Facts:

The appellant filed a civil suit for the eviction of the respondent from a property. The trial court and the first appellate court ruled in favor of the appellant. However, the High Court, in the second appeal, allowed the appeal filed by the respondent and dismissed the suit.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in allowing the second appeal filed by the respondent.

Held:

The court observed that the High Court framed two substantial questions of law for the first time in the impugned judgment itself, contrary to the requirement of Section 100(4) of the CPC.( Para 12)

Citing the case of Surat Singh (Dead) vs. Siri Bhagwan & Ors., the court emphasized that the procedure and manner in which the High Court decided the second appeal were not in conformity with the mandatory requirements of Section 100 of the CPC.( Para 14)

The court, invoking its authority, set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the case to the High Court for deciding the second appeal afresh. It emphasized the need for the High Court to frame proper substantial questions of law after hearing the appellant, in accordance with the law.( Para 15)

The court clarified that it did not express any opinion on the merits of the controversy but remanded the case due to the infirmity in the manner the second appeal was decided.( Para 17)

Facts:

FIR registered against the respondent under the Prevention of Corruption Act in 2002.

Charge-sheet filed in 2005 without including the authorization for investigation.

The prosecution's application to bring the authorization on record dismissed in 2008 due to a delay in filing.

Subsequent attempts to bring the authorization on record, invoking different provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Issues:

Whether the dismissal of the first application on procedural grounds operates as res judicata for subsequent attempts.

The nature of the lapse in not filing the authorization along with the charge-sheet.

Held:

The Court held that the failure to file the authorization order was a procedural lapse and not a substantive violation of the law. The rejection of the first application was based on the failure to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay and not on merits. The court emphasized that substantive justice must prevail over procedural or technical justice. Therefore, the prosecution was permitted to bring the authorization for investigation on record.( Paragraphs 6, 7, 9, 11)

FACTS:

On 23.11.1997, a dispute over a road led to a confrontation between the accused and the complainant's family. The prosecution claimed that accused No.1 and No.2 fired gunshots resulting in the death of Somiben and injuries to others. The trial court convicted the appellant-accused No.1, and the High Court affirmed the decision.

ISSUES:

Identification of assailants in the dark agricultural field.

Contradictions in witness testimonies regarding who fired the fatal shots.

Recovery of weapons and corroboration of evidence.

Motive and its role in establishing guilt.

HELD:

The court considered the lack of evidence on lighting conditions during the incident, casting doubt on the identification of assailants in the dark. Contradictions in witness testimonies regarding the shooter and the recovery of weapons raised concerns. The motive was acknowledged but deemed a double-edged sword.

In the absence of conclusive evidence and doubts on crucial aspects, the court gave the benefit of doubt to the accused. The conviction of appellant-accused No.1 was set aside under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC, Section 307 IPC read with Section 34 IPC, and Section 25(c) of the Arms Act.

REFERRED CASES:

Mahesh Dattatray Thirthkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 11 SCC 141

Facts:

Respondents filed a partition suit in 2007.

Decreed ex-parte in 2008.

Appellant and others filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, dismissed in 2010.

Appeal withdrawn in 2013, followed by a fresh appeal in the same year.

Issues:

Whether time spent in proceedings to set aside the ex-parte decree constitutes "sufficient cause" to condone the delay in filing an appeal?

When an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC is dismissed on merits, is a regular appeal under Section 96(2) CPC barred?

Held:

The court held that the time spent in pursuing the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC is a "sufficient cause" for condoning the delay in filing the first appeal. Emphasized that the right to appeal under Section 96(2) CPC is a statutory right and should not be denied merely because the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC was dismissed.

In the interest of justice, the court allowed the appeal, condoned the delay, and restored the appeal challenging the ex-parte decree. Noted that the appellant and others were not grossly negligent in pursuing their case. The court clarified that it did not express any opinion on the merits of the matter.

FACTS:

Uttar Pradesh created the Minority Welfare Department in 1995.

Appellants applied for the post of District Minority Welfare Officer in 1996 through deputation/transfer.

Appellants were selected and appointed in 1997 for a temporary period of two years.

UP Minority Welfare Department Gazetted Officers Service Rules 2001 came into force in 2001.

Appellants sought absorption in the Minority Welfare Department, but the State rejected the request based on the 2001 Rules.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellants, appointed before the 2001 Rules, can claim absorption under the said rules?

The applicability of the judgments in Saeed Ahmad Khan & Ors. v. State of U.P. and Chandrabhan Srivastava and Another vs. State of U.P. in the present case.

HELD:

The court observed that the appellants' appointment was not on deputation but by transfer of service, indicating selection and appointment in the Department of Minority Welfare.( Para 12)

The court cited Managing Director, UP Rajkiya Nirman Nigam v. P.K. Bhatnagar and others, emphasizing that the mere fact of spending several years on deputation does not alter the position from that of a deputationist to a regular employee.( Para 14)

The court noted that Rule 3(h) of UP Minority Welfare Department Gazetted Officers Service Rules 2001 defines 'Member of the Service' as a person substantively appointed under these rules or the rules in force prior to their commencement.( Para 15)

The court concluded that the appellants, having been appointed before the 2001 Rules, cannot be deprived of their rights of absorption in the Minority Welfare Department.( Para 16)

The court directed the absorption of the appellants as District Minority Welfare Officers in the Department of Minority Welfare and Waqf from the date of their appointment. For retired employees, the court directed compliance with pension-related matters.( Para 17)

REFERRED CASES:

Managing Director, UP Rajkiya Nirman Nigam v. P.K. Bhatnagar and others (2007) 14 SCC 498

Facts:

Appellant charged with strangulating his wife, leading to her death.

Incident occurred on the rooftop of the premises on the night of 31.08.2010 and 01.09.2010.

Prosecution's case supported by the evidence of a child witness (PW-7), who is the son of the accused and deceased.

Issues:

Reliability of the child witness (PW-7) questioned by the appellant.

Presence of the appellant at the crime scene disputed.

Challenge to the preservation of the deceased's body before postmortem.

Assertion of false implication and lack of inquiry into the child witness's background.

Held:

The High Court affirmed the conviction under Section 302 IPC, rejecting the appellant's plea under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. The Supreme Court, on reevaluation, found that the act occurred in a sudden fight without premeditation. The strangulation, while severe, did not meet the criteria of extreme cruelty. The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Section 302 conviction, modifying it to Section 304 Part II, IPC, and imposing a sentence of 10 years' simple imprisonment. The appeal is partly allowed.( Para 13,14,15)

FACTS:

Smt. Randhir Kaur gifted a property to Doaba Public School through a registered Gift Deed.

An oral exchange of land occurred in 1988, purportedly between the Principal of the school and the President of the Doaba Education Society.

The exchanged land included the portion originally donated by Smt. Randhir Kaur.

The Respondents executed a Lease Deed, making the school a Lessee and the Principal the owner of the suit property.

Legal proceedings ensued challenging the exchange and seeking restoration of ownership to the school.

ISSUES:

Validity of the oral exchange and subsequent transactions.

Ownership rights over the suit property.

HELD:

The Court held that the exchange was collusive, unauthorized, and illegal. The purported reason for the exchange, benefiting students in a remote village, was a mere ruse. The school continued to operate from the original property, and the exchange was an attempt to transfer valuable land to the Principal. The Court quashed the exchange, set aside the related documents, and directed the restoration of ownership to the Doaba Public School. Costs of Rs. 1 lac were awarded to the Appellants. The Appeals are allowed.

Facts:

The Respondent applied for the allotment of a flat under the Self-Financing Housing Scheme.

The Board allotted a flat, and after various proceedings, the matter reached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court passed an order on 19.09.2012, conclusively determining the rights and obligations of the parties.

Subsequently, the Respondent initiated execution proceedings to enforce the Supreme Court's order.

Issues:

Whether a Revision Petition under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is maintainable before the National Commission against an Order passed by the State Commission in execution proceedings?

Held:

The nature of execution proceedings is independent and different from the nature of proceedings for adjudication of a consumer complaint.

Execution proceedings cannot be considered a continuation of the original consumer dispute.

Revision Petition is not maintainable under Section 21(b) against an Order passed by the State Commission in execution proceedings.

The National Commission erroneously entertained the Revision Petition, which was not maintainable.

The Delhi High Court rightly set aside the Order passed by the National Commission on the ground that a Revision Petition was not maintainable against the Order passed by the State Commission in execution proceedings.

FACTS:

Nirval Singh, the respondent, sought compassionate appointment after the death of his father who was working with the appellants.

The policy for compassionate appointment dated 21.11.2002 was in force when the application was submitted.

The respondent did not receive compassionate appointment as the implementation of the policy was kept in abeyance for the consideration of a new policy.

ISSUES:

The delay in approaching the courts for redressal after a period of 7 years.

The change in policy from the earlier one to the new one.

The options offered to the respondent under the new policy, which he declined.

HELD:

Addresses the delay in approaching the courts and the change in policy. The Court held that the delay of 7 years extinguished the objective of providing immediate amelioration to the family. The abolishment of the earlier policy and the introduction of the new one meant that the application had to be considered under the new policy. The respondent failed to avail the options offered under the new policy.( Paragraph 7 )

Concludes the decision by stating that the offer of solatium could be the only remedy available at this stage. The Court directed the payment of Rs. 5 lakhs to the respondent within two months, considering the revised policy.( Paragraph 9 )