Mental Disorder – Divorce Grounds – The husband sought divorce under Sections 13(1)(ia) and 13(1)(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, claiming the wife was incurably of unsound mind and that her behavior constituted cruelty. The Family Court and High Court found the wife to be suffering from mild to moderate cognitive deficiencies but not of such a kind or extent to warrant divorce. The wife's desire to continue the marital relationship was noted, and the husband's responsibility in her condition was emphasized. The appeals were dismissed, affirming that the wife’s condition did not justify divorce under the alleged grounds [Paras 1-34].

Cruelty and Erratic Behavior – The husband's claims of cruelty and erratic behavior by the wife were not substantiated by independent evidence. Testimonies from interested witnesses and the husband's failure to produce available witnesses weakened his case. The Court found no evidence of aggressive or abnormal behavior from the wife, dismissing the claims of cruelty [Paras 34-36].

Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – The husband’s plea for divorce on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown of marriage was rejected. The Court noted the wife’s consistent desire to maintain the marriage and emphasized that the husband was largely responsible for the marital discord. Citing legal precedents, the Court refused to grant divorce on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown as it is not recognized under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act [Paras 38-39].

Article 142 – Complete Justice – The husband’s plea for invoking Article 142 to dissolve the marriage was also dismissed. The Court stressed the need for justice to be perceived similarly regardless of the parties’ roles and found that dissolving the marriage under Article 142 would not be just given the wife’s willingness to continue the marriage and the husband's responsibility in the situation [Paras 40-42].

Decision: Appeals dismissed. The Court upheld the lower courts' decisions, denying the husband’s petition for divorce and supporting the wife's petition for restitution of conjugal rights. The Court emphasized the husband’s role in the wife’s condition and her continued capacity to fulfill marital obligations.

Land Acquisition – Compensation Assessment – The appellant’s land was acquired for the construction of the Orni-reservoir. The Reference Court awarded compensation based on market value supported by sale transactions. The High Court reduced the compensation and set aside the damages for standing crops. The Supreme Court restored the Reference Court's award, noting errors in the High Court's assessment and improper reliance on evidence [Paras 1-23].

Market Value Determination – The Reference Court based its determination on sale deeds from nearby areas, adjusting for the larger area and increase in land value. The High Court's reduction of compensation to Rs. 100 per decimal was found to be unsupported by evidence and based on erroneous interpretation of the sale deeds as homestead lands. The Supreme Court highlighted that the High Court did not consider the increase in land value or the proper deduction rate, leading to the restoration of the Reference Court's compensation of Rs. 250 per decimal [Paras 7-20].

Standing Crops Damages – The Reference Court awarded Rs. 10,000 for standing crops based on witness testimonies, which the High Court set aside relying on the statement of an official not present at the time of acquisition. The Supreme Court found that the High Court disregarded the consistent evidence provided by multiple witnesses supporting the existence of standing crops and the resulting damage [Paras 21-23].

Decision: Appeal allowed. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and restored the award of the Reference Court. The respondents were directed to pay the appellant compensation as determined by the Reference Court, after adjusting amounts already paid, within three months [Para 23].

Property Ownership – Vesting Under Acquisition Act – The Swadeshi Cotton Mills Company Limited (SCMCL) properties, including Swadeshi House, were taken over by the Central Government and vested in NTC under the Swadeshi Act, 1986. The NTC claimed ownership of Bungalow No. 2 as part of Swadeshi House. However, the High Court and subsequent courts found that Bungalow No. 2 did not vest in the NTC, as it was not included in the properties specified under the Act or judicial decisions [Paras 3-16].

Judicial Interpretation and Previous Litigation – Various courts, including the Supreme Court in the Doypack Systems case, addressed issues of property vesting under the Swadeshi Act. The courts consistently found that Bungalow No. 2 was not vested in NTC, distinguishing it from Bungalow No. 1 and the Administrative Block, which were vested properties. The Supreme Court affirmed these findings, noting the lack of conclusive evidence to support NTC’s claims [Paras 9-12].

Eviction Proceedings and Title Disputes – NTC’s eviction proceedings under the Public Premises Act and a criminal complaint under Section 27 of the Swadeshi Act were dismissed by lower courts, which held that NTC failed to establish clear title over Bungalow No. 2. The courts directed NTC to seek appropriate remedies in civil court, but NTC did not file such a suit. The Supreme Court upheld these decisions, emphasizing the need for clear title and proper legal proceedings to resolve such disputes [Paras 13-16].

Decision: Appeals dismissed. The Supreme Court confirmed the High Court's dismissal of NTC's writ petitions and upheld the findings that Bungalow No. 2 did not vest in NTC under the Swadeshi Act. The Court reiterated the requirement for clear title and appropriate legal action in property disputes [Para 17].

Municipal Corporation – Duty to Repair Dangerous Structures – The appellant sought a writ of mandamus directing the Municipal Corporation to repair the damaged portion of his flat, which had deteriorated, posing a danger to occupants. Notices issued under Section 354 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, required the housing society to carry out repairs, but these were not complied with. The High Court dismissed the writ, suggesting the appellant seek execution of orders from the Cooperative Appellate Court [Paras 1-13].

Interpretation of Section 489 – Enabling vs. Mandatory – The Supreme Court held that while Section 489 of the Act appears to be enabling, it imposes a duty on the Commissioner to act upon non-compliance with notices under Section 354, to prevent danger from ruinous structures. The Court clarified that statutory provisions aimed at public safety should be construed to advance their remedial objectives [Paras 14-20].

Alternative Remedy – Section 499 Approval – The Court noted that the appellant could have sought approval from the Commissioner under Section 499 of the Act to carry out repairs himself and recover costs from the housing society. The appellant failed to pursue this remedy despite being advised by the municipal authorities [Paras 21-22].

Decision: Appeal dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing the appellant's failure to utilize the remedy under Section 499 and the Cooperative Appellate Court’s directions for repairs. The appellant was directed to seek execution of the Cooperative Appellate Court’s order [Para 23].

Territorial Jurisdiction – Section 138 NI Act – The appellant challenged the jurisdiction of the Court at Bhiwani to try a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The cheque in question, drawn on a Guwahati bank, was deposited by the respondent in Bhiwani, where it was dishonoured. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that under K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, jurisdiction lies in any of the places where components of the offence occur, including where the cheque is presented and dishonoured [Paras 1-14].

Components of Offence – Section 138 NI Act – The offence under Section 138 consists of drawing the cheque, presentation, dishonour, notice to the drawer, and failure to pay within 15 days. The Court emphasized that the complaint can be filed in any jurisdiction where these acts occur, thereby supporting the complainant's choice of forum in Bhiwani [Para 8].

Distinguishing Precedents – The Court distinguished the reliance on Ishar Alloy Steels Ltd. v. Jayaswals NECO Ltd., which focused on the period within which a cheque must be presented to the drawee bank, and did not address territorial jurisdiction. The decision in Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. v. National Panasonic India Ltd., was also discussed, clarifying that notice alone does not confer jurisdiction unless combined with other components of the offence [Paras 10-12].

Decision: Appeal dismissed. The Court upheld the jurisdiction of the Court at Bhiwani, confirming that the complaint under Section 138 NI Act was rightly filed there as the respondent is a resident of Bhiwani and the cheque was presented and dishonoured in Bhiwani [Para 14].

Preservation of Historical Monuments – Mining Restrictions – The appellant, K. Guruprasad Rao, filed a writ petition seeking the cancellation of a mining lease and the cessation of mining activities within one kilometer of Jambunatheswara Temple in Hospet, Karnataka. The temple, built in 1540 and a protected monument under the Karnataka Ancient and Historical Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1961, faced structural damage due to nearby mining operations [Paras 1-23, 24-48].

Factual Background and Legal Framework – The temple, surrounded by rich iron-ore deposits, suffered from structural cracks and discoloration attributed to mining activities, including the use of explosives. The temple was officially declared a protected monument, with specific areas around it designated as 'protected' and 'safe zones' where mining was prohibited [Paras 24-26, 32-35].

Impact Assessment and Expert Committee Findings – An expert committee was constituted to assess the impact of mining on the temple. The committee conducted extensive investigations, including experimental blasts and monitoring vibrations. The findings confirmed that mining activities within close proximity to the temple caused significant structural damage. Recommendations included banning mining activities within a 1 km radius of the temple and implementing strict controls on mining practices beyond this zone to minimize further damage [Paras 44-48].

Decision: Appeal allowed. The Supreme Court directed the State Government to implement the recommendations of the expert committee, including the creation of a Corpus Fund for the conservation of the temple. The mining activities within a one-kilometer radius of the temple were prohibited to protect and preserve the historical monument [Para 48].

Motor Vehicle Accident – Compensation for Disability – The appellant, Neerupam Mohan Mathur, suffered a severe injury resulting in the amputation of his right arm above the shoulder due to a motor vehicle accident caused by rash and negligent driving. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) initially awarded Rs. 320,000 with 12% interest, which was later enhanced by the High Court to Rs. 704,800 with 6% interest. The appellant challenged the compensation as inadequate, citing incorrect assessment of disability and insufficient compensation for prosthesis and other damages [Paras 2-18].

Assessment of Disability and Earning Capacity – The appellant, a qualified Product Design Engineer, contended that his disability should be assessed at 100% rather than the 70% determined by the High Court. The Supreme Court emphasized the need to assess the impact of disability on earning capacity rather than just the percentage of physical disability. The Court noted that the appellant could still perform jobs requiring intellectual rather than physical labor, thus supporting the High Court’s assessment of 70% disability [Paras 9-14].

Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary Damages – The Court found that the Tribunal and the High Court had inadequately compensated the appellant for various damages, including the cost of prosthesis, future medical expenses, loss of earnings during treatment, and pain and suffering. The Supreme Court re-determined the compensation to ensure complete justice, awarding a total of Rs. 11,64,300, inclusive of amounts for medical expenses, prosthesis, and other damages [Paras 15-18].

Decision: Appeal allowed. The Supreme Court directed the respondent, New India Assurance Co., to pay the appellant a total sum of Rs. 11,64,300, after adjusting amounts already paid, within three months from the judgment date, with interest at 12%. The orders of the High Court and the Tribunal were modified accordingly [Paras 18-19].

Promotion Criteria – Merit and Ability vs. Seniority – The case concerns the promotion of K.V. Karthalingan from Motor Vehicles Inspector (Grade II) to Regional Transport Officer. The contention was whether Rule 36(b)(ii) of the General Rules, allowing for out-of-turn promotions based on merit and ability, could be applied. The Supreme Court examined the eligibility criteria under the Special Rules framed for the Tamil Nadu Transport Subordinate Service and Tamil Nadu Transport Service, which supersede the General Rules in case of conflict [Paras 1-30].

Eligibility and Special Rules Supremacy – The Court noted that the Special Rules require specific conditions for promotion, including a minimum service period. Respondent No. 5, K.V. Karthalingan, did not meet these conditions at the time of seeking promotion. The Special Rules also state that promotion should be based on merit and ability, with seniority considered only when merit and ability are equal. The application of Rule 36(b)(ii) for out-of-turn promotion was found inapplicable, as the General Rules cannot override the Special Rules [Paras 22-30].

Procedural Impropriety – The Court observed that the Administrative Tribunal and High Court erred in granting promotion without ensuring compliance with the Special Rules. The absence of affected senior candidates in the original proceedings and the failure to provide a platform for their objections were significant lapses. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of following established rules and procedures for promotions to maintain fairness and meritocracy [Paras 16-30].

Decision: Appeals allowed. The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Administrative Tribunal and the High Court, which had directed the promotion of Respondent No. 5. The Court reaffirmed the need to adhere to the Special Rules and the proper procedural requirements for promotions within the service [Para 30].

Workmen's Compensation – Evidence and Assessment – The appellants, employed as driver, cleaner, and loaders in a lorry, were injured in an accident. The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner awarded compensation based on medical evidence and disability certificates. The High Court overturned this decision, demanding x-rays as proof of injury. The Supreme Court reinstated the Commissioner’s award, emphasizing that medical experts, not the Commissioner, assess disabilities. The insurer's challenge to the evidence was dismissed as the Commissioner had rightly relied on the orthopedic surgeon’s testimony and disability certificates [Paras 1-10].

Legal Standard for Appeals – Substantial Question of Law – The Supreme Court highlighted that appeals under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act require a substantial question of law. The High Court erred in re-appreciating evidence, which is beyond its jurisdiction in such cases. The Commissioner’s findings on fact were based on credible evidence and thus binding. The High Court’s intervention lacked grounds as no material irregularity or perversity in the evidence appraisal was demonstrated [Paras 10-12].

Interest on Compensation – The Commissioner’s award included a 12% interest on the compensation amount, in line with Section 4A of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The Supreme Court upheld this statutory interest rate [Para 13].

Decision: Appeals allowed. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and restored the orders of the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, affirming the awarded compensation and statutory interest. The insurer was directed to comply with the payment order within the specified timeframe [Paras 14-15].