Facts:

Appellants were respondents 2 and 3 in a writ petition before the Rajasthan High Court.

High Court directed appellants to consider the candidature of the private respondent for appointment as a Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate.

Private respondent initially applied as a "General" candidate and did not indicate any disability.

Subsequently claimed visual impairment and submitted a representation with a disability certificate indicating Hemiplegia.

Issues:

Whether the private respondent, who initially applied as a General candidate, can claim consideration under the Differently Abled Persons category.

Interpretation of disability-related provisions under the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995, and the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010.

Held:

The court held that the private respondent's claim under the Differently Abled Persons category should have been made in the application, and the disability certificate should have been produced at the appropriate stage. The nature of the disability (locomotor or visual impairment) and the percentage of disability were crucial factors. The court, being unable to act as an expert, found the High Court's direction unjustified, especially when the appellants followed the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's order was set aside.

Facts:

The Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure involved Sudam Kisan Gavane (Deceased) through legal representatives and others as appellants and Manik Ananta Shikketod (Deceased) through legal representatives and others as respondents.

The High Court admitted the appeal without framing any questions of law, creating a procedural irregularity.

Issues:

The primary issue addressed in the judgment pertains to the procedural lapse in admitting the appeal without formulating substantial questions of law as required by Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Held:

The Supreme Court, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, determined that the matter should be remanded to the High Court.

It noted that the High Court's admission of the appeal without framing questions of law was a procedural flaw that wasn't fair to the parties.

Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure was emphasized, stating that an appeal can only be admitted if it involves a substantial question of law. The court highlighted the importance of precisely stating the substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal.

The Court set aside the High Court's order due to the failure to formulate substantial questions of law before the final hearing.

Remanding the matter to the High Court, the Supreme Court requested the High Court to decide the questions of law after hearing the parties and granted the liberty to reframe the questions after the hearing.

The High Court was urged to treat the case as a second appeal filed in 1990 and give it priority.

Regarding the death of Respondent No. 2, the Supreme Court left it to the High Court to decide the effect of the death on the appeal.

The appeal was allowed in the aforementioned terms.

Facts:

The petitioners, diploma holders in the technical field and government employees, enrolled in the B.Tech. degree course offered through distance learning mode by the Institute-TIET (deemed to be University). The institute had received provisional recognition from the Distance Education Council (DEC) to initiate the course for one year. The petitioners sought clarification on the validity and recognition of their B.Tech. degrees from TIET through distance learning.

Issues:

Whether the B.Tech. degrees acquired through distance learning from TIET are valid and recognized, considering the absence of approval from the University Grants Commission (UGC) and the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE).

Held:

Approval of AICTE Mandatory : The court held that the approval of AICTE was mandatory for commencing the Bachelor of Technology courses. TIET, Patiala, failed to obtain AICTE approval.

Compliance with UGC and DEC Guidelines: The judgment clarified that, post the 2004 Guidelines, every deemed university, including TIET, required approvals from both UGC and DEC for starting any degree course through open and distance learning mode. The condition of approval was deemed mandatory.

Misconstrued Judgment in Orissa Lift-I Case : The petitioners and TIET misconstrued a specific paragraph in the Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited–I case. The court clarified that the judgment did not confer the right upon deemed universities to start distance education courses without prior approval from AICTE and UGC.

No Relief Similar to Orissa Lift Cases : The plea for relief, similar to that granted in the Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited I and II cases, was rejected since no relief was granted to candidates who took admission in 2005 or thereafter.

Provisional Recognition Contrary to Law : The judgment highlighted that TIET's provisional recognition by DEC was contrary to the law, and the institute was not competent to award graduation degrees in technical courses via distance mode. Various notifications and policy decisions were overlooked by the petitioners and TIET.

Criticism of DEC's Functioning : The functioning of DEC faced strong criticism, and its provisional recognitions were considered invalid. The court noted the order dated December 29, 2012, issued by the Ministry of Human Resource Development, vesting UGC and AICTE with regulatory powers for technical courses offered through distance learning.

Facts:

The Roads and Buildings Department of the State of Telangana floated a tender for the construction of a BT Road.

The tender conditions required bidders to own a "Batch Type Hot Mix Plant" within 100 kilometers from the last point of working reach.

The appellant and the fourth respondent participated in the tender process, submitting necessary documents.

Dispute arose regarding the distance of the Hot Mix Plant owned by the appellant, leading to a complaint by the fourth respondent.

Chief Engineer, in response to the complaint, called for verification reports from Superintending Engineers in different regions.

Issues:

The re-verification of the distance of the Hot Mix Plant, as contested by the fourth respondent.

Whether the Chief Engineer's actions, including seeking reports from independent authorities, were in accordance with the tender conditions and legal procedures.

Held:

The learned Single Judge of the High Court held that the re-verification undertaken by the Chief Engineer was not illegal, as there were no specific mala fides against any individual. The judge observed that the tender conditions permitted objections, and the authorities acted reasonably in getting re-verification done based on a complaint. The learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition.

The Division Bench, however, found fault with the report of the Superintending Engineer, Warangal, and criticized the Chief Engineer for seeking a second report from the Superintending Engineer, Karimnagar, outside the jurisdiction. The Division Bench allowed the intra court appeal, directing the award of the work based on the report submitted by the Superintending Engineer, Warangal.

Facts:

Appellant, a partnership firm, owned disputed land reserved for shopping center and garden under the 2005 development plan.

Section 127(1) allows the owner to serve notice if the land is not acquired within ten years.

Appellant served notice on 31.08.2015, but respondents claimed it was premature.

Dispute arose over the acknowledgment date, with the appellant relying on meeting minutes stating receipt on 02.09.2015.

Issues:

Validity of the notice served by the appellant.

Adequacy of steps taken by authorities for land acquisition under Section 127(1).

Discretion of the government in de-reservation under Section 127(2).

Held:

Notice Validity: The Court accepted the appellant's argument, emphasizing that reliance on the acknowledgment date alone was not safe. The date of receipt mentioned in the General Body Meeting minutes was considered accurate. (Para 15)

Steps Toward Acquisition: The Court held that the authorities had not taken sufficient steps toward land acquisition within the stipulated 24 months. Mere forwarding of the proposal did not fulfill the requirements of Section 127(1). (Para 17)

Government's Discretion: The Court disagreed with the respondents, emphasizing that de-reservation is not solely at the government's discretion. The Official Gazette declaration is a consequential step. (Para 19)

Expunging Adverse Remarks: Adverse remarks against the appellant's advocate by the High Court were expunged as uncalled for and unnecessary. (Para 20)

Conclusion and Direction: The Court concluded that the reservation of the appellant's land had lapsed, and the State Government was directed to notify the lapsing in the Official Gazette expeditiously, preferably within four months. (Para 21)

Facts:

Arbitration proceedings initiated based on an agreement dated 28th April 2000.

Dispute arose regarding the time limit for the conclusion of arbitral proceedings.

Appellants argued that the arbitrator's mandate terminated as per the agreement's time limit.

High Court held that the appellants waived their right to an extension of time.

Issues:

Whether the time limit specified in the arbitration agreement is binding.

Whether the appellants waived their right to enforce the time schedule.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the time limit agreed upon in the arbitration agreement is binding. The court emphasized the importance of parties adhering to agreed-upon time limits in arbitration proceedings. As per Sections 14 and 15 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and the terms of the agreement, after the expiry of four months, the arbitrator became unable to perform the functions, and the mandate stood terminated. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. The respondents were given the liberty to address their grievances through appropriate legal avenues.

Facts:

Land leased to Govind, Sadashiv, and Nivrutti.

Agreement to Sell in 1956, not culminating in a sale deed.

Section 32 of the Bombay Tenancy Act deems tenants as purchasers.

Certificate issued under Section 32M in favor of Govind, Sadashiv, and Nivrutti.

Disputes over mutation in Nivrutti's name contested by Laxman's family.

Suit filed in 2003 claiming joint family rights.

Issues:

Validity of joint family rights in the land.

Whether the civil court should stay proceedings and refer to the Mamlatdar under Section 85 and 85A.

Held:

The court rejected the contention that the civil court should have referred the matter to the Mamlatdar. It emphasized that the Kabuliyatnama did not include Laxman as a tenant, and the certificate under Section 32M did not include his name. There was no ambiguity about Laxman's tenancy rights. The legal proceedings initiated by Laxman's grandsons were deemed an attempt to re-open a matter that could not be directly challenged – the certificate under Section 32M. The appeal was dismissed.

FACTS:

Appellant filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 20.04.1993.

Appellant claimed readiness and willingness to perform, but the first defendant did not execute the sale deed.

Expert opinion on the signature's genuineness was sought, and Trial Court preferred attesting witnesses' testimony over the expert opinion.

High Court relied on expert opinion and dismissed the suit.

ISSUES:

Validity of the first defendant's signature on the agreement of sale.

Reliability of expert opinion versus attesting witnesses' testimony.

HELD:

The Court emphasized the relevance of an additional receipt (Ext. A-2) related to earnest money, bearing the first defendant's signature, which the High Court did not consider.( Para 12)

DW-3 (brother of the first defendant) identified the disputed signature of the first defendant on Ext. A-1, supporting the appellant's case. The Court gave weight to DW-3's testimony, being acquainted with the first defendant's handwriting.( Para 14)

The Court criticized the High Court for not assigning valid reasons for disbelieving the attesting witnesses and emphasized that expert evidence should be approached cautiously.( Para 15)

Flaws in the expert's report were pointed out, such as the use of signatures obtained after the filing of the suit for comparison, leading the Court to question the reliability of the entire report.( Para 16)

The Court held that the High Court wrongly observed that the plaintiff did not produce evidence of demanding performance after the agreement, clarifying that the filing of the suit suffices as per the Specific Relief Act.( Para 17)

REFERRED CASES:

Alamgir vs. State (NCT, Delhi), (2003) 1 SCC 21

Magan Bihari Lal vs. State of Punjab, (1977) 2 SCC 210

Murari Lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1980) 1 SCC 704

Ram Chandra and Ram Bharosey vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 381

S. Gopal Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1996) 4 SCC 596

Shashi Kumar Banerjee vs. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 529

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between the Commissioner of Income Tax, Karnal, and Carpet India, Panipat, regarding the interpretation of Section 80HHC of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The appellant contends that supporting manufacturers should be treated on par with direct exporters for the purpose of claiming deductions under Section 80HHC.

Issues:

Whether supporting manufacturers are entitled to deductions under Section 80HHC of the Income Tax Act, and if so, whether their eligibility is on par with direct exporters.

The court also considers the applicability of previous judgments, including Commissioner of Income Tax, Thiruvananthapuram vs. Baby Marine Exports, Kollam.

Held:

The court highlights the distinct parameters and schemes for claiming deductions under Section 80HHC for exporters (Section 80HHC(1)) and supporting manufacturers (Section 80HHC(1A)). The court emphasizes that the statutory scheme treats these entities differently.( Para 5)

The court overturns the decision in C.I.T. v. Satish Kumar Gupta, stating that it cannot be relied upon to conclude that supporting manufacturers are to be treated on par with direct exporters for the purpose of deduction under Section 80HHC.( Para 6)

The court allows the appeals in favor of the Revenue, setting aside the impugned judgments. In certain cases, the respondents are given the opportunity to demonstrate, with necessary facts, that they qualify as direct exporters and can avail of deductions under Section 80HHC(1) read with (3). These matters are remanded to the Appellate Tribunal for further consideration.( Para 7)