FACTS:

Smt. Randhir Kaur gifted a property to Doaba Public School through a registered Gift Deed.

An oral exchange of land occurred in 1988, purportedly between the Principal of the school and the President of the Doaba Education Society.

The exchanged land included the portion originally donated by Smt. Randhir Kaur.

The Respondents executed a Lease Deed, making the school a Lessee and the Principal the owner of the suit property.

Legal proceedings ensued challenging the exchange and seeking restoration of ownership to the school.

ISSUES:

Validity of the oral exchange and subsequent transactions.

Ownership rights over the suit property.

HELD:

The Court held that the exchange was collusive, unauthorized, and illegal. The purported reason for the exchange, benefiting students in a remote village, was a mere ruse. The school continued to operate from the original property, and the exchange was an attempt to transfer valuable land to the Principal. The Court quashed the exchange, set aside the related documents, and directed the restoration of ownership to the Doaba Public School. Costs of Rs. 1 lac were awarded to the Appellants. The Appeals are allowed.

FACTS:

Writ petitioners (C&V Teachers) argue their conversion to TGT under Rule 9(5) of 2012 Rules makes them eligible for promotion to Elementary School Headmaster.

The State contests, asserting the writ petitioners lack the requisite qualifications for TGT under the 2012 Rules.

ISSUES:

Whether C&V Teachers, converted to TGT under Rule 9(5), are entitled to promotion as Elementary School Headmasters.

The qualification discrepancy between writ petitioners and the requirements for TGT under 2012 Rules.

HELD:

The High Court's interpretation of Rule 9(5) simplistically assumed C&V Teachers become part of the TGT Cadre, entitling them to promotion as Elementary School Headmasters. The Court reviews this stance.( Para 15)

The 1998 Rules established a promotion path for C&V Teachers to the post of Master, equivalent to TGT. The Court scrutinizes the qualifications and positions under both the 1998 and 2012 Rules.( Para 16)

The Court emphasizes that TGTs, as per 2012 Rules, include Masters appointed before the notification. The post of Master under 1998 Rules aligns with TGT under 2012 Rules, making it a promotion post for C&V Teachers.( Para 18)

The conversion of C&V Teachers to TGT is seen as a facilitation of service conditions under 2012 Rules, not an upgrade to the TGT Cadre. The Court stresses that such conversion is for administrative convenience, not to confer membership in the TGT Cadre.( Para 20)

The Court concludes that the purpose of the Rules is to ensure better education through Trained Graduate Teachers. Interpreting the rules in a way that aligns with the educational goals is favored over an interpretation leading to anomalous results.( Para 22)

The High Court's order is set aside, and the appeal is allowed. The Court holds that C&V Teachers, despite conversion to TGT notionally, do not become part of the TGT Cadre as per the cumulative reading of the 2012 Rules.( Para 23)

Facts:

The Appellants sought permission under Order XLI Rule 27, CPC to introduce additional evidence before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. The evidence, comprising two documents, came into existence after the filing of the appeal before the State Commission. The State Commission rejected the application, deeming the documents "not necessary." The matter reached the National Commission, which affirmed the State Commission's decision.

Issues:

Whether the Appellants should be allowed to introduce additional evidence at the appellate stage.

Whether the rejection by the State Commission was justified.

Held:

The court observed that under Order XLI Rule 27, CPC, a party can produce additional evidence at the appellate stage if it establishes the evidence's unavailability despite due diligence when the decree was passed. The two documents were crucial to the Appellants' case, showing their inability to obtain the Occupancy Certificate due to unauthorized structures.

The State Commission's rejection was deemed an error as it merely stated the documents were "not necessary" without a reasoned explanation. The National Commission's affirmation of this decision was set aside. The Civil Appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the State Commission to consider the additional documents and decide the appeal on its merits expeditiously.

Facts:

The Respondent applied for the allotment of a flat under the Self-Financing Housing Scheme.

The Board allotted a flat, and after various proceedings, the matter reached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court passed an order on 19.09.2012, conclusively determining the rights and obligations of the parties.

Subsequently, the Respondent initiated execution proceedings to enforce the Supreme Court's order.

Issues:

Whether a Revision Petition under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is maintainable before the National Commission against an Order passed by the State Commission in execution proceedings?

Held:

The nature of execution proceedings is independent and different from the nature of proceedings for adjudication of a consumer complaint.

Execution proceedings cannot be considered a continuation of the original consumer dispute.

Revision Petition is not maintainable under Section 21(b) against an Order passed by the State Commission in execution proceedings.

The National Commission erroneously entertained the Revision Petition, which was not maintainable.

The Delhi High Court rightly set aside the Order passed by the National Commission on the ground that a Revision Petition was not maintainable against the Order passed by the State Commission in execution proceedings.

Facts:

The appellant, Ganesan, was declared entitled to Ambalam right in his village by the Joint Commissioner of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Board. The third respondent filed an appeal under Section 69 of the Act, accompanied by a delay condonation application for a delay of 266 days. The Commissioner condoned the delay. The appellant challenged the order condoning the delay through a writ petition.

Issues:

The applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in appeal proceedings before the Commissioner, and whether the Commissioner could be considered a court under the statutory scheme of the Act, 1959.

Held:

The court held that the Commissioner, while hearing an appeal under Section 69 of the Act, is not a court as defined in Section 6(7). The Commissioner is an appointed authority entrusted with various functions, including hearing appeals.( Paragraph 15)

Section 70 of the Act further provides that any party aggrieved by the Commissioner's order under Section 69 can file a suit in the court. The Commissioner is not considered a court under the statutory scheme.( Paragraph 16-17)

The judgment clarifies that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act applies only to suits, appeals, and applications to be filed in a court and not before statutory authorities like the Commissioner.( Paragraph 54)

The court decided that Section 29(2) cannot be invoked concerning filing suits, appeals, and applications before statutory authorities. Consequently, the Commissioner cannot condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.( Paragraph 55)

The court emphasized that a special or local law can determine the applicability of any provision of the Limitation Act, including Section 5. The Act, 1959, does not indicate an intention to apply Section 5.( Paragraph 56)

Section 115 of the Act, dealing with limitation, only provides for the computation of limitation, excluding the time for obtaining a certified copy. The judgment concluded that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable as per the scheme of the Act, 1959.( Paragraph 63)

Facts:

Appellants challenged the High Court's orders allowing candidates with research and development experience in drugs to be considered for the post.

Dispute arose over the interpretation of essential and desirable qualifications mentioned in the advertisements dated 04.01.2012 and 31.03.2015.

Issues:

Whether candidates with research and development experience can be considered eligible for the post of Assistant Commissioner (Drugs) and Drug Inspectors.

The interpretation of essential and desirable qualifications as per the advertisements.

Held:

The essential qualifications for the post are at the discretion of the employer, and the court cannot reinterpret them.

Desirable qualifications do not automatically confer eligibility; they are preferences.

Research experience in a research and development laboratory does not equate to essential eligibility for the post.

The experience of testing in a research and development laboratory is different from the testing carried out in the manufacturing process.

The preference clause means additional weightage for candidates with research experience, not automatic eligibility.

The Court set aside the High Court's orders and allowed the appeals.

Facts:

The respondent was appointed as a conductor on a contractual basis by the appellant. The contractual appointment allowed termination at any time without notice. The services were terminated on 21 March 2007. The respondent challenged the termination, citing a breach of natural justice.

Issues:

Whether the termination of the respondent's contractual appointment was in accordance with the terms of the agreement.

Whether there was a breach of the principle of natural justice.

Held:

The Court found that the nature of the appointment was purely contractual and allowed termination without notice. The terms of the agreement explicitly granted the appellant the right to terminate at any time. The Court distinguished the present case from Hari Ram Maurya v Union of India, where the removal was based on a charge of bribery. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and the writ petition was dismissed. No costs were awarded.

Facts:

The petitioner, Federation of Obstetrics and Gynecological Societies of India (FOGSI), challenged the constitutional validity of Section 23(2) of the Act, contending that it presumes guilt before conviction and violates the fundamental right under Article 21. Additionally, the petitioner sought relief regarding paperwork anomalies, asserting violations of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 21.

Issues:

Constitutional validity of Section 23(2) of the Act.

Decriminalization of paperwork anomalies under the Act.

Held:

The court underscored that Section 23(2) is not an isolated provision but operates in conjunction with other Act provisions. Dilution of this section, which penalizes medical practitioners violating the Act, would compromise the Act's fundamental purpose of curbing female foeticide. The court emphasized that the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 is not a mere formality and must be actively safeguarded through stringent provisions.( Para 1-23)

In scrutinizing Form 'F,' the court highlighted its significance in ensuring compliance with the Act. The court dismissed the petitioner's assertion that Form 'F' is merely clerical, emphasizing that it is a vital tool for overseeing the usage of ultrasound machines and regulating the Act's objectives. Incomplete Form 'F' not only raises doubts about the medical practitioner's conduct but also poses a severe threat to the Act's effectiveness in preventing gender-based prenatal practices.( Para 24-58)

The court rejected the petitioner's plea to read down Section 4(3), emphasizing the mandatory nature of maintaining records. The court reiterated that non-maintenance is not a trivial clerical lapse but a violation of the Act's core provisions. Section 4(3) and its proviso reflect the pivotal role records play in preventing sex-determination, with any deficiency amounting to a contravention of other Act sections.( Para 59-77)

Upholding the validity of Section 23(1) and Section 23(2), the court justified these provisions as reasonable restrictions. The court highlighted that the suspension of registration under Section 23(2) serves as a deterrent against potential violators. In emphasizing the gravity of female foeticide and its impact on the overall sex ratio, the court found these provisions necessary and not violative of the right to equality or the right to practice any profession.( Para 78-94)

The court concluded that any dilution of the Act's provisions, particularly Section 23, would defeat its fundamental purpose of preventing female foeticide. Such dilution would relegate the right to life of the girl child, enshrined under Article 21, to a mere formality. The court reaffirmed the Act's status as a social welfare legislation designed to rectify the skewed sex ratio in India.( Para 95)

Facts:

The case revolves around an incident on 23.11.1997, where accused persons, involved in a land dispute, allegedly fired shots at the complainant party during a confrontation, resulting in death and injuries.

Issues:

Identification discrepancies and contradictions in witness statements, along with doubts about the recovered weapons, raised questions about the prosecution's case.

The High Court specifically questioned the identity of accused No.2-Kalusinh.

Held:

The trial court convicted accused No.1-Ashok Singh and accused No.2-Kalu Singh, but the High Court acquitted accused No.2, citing doubts about his identity.

Contradictions in witness statements, uncertainties in weapon recovery, and lack of clarity on the type of firearm used raised reasonable doubts.

The High Court's decision to acquit accused No.2 was deemed a plausible view, not warranting interference.

The appeal by the State of Gujarat was dismissed.