Facts:

The case involved appellant No.3, Hashmukhbhai Ravjibhai Patel, who filed a criminal case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against accused Yogeshbhai Muljibhai Patel. The dispute arose from the issuance of four cheques and the authenticity of related receipts. Appellant No.3 alleged that the cheques were issued to repay a debt but were dishonored. Accused Yogeshbhai claimed that the receipts were forged, leading to a criminal complaint against the appellants for forgery and cheating.

Issues:

The admissibility and weight of expert handwriting opinions in criminal cases.

The impact of a pending civil suit on related criminal proceedings.

Whether the FIR was validly registered based solely on handwriting expert opinions.

Held:

Para 16: The court held that the FIR should not have been registered solely based on the opinion of a handwriting expert, as expert opinions are relevant but not conclusive. Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act empowers the court to compare admitted and disputed writings for its own opinion. The continuation of the FIR would amount to an abuse of the court's process. Thus, Criminal Misc. Application No.2735/2017 filed by the appellants was allowed, and the FIR No.I-194/2016 was quashed.

Para 20: The court ruled that the High Court erred in quashing the criminal case in C.C.No.367/2016 filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act, in favor of the holder of the cheque, remains until the accused discharges their burden of rebuttal. The case should proceed to allow the accused to adduce evidence to rebut the presumption. The FIR should not be quashed merely due to inter-se disputes between the parties.

Facts:

The Board decided to implement the 6th Pay Commission Report from January 1, 2006, and issued an order dated December 8, 2008, excluding its applicability to the employees of local bodies and public enterprises. Various orders and regulations were issued in this regard. Several writ petitions were filed challenging these orders, including one seeking to quash an order dated May 5, 2015, regarding pensionary benefits and another to grant arrears of salary from January 1, 2006, to January 13, 2010.

Issues:

Whether the State Government had jurisdiction to issue directions regarding the implementation of pension, family pension, and gratuity schemes, as well as service conditions, for the employees of the Board.

Held:

The judgment in Preetam Singh's case, which had held that conditions of service of officers and employees do not constitute the functions of the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, was found to be in error. This judgment did not consider other relevant provisions of the 1965 Act, such as Sections 8, 92, 95(1)(f), and the expression "subject to the provisions of the Act, rules, and regulations."

The court emphasized that the functions of the Board, as enumerated in Section 15 of the Act, were not exhaustive and had to be read along with other functions provided in the Act, rules, and regulations. Section 8 of the Act indicated that the appointment of officers and servants was one of the functions of the Board.

The State Government had jurisdiction under both the 1975 Act and the 1965 Act to issue directions regarding the service conditions of the Board's employees. Section 8(1) of the 1965 Act explicitly subjected the appointment of officers and servants by the Board to control and restrictions imposed by the State Government.

The State Government had legislative competence under Entry 41, List 5 of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and executive power under Article 162 to issue executive orders regulating the conditions of service of officers and servants employed in the affairs of the State.

Facts:

The appellant, Oudh Sugar Mills Ltd., filed a Writ Petition before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow, seeking various reliefs related to the classification of their sugar factory for price determination under the Sugar (Price Determination for 1984-85 Production) Order, 1984, and Sugar (Price Determination for 1985-86 Production) Order, 1985. The appellant argued that their sugar mill should have been placed in the eastern zone for price fixation, similar to other sugar factories in the same district (Sitapur). The High Court dismissed the writ petition, stating that the classification decision was a policy decision made by the Central Government, and there was no evidence of arbitrariness or hostile discrimination.

Issues:

Whether the classification of the appellant's sugar mill for price determination under the Sugar Control Orders was arbitrary or discriminatory.

Whether Section 3(2)(f) and Section 3(3c) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, were ultra vires of Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.

Held:

The price of levy sugar was fixed for different zones with the intention of ensuring a reasonable return for sugar manufacturers, provided their units were running economically and efficiently. Sugar was a controlled commodity during the relevant time, covered by the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The price of levy sugar was determined based on Control Orders, and the Central Government considered various factors, including expert recommendations and cost schedules. The Court found that the appellant failed to demonstrate invidious discrimination or statutory violation. The policy decisions regarding classification were made based on expert reports and were not discriminatory or unreasonable. (Para 7)

The Court concluded that there was no merit in the appeals and dismissed them. The appellant had made deposits and provided bank guarantees as per interim orders, and the Court allowed the respondent-Government to withdraw the deposited amount and accrued interest. (Para 8)

These appeals are, accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute regarding the regularization of workers employed by the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) based on the provisions of clause 2(ii) of ONGC's Certified Standing Orders. Four impugned orders upheld the regularization of workers relying on a judgment in the "PCLU case," while one impugned order declined regularization, distinguishing it from the "PCLU case."

Issues:

Whether the construction placed on the provisions of clause 2(ii) of ONGC's Certified Standing Orders in the "PCLU case" is correct.

Whether the decision in the "PCLU case" should be reconsidered.

The applicability of principles from the "Umadevi case" in the context of industrial adjudication.

Held:

The Supreme Court made the following observations and held as follows:

The decision in the "PCLU Case" held that workers completing 240 days' service in a period of 12 calendar months are entitled to regularization of their services into permanent posts of the corporation. The Court further held that under clause 2(ii) of the Certified Standing Orders, upon the completion of 240 days of service in a calendar year, the workers have acquired a valid statutory right and should have been granted the status of regular employees of the corporation. The Court found that the construction placed on the provisions of clause 2(ii) in the "PCLU Case" prima facie does not appear to be correct. Additionally, it noted that the "PCLU Case" did not consider an earlier judgment in the "Engineering Mazdoor Sangh Case," which pertained to ONGC's Certified Standing Orders.( Para 17)

The second aspect to be considered is the applicability of the principles set out in the "Umadevi Case" in the context of industrial adjudication. The Supreme Court found that this issue also needs to be placed before a larger bench for consideration.( Para 18)

The "PCLU Case" needs reconsideration to align its position in law with the principles emerging from earlier precedents. Specific areas for reconsideration include: (i) the interpretation of clause 2(ii) of the Certified Standing Orders; (ii) the meaning and content of an unfair labor practice under Section 2(ra) read with Item 10 of the Vth Schedule of the ID Act; (iii) limitations, if any, on the power of the Labor and Industrial Courts to order regularization in the absence of sanctioned posts.( Para 24)

Decision: The Supreme Court decided to refer the matter to a larger bench for reconsideration of the "PCLU case" and for clarification on various aspects of labor law related to the regularization of workers.

Facts:

The appellant, Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. (formerly known as Maruti Udyog Ltd.), is engaged in the manufacturing of automobiles, which are subject to Excise Duty under the Central Excise Act, 1994. For the assessment year 1999-2000, the appellant claimed deductions under Section 43B of the Income Tax Act for two specific amounts:

Deduction of Rs. 69,93,00,428/- representing unutilized MODVAT credit of Excise Duty.

Deduction of Rs. 3,08,88,171/- in respect of Sales Tax Recoverable Account.

Issues:

Whether the unutilized MODVAT credit of Excise Duty qualifies for deduction under Section 43B of the Income Tax Act.

Whether the amount in the Sales Tax Recoverable Account is eligible for deduction under Section 43B.

Held:

Unutilized MODVAT Credit of Excise Duty: The court held that unutilized MODVAT credit under the MODVAT scheme does not qualify for deductions under Section 43B of the Income Tax Act. The scheme of the Central Excise Act and Rules imposes the liability to pay Excise Duty on the manufacturer of raw materials and inputs, not on the purchaser (the appellant). While the appellant could credit the Excise Duty paid on raw materials and inputs to their account under the MODVAT scheme, this did not mean that they were liable to pay Excise Duty on these materials. The liability to pay Excise Duty was on the manufacturer of the raw materials and inputs. Hence, the unutilized MODVAT credit did not represent a sum payable by the appellant by way of tax, duty, cess, or fee, as required by Section 43B.

Sales Tax Recoverable Account: The court upheld the disallowance of the deduction claimed for the Sales Tax Recoverable Account under Section 43B. The appellant had the option to set off the sales tax paid against its liability on the sales of finished goods. Since the sales tax paid was not actually paid but merely recorded in a separate account, it did not meet the conditions of Section 43B, which requires actual payment of the sum. Therefore, the deduction was rightly disallowed.

Proviso to Section 43B: The court rejected the appellant's claim under the first proviso to Section 43B. The proviso allows a deduction if a sum is actually paid on or before the due date for furnishing the return of income for the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred. In this case, the liability to pay Excise Duty on the manufactured vehicles was incurred in the subsequent year, not in the assessment year in question. Therefore, the proviso did not apply.

The appeals are dismissed.

Facts:

The dispute arose over the selection process for the post of Gram Rojgar Sahayak in the Panchayat of the Rewa District in Madhya Pradesh. The selection process was governed by guidelines issued on June 2, 2012, by the Madhya Pradesh State Employment Guarantee Parishad, a registered institution under the Panchayat and Rural Development Department. These guidelines specified the qualifications and criteria for selection.

However, the Collector of Rewa, Madhya Pradesh, issued a Revised Time Schedule for the recruitment process on June 17, 2014. This schedule included a computer efficiency test as part of the selection process, even though it was not mentioned in the original guidelines.

Some candidates who had already been selected or were in the process of selection challenged the introduction of the computer efficiency test, arguing that it was not part of the original guidelines and should not be added mid-way through the selection process.

Issues:

Whether the introduction of the computer efficiency test was valid when it was not part of the original guidelines.

Whether candidates who participated in the computer efficiency test without objection could later challenge the process.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, stating that the introduction of the computer efficiency test after the selection process had already begun was not in accordance with the guidelines issued on June 2, 2012. Therefore, the candidates who had participated in the test could not be considered to have accepted it as a valid part of the selection process.

The Supreme Court also cited the principle that candidates who participate in an examination or selection process without objection cannot later challenge the process. However, it clarified that this principle did not apply in this case because the computer efficiency test had been introduced in a manner inconsistent with the original guidelines.

The appeals were dismissed, and the High Court's decision was upheld.

Facts:

The case pertains to a claim filed by the respondent, Priya Paul, following an aviation accident resulting in her son's death. The appellant-insurer, Bharti AXA General Insurance, rejected the claim, arguing that the deceased was flying in a motorized glider for sightseeing, which they believed was not covered by the insurance policy.

Issues:

Whether the motorized glider involved in the accident should be considered an "aircraft" under the policy?

Whether the glider in question qualifies as a "standard type of aircraft"?

Whether the glider was duly licensed?

Whether the entity operating the glider, Pemberton Soaring Centre, qualifies as an "air charter company"?

Whether the deceased was a fare-paying passenger on the glider?

Held:

Issue 1: Glider as an Aircraft: The fact that the glider had a motor does not preclude it from being considered an "aircraft." The policy did not provide specific definitions for "aircraft" or "glider," and the Transport Safety Board of Canada (TSBC) Report repeatedly referred to the glider as an "aircraft." Thus, the glider is deemed an aircraft under the policy.

Issue 2: Standard Type of Aircraft: The policy did not define "standard type of aircraft," and the 1937 Rules did not categorize aircraft as "standard" or "non-standard." The insurer could not reject the claim based on this argument.

Issue 3: Licensing of the Glider: The glider was found to be duly licensed and compliant with existing regulations and procedures, including the certification of the pilot. It was rightly held that the aircraft was duly licensed.

Issue 4: Air Charter Company: The Pemberton Soaring Centre, which operated the glider, offered sightseeing services for a fixed fee, essentially chartering the entire aircraft for the duration of the aerial journey. This practice may constitute an own-use charter. The policy did not provide a clear definition of an "air charter company," so the ambiguity favored the claimant's position.

Issue 5: Fare-Paying Passenger: The argument that the deceased was not a fare-paying passenger because the journey started and ended at the same location was rejected. The purpose of the journey was sightseeing, similar to how a sightseeing bus operates, and passengers should be considered as such.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between C.S. Venkatesh (the appellant) and A.S.C. Murthy (the plaintiff), who filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement of reconveyance concerning a property in Bangalore. The plaintiff also sought a declaration that a sale deed executed by him in favor of the defendants was null and void. The plaintiff's claim was based on the contention that the sale deed served as security for a loan advanced by the defendants, and there was an agreement of reconveyance.

Issues:

Is the sale deed nominal or an outright sale?

Has the plaintiff demonstrated readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, as required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act?

Held:

The sale deed was not nominal but constituted an outright sale. The language and recitals within the deed indicated an unequivocal intention to transfer ownership. (Para 12)

To establish readiness and willingness for specific performance, the plaintiff must demonstrate continuous preparedness to fulfill the contractual obligations throughout the relevant period. Mere pleadings are insufficient; proof of the plaintiff's ability to generate the necessary consideration is required. In this case, the plaintiff's pleadings were not substantiated by evidence, and the plaintiff's financial situation did not support the claim of readiness and willingness. (Para 15-20)

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and reinstated the trial court's decision in favor of the defendant, C.S. Venkatesh.

Facts:

The respondent occupied the 16th floor of a building since February 1, 2012, without paying any lease rent, maintenance charges, electricity charges, or other dues.

The appellant claimed lease rent of Rs. 7,29,240 from February 1, 2012, to December 2, 2019, which the respondent did not seriously dispute.

Disputes arose over the maintenance charges, with the respondent arguing that they should not be liable to pay due to the absence of air-conditioning.

The appellant also claimed electricity charges, including minimum demand charges and additional fees, which the respondent disputed, asserting they only used minimal electricity and were not provided with invoices.

The respondent did not make any payments despite occupying the premises for over seven years.

Issues:

Whether the respondent is liable to pay lease rent and maintenance charges.

How to calculate maintenance charges in the absence of air-conditioning.

Whether the respondent is liable to pay electricity charges.

How to determine the electricity charges owed by the respondent.

Whether the electricity disconnection was justified due to non-payment by the respondent.

Held:

The respondent is liable to pay the appellant:

Lease rent of Rs. 7,29,240 from February 1, 2012, to December 2, 2019.

Maintenance charges of Rs. 2,11,20,000 at a rate of Rs. 7.50 per sq. ft. per month from February 1, 2012, to January 31, 2020.

Minimum electricity charges of Rs. 1,10,000 per month from February 1, 2012, to January 31, 2020.

The respondent is required to pay Rs. 1,00,00,000 within one month, with the remaining amount in three equal installments.

The appellant must restore electricity within three days of receiving the initial payment.

Monthly bills for lease rent, electricity charges, maintenance charges, and other charges must be sent by the appellant to the respondent. Payment must be made by a specified date each month, with a portion to be paid even in case of a dispute.

If any of the conditions set by the court are violated, the appellant has the right to disconnect electricity.