Facts:

Respondent, G.C. Pandya, was a Deputy Engineer (civil) with the Appellant, Gujarat Maritime Board.

Pandya was charge-sheeted for irregularities during 1982-1984, resulting in losses for the Board.

He was found guilty in the departmental inquiry and was punished with "censure" on 26.6.2002, after which he retired on 30.6.2002 as a Superintending Engineer.

Pandya filed a civil suit seeking a declaration that the departmental inquiry and the punishment were illegal, and also sought promotion with effect from 1.1.2002.

The trial court ruled in favor of Pandya, declaring him promoted to Chief Engineer with effect from 1.1.2002, without considering his service record.

The appellant did not file a written statement, and no issues were framed as per Order VIII Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.

Issues:

Whether the departmental inquiry and punishment against Pandya were illegal.

Whether Pandya was entitled to promotion with effect from 1.1.2002.

Whether the trial court's decree declaring Pandya promoted without considering his service record was valid.

Held:

The trial court did not act mechanically but properly considered the evidence and arguments.

However, it erred in declaring Pandya promoted without considering his service record.

The appellate courts also overlooked this error.

The Supreme Court partially allowed the appeal, modifying the decree to direct the appellant to consider Pandya's promotion to Chief Engineer with effect from 1.1.2002 within three months, taking into account the findings of the suit (Para 15).

Facts:

The case involved a petition filed by Laxmi concerning acid attacks in India.

A meeting was held by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare with all Chief Secretaries/their counterparts in the States/Union Territories on 14.03.2015.

Provisional figures for 2014 indicated 282 acid attacks across various states and territories, with Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Gujarat having the highest numbers.

The meeting noted the existence of a Victim Compensation Scheme in almost all states and union territories.

Issues:

Compliance with compensation norms for acid attack victims.

Ensuring proper medical treatment, aftercare, and rehabilitation for acid attack victims.

Banning over-the-counter sale of acid.

Setting up a separate board for criminal injuries compensation.

Held:The court observed that despite its directions, some states/union territories hadn't fixed the minimum compensation of Rs. 3,00,000 per acid attack victim. It directed the Member Secretary of the State Legal Services Authority to take up the issue with the state governments for compliance.

The court directed the Member Secretary to obtain and publicize the Victim Compensation Scheme for the benefit of acid attack victims.The court emphasized that victims should receive full medical assistance, including reconstructive surgeries, and private hospitals should provide free treatment. It instructed state governments to ensure compliance and take action against hospitals refusing treatment

The court directed the Ministries of Home Affairs and Health and Family Welfare to ensure all states and union territories issue notifications banning over-the-counter sale of acid within three months.

Instead of setting up a separate board, the court decided that claims for compensation would be handled by the District Legal Services Authority, functioning as the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.

Facts:

M/S UTC FIRE AND SECURITY INDIA LTD. was involved in the manufacturing of smoke detectors and parts thereof. These goods were sold both in loose condition and as part of turnkey projects. The Assessing Officer proposed to value the goods used in turnkey projects based on the price of similar goods sold in loose condition. The appellant contested this, arguing for the application of Section 4(1)(b) of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, and the Central Excise (Valuation) Rules, 1975.

Issues:

The appropriate rule under the Valuation Rules, 1975, for the valuation of goods used in turnkey projects. The appellant argued for Rule 7, while the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) upheld the application of Rule 4 without providing detailed reasons.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified that Section 4(1)(a) of the Act, dealing with the normal price of goods sold by the assessee to a buyer, was not applicable. It was agreed that the case fell under Section 4(1)(b), where the normal price of goods was not ascertainable.

The court emphasized that Rule 4 would only apply if the goods sold were the same as those used in turnkey projects, which was not the case here. The court concluded that Rule 7, which allows for the determination of value according to the best judgment assessment, should have been applied by the Commissioner (Appeals) instead of Rule 6. However, it noted that the Commissioner's acceptance of the costing method provided by the appellant amounted to a best judgment assessment.

Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the CESTAT's order and restored the Commissioner (Appeals)'s decision, modifying it to apply Rule 7 instead of Rule 6. The appeals were allowed with no orders as to costs.

Facts:

The appellant, a minor at the time, alleged rape by the respondent.

Despite identification of the accused in court, the trial court acquitted him due to the absence of a prior test identification parade.

High Court affirmed this decision, citing the lack of a test identification parade.

Issues:

Whether the identification in court, without a test identification parade, could be relied upon.

Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to prove the guilt of the respondent.

Held:

The Supreme Court found the appellant's testimony and evidence credible, despite the absence of a test identification parade. The immediate reporting of the incident, medical examination, and identification of the accused's clothing supported her claims. The Court emphasized that the identification in court could be relied upon under certain circumstances, especially when the witness is found trustworthy and reliable. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the respondent was convicted under Section 376(1) of the Indian Penal Code, sentenced to seven years' imprisonment, and fined Rs. 5,000, with the entire amount to be given to the appellant. If the fine is not paid, the respondent faces an additional six months' imprisonment. However, the acquittal under Section 3(2)(V) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 was confirmed.

Facts:

The deceased, Het Ram, went missing after being last seen with the appellant, Raja.

Suspicion arose regarding the appellant's involvement in the disappearance and probable murder of Het Ram.

Investigation led to the recovery of incriminating evidence, including blood-stained clothes and a knife, based on a disclosure statement made by the appellant.

Motive for the crime was suspected to be the appellant's anger over an alleged illicit relationship between Het Ram and the appellant's brother's wife.

Issues:

Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether the recovery of evidence based on the appellant's disclosure statement is admissible in court.

Held:

The court emphasized that in cases relying on circumstantial evidence, the chain of events leading to the crime must be firmly established, leaving no reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt.

The last seen theory, supported by witness testimonies, provided a strong circumstantial link between the appellant and the deceased.

The recovery of evidence, including blood-stained clothes and a knife, based on the appellant's disclosure statement, was deemed admissible in court.

The court highlighted the significance of motive in cases based on circumstantial evidence, and in this case, the suspected motive of the appellant's anger over an alleged illicit relationship further strengthened the prosecution's case.

After thorough analysis of the evidence and arguments, the court found the appeal to be devoid of merit and upheld the appellant's conviction. The appeal preferred by the Appellant is totally devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed.

Facts:

Bajrang Bahadur Singh, a petitioner, was elected to the State Legislative Assembly from an Assembly Constituency. The Governor declared that Singh had incurred disqualification under Section 9A due to entering into contracts with the State after his election. Consequently, a notification was issued declaring Singh's seat vacant, and an election schedule was announced to fill the vacancy. Singh filed a writ petition challenging the disqualification. Subsequently, a notification was issued to notify the election to fill the Assembly Constituency. The High Court stayed the election process through an interim order.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 9A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, regarding the disqualification of legislators holding government contracts. Additionally, the jurisdiction of the High Court in interfering with the election process was also in question.

Held:

The court held that Acquisition of a disqualification under Article 191 of the Constitution immediately vacates the seat occupied by the disqualified legislator by operation of law.

The Governor's decision under Article 192 is to determine whether the legislator acquired the disqualification, not to remove the legislator from the Legislature.

The disqualifying event makes the legislator cease to be a Member of the Legislature from the date of acquiring the disqualification, and cessation of the disqualifying factor does not reinstate the legislator without reelection.

The clause "if and for so long as" in Section 9A means that the disqualified legislator can contest elections again if the disqualifying event ceases to exist.

The purpose of Section 9A is to maintain the purity of the legislature and avoid conflicts of interest among legislators.

High Courts have the authority and jurisdiction under Article 226 to adjudicate disputes, and their interference in election processes can be justified in certain circumstances.

The interim order by the High Court staying the election process was justified, but the Election Commission is obligated to hold a bye-election within six months of the vacancy. In view of the dismissal of the transferred case, the special leave petition is disposed of.

Facts:

Chennai Properties and Investment Ltd., the appellant, was a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act with the main objective of acquiring properties in Chennai and letting them out. The appellant declared the rental income from these properties as business income in its tax return. However, the assessing officer disagreed, contending that the income should be treated as rental income from house property. The matter was subject to various appeals, leading to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

• Whether the income derived from letting out properties should be classified as business income or rental income from house property.

Held:

The court analyzed the company's Memorandum of Association, which outlined acquiring and letting out properties as its primary purpose. Additionally, all income for the relevant assessment year came from letting out these properties. Referring to relevant case law, the court emphasized that the determining factor is the nature of the company's activities related to the properties. The court concluded that letting out properties constituted the business of the appellant, and thus, the income derived from this activity should be classified as business income. The judgment of the High Court was set aside, and that of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was restored. The appeals are disposed of.

Facts:

Ravinder Kaur and Anil Kumar got married on August 14, 1991. Anil Kumar filed for divorce twice, and the second divorce petition resulted in an ex-parte decree of divorce on January 8, 1994. Ravinder Kaur claimed she was unaware of this decree until June 23, 1994, when Anil Kumar married another woman. She then applied to set aside the divorce decree, which was granted on February 19, 1996, effectively restoring their marriage.

Ravinder Kaur filed multiple legal complaints against Anil Kumar, including one under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code for continuing sexual relations between January 8, 1994, and June 23, 1994. However, Anil Kumar was discharged, and no trial occurred in relation to this complaint.

Ravinder Kaur filed a second complaint against Anil Kumar under various sections of the IPC, including Sections 493 (deceitful cohabitation) and 494 (bigamy), among others.

Issues:

Whether the second complaint filed by Ravinder Kaur against Anil Kumar is barred by the principle of double jeopardy as per Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code?

Whether the charges under Sections 493 and 494 of the Indian Penal Code are applicable in the given circumstances?

Held:

The applicability of Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code and concludes that since no trial had taken place in the earlier complaint, double jeopardy does not apply. Thus, the second complaint is not barred. Paragraph 10 analyzes the charges under Sections 493 and 494 of the Indian Penal Code. It concludes that while the charge under Section 493 is not applicable due to the restoration of the marriage, the charge under Section 494 (bigamy) is compoundable. Paragraph 13 presents the court's decision to compound the offense under Section 494 and direct Anil Kumar to pay compensation to Ravinder Kaur, which she agrees to. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The appellant, Rajan, appealed against the quashing of criminal proceedings initiated against the respondents, Joseph and others, arising from the death of Ammini, a maid who died due to an electric shock from a washing machine while working at the respondents' house. The appellant alleged negligence on the part of the respondents, while investigations revealed no negligence regarding the maintenance of the washing machine.

Issues:

Whether the actions of the respondents constituted an offense under Section 304A of the IPC, and if so, whether compensation should be awarded to the appellant.

Held:

The court held that no offense under Section 304A of the IPC was made out as there was no negligence on the part of the respondents. However, considering the circumstances of Ammini's death and her socioeconomic background, the court directed the respondents to pay compensation to the appellant. The State Government had also decided to provide financial assistance to the appellant from the Chief Minister's Distress Relief Fund. Thus, the appeal was disposed of with directions regarding compensation.