Facts:

The government decided to provide employment to displaced abkari workers by reserving 25% of daily wage vacancies in the Corporation.

A subsequent change in policy favored dependent sons of deceased abkari workers who lost employment after 1996.

The affected abkari workers filed a writ petition seeking the implementation of the initial government order.

Issues:

Whether there was a legitimate expectation for re-employment for all displaced abkari workers.

Whether the change in policy was arbitrary or in the public interest.

Whether the altered assurance to consider dependent sons of deceased abkari workers was justified.

Held:

The Court held that no assurance was given to provide re-employment to all displaced abkari workers. The government promised to reserve 25% of future daily wage vacancies, and no vested right accrued to all abkari workers.

The change in policy was deemed justifiable due to administrative difficulties in implementing the initial order, considering the insufficient number of vacancies.

The Court recognized the principle of substantive legitimate expectation but emphasized that administrative policies may change with evolving circumstances.

The decision makers' freedom to change policy in the public interest cannot be fettered by applying the principle of substantive legitimate expectation.

The expectation of the respondents for consideration against future vacancies was deemed not legitimate, considering the change in policy. The decision to alter the policy was made to balance the interests of displaced abkari workers and unemployed youth.

The requirement of giving an opportunity before altering the policy was discussed, noting that displaced abkari workers were consulted through their representatives.

The Court acknowledged that a claim of legitimate expectation can be raised if an administrative authority reneges from a promise without giving an opportunity, especially if past practice dictates so.

The principle of procedural legitimate expectation was discussed, emphasizing exceptions in cases where the government announces a policy but subsequently withdraws it due to overriding public interest.

The Court differentiated between primary and secondary review, stating that the Court can ask the State to justify the policy during primary review, but secondary review shows deference to the executive's decision.

The Court explained the test of proportionality involving a 'balancing test' and 'necessity test.'

The change in policy was held not disproportionate, considering the balancing act between the interests of displaced workers and unemployed youth.

The Court applied the test of proportionality to review the impugned decision of the Government, given the challenge was on the ground of violation of Articles 14, 19, and 21.

The Court rejected the argument that the order dated 07.08.2004 was a continuation of the earlier order dated 20.02.2002.

The findings recorded by the High Court regarding a right of appointment accruing to the respondents were disapproved. The Order dated 07.08.2004 was issued in modification of the Order dated 20.02.2002.

FACTS:

The appellant, Madhoor Buildwell Private Limited, filed a writ petition seeking direction for the disbursement of approved funds under the Urban Infrastructure Development Scheme.

The Scheme involved funding from the Central Government (80%), State Government (10%), and the Municipal Council (10%).

The Municipal Council issued a public tender for an underground sewer Scheme without the Central Government's fund sanction.

The State Level Sanctioning Committee and Ministry of Urban Development approved the Sewage Scheme for Yeola Municipal Council, but funds were not released due to lack of approval from the Finance Department.

ISSUES:

Whether there is a commitment from the Central Government to release funds for Yeola Municipal Council.

The legality of the Municipal Council awarding the contract without the Central Government's fund sanction.

HELD:

The High Court's order dismissing the writ petition was upheld.

The Supreme Court emphasized the necessity of a sewage system in urban areas.

Directed the State Government to consider and approve the sewer Scheme for Yeola Municipal Council within three months.

If the State Government cannot provide funds, it should seek funds from the Central Government under the AMRUT Scheme.

The Central Government is expected to consider and decide within three months based on the State Government's recommendation. The appeal stands disposed of.

Facts:

The case, Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties & Ors., pertains to the interpretation of Section 9A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The proceedings were heard by a bench consisting of Justice Arun Mishra, Justice M. R. Shah, and Justice B. R. Gavai. The judgment was delivered on October 4, 2019.

Issues:

The narrow interpretation of "jurisdiction to entertain" under Section 9A, the relationship between jurisdiction and the preliminary issue of limitation, and the distinction between the existence and exercise of jurisdiction.

Held:

The court clarified the meaning of "jurisdiction," emphasizing that it is the authority to decide and not solely the power to decide correctly. Jurisdiction encompasses the power to decide justiciable controversies, including questions of law and facts on merits. (Para 16, 17)

The interpretation of Section 9A was discussed, highlighting that "jurisdiction to entertain" is a narrower concept relating to the court's competence to receive a suit for adjudication, especially in the context of maintainability. (Para 28, 45)

The distinction between the existence and exercise of jurisdiction was emphasized. While a court may have jurisdiction, a mistake in its exercise can be a jurisdictional error, but it does not negate the existence of jurisdiction.

(Para 33, 36)

The court addressed the scope of Order XIV Rule 2 and Section 9A, noting that a mixed question of law and fact cannot be decided as a preliminary issue under these provisions. The court also discussed the rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) concerning issues of limitation.(Para 46, 65)

The literal interpretation of "jurisdiction to entertain" in Section 9A was emphasized, suggesting that it denotes the power to receive a case for consideration.(Para 76)

Decision: The court concluded that the word "jurisdiction" in Section 9A should be interpreted in the context of the power to entertain, and the court must have the competence to receive a suit for adjudication. While the court may have jurisdiction to decide issues of limitation, it may not be able to grant relief if the claim is time-barred.

Facts:

Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. filed a suit before the Commercial Court seeking registration of a mortgage deed related to an immovable property.

The High Court held that the immovable property was not used for trade or commerce, making the suit not maintainable before the Commercial Court.

Issues:

Whether the dispute arising from the agreement qualifies as a commercial dispute under Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Commercial Courts Act.

Whether the immovable property was used exclusively in trade or commerce.

Held:

The court examined Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Commercial Courts Act, which defines commercial disputes arising from agreements related to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce.

The plaintiff's suit sought specific performance of the MoU terms, but neither the agreement nor the plaint indicated exclusive use of the immovable property for trade or commerce.

Emphasized the need for basic pleadings and a purposive interpretation of the Commercial Courts Act to avoid burdening the system with non-commercial disputes.

Stressed the importance of entertaining only disputes that fit the definition of 'commercial disputes' and ensuring a strict procedure for such litigation.

Highlighted that a dispute involving immovable property becomes a commercial dispute only if the property is "used exclusively" in trade or commerce, and the term "used" means "actually used."

Described the facts of the case involving a Memorandum of Understanding executed in 2017 and the execution of a mortgage deed, emphasizing that the property's use was not exclusively for trade or commerce.

Pointed out that the trial court incorrectly assumed the property's use based on the plaintiff's business activities, and the property was not being exclusively used in trade or commerce in 2012.

Reiterated the purpose of Commercial Courts for speedy resolution of commercial disputes, and the need for meaningful interpretation to benefit litigants engaged in trade and commerce.

Conclusion: The court held that the suit did not qualify as a commercial dispute under Section 2(1)(c)(vii) due to the lack of pleadings indicating exclusive use of the property for trade or commerce. The Commercial Court was directed to return the plaint to the court with jurisdiction.

Facts:

The appellant, DUNCANS INDUSTRIES LTD., manages 14 tea gardens, and the Central Government, under the Tea Act, took control of 7 gardens. The appellant defaulted on payments to the respondent-operational creditor for pesticides.

Issues:

The maintainability of insolvency proceedings under the IBC without the prior consent of the Central Government as mandated by Section 16G(1)(c) of the Tea Act.

The applicability of Section 16G of the Tea Act considering the continued management and control of the appellant over the tea gardens.

Held:

In effect, the appellant continues to be in management and control of the tea estates, despite the Central Government's control over 7 gardens. The Court noted that Section 16G(1)(c) of the Tea Act is not applicable as the appellant remains in control. The provisions of the IBC override the Tea Act, and no prior consent of the Central Government is required for insolvency proceedings under Section 7 or Section 9 of the IBC.

Section 16G(1)(c) refers to winding up proceedings. The Court clarified that proceedings under Section 9 of the IBC are not limited to winding up and are focused on corporate insolvency resolution. The IBC's objective is to ensure the revival of the corporate debtor. Section 238 of the IBC, being a subsequent Act to the Tea Act, takes precedence, and the IBC's provisions override the Tea Act.

Conclusion: The Court upheld the NCLAT decision, stating that the insolvency petition under Section 9 of the IBC initiated by the respondent-operational creditor is maintainable.

FACTS:

Appellant issued a fire insurance policy to the respondent for plant and machinery.

Claim arose after a fire accident on 23.04.2000.

Appellant offered Rs. 7,98,019/-, which was refused.

A meeting was held on 20.09.2001, where the appellant revised the offer to Rs. 33,80,925/-.

Respondent, dissatisfied, approached the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, which dismissed the complaint.

Matter referred to arbitration, resulting in an award dated 28.06.2004.

ISSUES:

Validity of the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

The jurisdiction of the Court for re-presentation of the petition.

HELD:

The Court observed that the delay of 8 days in re-presentation was the only issue. It was not justified to re-examine the entire period spent before the Jaipur court as malafide. The Court set aside the orders of the lower courts and allowed the appeal, restoring the proceedings to the file of the Additional District Judge S.No.3, Jodhpur.( Para 12)

The parties were directed to appear before the Jodhpur court on 15.10.2019 for further proceedings. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.( Para 14)

REFERRED CASES:

Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs. The Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department & Ors. (2008) 7 SCC 169

Joginder Tuli vs. S.L. Bhatia and another (1997) 1 SCC 502

S. Ganesharaju (dead) through LRs. and Anr. vs. Narsamma (dead) through LRs. and Ors. (2013) 11 SCC 341

Shri Amar Chand Inami vs. Union of India (1973) 1 SCC 115

Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 455

Union of India vs. Popular Construction Company, (2001) 8 SCC 470

Facts:

Air Commodore Naveen Jain, along with nine other officers, was being considered for promotion to the rank of Air Vice Marshal against five vacancies. Despite securing the top position in the merit list, he was not promoted due to his placement at serial number 3 in seniority.

Issues:

The interpretation and application of the Promotion Policy dated February 20, 2008. The appellant's contention was centered on lost promotion opportunities as he reached superannuation before vacancies arose.

Held:

The Promotion Policy does not explicitly state whether promotion is based on "merit-cum-seniority" or "seniority-cum-merit." However, clauses 17 and 22 clarify that the select list is prepared from the merit list and rearranged in order of seniority.( Para 10)

The Court emphasized that the Promotion Policy, as per clauses 17 and 22, ensures the determination of the final list based on merit first and then rearranging it in order of seniority. The policy, therefore, is not illegal, arbitrary, or discriminatory and does not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.( Para 18)

The Court held that the lack of promotion due to non-availability of vacancies before superannuation is not a ground to strike down the Promotion Policy. The two-stage policy, involving shortlisting based on eligibility criteria and marks, does not make the applicability of seniority arbitrary or irrational.( Para 21)

Promotion to the post of Air Vice Marshal is governed by the Circular dated February 20, 2008, and can be claimed only in terms of eligibility and the norms fixed therein. The policy provides equal opportunities to officers within the zone of consideration, and the appellant is estopped from challenging the policy after participating in the selection process based on it.( Para 22)

The Court affirmed that the Promotion Policy, in line with the executive instructions, does not discriminate and provides equal opportunities to officers within the zone of consideration and subsequent promotion.( Para 23)

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, upholding the validity of the Promotion Policy and finding it legally sound, non-discriminatory, and in compliance with constitutional provisions.

Facts:

The case revolves around the disappearance of a child, subsequent discovery of a freshly dug mound in the appellants' house, and their confession to murdering the child for a human sacrifice.

Issues:

The admissibility of the accused's confessions, the applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, and the validity of the convictions under different sections of the IPC.

Held:

The court notes consistent testimonies by independent witnesses regarding the accused's confession to the murder for a sacrifice. The confessions were found to be voluntary, without any indication of inducement, threat, or promise.( Para 14)

The court upholds the trial court and High Court's reliance on the confessions, along with corroborating evidence, establishing the guilt of the main accused for the offense under Section 302 r/w Section 34 IPC.( Para 16)

Regarding charges of kidnapping and conspiracy, the court finds insufficient evidence. Lack of consistency in witnesses' statements and failure to prove common intention or conspiracy lead to acquittal of co-accused based on the benefit of doubt.( Para 17)

Applying Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the burden is placed on the accused to explain how the body of the missing boy came to be buried in their house, emphasizing the incriminating evidence against them.( Para 19)

The court deliberates on the sentencing, emphasizing that death sentences are reserved for the "rarest of rare cases." Factors considered include the brutality of the murder, lack of basic humanness in the accused, and their prior conviction for a similar offense.( Paras 22, 23)

Facts:

Narsingh Yadav, the appellant, enrolled in the Indian Army on December 2, 2003.

Diagnosed with Schizophrenia, disability assessed at 20% for five years.

Invalidating Medical Board's opinion: Disability not attributable to or aggravated by military service.

Appellant discharged from army service on May 8, 2007.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's Schizophrenia can be considered attributable to or aggravated by military service.

Applicability of Rule 14 of the Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982.

Validity of the decision of the Armed Forces Tribunal rejecting the claim for disability pension.

Held:

The court applied Rule 14(d) and emphasized that entitlement to disability pension should be considered only if it is established that the cause of the disease was adversely affected due to factors related to conditions of military service.

Mental disorders, like Schizophrenia, are difficult to detect at the time of recruitment.

The appellant, posted in a peace station as a Vehicle Mechanic, did not face conditions causing stress and strain leading to disability attributed to military service.

The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the Tribunal.