Facts:

Respondent company processed cotton and non-cotton seeds in its unit.

Processed seeds stored in a godown for transportation.

Appellant alleged the respondent lacked a valid license for storage and committed a violation.

Seed inspector sealed the godowns; respondent filed a writ petition.

Issues:

Validity of the sealing of godowns by the seed inspector.

Requirement of a separate license for labeling and packaging activities.

Compliance with Seeds Acts, Rules, and related regulations.

Held:

The respondent lacked a license for storage or sale of seeds, making the labeling and packaging activities illegal (Para 24).

Packaging and labeling operations require a separate license under Seeds Rules, 1968 (Para 25).

Powers of the Seed Inspector include entering premises, drawing samples, seizing stock, and issuing stop-sale orders (Para 32).

Section 14(1)(e) of the Seeds Act grants the Seed Inspector the power to exercise other necessary powers, including sealing (Para 33).

Sealing can be justified if the Seed Inspector has reasons to believe an offense is being committed and if it is necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act (Para 35).

The actions of the Seed Inspector and authorities in sealing the godown were not arbitrary, considering the non-compliance of the respondent and lack of information (Para 36).

Facts:

The notification dated April 27, 2018, under Section 26-A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, limits the manufacture of Oxytocin formulations for domestic use exclusively to public sector entities. The private sector is allowed to manufacture the drug for export purposes.

Issues:

The addresses substantial questions of law, including the applicability of Section 26-A to drugs listed in the National List of Essential Medicines.

It examines the creation of a potential monopoly in favor of public sector companies, constitutional validity, classification between public and private sector companies, and the impact on public interest, particularly concerning maternal mortality rates.

Held:

Nature of Powers under Section 26-A: The court notes the absence of a prior decision on whether the powers exercised by the Central Government under Section 26-A are legislative or executive. The decision on this matter would significantly impact the legality of the impugned notification.

Far-Reaching Consequences: The judgment acknowledges the profound implications on citizens' rights and public health. The nature of powers under Section 26-A, essential ingredients for its invocation, and the potential conflict with the Essential Commodities Act are crucial aspects to be determined.

Constitutional Validity: The court raises concerns about the potential creation of a monopoly by the impugned notification and examines whether such a situation, if established, aligns with the constitutional provisions of Article 14 and Article 19(6)(ii).

Public Interest Consideration: The court questions the wisdom of restricting the manufacture of a life-saving drug like Oxytocin for domestic use to a single public sector undertaking, excluding the private sector, especially in light of the high maternal mortality rates.

Relevance of Material: The court queries whether there was sufficient relevant and objective material before the Central Government to justify the prohibition on private sector companies from manufacturing the drug for domestic use under Section 26-A.

Facts:

Marriage of deceased Sahitya with L. Manjunatha on March 10, 2006.

FIR lodged on August 25, 2009, alleging that Sahitya was killed by the appellants along with others.

Initial allegations of dowry demand and harassment against appellants.

Lack of evidence supporting dowry demand or harassment.

No proven conspiracy involving appellants.

Charges framed against appellants included offenses under Sections 120-B, 302, 498-A read with Section 34 IPC and Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Issues:

Absence of dowry demand or harassment allegations against the appellants.

Lack of evidence supporting the conspiracy charge.

Omission to frame an alternative charge under Section 302 IPC.

Compliance with procedural laws and principles of natural justice.

Held:

Chain of Circumstances and Lack of Conspiracy (Para 15-16): The Court held that the chain of circumstances leading to the conclusion that the appellants were solely responsible for the crime was not completed. The conviction was based on probabilities rather than conclusive evidence. The charge of conspiracy against the appellants was not proved.

Omission to Frame Alternative Charge (Para 18-19): Emphasizing the importance of framing charges, the Court considered the omission to frame an alternative charge under Section 302 IPC. It reiterated that the accused must be aware of the exact nature of the charge against them to ensure a fair trial. The absence of framing a charge, coupled with the failure to prove the alleged conspiracy, led to prejudice and failure of justice.

Principles Relating to Framing of Charges (Para 20): The judgment cited principles related to Sections 212, 215, and 464 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, emphasizing the importance of framing charges to enable the accused to understand the nature of the accusations against them.

Acquittal of the Appellants (Para 21): Based on the above considerations, the Court allowed the appeal, acquitted the appellants of the charges, and directed their release if not required in any other case.

Facts:

The respondent, Capt. Gurdarshan Kaur Sandhu, served as a pilot for Air India Express Limited. She tendered her resignation through email on July 3, 2017. The appellant accepted her resignation on September 2, 2017. Subsequently, on December 18, 2017, the respondent sought to withdraw her resignation via email, which the appellant declined.

Issues:

Whether the stipulation of the notice period in the Civil Aviation Requirement (CAR) safeguards the interest of the employee?

Whether the provisions of the CAR and the governing principles therein fall within the exception stipulated in Gopal Chandra Mishra and Balram Gupta, thus preventing the respondent from withdrawing her resignation?

Held:

The Court held that the resignation could normally be withdrawn before it becomes effective, based on service regulations and terms. The crucial questions were: A) Whether the CAR's notice period is intended to safeguard the employee's interest. B) Whether the CAR provisions fall within exceptions allowing the employer to reject withdrawal.

The CAR recognized the time and effort required to train a pilot and the potential impact on flights and passengers if resignations occur without a six-month notice. The underlying principle of the notice period was public interest, preventing last-minute flight cancellations.

The notice period serves public interest, enabling the employer to find a suitable replacement. In this case, the appellant took steps to fulfill this obligation, finding a replacement. The Court concluded that, considering the CAR's core principles, the respondent could not withdraw her resignation.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, affirming that the respondent could not withdraw her resignation in the specific context of this case.

Facts:

The respondent was initially appointed as a Road Gang Mazdoor.

Subsequently appointed as a Revenue Assistant based on a High Court order, as she possessed a Diploma in Civil Engineering.

The respondent sought appointment as a Town Planning Inspector based on her qualifications.

The appellant challenged the High Court's order directing the respondent's appointment as a Town Planning Inspector.

Issues:

Whether possession of educational qualifications alone is sufficient for appointment to a public post?

Whether appointments must be made in accordance with applicable recruitment rules?

Whether the respondent was eligible for appointment as a Town Planning Inspector?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that possession of the required educational qualifications is not the sole criterion for appointment to a public post. Appointments must be made in accordance with applicable recruitment rules, either under the law enacted pursuant to Article 309 of the Constitution of India or rules made under the proviso to Article 309. In the absence of recruitment rules, appointments should follow executive instructions prescribing eligibility conditions.

The respondent's appointment as a Revenue Assistant, based solely on possessing a Diploma in Civil Engineering, was deemed illegal. The Court emphasized that appointments should be made through proper procedures, including advertising posts and providing opportunities for eligible candidates to apply.

The High Court's order directing the consideration of the respondent's appointment as a Town Planning Inspector was set aside. The Court clarified that the respondent was not in the feeder cadre for such a post, and the appointment would be against the applicable rules. The Court imposed a cost of Rs. 20,000 on the respondent for initiating frivolous proceedings.

Facts:

The Government of Kerala, in 1972, specified qualifications for the post of Health Inspector/Food Inspector Grade-II.

In 2014, KPSC advertised vacancies for Junior Health Inspector Grade-II, including the Sanitary Inspectors' Certificate. Candidates with a DHIC qualification were included in shortlists.

A Committee conducted a comparative study of DHIC and SIDC, concluding that DHIC is a higher qualification.

Tribunal and High Court held that there was a clear distinction between qualifications for the same post in different departments.

Issues:

Interpretation of Rule 10(a)(ii) concerning the recognition of DHIC as a higher qualification.

Whether DHIC presupposes the completion of the certificate course.

Held:

The Supreme Court observed that none of the conditions stipulated in Rule 10(a)(ii) were fulfilled. It emphasized the lack of a determination of equivalence by any executive order or standing order of the State Government and the absence of a finding that DHIC presupposes the acquisition of the lower qualification. The Court distinguished a previous case (Jyoti K K) and concluded that the judgment of the High Court did not suffer from error. The appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

The first respondent joined the school on probation for one year on July 1, 2008, but continued as a probationer for almost five years until being discharged on June 30, 2013.

Issues:

Whether the words "by another year" appearing in Rule 105(1) limit the total duration of permissible probation to two years.

Whether the 1973 Rules require the issuance of an order of confirmation for a probationer to be confirmed in service.

Held:

Interpretation of Rule 105(1) – "by another year": 1.1 The words "by another year" imply an extension of the probationary period by one additional year over and above the mandatory year, making the total probationary period two years. 1.2 Rule 105(1) imposes a limitation on the total probationary period to two years, with the first proviso exempting minority institutions from the Director's prior approval. (Para 23-33)

Confirmation of Service and Rule 105(2): 2.1 Rule 105(2) stipulates that an order of confirmation may be issued if the work and conduct of the employee during the probationary period are found satisfactory. 2.2 The mere continuation of services beyond the probationary period does not lead to deemed confirmation. Confirmation requires the issuance of a formal order. (Para 35-38)

Decision and Award of Compensation: The High Court's decision of deeming confirmation was set aside. However, due to the prolonged probationary period, the court awarded ex-gratia compensation of Rs. 5,00,000 to the first respondent under its power under Article 142 of the Constitution. (Para 47-48)

The State issued an advertisement for a departmental examination for the position of Land Records Inspector, and the dispute arose regarding the seniority of successful candidates. The appellants claimed their seniority based on the year in which the vacancies arose, leading to a legal challenge.

Facts:

The appellants appeared for the departmental examination on May 16, 2013.

Appointment orders were issued in 2012 for 80% seniority-cum-merit vacancies and in 2014 for the remaining 20% competitive exam vacancies.

A provisional seniority list issued on November 7, 2013, excluded the appellants.

Another seniority list on April 24, 2017, determined seniority as of April 1, 2014, placing the appellants below those promoted against vacancies arising after their promotional year.

The State ordered the removal of the appellants from the seniority list, treating them as appointed in 2014-15.

Issues:

The computation of seniority for Land Records Inspectors based on the year in which their vacancies arose.

Held:

The interplay between the Rajasthan Land Revenue (Land Records) Rules 1957, particularly Rules 171-A, 347-A, and 347-B, with the Rajasthan Subordinate Services Rules of different years, is crucial. Rule 347-A indicates that conditions of service are governed by enumerated rules, including the 1960 Rules, unless otherwise provided in the 1957 Rules.( Para 24)

Rule 171-A(2) prior to its October 2014 amendment contemplated determining seniority based on continuous officiation. The amendment changed it to determine seniority based on the recruitment year of promotion.( Para 26)

Part V of the 2001 Rules does not comprehend a limited competitive examination for accelerated promotion. Rule 35, applicable to promotions, has no relevance in the context of accelerated promotion through a limited competitive examination.( Para 29)

The deeming fiction in Rule 35(6) of the 2001 Rules, applicable to promotions made under a departmental promotion committee (DPC), does not extend to candidates recruited through a competitive examination for accelerated promotion.( Para 30)

Retrospective seniority cannot be granted from a date when the employee was not borne on a cadre. Seniority must be counted from the date of initial entry into the grade.( Para 31)

The 1960 Rules give way to Rule 171-A(2) of the 1957 Rules, which determines seniority based on continuous officiation.( Para 34)

Rule 347-B of the 1957 Rules does not aid the appellants, and the 1972 Rules mentioned in Rule 347-B have no application to the present case governed by Rule 284 of the 1957 Rules.( Para 35)

Facts:

The appellant supplied commodities and rice bags to the respondent, who issued cheques subsequently dishonoured.

The appellant filed complaints under Section 138 alleging non-payment despite legal notices.

The trial court acquitted the respondent, finding the appellant's case inconsistent, and the High Court affirmed the acquittal.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented is sufficient to raise the presumption under Section 139.

Whether the respondent successfully rebutted the presumption by evidence.

Whether the cheques were issued for a legally enforceable debt.

Held:

The evidence adduced by the complainant raised the presumption under Section 139.

The respondent's defense that cheques were not returned despite payment was unbelievable and unacceptable.

The High Court's decision to affirm acquittal was not sustainable.

The respondent was convicted under Section 138, and a fine of Rs. 2,97,150 was imposed.

Conclusion: The appeal was allowed, the respondent convicted under Section 138, and a fine imposed. The court emphasized the importance of the statutory presumption under Section 139 and the accused's responsibility to rebut it.