Facts:

The State of U.P. issued notifications between 1976 and 2010 to acquire land for planned industrial development in Noida and Greater Noida.

Some landowners challenged the acquisition in the High Court of Allahabad, arguing that it was illegal, lacked urgency, and deprived them of the opportunity to object.

The High Court disposed of several writ petitions, upholding the acquisition in most cases but directing the State to pay enhanced compensation and allot developed abadi plots to certain landowners, based on the extent of development on the acquired land.

The appellants, who were also landowners in the acquisition proceedings, appealed to the Supreme Court seeking similar relief as granted by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the appellants are entitled to claim the same relief as granted by the High Court to certain landowners in the acquisition proceedings.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the appellants lacked both legal right and factual foundation to claim the relief of allotment of additional developed abadi plot.

The Land Acquisition Act does not provide for such reliefs to landowners.

The State had already paid statutory and additional compensation to all landowners, including the appellants.

Granting the relief sought by the appellants would contradict the Court's previous directions and set a precedent against its decision in a similar case.

The appeals were dismissed, upholding the High Court's decision to deny the appellants the relief of allotment of additional developed abadi plot.

Facts:

The appellant, Kurukshetra University, terminated the services of the respondent, Prithvi Singh, a security guard, on grounds of misconduct.

A departmental inquiry was conducted, and Singh's services were terminated, leading to an industrial reference to the Labour Court, Ambala.

The Labour Court ruled in favor of Singh, stating that his termination was illegal due to procedural irregularities in the inquiry.

The High Court upheld the Labour Court's decision, prompting the appellant to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the Labour Court and High Court correctly applied legal principles in assessing the termination of employment and the conduct of the domestic inquiry.

Whether the termination of the respondent's employment constituted retrenchment or punishment under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Whether the appellant should be afforded an opportunity to present evidence regarding the alleged misconduct.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Labour Court and High Court failed to properly apply legal principles in assessing the termination and domestic inquiry.

The termination of the respondent's employment constituted punishment, not retrenchment, under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The Labour Court erred in not allowing the appellant to present evidence regarding the alleged misconduct and in treating the termination as retrenchment.

The case was remanded back to the Labour Court, affording the appellant an opportunity to present evidence on the alleged misconduct, and directing the Labour Court to issue a fresh notice to the respondent for appearance.

Facts:

The Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. is the appellant, and the Appellate Authority is the respondent.

The appellant detected unauthorized use of electricity by a consumer (respondent No. 2) running an oil mill in Maharashtra.

Legal proceedings were initiated under Sections 126 and 127 of the Electricity Act, 2003, resulting in the issuance of provisional and final bills to the consumer.

The consumer challenged the legality of the bills through a writ petition, which was partly allowed by the High Court, remanding the case to the Assessing Authority.

Issues:

Whether the Electricity Act, 2003, applies to the case.

Whether the consumer has the right to appeal under Section 127 of the Act against orders/demands raised under Section 126.

Held:

The Supreme Court held the Electricity Act, 2003, applies to the case as the meter inspection occurred after the Act came into force.

The consumer has the right to appeal under Section 127 against orders/demands raised under Section 126.

Sections 126 and 135 of the Act provide for different liabilities: monetary liability under Section 126 and criminal liability under Section 135.

Compliance with the High Court's directions for passing consequential orders under Section 126 within three months was directed.

Facts:

Sundaram Finance Limited (the appellant) granted a loan to Abdul Samad (the respondent) for the purchase of a Tata Lorry-HCV under a loan agreement.

The respondent defaulted on the loan payments, leading to arbitration proceedings initiated by the appellant.

An ex parte arbitration award was made in favor of the appellant.

The appellant filed for execution of the award in the jurisdiction of the Morena courts, Madhya Pradesh.

The trial court returned the execution application citing lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether an arbitral award should first be filed in the court having jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings for execution and then transferred to another court where the assets are located,

Whether the award can be directly filed and executed in the court where the assets are situated.

Held:

The Court clarified that an award can be directly filed for execution in the court where the assets are situated, without the need for obtaining a transfer of the decree from the court which had jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings.

We are, thus, unhesitatingly of the view that the enforcement of an award through its execution can be filed anywhere in the country where such decree can be executed and there is no requirement for obtaining a transfer of the decree from the Court, which would have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings.

The appeal was allowed, and the impugned order was set aside, restoring the execution application filed by the appellant before the Morena courts.

Facts:

Rajendra Shankar Shukla (the respondent) faced allegations related to his conduct as an employee of UCO Bank, particularly regarding the issuance of a cheque.

Shukla was issued a charge sheet after a delay of about 7 years, during which he was promoted to a higher category within the bank.

Despite the ongoing proceedings, Shukla faced financial constraints as he was denied salary, pension, and subsistence allowance.

Issues:

Whether the delay in issuing the charge sheet against Shukla affected the fairness of the inquiry process.

Whether the denial of financial resources to Shukla during the disciplinary inquiry violated his right to access justice.

Whether the imposition of penalties post-superannuation was legal under the relevant regulations.

Held:

The Court held the delay of 7 years in issuing the charge sheet against Shukla was unreasonable and unacceptable, and the charge sheet was liable to be set aside on this ground.

The denial of financial resources to Shukla during the disciplinary inquiry, including salary, pension, and subsistence allowance, violated his right to access justice.

The imposition of dismissal as a penalty post-superannuation was illegal under the relevant regulations. The appeal filed by the Bank was dismissed, and costs of Rs. 1 lakh were imposed on the Bank to be paid to Shukla towards his legal expenses.

Facts:

The Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) denied exemption under excise notifications for jute bags manufactured and supplied for packing food grains, based on the assertion that affixing buyer-specific information amounted to using a brand name.

Issues:

Whether the markings on jute bags constitute a brand name, thus disqualifying them from excise duty exemption.

Held:

The Court, after examining the definition of "brand name" and considering precedents, held that the compulsory markings on jute bags, mandated by the Jute Commissioner and government requisition orders, did not serve the purpose of indicating a connection in the course of trade between the product and any person. Thus, they did not qualify as a brand name as defined under the law. The Court referred to the judgment in CCE v. Stangen Immuno Diagnostics (2015) 11 SCC 761, where it was held that a brand name must establish a connection between the product and the manufacturer. Similarly, in CCE v. Sanghi Threads (2015) 14 SCC 701, it was emphasized that a mark used for identification within a group did not constitute a brand name.

The Court distinguished the present case from Kohinoor Elastics P Ltd. v. CCE (2005) 7 SCC 528, where the brand name was affixed to indicate a connection between the product and the customer, unlike the compulsory markings here. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals and set aside the CESTAT's judgment.

Facts:

Swaraj Abhiyan and other petitioners filed writ petitions seeking investigation into the purchase of a helicopter by the State of Chhattisgarh.

Allegations included irregularities in the procurement process and possible links to offshore accounts of the Chief Minister's son.

Issues:

Whether there were irregularities in the procurement process of the helicopter.

Whether there were grounds to suspect kickbacks or undue benefits to the Chief Minister's son.

Whether the writ petitions had a sufficient element of public interest.

Held:

The court examines the documents and finds no evidence to substantiate the allegations of irregularities or kickbacks in the procurement process. It notes that the state government's decision was based on recommendations and comparisons of helicopter models, and there was no indication of undue benefits to any individual.

Emphasizes that a petition under Article 32 should have a clear element of public interest and cannot be entertained solely based on alleged procedural irregularities. The court dismisses the writ petitions, highlighting the importance of genuine public interest in such cases.

Facts:

The appellant was convicted by the Sessions Judge, Mehsana (State of Gujarat) for offences under Sections 498A and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) in connection with the suicide of his wife. However, the High Court acquitted the appellant of the offence under Section 498A while maintaining the conviction under Section 201. The incident occurred on 26.12.1990, and the appellant's wife committed suicide by hanging. Subsequently, the appellant was charged under various sections, including Sections 304B, 306, 498A, and 201 of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The Sessions Judge convicted the appellant under Sections 498A and 201 of the IPC but acquitted seven other persons. The appeals were filed in 1995 and heard in 2015, resulting in the appellant's acquittal under Section 498A and maintenance of conviction under Section 201.

Issues:

Whether the conviction under Section 201 of the IPC can be maintained while acquitting the appellant of the main offence under Section 498A.

Held:

The court held that a charge under Section 201 of the IPC can stand independently if the prosecution establishes that an offence has been committed, the accused knew or had reason to believe that such an offence had been committed, and the accused caused the disappearance of evidence with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment. Mere suspicion is insufficient, and there must be evidence to support the accusation.

The court found that the prosecution failed to establish these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The deceased's family, including her father and brother, attended her last rites without expressing any suspicion of foul play. Additionally, the deceased left a suicide note taking full blame for her actions. Thus, the appellant's conduct, while suspicious, did not amount to intentional omission or actions to hide evidence of the alleged offence. Therefore, the court concluded that the appellant cannot be convicted under Section 201 of the IPC.

The acquittal of the appellant under Section 498A was upheld, and the conviction under Section 201 was set aside.

The court referred to various legal precedents, including Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 354, and Suleman Rehiman Mulani and another v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 829, to support its decision. These cases emphasized the necessity of establishing clear evidence and meeting the legal criteria for conviction, especially in cases involving serious offences like dowry death and disappearance of evidence.

Facts:

The Maharashtra Housing Development Authority (MHADA) issued an e-Tender notice for a redevelopment project.

The respondent, Shapoorji Pallonji & Company Private Limited, claimed to have submitted their bid within the specified timeframe but did not receive an acknowledgment.

The High Court directed the National Informatics Centre (NIC) to retrieve and consider the bid documents of the respondent.

Issues:

Whether the bid documents uploaded by the respondent could be retrieved.

If the bid documents could be retrieved, whether the respondent's bid should be considered.

Held:

The Supreme Court found that the bid documents uploaded by the respondent could not be retrieved under any circumstances, as affirmed by the NIC.

The Court accepted the NIC's assertion that the bid was invalid due to the failure of the respondent to complete the bid process by pressing the 'freeze button'. Therefore, the High Court's directions to consider the respondent's bid were incorrect as it effectively provided the respondent with a second opportunity, which was unwarranted.

The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the directions issued by the High Court.