Sales Tax – Refund of Excess Tax – Unjust Enrichment – Appeal against the refusal of refund based on the principle of unjust enrichment. Held: The officer determining the refund amount cannot review or revise the assessment order but must respect it and only quantify the refund. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was entitled to a refund as per the assessment order. [Paras 1-12]

Refund Authority's Limits – The Court emphasized that the refund-determining officer's role is limited to quantifying the refund amount based on the assessment order and cannot exercise powers of review, appeal, or revision over the assessment. The impugned orders of the Excise and Taxation Commissioner and the Haryana Tax Tribunal were set aside. [Paras 7-9]

Precedents – Binding Nature – The Court relied on its previous ruling in M/s Raghbar Dass Hukam Chand v. State of Haryana, which established that the refund must follow the assessment order's findings, and any higher authority in the sales tax department cannot nullify the assessment in the guise of refund approval. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court. [Paras 8-9]

Decision – Refund Granted – The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was granted a refund in accordance with the assessment order dated 11.02.2003 for the assessment year 1998-99. [Paras 11-12]

Criminal Revision Petition - Juvenile in conflict with law - Transfer of trial - Mental and physical capacity to commit the offense - Understanding of consequences - Compliance with Supreme Court's directions - Juvenile Justice Act, 2015.

Applicability of Juvenile Justice Act - Heinous offense - Age of the juvenile - Preliminary assessment of mental and physical capacity - Transfer of trial to Children's Court - Compliance with Supreme Court's directions - Adherence to legal provisions.

Detailed assessment - Mental age and intelligence functioning - Clinical assessment and psychological reports - Social Investigation Report - Absence of parental neglect or abuse - Family circumstances and socio-economic status.

Upholding previous decisions - Affirmation of Juvenile Justice Board's order - No illegality in the decision - Adherence to Supreme Court's directions - No interference warranted - Trial expedited.

Decision:

The Criminal Revision Petition is dismissed. The impugned order of the Juvenile Justice Board, which transferred the trial of the juvenile in conflict with law to the Children's Court, is upheld.

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 138 – Acquittal – Appeal – The appellant's appeal against the judgment of acquittal was based on a statement made by the respondent agreeing to pay the disputed amount. Held: Such a statement cannot be considered a confession as it might have been made under duress or for other reasons. The appellant failed to provide evidence of goods supplied to the respondent or establish legal liability. Appeal dismissed. [Paras 1-15]

Confession and Legal Liability – Insufficient Evidence – The Court held that the respondent's statement to pay the amount does not constitute a confession of guilt. Additionally, the appellant did not produce account books or any other evidence to show that the goods were supplied and the cheques issued were in discharge of legal liability. The presumption under Section 139 of the Act was rebutted by the respondents. [Paras 11-12]

Defense Evidence – Handwriting Expert – The respondent presented a handwriting expert who confirmed that the disputed signatures on the cheques were forged. The respondent also provided evidence that she was not involved in the firm's operations during the relevant period, further weakening the appellant's case. [Paras 11-12]

Decision – Acquittal Upheld – The Court found that the findings of the trial court were well-reasoned and did not warrant interference. The appellant's application for leave to file an appeal was declined, and the appeal was dismissed. [Paras 13-15]

Criminal Law – Appeal against Conviction – Section 411 IPC – Appeal against conviction for the offence under Section 411 IPC. Appellant was convicted based on the recovery of Rs. 13,000, a photograph, and a bag. Held: In the absence of strong evidence, particularly the lack of proof that the appellant knew or had reason to believe the property was stolen, the conviction under Section 411 IPC cannot be sustained. Prosecution's evidence primarily relied on the disclosure statements of co-accused, which is insufficient. Appeal allowed, and conviction set aside. [Paras 1-18]

Knowledge of Stolen Property – Insufficient Evidence – The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove the appellant's knowledge or belief that the property in his possession was stolen, an essential ingredient for conviction under Section 411 IPC. The primary evidence was the disclosure statements of the co-accused, all of whom were acquitted, leaving the prosecution's case weak and unsubstantiated. [Paras 8-16]

Mens Rea and Disclosure Statements – Weak Evidence – The Court emphasized that mens rea, or the guilty mind, is crucial for proving an offence under Section 411 IPC. The disclosure statements of the co-accused do not provide sufficient proof of the appellant's knowledge that the property was stolen. [Para 11, 16]

Decision – Acquittal – The appeal was allowed, and the conviction under Section 411 IPC was set aside due to lack of evidence proving the appellant's knowledge of the stolen nature of the property. [Para 18]

Criminal Procedure – Quashing of Kalendra – Initiation of Proceedings – Petition challenging the initiation of proceedings by SHO for offences under Section 211 IPC. Held: The initiation by SHO violates mandatory provisions of Sections 195 and 340 Cr.P.C., rendering the prosecution and consequent proceedings void. Presentation of Kalendra barred by limitation under Section 468 Cr.P.C. Petition allowed. [Paras 1-18]

Prosecution Bar – Section 195 Cr.P.C. – Section 195 Cr.P.C. mandates that for offences under Sections 193-196, 199, 200, 205-211, and 228 IPC related to court proceedings, a written complaint by the concerned court or an authorized officer is required. The initiation by the SHO without a court complaint is invalid, making the proceedings void. [Paras 7-13]

Limitation Period – Section 468 Cr.P.C. – The offence under Section 182 IPC, punishable by up to six months, has a one-year limitation period for taking cognizance. The Kalendra was presented more than three years after the alleged offence, making it time-barred. [Paras 14-15]

Decision – Quashing of Kalendra – The Court quashed the Kalendra and the summoning order due to non-compliance with Section 195 Cr.P.C. and the bar of limitation under Section 468 Cr.P.C. [Paras 16-17]

Family Pension - Right Under Statutory Rules – Deemed Option – The petitioner, whose husband died on 01.04.1994 while in service with the Municipal Council, Moga, was entitled to family pension under the Punjab Municipal Employees Pension and General Provident Fund Rules, 1994 – The petitioner’s husband did not exercise the option within the stipulated four months from the publication of the rules on 16.03.1994 – As per Rule 3(1)(c), he is deemed to have opted for the pension scheme – The Court held that the petitioner was entitled to family pension by virtue of the deeming clause. [Paras 1-14]

Application of Municipal Council Rules vs. Municipal Corporation Rules – The respondents applied the Punjab Municipal Corporation Employees Pension and General Provident Fund Rules, 1994, which were not applicable as the husband of the petitioner was governed by the Municipal Council rules – The impugned order was set aside as it was based on the wrong set of rules. [Paras 11-13]

Decision – Quashing of Impugned Order and Grant of Family Pension – The Court quashed the impugned order and directed the respondent corporation to grant family pension to the petitioner from the date of her husband’s death – The petitioner was also directed to deposit the employer’s share of CPF with interest, and the respondents were instructed to pay arrears of pension along with 8% interest per annum – Costs of Rs. 20,000 were awarded to the petitioner. [Paras 14-17]

Eviction Orders – Jurisdictional Competence – Commissioner’s Role – The petitioner sought quashing of eviction orders issued by the Assistant Collector and upheld by the Commissioner and appellate authorities – The Court held that the Commissioner does not have jurisdictional competence to entertain an appeal if the Assistant Collector did not adjudicate upon the question of title under Section 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 – The Commissioner can only entertain a revision where the Assistant Collector has formed an opinion on the question of title – Orders passed by the Commissioner without jurisdiction are a nullity. [Paras 1-7]

Maintainability of Revision – Limited Scope – Revision before the Commissioner is maintainable only if the Assistant Collector has addressed the question of title – In cases where the Assistant Collector passes a simple eviction order without addressing the title, the Commissioner cannot entertain an appeal or revision. [Para 5]

Decision – Quashing of Orders and Upholding Appellate Authority’s Order – The Court quashed the impugned orders dated 11.06.2014, 11.07.2013, and 27.02.2009, and upheld the order dated 25.08.2009 passed by the first appellate authority – The initial order by the Commissioner was deemed a nullity, rendering subsequent orders void. [Para 7]

Arms Act – Rejection of Arms License Application – Non-Speaking Order – Writ petition challenging the rejection of an arms license application and the dismissal of the appeal. The rejection was based on the petitioner’s involvement in FIRs, but the order was a pre-printed proforma with mere blanks filled and lacked reasons. Held: Section 17(5) of the Arms Act, 1959, mandates that reasons must be recorded in writing for varying conditions, suspending, or revoking a license. The impugned orders were set aside due to non-compliance with Section 17(5) and principles of natural justice. Matter remanded for fresh decision. [Paras 1-8]

Non-Application of Mind – Quasi-Judicial Authority – The Court found that the licensing authority’s use of a pre-printed form with blanks filled indicated non-application of mind and non-compliance with statutory requirements. Quasi-judicial authorities must record reasons for their decisions, ensuring adherence to principles of natural justice and statutory obligations under the Arms Act. [Paras 7-8]

Decision – Remand for Fresh Consideration – The Court set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matter to the licensing authority to decide the application afresh, emphasizing the need for a reasoned and speaking order. [Para 8]

Service Law – Pay and Allowances During Probation – Notification Quashed – Writ petitions challenged notifications and clarifications issued by the State of Punjab, which stipulated that only traveling allowance would be paid during the probation period, and that the probation period would not count towards the time scale applicable to the post – Held, the principle of "equal pay for equal work" must be applied without discrimination among employees – Plea of financial constraints cannot be selectively applied – Notifications and conditions in appointment letters quashed – Petitioners entitled to regular pay scale and other emoluments from the date of initial appointment. [Paras 1-45]

Equal Pay for Equal Work – Financial Constraints – Analysis – The Court rejected the State's plea of financial constraints for not granting full pay and allowances during probation to certain categories of employees while others received such benefits – The principle of "equal pay for equal work" was emphasized, and financial constraints cannot justify unequal treatment among employees. [Paras 38-40]

Decision – Quashing of Notifications and Conditions in Appointment Letters – The Court quashed the notifications and conditions in appointment letters that restricted pay and allowances during the probation period and excluded the probation period from the time scale applicable to the post – Petitioners were directed to be granted regular pay scale and all emoluments from the date of their initial appointment. [Para 45]