judgment and Decree dated 6-1-1973 set aside. The "Dastbardari" dated 23-2-1966 is declared null and void. Parties held entitled to shares as per the preliminary decree in the connected partition suit (2/5th share each to brothers).