Facts:

The case involved a dispute regarding the interpretation of Section 16(5)(a) of The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.

There was a pending civil suit between the parties concerning the cancellation of a sale deed related to the premises in question.

Issues:

Whether a review under Section 16(5)(a) of The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, regarding an order concerning vacancy, is maintainable.

Held:

The Court clarified that Section 16 of the Act deals with the allotment and release of vacant buildings. It stated that a finding regarding vacancy is a pre-condition for an order under Section 16(1)(a) or (b). Therefore, if there is a wrong order regarding vacancy, it is open to review under Section 16(5)(a) as it is a statutory remedy.

The Court directed the trial court to expedite the disposal of the pending civil suit within six months and to ensure that the suit is tried on its own merits.

The Court ordered that the status quo with regard to possession shall continue until the suit is finally disposed of by the trial court.

Facts:

The State Transport Authority convened a meeting on 16.10.2014, where the Chairperson and two members were present, to hear an application for modification of time schedules for vehicle movement.

The decision was issued on 15.12.2014, signed by the Chairperson and only one member, as one member had been transferred.

The dispute arose regarding the validity of the decision made by only two members when all three had heard the application.

Issues:

Whether a decision made by the Chairperson and one member of the State Transport Authority, when all three members had heard the application, is valid under the relevant statutory provisions and precedents?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the decision made by the Chairperson and one member of the State Transport Authority was valid. The decision was in accordance with the statutory scheme and the principles established in relevant precedents. The court rejected the findings of both the Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court, declaring the decision as invalid.

The court emphasized that the decision-making process of multi-member bodies typically involves expressing opinions by a majority vote of the members present. There was no provision requiring all members to sign the decision, and the absence of the signature of the third member did not invalidate the decision.

The court referred to the judgment of the Privy Council in Gokal ChandJagan Nath v. Nand Ram Das-Atma Ram, and the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A. Shanta Rao v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad & Ors., which upheld decisions made by majority members, even if not all members signed the order.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgments of the High Court, affirming the validity of the decision made by the State Transport Authority.

Decided on : 08-02-2018

Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 - Rule 63, Rule 65

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 68

Counsel for Appearing Parties

Arjun Garg, Manish Yadav, Rohit Chandra, Aakash N., Baij Nath Patel, Ms. Sweta, Ms. Romila, Advocates, for the Appellants

Cases Referred

A. Shanta Rao Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad, AIR 1985 A.P. 256

Gokal ChandJagan Nath Vs. Nand Ram Das-Atma Ram, AIR 1938 P.C. 292

Ramaswamy Nadar Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1958 SC 56

Facts:

The case revolves around the renewal of mining leases in the state of Goa following reports of large-scale illegal mining. A Commission of Inquiry was appointed, leading to the suspension of all mining operations by the Government of Goa and the abeyance of environmental clearances by the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF). The Goa Foundation filed a PIL seeking termination of mining leases carried out in violation of various statutes. The Supreme Court, in the Goa Foundation case, upheld the suspension orders and directed the grant of fresh leases. However, the State of Goa proceeded to grant second renewals to several mining lease-holders instead of fresh leases. The MoEF lifted the abeyance order on environmental clearances for some cases.

Issues:

Whether the grant of second renewals of mining leases in Goa was in line with the Goa Foundation case's directions for fresh leases.

Whether there is a constitutional mandate for the allocation of natural resources through the auction method.

Whether judicial review of policy decisions regarding natural resource allocation is permissible.

Whether the renewal of a lease must comply with statutory requirements.

Held:

The Court held that the grant of second renewals of mining leases in Goa was erroneous and contrary to the directions given in the Goa Foundation case. The Court emphasized that the Goa Foundation case explicitly directed the grant of fresh leases, not second renewals. Therefore, the second renewals were set aside.

Regarding natural resource allocation, the Court clarified that while there is no constitutional mandate for auctioning natural resources, such allocation should not be arbitrary. The decision to deviate from auctioning is subject to judicial review, particularly if it serves commercial interests over public welfare.

The Court affirmed that judicial review of policy decisions is permissible if they violate constitutional principles or prioritize profit over public welfare. However, the Court cautioned against setting aside policies merely based on disagreement or the existence of a better policy.

The Court emphasized that the renewal of a lease must comply with statutory requirements and cannot be granted without proper consideration, as it constitutes a fresh grant. Therefore, the State of Goa's hasty renewals were unjustified.

Referred Cases :

Ambica Quarry Works Vs. State of Gujarat, (1987) 1 SCC 213

BALCO Employees... Union Regd Vs. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 333

Captain Sube Singh Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (2004) 6 SCC 440

Centre for Public Interest Litigation Vs. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 1

CIT Vs. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala, (2002) 1 SCC 633

Common Cause Vs. Union of India, (2014) 14 SCC 155

Common Cause Vs. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 499

Delhi Development Authority Vs. Durga Chand Kaushish, (1973) 2 SCC 825

Gajraj Singh Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, (1997) 1 SCC 650

Goa Foundation Vs. Union of India, (2014) 6 SCC 590

Goa Foundation Vs. Union of India, (2014) 6 SCC 738

Kasturi Lal, (1980) 4 SCC 1

Lithoferro Vs. State of Goa, (2014) SCC OnLine Bom 997

M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India, (2004) 12 SCC 118

M/s. Ajar Enterprises Private Limited Vs. Satyanarayan Somani, (2017) 10 SCALE 346

Manohar Lal Sharma Vs. Principal Secretary, (2014) 9 SCC 516

Property Owners... Association Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 7 SCC 522

Provash Chandra Dalui Vs. Biswanath Banerjee, (1989) Supp 1 SCC 487

Quarry Owners' Assn. Vs. State of Bihar, (2000) 8 SCC 655

Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra Vs. State of U.P., (1989) Supp 1 SCC 504

S.N. Mohanty Vs. Union of India, (2012) SCC OnLine Del 4000

Sandur Manganese and Iron Ores Limited Vs. State of Karnataka, (2010) 13 SCC 1

State of Assam Vs. Om Prakash Mehta, (1973) 1 SCC 584

State of M.P. Vs. Krishnadas Tikaram, (1995) Supp 1 SCC 587

State of U.P. Vs. Singhara Singh, (1964) 4 SCR 485

State of West Bengal Vs. Calcutta Mineral Supply Company Private Limited, (2015) 8 SCC 655

Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (1996) 9 SCC 709

Facts:

The case revolves around the maintainability of an appeal against the enforcement of a foreign award under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues:

Whether appeals against the enforcement of foreign awards are maintainable under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

The relationship between Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act and Section 50 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Interpretation of the doctrine of harmonious construction in the context of both statutes.

Objectives of the Acts and the implications of delaying enforcement of foreign awards.

Held:

The Court held that Section 50 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a self-contained provision dealing exhaustively with arbitration matters, including the permissibility of appeals. Hence, appeals not explicitly mentioned in the Act are impermissible. Consequently, Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, being a general provision, does not apply to cases governed by Section 50 of the Arbitration Act.

The inclusion of Section 37 of the Arbitration Act in the proviso to Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act indicates that appeals under the Arbitration Act follow its provisions alone. This ensures that special provisions of the Arbitration Act take precedence over general provisions of the Commercial Courts Act in matters of arbitration.

Section 50 of the Arbitration Act provides the forum for appeals in arbitration cases. If an appeal lies under Section 50, only then does Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act apply to determine the forum for hearing and deciding such an appeal.

The Court emphasized that both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act aim for the speedy resolution of disputes, particularly in commercial matters. Allowing additional appeals under the Commercial Courts Act in cases addressed by Section 50 of the Arbitration Act would undermine the objective of expeditious enforcement of foreign awards.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming that appeals against the enforcement of foreign awards must follow the provisions of the Arbitration Act alone, to ensure efficient and prompt resolution of commercial disputes.

Facts:

M/S ONGC Mangalore Petrochemicals Ltd. (appellant) awarded a contract to M/S Ans Constructions Ltd. (respondent no. 1).

Respondent no. 1 submitted a No Dues/No Claim Certificate on September 21, 2012, and the final bill was paid by the appellant on October 10, 2012.

On October 24, 2012, respondent no. 1 withdrew the No Dues Certificate alleging coercion.

On January 12, 2013, respondent no. 1 submitted a claim of Rs. 96,88,48,642/- for losses incurred during the contract execution.

Issues:

Whether the No Dues Certificate was voluntarily submitted by respondent no. 1 or under coercion?

Whether the claim for losses made by respondent no. 1 was valid considering the circumstances?

Held:

The court emphasized that a contract discharge by agreement or voucher should be validly and voluntarily executed. If coercion, fraud, or undue influence is proven, the discharge becomes void, rendering any subsequent dispute arbitrable.

The court considered whether there was coercion or undue influence in the issuance of the No Dues Certificate, examining the background of the letters exchanged between the parties.

The court noted the belated submission of the claim for losses by respondent no. 1, highlighting the contractual provisions requiring notice within a specific timeframe.

The court found that the No Dues Certificate was voluntarily submitted, and the claim for losses lacked credibility as it was raised after the final bill settlement.

The court concluded that there was no arbitrable dispute, as the voluntary submission of the No Dues Certificate and acceptance of final payment constituted accord and satisfaction.

Decision: The court allowed the appeal, ruling in favor of the appellant.

Facts:

The Court of Small Causes, Srinagar, issued an injunction order on 22.06.2011, staying arbitration proceedings in a matter titled M/s Ace Enterprises v. Union of India and others.

Subsequently, an application was filed alleging violation of the injunction order and seeking contempt proceedings.

The trial court treated the application as one for contempt, without mentioning any specific provision, and dismissed it on 06.11.2013.

The respondent challenged this order before the High Court, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceedings against itself.

The High Court, considering the relevant provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Contempt of Courts Act, held that subordinate courts do not possess the jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceedings against themselves.

Issues:

Whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceedings against itself.

The proper treatment of applications alleging violation of injunction orders.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified the jurisdictional issue and directed the reclassification of the application:

The trial court's treatment of the application as one for contempt was erroneous. The Court held that it should be treated under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Jammu and Kashmir Code of Civil Procedure instead.

Subordinate courts, as per the Jammu and Kashmir Contempt of Courts Act, do not possess the jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceedings against themselves. The High Court's decision on this matter was upheld by the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court directed the trial court to determine if there was disobedience of the injunction order and to proceed under Order XXXIX Rule 2A accordingly.

Both parties were allowed to present their arguments before the trial court, and the trial court was instructed to expedite its decision, preferably within three months.

Facts:

The case involved an appeal by the State of Maharashtra against the acquittal of the respondent, accused No. 2, who was charged under Section 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC for allegedly destroying evidence in a murder case.

The prosecution's case primarily relied on the testimony of PW7, Pushpabai, as the sole eyewitness to the alleged crime.

Issues:

The reliability and credibility of PW7's testimony, considering the circumstances surrounding the case and the standards set by precedents.

Held:

The Court emphasized the need to scrutinize the evidence when relying on the testimony of a sole eyewitness.

It found several discrepancies and weaknesses in PW7's testimony, including the failure to raise an alarm despite witnessing the crime in a densely populated area without electricity.

The Court noted lapses in the investigation, such as the failure to examine PW7's husband, conduct a test identification parade, and establish a link between the blood stains found at the crime scene and the victim's blood group.

Considering these factors, the Court concluded that it was unsafe to convict the respondent solely based on PW7's testimony.

It upheld the High Court's decision to acquit the respondent, finding no reason to interfere with its judgment.

Thus, the Court dismissed the State's appeal.

Facts:

The appellant's land was reserved for public purpose under a development plan. A purchase notice was issued under Section 49(1)(e) of the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966. The State Government confirmed the purchase notice and indicated that proceedings for the acquisition of land would commence within one year. However, despite a proposal for acquisition being submitted, no further action was taken. The appellant contended that since no action had occurred, the proposal for acquisition had lapsed, and the land should be returned to the owner. The Commissioner, however, maintained that the acquisition proposal was still in process, and there had been no lapse.

Issues:

Whether the reservation and acquisition proposal for the appellant's land have lapsed due to inaction by the authorities.

The interpretation and application of Sections 49, 126, and 127 of the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966 in this context.

Held:

The object of Section 49 is to impose an obligation to acquire land once a purchase notice is received. While there may not be specific timelines after Section 49(7), the Act should be read in conjunction with Sections 126 and 127. Once the appropriate authority makes the necessary application to acquire the land within the specified time, the provisions of Sections 126 and 127 come into play.( Paragraph 12, 13)

Section 126 outlines the procedure for acquiring land for public purposes, and Section 127 deals with the lapse of proceedings if no action is taken within the prescribed period.( Paragraph 14)

Under Section 126(4), the State Government may make a declaration for acquisition within a reasonable time from the application. If no declaration is made within the specified period, the aggrieved person can approach the court. Section 127 provides for the lapse of proceedings if no action is taken within ten years from the publication of the plan.( Paragraph 15, 16)

In cases under Section 49, if the appropriate authority fails to apply for acquisition within the specified time, the reservation will be deemed to have lapsed. Similarly, if no action is taken within ten years of plan publication and a purchase notice is served, the proceedings will lapse.( Paragraph 24)

Considering the prolonged delay and lack of action by the authorities, the reservation and acquisition proposal for the appellant's land were deemed to have lapsed. This decision was made to ensure complete justice between the parties under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. However, in future cases under Section 49, the procedure outlined in Section 127 must be followed to avoid lapsing of proceedings.( Paragraph 31)

Facts:

The appellant, Dataram Singh, was accused of cheating the complainant of a substantial amount of money.

A First Information Report (FIR) and a complaint case were lodged against the appellant for offenses under various sections of the Indian Penal Code and the Negotiable Instruments Act.

The appellant was not arrested during the investigations, and there was a considerable delay in the filing of the charge sheet against him.

Despite apprehensions of arrest, the appellant cooperated with the legal proceedings and eventually appeared before the trial judge.

Issues:

Whether the appellant should be granted bail considering the circumstances of the case.

Whether the denial of bail was justified by the lower courts.

Held:

The grant of bail is the general rule, and it should be judiciously exercised by considering various factors, including the accused's conduct during investigations, past criminal record, poverty status, and other relevant circumstances.

Bail should not be withheld as a punishment, and conditions for bail should not be so strict as to make it illusory.

Despite opposition from the complainant, the appellant's conduct during the investigative process, lack of evidence suggesting flight risk or obstruction of justice, and absence of prior involvement in illegal activities warranted the grant of bail.

The court emphasized that its decision to grant bail should not be construed as an opinion on the merits of the allegations against the appellant, which would be determined during the trial.

Ultimately, the court allowed the appeal and granted bail to the appellant, leaving it to the trial judge to impose reasonable conditions for bail.