Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the validity of certain provisions governing admissions and fee fixation in private medical colleges. The appellants contested the absolute right of private medical colleges to make admissions and fix fees.

Issues:

The legislative competence of the State to conduct common entrance tests, determine fees, and the overall validity of the impugned legislation. Additionally, the Court needs to address the consistency of the High Court's judgment with earlier decisions and the need for regulations to ensure fairness and transparency in admissions.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that private medical colleges do not possess an absolute right to make admissions or fix fees.

The previous judgment by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh was deemed inconsistent with earlier decisions of the Court.

The State was acknowledged to have legislative competence to conduct common entrance tests and determine fees for professional educational institutions.

The impugned legislation's validity was upheld by the Court.

Regulations on admission through a common entrance test and fee determination were found to be in compliance with the Court's directions and observations.

The Court emphasized the necessity of regulations in the larger public interest, ensuring fairness, transparency, and promoting merit and excellence.

Fee fixation regulations were considered essential to protect students' rights and prevent exploitation in the form of profiteering.

Decision: The Court, therefore, concluded that the State has the authority to regulate admissions and fees for professional educational institutions, and the impugned legislation is valid and in compliance with the Court's directives.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over a deed dated 30.12.1960, labeled as a conditional sale, between Patel Ravjibhai Bhulabhai (deceased) and Rahemanbhai M. Shaikh (deceased) and others.

The plaintiffs argued that the deed was a mortgage, allowing them the right to redeem the property, while the defendants claimed it to be a conditional sale with no redemption rights after a specified period.

Issues:

Whether the deed in question is a mortgage by way of a conditional sale or a sale with an option to repurchase.

Interpretation of the condition in the deed regarding the right to reclaim the property within a specified time.

Held:

The court, after considering the nature of the transaction and the distinguishing features between a mortgage by conditional sale and a sale with an option to repurchase, held that the deed in question was a mortgage by way of a conditional sale. The debtor-creditor relationship was found to exist, and the plaintiffs were entitled to redeem the property. The High Court's decision in favor of the plaintiffs was upheld. The appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

Mohammad Sadique, the appellant, born to Muslim parents, faced a challenge to his election in an Assembly Constituency reserved for Scheduled Caste.

The election petition alleged that, being a Muslim, Sadique did not belong to the Scheduled Caste and was ineligible to contest from the reserved constituency.

Issues:

The appellant's family background and their association with the 'Doom' community.

Validity of the Scheduled Caste Certificate obtained by the appellant after converting to Sikhism.

Public declaration of the appellant's conversion to Sikhism and the absence of objections during the nomination process.

The interpretation of the terms 'Caste' and 'Scheduled Caste' in the context of the case.

Held:

The appellant successfully demonstrated that, despite being born to Muslim parents, his family belonged to the 'Doom' community, recognized as a Scheduled Caste in Punjab (Para 22).

The Scheduled Caste Certificate, issued post-conversion to Sikhism, was accepted by the Returning Officer and remained uncancelled (Para 22).

The appellant's conversion to Sikhism was publicly declared, and he adhered to Sikh traditions. The absence of objections during the nomination process was noted (Paras 23, 24, and 26).

The court affirmed that a person can change their religion, not the caste, as caste is linked to birth. The appellant's eligibility as a Scheduled Caste member was upheld (Para 22).

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, determining that the Election Petition lacked merit. Mohammad Sadique's election was deemed valid and not subject to being set aside (Para 26).

Facts:

Mohammad Sadique, the appellant, born to Muslim parents, faced a challenge to his election in an Assembly Constituency reserved for Scheduled Caste.

The election petition alleged that, being a Muslim, Sadique did not belong to the Scheduled Caste and was ineligible to contest from the reserved constituency.

Issues:

The appellant's family background and their association with the 'Doom' community.

Validity of the Scheduled Caste Certificate obtained by the appellant after converting to Sikhism.

Public declaration of the appellant's conversion to Sikhism and the absence of objections during the nomination process.

The interpretation of the terms 'Caste' and 'Scheduled Caste' in the context of the case.

Held:

The appellant successfully demonstrated that, despite being born to Muslim parents, his family belonged to the 'Doom' community, recognized as a Scheduled Caste in Punjab (Para 22).

The Scheduled Caste Certificate, issued post-conversion to Sikhism, was accepted by the Returning Officer and remained uncancelled (Para 22).

The appellant's conversion to Sikhism was publicly declared, and he adhered to Sikh traditions. The absence of objections during the nomination process was noted (Paras 23, 24, and 26).

The court affirmed that a person can change their religion, not the caste, as caste is linked to birth. The appellant's eligibility as a Scheduled Caste member was upheld (Para 22).

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, determining that the Election Petition lacked merit. Mohammad Sadique's election was deemed valid and not subject to being set aside (Para 26).

Facts:

The case involves land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, culminating in the passing of awards on different dates.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, specifically addressing the lapse of land acquisition proceedings when possession has not been taken or compensation has not been paid within the stipulated time frame.

Held:

The Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Delhi Development Authority, upholding the High Court's decision that the land acquisition proceedings had lapsed. The Court emphasized that, according to Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Collector must take possession of the land for it to vest absolutely in the Government. Since the land had not been taken possession of within five years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act, the Court concluded that the proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.

FACTS:

An Insecticide Inspector seized a sample of Dimethoiate 30% EC from a shop in Rajasthan.

The sample was declared misbranded after analysis by the State Pesticide Testing Laboratory.

The accused, M/s Northern Minerals Ltd., submitted a reply indicating their intention to adduce evidence in controversion of the Analyst's report.

Complaint filed, and cognizance taken by the Magistrate.

Accused appealed, challenging the order of cognizance.

ISSUES:

Whether the accused's right to rebut the Analyst's report was valid.

The impact of the expiration of the sample's shelf life on the accused's defense.

HELD:

The court interpreted Sections 22 and 24 of the Insecticides Act, emphasizing the accused's right to challenge the Analyst's report. It concluded that the accused, even if not the person from whom the sample was taken, has the right under Section 24(4) to adduce evidence in controversion. The expiration of the sample's shelf life was considered crucial, and the court held that the accused's right to disprove their guilt had been frustrated. The proceedings were quashed. The instant appeal is allowed.

REFERRED CASES:

Northern Mineral Limited Vs. Union of India, (2010) 7 SCC 726.

Facts:

Writ Petition (C) No. 261 of 2016 filed seeking a Writ of Mandamus for conducting NEET for MBBS admissions nationwide for the academic session 2016-17.

Court orders on April 27, 2016, included removal of office objections, deletion of Respondent No. 4, and assurance from all three respondents for conducting NEET.

Issues:

Whether NEET should be conducted for MBBS admissions in the academic session 2016-17.

Effect of earlier court orders against holding NEET, considering the recalled judgment in Christian Medical College, Vellore vs. Union of India.

Held:

The court, based on respondents' submissions, recorded that NEET shall be held for the academic session 2016-17.

Clarified that, notwithstanding any earlier court orders, the current order shall operate.

Disagreed with arguments against NEET based on the recalled judgment, stating that Notifications from December 21, 2010, are in operation.

Emphasized that the order would not impact pending petitions before the court.

Facts:

The case involves the provisional arrest of Marie-Emmanuelle Verhoeven based on a request from the Embassy of Chile through a Note Verbale dated September 22, 2015. The petitioner is accused of conspiracy in the assassination of a Chilean Senator.

Issues:

The applicability of the Extradition Act to a foreign state, the binding nature of the Extradition Treaty between India and Chile, the validity of the provisional arrest under Section 34-B of the Act, and the principle of reciprocity in extradition proceedings.

Held:

Establishes that the Government of India considered itself bound by the Extradition Treaty with Chile since 1897-1898. The Extradition Treaty remains in force and binding on both India and Chile.( Paragraph 95)

Confirm that a Red Notice is not a warrant of arrest but is issued to seek the provisional arrest of a wanted person. The absence of a Red Notice does not preclude the Government of India from arresting a fugitive criminal.( Paragraphs 121 and 122)

Dismisses the argument that the petitioner's arrest under Section 34-B could only be made on a request from the foreign State itself, emphasizing that a request from the Embassy of a foreign State is equivalent.( Paragraph 12)

Delve into the principle of reciprocity, stating that it can be invoked even without an extradition treaty. The court affirms that the petitioner could have been validly detained and placed under provisional arrest on a reciprocal basis, irrespective of an Extradition Treaty between India and Chile.( Paragraphs 124, 127, 128, and 129)

Reinforces that the decision on whether the Extradition Act is applicable to a foreign state is a political decision, not subject to judicial review.( Paragraph 130)

Directs the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to decide on the extradition of the petitioner based on the merits of the case and the evidence before him.( Paragraph 137)

Decision: The court dismisses the writ petition and appeal, upholding the validity of the provisional arrest and extradition proceedings against the petitioner.

Facts:

Search and seizure took place on June 22, 1998, in the business premises of the appellant companies.

Notices under Section 158BC(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 were issued in 1999.

The assessing officer issued a direction under Section 142(2A) for a special audit.

Appellants challenged the special audit order through a writ petition, and an interim stay was granted on August 24, 2000.

The High Court quashed the special audit direction but held that the period between August 24, 2000, and December 15, 2006, should be excluded in counting the limitation for block assessment.

Issues:

Calculation of the limitation period for block assessment - from the first search on June 22, 1998, or the last search on August 5, 1998?

Whether the interim stay on special audit (August 24, 2000, to December 15, 2006) should be excluded from the limitation period for block assessment?

The validity of subsequent searches and the requirement for fresh authorization.

Held:

Limitation Period for Block Assessment The court held that the limitation period for block assessment is to be counted from the last date of the search when the search operation was finally concluded, i.e., August 5, 1998. This interpretation is based on Explanation 2 to Section 158BE(2) of the Income Tax Act.

Stay of Assessment Proceedings The court held that the period between August 24, 2000, and December 15, 2006, during which the interim stay on special audit was in operation, should be excluded from the limitation period for block assessment. The special audit was considered an integral part of the assessment proceedings.

Validity of Subsequent Searches The court did not entertain the argument challenging the validity of subsequent searches, as the appellants did not raise this issue in their writ petition.

Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, upholding the decision of the High Court. The court determined that the limitation period for block assessment is to be counted from the last date of the search, and the period during the interim stay on special audit should be excluded from the calculation of the limitation period. The court did not entertain the challenge regarding the validity of subsequent searches due to the absence of such a challenge in the writ petition.