Facts:

The appellant, Mahant Lalita Sharanji, was the Mahant of Shri Mukunddevacharya Peeth in Vrindavan.

During consolidation proceedings, he was allotted land along with others, including Deoki Devi, by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation.

Subsequently, an appeal filed by another party, Bansi Ballabh, led to changes in the allotments, adversely affecting the appellant's holdings.

Despite not being a party to the appeal, the appellant's holdings were altered.

Issues:

Whether the appellant had the right to challenge the altered order despite not challenging the original order.

Whether the alteration of the order nullified the earlier order, giving the appellant a fresh cause of action.

Held:

The Court held that the appellant had a right to challenge the altered order since it significantly affected his holdings, despite not challenging the original order. The alteration virtually nullified the earlier order, giving the appellant a fresh cause of action.

The Court emphasized that each case must be decided on its own facts and noted that the purpose of consolidation laws is to prevent fragmentation of holdings and ensure one common holding. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the Deputy Director, Consolidation's order was restored. Deoki Devi was directed to remove any construction at her own cost and hand over possession of the land to the appellant within 30 days.

Failure to comply would empower the appellant to seek assistance from the court to take possession, with Deoki Devi not entitled to compensation for the structure or damages.

Facts:

The appellants were accused of committing a dacoity with murder at a pawnbroking shop in November 2002. The prosecution alleged that the appellants, along with others, robbed jewelry from the shop and murdered the owner.

The trial court convicted all five accused under Section 396 IPC and sentenced them to ten years of rigorous imprisonment. The High Court enhanced the sentence to life imprisonment for the conviction under Section 396 IPC.

Issues:

Whether the sentence imposed by the trial court or the enhanced sentence imposed by the High Court is appropriate in the case of dacoity with murder.

Held:

The court observed that while the offense under Section 396 IPC is serious, the court has larger discretion in imposing a penalty, which could be lesser than death or imprisonment for life.

Noting that the accused were found to be unarmed during the commission of the crime and considering the long lapse of time since the incident occurred, the court modified the sentence of imprisonment for life to ten years, as directed by the trial court.

Therefore, the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals, maintaining the conviction under Section 396 IPC but modifying the sentence to ten years of imprisonment.

As the appellants had already been in custody for more than ten years, they were ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

Facts:

The prosecution's case involved the discovery of a large quantity of cannabis mixture in a car during a police patrol on National Highway 21. The accused-respondents were found in the car, while another person allegedly fled the scene. The trial court convicted accused-respondents Nos. 1 and 2, but the High Court acquitted them due to lack of independent witnesses and doubts regarding the condition of the contraband parcel.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in acquitting the accused-respondents based on the absence of independent witnesses and doubts about the contraband parcel's condition.

Held:

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's acquittal and restored the trial court's conviction and sentence against the accused-respondents.

The absence of independent witnesses was not fatal to the prosecution's case, given the circumstances. The Court found it unlikely that the contraband was planted and explained the condition of the contraband parcel.

Therefore, the appeals were allowed, and the accused-respondents were directed to surrender forthwith to serve the remaining part of their sentence.

NONE

Facts:

The petitioners in this case sought revaluation of the answer-sheet of the criminal law paper of the main examination of the Delhi Judicial Service Examination, 2015. They also sought moderation of marks obtained by the candidates in the examination.

Issues:

Whether revaluation of answer-scripts and moderation of marks are warranted in the circumstances of the case.

Whether the minimum marks for viva voce examination were reasonable.

Whether rounding off of marks was permissible to meet the minimum aggregate requirement for an interview.

Whether the minimum cut-off marks for individual subjects should be reduced.

Held:

The Court held that moderation is only appropriate when multiple examiners assess the same subject. Since only one examiner evaluated the subject in question, moderation wasn't necessary.

Additionally, revaluation of answer-scripts cannot be ordered in the absence of a provision for it, which was the case here.

The Court found that the decision not to relax the minimum passing marks for the viva voce examination was reasonable, considering the importance of maintaining standards in judicial appointments.

The petitioner's performance did not meet even the minimum passing marks, as evidenced by the fact that only one candidate out of 64 failed in the interview.

Rounding off marks to meet the minimum aggregate requirement wasn't permissible in this case, as candidates must meet the criteria without relaxation when a specific aggregate is prescribed.

The Court upheld the minimum passing marks prescribed for written papers, stating that they were reasonable and necessary to assess academic knowledge in various subjects. There was no justification for interference with the prescribed cut-off marks, as performance in all subjects is crucial for judicial roles.

Facts:

The Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board invited bids for power stations in 1995.

The respondent won the bid and established a power generation plant.

A PPA was signed in 1997, initially with naphtha as primary fuel and gas as an alternate.

The PPA underwent amendments in 2003 and 2007, making gas the primary fuel.

The respondent sought permission to use RLNG as fuel, claiming it was a form of natural gas.

Disagreement arose over the interpretation of the term "fuel" in the PPA.

Issues:

Whether RLNG falls under the definition of "fuel" as per the PPA.

The intention of the parties regarding the type of fuel permissible.

The significance of surrounding circumstances and correspondence in interpreting the contract.

Held:

The Court held that interpreting the contract solely based on technical scientific meanings of terms is not prudent.

In case of ambiguity, all surrounding facts and circumstances must be considered to understand the intention of the parties.

The respondent's correspondence requesting RLNG usage and the appellant's refusal indicated RLNG was not intended to be included in the definition of natural gas.

Use of RLNG in exceptional circumstances does not change the contractual interpretation.

The primary consideration was generating power from reasonably priced fuel for consumer benefit.

RLNG was not included in the definition of natural gas under the PPA, as understood by both parties.

Decision: The Court concluded that RLNG was not intended to be included in the definition of natural gas under the PPA. The decision was based on the intention of the parties, correspondence, and commercial context.

Facts:

Plaintiff filed a civil suit against the defendants for recovery of a sum.

Summons initially sent to defendants' place of business, later sought substituted service by publication.

Summons published in newspapers but lacked specific details like day, date, year, and time for defendants' appearance.

Defendants did not appear, leading to the passing of an ex-parte decree.

Defendants filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC to set aside the decree, citing improper summons service.

Issues:

Whether the summons served on the defendants complied with statutory requirements.

Whether the lack of specific details in the summons invalidated the ex-parte decree.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the summons did not comply with statutory requirements, as they lacked specific details for the defendants' appearance. This non-compliance invalidated the ex-parte decree, and the defendants were entitled to have it set aside under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC.

The Court emphasized the importance of adherence to statutory provisions and set aside the judgments of the lower courts. The civil suit was restored to its original file, and the parties were directed to appear before the concerned court for further proceedings.

Any deposits made by the appellant would be subject to the final result of the suit.

Facts:

The case involved workers seeking regularization of their services in Chennai Port Trust, governed by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The High Court had given directions regarding cargo distribution between Chennai and Ennore Ports. Chennai Port Trust terminated the MOU after certain activities were shifted to Ennore Port Trust. Workers filed a writ petition, initially dismissed by a Single Judge but partially allowed by a Division Bench.

Issues:

The employment status of the workers, their association membership, and entitlement to relief.

Held:

The Supreme Court directed that the case should have been referred to arbitration instead of being entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution. Various questions regarding employment status and entitlement to relief need to be decided by an Arbitral Tribunal.

The Court set aside the impugned judgments and dismissed the writ petition, granting liberty to the parties to approach the court for the appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal as per the MOU.

The Tribunal is instructed to consider all issues raised, ensure a fair resolution within six months, and may frame additional questions if necessary.

Facts:

The appellants (plaintiffs) filed a civil suit against the respondents (defendants) for specific performance of an agreement.

The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the appellants.

The respondents appealed to the Single Judge of the High Court, who allowed their appeal and dismissed the appellants' suit.

The appellants then filed a Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) before the Division Bench of the High Court, which was summarily dismissed.

Issues:

Whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in dismissing the appellants' LPA.

Held:

The Supreme Court found that the Division Bench's dismissal of the LPA lacked proper reasoning and did not comply with the requirements of the Civil Procedure Code. The lack of a reasoned order deprived the parties of understanding the basis for the decision, causing prejudice. Thus, the Supreme Court decided to set aside the impugned order and remand the case to the Division Bench of the High Court for fresh consideration on merits.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and remanded the case to the Division Bench of the High Court for fresh consideration on merits, emphasizing the importance of reasoned orders and expeditious disposal of the appeal.