FACTS:

The appellant was removed from the position of Headmaster after allegations of misappropriation.

Two inquiries were conducted, and the High Court later quashed the removal order citing illegality in the second inquiry.

The appellant sought back wages, challenging the denial by the High Court.

ISSUES:

Legality of the termination.

Entitlement to back wages after reinstatement.

HELD:

The Court upheld the illegality of the second inquiry, emphasizing that reasons must be recorded for a fresh appointment of an inquiry officer. Citing CSHA University vs. BD Goyal, it stressed the duty to provide reasons in case of disagreement with the inquiry report.( Paragraph 8)

Referring to Hindustan Tin Works, the Court established the normal rule of granting full back wages in cases of wrongful termination. It acknowledged the financial situation of the Municipal Council but granted compensation of Rs 5 lakhs to the appellant in full and final settlement of his back-wages claim. It highlighted the discretionary power of the court to consider circumstances like length of service, nature of misconduct, and financial condition of the employer.( Paragraph 9-11)

Considering the impracticability of reopening proceedings after a long delay and the appellant's superannuation, the Court directed the payment of Rs 5 lakhs within two months. It clarified that this amount is in addition to the retiral benefits granted by the High Court.( Paragraph 12-14)

REFERRED CASES:

CSHA University vs. BD Goyal, (2010) 15 SCC 776

Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya ("Deepali Surwase"), (2013) 10 SCC 324

Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd vs. Employees ("Hindustan Tin Works"), (1979) 2 SCC 80

Indian Rly. Construction Co. Ltd. vs. Ajay Kumar, (2003) 4 SCC 579

P.G.I, of Medical Education & Research vs. Raj Kumar, (2001) 2 SCC 54

Surendra Kumar Verma vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, (1980) 4 SCC 443

Susannah Sharp vs. Wakefield [(1891) AC 173

Facts:

The dispute involves two brothers, Suriaji and Gones, who were heirs to their grandfather's property. The grandfather had gifted one-half right in property 'M' to both Suriaji and Gones through a Gift Deed in 1913. The properties in dispute originally belonged to their grandfather, and subsequent transactions, including a sale deed in 1915 and a settlement deed in 1919, play a crucial role in the case. Gones, the appellant's predecessor, received his share until his death in December 1978.

Issues:

The appellants' claim for one-eighth share in property 'M' and one-fourth share in property 'B.' The exclusion of the appellants from a partition deed dated 13.03.1969 is challenged as null and void.

Held:

The court rejects the argument that Gones acquired title through the sale deed of 1915 and settlement deed of 1919, emphasizing his lack of objection during inventory proceedings and the absence of evidence regarding his receipt of income from the property (Para 50, 58, 61, 62, 63).

The court dismisses the appellants' claim, highlighting Gones' failure to raise objections during his lifetime and the absence of any challenge to the allotment of property to Shantibai (Para 64, 65, 67, 68).

The court discusses the concept of resulting trust and concludes that Gones did not become entitled as the owner under the documents of 1915 and 1919 (Para 64, 65, 67, 68).

The court considers the inventory proceedings, noting Gones' failure to protest or challenge the allotment to Shantibai, and suggests that Gones, by his conduct, acknowledged Shantibai's right to the property (Para 81, 82, 84, 85).

The court discusses legal principles related to abandonment, estoppel, and detrimental reliance, suggesting that Gones' conduct may be seen as abandonment, and there is no defense pleaded as to estoppel or abandonment (Para 87, 88).

Facts:

The case involves a criminal appeal by Pramod Suryabhan Pawar against the State of Maharashtra. The appellant faced charges under various sections of the IPC and the SC/ST Act based on allegations of sexual assault and insulting messages.

Issues:

The validity of the FIR, specifically addressing the alleged false promise of marriage and insulting messages.

The court needed to determine whether the "misconception of fact" regarding the promise vitiated the woman's consent and whether the SC/ST Act offenses were established.

Held:

The court emphasized the cautious use of its inherent powers under s.482 to quash an FIR, considering the denial of the prosecution's opportunity to establish its case. (Para 7, 8)

The judgment clarified the legal principles surrounding consent in sexual offenses (s.375 IPC), highlighting the distinction between false promises and breaches of promises made in good faith. (Para 9, 10, 12-14, 16)

The "misconception of fact" alleged by the complainant (promise to marry) did not vitiate consent, as the allegations did not indicate the promise was false or made in bad faith.(Para 18, 19, 20)

The offenses under the SC/ST Act were not established, as the relevant provisions were not enacted when the alleged messages were sent, and the acts did not meet the criteria of the amended Act.(Para 21, 22)

Decision: The court allowed the appeal, quashing the FIR against the appellant.

Facts:

Dr. P. S. Malik, serving as an Additional District Judge, faced written complaints of sexual harassment at the workplace. The complaints were submitted by a lady Junior Judicial Assistant who worked in the petitioner's court. The petitioner was subsequently suspended, and an Internal Complaints Committee was constituted to investigate the matter.

Issues:

The petitioner contended that, due to the existence of an Inquiry Report by the Internal Complaints Committee, the High Court lacked the authority to initiate an inquiry or suspend him.

Additionally, concerns were raised regarding the non-supply of the Preliminary Inquiry Report dated 05.11.2016 to the petitioner.

Held:

The term "control" in Article 235 includes disciplinary control over judicial officers. Disciplinary authority for judicial officers lies with the High Court, allowing it to initiate disciplinary proceedings and suspend members of the judiciary.[Para 9, 14, 16]

The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2013, including Sections 11 and 13, addresses mechanisms for protecting the dignity and welfare of women at the workplace. These provisions do not impede the High Court's control over judicial officers.[Para 18-21]

The Full Court's decision to suspend the petitioner and initiate the inquiry on 13.07.2016 was deemed error-free. The Preliminary Inquiry Report dated 05.11.2016 did not contain findings but recommended an inquiry. The Inquiry Report dated 09.03.2018, submitted after the completion of the inquiry, was supplied to the petitioner. The right of appeal is granted under Section 18 only when the report is submitted under Section 13 to the employer.[Para 22, 24-26]

The petitioner's argument that the non-supply of the Preliminary Inquiry Report dated 05.11.2016 vitiated the proceedings was not accepted, as the report did not contain findings against the petitioner.[Para 26]

Decision: The writ petition was dismissed, affirming the High Court's authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings. The court held that no prejudice was caused to the petitioner by the non-supply of the Preliminary Inquiry Report. The petitioner retained the right to raise all pleas of facts and law during the ongoing disciplinary proceedings.

Facts:

On 08.01.1984, the deceased, Ram Autar, was attacked in his courtyard by appellant No.1 and others, resulting in a gunshot injury.

Witnesses presented inconsistent statements on who fired the fatal shots, leading to contradictions in the evidence.

Issues:

Identification of the person responsible for the fatal gunshot.

Application of Section 34 IPC to establish common intention.

Held:

The High Court affirmed the conviction under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC.

Even if appellant No.1 was identified as the shooter, the conviction of appellant No.2 was sustained with the aid of Section 34 IPC.

Section 34 IPC requires the establishment of common intention and the commission of the crime by more than one person in furtherance of that intention.

Presence of appellant No.2 with a rifle was established by consistent eyewitness evidence.

The court concluded that appellant No.2 acted in concert with appellant No.1, sharing the common intention, justifying the invocation of Section 34 IPC.

The appeal against appellant No.2 was dismissed, affirming the life imprisonment sentence.

The appeal against appellant No.1 was dismissed as abated due to his demise.

Facts:

The competent authority issued a detention order under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act, leading to the detainment of the respondent. The order was subsequently referred to the Advisory Board for evaluation.

Issues:

The Advisory Board's opinion, which, in its report, asserted that there was no sufficient cause for the continued detention of the respondent under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act.

Held:

In accordance with Article 22, Clause (4) of the Constitution, no law permitting preventive detention can authorize detention beyond three months unless an Advisory Board reports, within that period, that there is sufficient cause for such detention. The Advisory Board holds exclusive authority to determine the sufficiency of cause for detention.( Para 9)

Provisions in Section 8 of the COFEPOSA Act outline the procedure for reference to the Advisory Board, emphasizing the confidentiality of the assessment report and the non-confidential nature of the opinion. If the Advisory Board opines that there is no sufficient cause for detention, the appropriate government must revoke the order.( Para 10)

The nature of the opinion provided by the Advisory Board is neither judicial nor quasi-judicial. Treating it as a judgment of a criminal court is deemed erroneous. The opinion serves to assist the government and is binding only if it favors the detenu. It cannot be reviewed or scrutinized by judicial courts or tribunals.( Para 15)

Decision: The petition challenging the Advisory Board's opinion is deemed not maintainable, as the Advisory Board's role is confined to providing an opinion for the government's consideration.

Facts:

The action against the respondents was based on a 1986 order related to the Imports (Control) Order, 1986.

Import of goods by Obron Impex (Pvt.) Ltd. occurred in August 1997, after the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 came into effect.

The appellants sought to uphold the action based on the 1986 order, arguing for a savings clause under the 1992 Act.

Issues:

Whether the 1986 order could be sustained under the provisions of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992?

Whether the savings clause under Section 20 of the 1992 Act applies to the 1986 order?

Held:

The High Court correctly noted that the 1992 Act did not save the quasi-judicial order based on the 1986 order.

Any interpretation validating the 1986 order would be repugnant to the legislative intent of the 1992 Act.

The court concluded that the show cause notice issued against the respondents based on the 1986 order could not withstand judicial scrutiny.

Section 20 of the 1992 Act did not cover the 1986 order, and even the saving provision under the General Clauses Act was not applicable.

The quasi-judicial order passed under the repealed statutory order and act could not be saved, especially when it contradicted the spirit of the 1992 Act, which opened the import regime for the stated goods.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute related to the unauthorized use of electricity, specifically addressing instances of tampering with meters. The appellant, West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. & Ors., sought legal clarification on the powers of authorities under Sections 126 and 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

Issues:

The defining unauthorized use of electricity, determining the authorities' powers to make assessments under Section 126(1), and understanding the interplay between criminal complaints for theft under Section 135 and assessment proceedings.

Held:

The court emphasized that unauthorized use of electricity, as per Section 126(6)(b), encompasses various scenarios, including tampering with meters.[Para 9, 11]

The power conferred on authorities under Section 126(1) allows for provisional and final assessments, even in cases of unauthorized use through theft.Distinction between Section 126 and Section 135 clarified; Section 126 focuses on revenue loss due to unauthorized use, while Section 135 addresses the riminal offense of theft.The court rejected the notion that proceedings under Section 126(1) and Section 154(5) operate parallelly, emphasizing their distinct nature.[Para 12]

Simultaneous initiation of criminal complaints for theft and assessment proceedings under Section 126(1) is permissible, especially in cases of unauthorized use amounting to theft.[Para 14]

Decision: The appeal was allowed, affirming the authorities' power to make provisional and final assessments under Section 126(1) even when criminal complaints for theft are lodged simultaneously.

Facts:

The Goa, Daman and Diu Cooperative Fisheries Federation Limited (the Society) was registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960.

The Society advanced loans to its members during the period from 1974 to 1980.

Serious irregularities in loan disbursement by the Society led to a misfeasance case and ultimately, the winding-up proceedings.

The Registrar of Cooperative Societies appointed multiple liquidators to recover loans from defaulting members.

Issues:

Whether, under Section 109, proceedings for recovery of dues against members should be closed after the expiry of the liquidation period.

Held:

The concept of restitution is a common law principle serving as a remedy against unjust enrichment. Members obtaining stay in appeal or on recovery proceedings cannot benefit from the expiry of the Liquidator's period.( Para 23)

Upon the liquidation of the Society or the expiration of the liquidation period, the liability of members for the loans does not automatically cease. The disbursement of loans in an arbitrary manner and failure to recover were key reasons for the Society's winding up.( Para 24)

The decision of the High Court, which held that winding-up proceedings must be closed after the lapse of a specific period, is set aside. The bank, being the prime lender and liquidator, can continue recovery proceedings.( Para 25)