Facts:

The case involves appointments against Class II or IV posts in the Health Department in the Government of Bihar. A Committee Report characterized the appointments as irregular, illegal, and based on forged letters. Subsequently, termination orders were issued against candidates who secured employment with forged documents. A writ petition challenged the Committee Report, leading to the quashing of the report and a direction to reinstate the employees.

Issues:

The legality of appointments against Class II or IV posts in the Health Department. The Committee Report deemed the appointments irregular, while the writ petition sought reinstatement of terminated employees.

Held:

Nature of Service Benefits (Para 35-36): The court emphasized that rights to salary, pension, and other service benefits are entirely statutory in nature in public service. These rights stem from a valid and legal appointment to the post. Once the appointment is found to be illegal and non-existent in the eye of the law, no statutory entitlement for salary or consequential rights of pension and other monetary benefits can arise.

Illegal Appointments (Para 44): The court categorically stated that the appointments were not irregular but illegal. They were made without sanctioned posts, without advertising for eligible candidates, and without any recruitment process. Such appointments were considered backdoor entries, acts of nepotism, and favoritism.

Appointing Authority (Para 30, 31): Identification of the Director of Health Services as the appointing authority for non-gazetted appointments in the Health Department was emphasized. Certain circulars and orders clarified the authority for appointments, and the court noted that several appointments did not adhere to these procedures.

Delegation of Powers (Para 32): Discussion on the delegation of powers highlighted instances where authorities made appointments without the requisite competence, leading to non-compliance with the established procedures.

Committee Examination (Para 38): A five-member Committee examined the appointments and found 91 candidates to be cases of irregular appointment, yet they continued in service. The court held that none of the candidates could prove that they were appointed through a proper process, such as by advertisement and giving an opportunity to all eligible candidates.

Legal Precedents (Para 44, 45): The court referred to legal precedents, including Uma Devi's case and Rita Mishra's case, to support its findings on the nature of appointments.

Decision: The court allowed the appeals by the State and dismissed the appeals by the candidates. The order dated July 12, 2011, or similar orders passed by the High Court, were set aside. The court emphasized that no statutory entitlement for salary or other benefits could arise from illegal appointments.

Facts:

The appellant owns an apple orchard and supplies apple cartons, trays, and packing materials to other growers on a cash and credit basis.

In 2011, the respondent purchased apple crops from various growers through the appellant's agent and procured packing material on credit.

After settlement, a cheque issued by the respondent for the outstanding amount was dishonored due to insufficient funds.

The appellant, after legal notice, filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Issues:

• Discrepancies in the number of cartons and packing materials led to a dispute over the cheque amount.

• The trial court and the high court acquitted the respondent, citing the alleged discrepancies and failure to prove the exact amount due.

Held:

Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act establish a statutory presumption of consideration for a cheque.

The onus shifts to the accused to rebut this presumption by establishing a probable defense.

The respondent failed to rebut the presumption as:

The appellant's agent affirmed the settlement and issuance of the cheque.

The respondent did not deny issuing the cheque, challenge the signatures, or provide evidence of loss or theft.

Mere discrepancies in the appellant's statements regarding cartons do not invalidate the cheque.

The trial court and high court erred in treating the case as a civil matter and dismissing it on alleged discrepancies.

Reference to Bir Singh vs. Mukesh Kumar, Kumar Exports vs. Sharma Carpets, and Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel vs. State of Gujarat supports the presumption of consideration.

The appeal is allowed, the respondent is held guilty under Section 138, and a fine is imposed.

Facts:

The case involves IDBI Bank Limited, the Official Liquidator, and others. It centers around winding up petitions, the mandatory advertisement of such petitions, and the validity of an agreement to sell executed by the company in favor of the petitioner.

Issues:

The mandatory requirement of advertising a winding up petition.

Whether the agreement to sell constitutes a fraudulent preference.

Compliance with Sections 293 and 531 of the Companies Act, 1956.

Held:

The court underscores the mandatory nature of advertising a winding up petition, as stipulated in Rules 96, 99, and 24. Rule 101 grants the court discretion to substitute a petitioning creditor if advertisement is not made within the prescribed time.

Emphasis on the court's discretion to direct advertisement to secure the interests of other creditors, especially when the petitioning creditor fails to advertise, and no other creditor or contributory steps forward.

Acknowledgment that the winding up proceedings impact the rights of individuals in general. The court rejects an absolute bar to continuation when the petitioning creditor fails to advertise, especially in cases where unsatisfied creditors are deprived of the opportunity.

Recognition of the relevance of secured creditors who were affected by the lack of adequate advertisement. The court upholds the decision to revive one winding up petition, directing the Company Court to issue appropriate directions for advertisement.

Discussion on Section 531 of the Companies Act, 1956, which deals with the effect of winding up on antecedent transactions, and its conjunction with Section 293 regarding the sale of a public company's property.

Clarification that the sale of immovable property can only be effectuated through a sale deed, and an agreement to sell does not transfer any right, title, or interest in the immovable property.

The court scrutinizes whether the agreement to sell constitutes a fraudulent preference under Section 531. Emphasis on the two conditions - dominant motive to prefer a creditor and the act undertaken within the six-month period preceding the winding up petition.

Rejection of the claim that the agreement to sell is a fraudulent preference due to the non-fulfillment of the six-month condition. The court highlights the comprehensive nature of Section 531, covering indirect transactions.

Facts:

The prosecutrix, a small child, alleged sexual harassment in a school managed by the appellant.

Photos introduced by the child's parents implicated a person with spectacles as the accused.

Inconsistencies in the statements of the child and the anger of her father against the school management, including the appellant.

Issues:

Whether a prima facie case against the appellant for the alleged offenses is established.

Validity of the order summoning the appellant under Section 319 of the CrPC.

Held:

The court found no prima facie case against the appellant, noting inconsistencies and suggestive roles in the child's statements.

The anger of the child's father against the school management was deemed insufficient to implicate the appellant for the offenses.

The order summoning the appellant under Section 319 of the CrPC was declared not legal.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was not to stand trial for the mentioned offenses.

FACTS:

The appellant, who runs a hotel in Madurai, filed a suit for damages against the respondents for various acts, including obstruction of property and damage to the hotel. The Trial Court decreed the suit, but the High Court set aside the decree, holding that the suit was not maintainable under the Tamil Nadu Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act, 1992.

ISSUES:

Whether the suit for damages is maintainable under the Act, and whether the Act excludes the jurisdiction of the civil court.

HELD:

The court relies on the principles laid down in Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1968) to determine whether the Act provides an adequate final remedy comparable to what the civil court would normally do in a suit.( Para 6.1)

The judgment emphasizes that Section 7 of the Act recognizes the possibility of a civil suit being filed subsequent to criminal proceedings under the Act, and this acknowledgment does not stand to reason if the Act excludes the concurrent jurisdiction of the civil court.( Para 13)

The court interprets Section 14 of the Act, the savings provision, to conclude that the Act is in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other law in force. It preserves the right of an aggrieved person to approach the civil court for relief in addition to the remedies provided by the Act.( Para 14)

The court draws parallels with the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, emphasizing that Section 3 of that Act, similar to Section 14 of the present Act, does not supplant the jurisdiction of the civil court but permits an aggrieved person to approach the civil court for relief if desired.( Para 15)

The court concludes that even the summary remedy of claiming compensation under Section 10 of the Act, read with the Rules, does not preclude the filing of a suit for damages. The Act does not oust the jurisdiction of the civil court either expressly or by necessary implication.( Para 16)

The appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside, and the matter is remitted to the High Court for deciding the first appeal on merits.( Para 17)

REFERRED CASES:

Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1968 (3) SCR 662

Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha, (1995) 6 SCC 651

State of Karnataka v. Vishwabharathi House Building Coop. Society, (2003) 2 SCC 412

Facts:

The case involves Barasat Eye Hospital and Kaustabh Mondal under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. The respondent (pre-emptor) sought pre-emption rights, and the dispute centered around the deposit requirement and procedural aspects under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act.

Issues:

Activation of the right of pre-emption: Whether the right is triggered only upon the deposit of the specified amounts?

Inquiry into consideration amount: What is the process and prerequisite for investigating the stated consideration?

Deposit requirement for pre-emption: Is the pre-emptor allowed discretion in depositing amounts, or must the full amount be deposited?

Strict construction of pre-emption right: How should the weak right of pre-emption be construed in legal terms?

Refund of deposit: Under what circumstances can the pre-emptor claim a refund, and what does the phrase "remainder" signify?

Extension of time: Can the respondent be granted an extension of time for depositing the full amount?

Held:

The pre-emptor has two rights: the inherent or primary right for the offer of a thing about to be sold, and the secondary or remedial right to follow the thing sold. The secondary right is a right of substitution, and the pre-emptor must show the superiority of their right over that of the vendee.

Under Section 8(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, the right of pre-emption is activated on the deposit of the consideration money and an additional 10%. No deposit means the right is not triggered. Section 8 is clear and explicit.

Section 9(1) comes into play only after the deposit mentioned in Section 8(1) is made. The inquiry into the consideration amount, as envisaged in Section 9, is based on the deposit under Section 8.

The nature of inquiry by the Munsif involves first depositing the amount mentioned in the sale transaction. The phrase "the remainder, if any, being refunded to the applicant" pertains to the refund of any excess amount deposited.

The pre-requisite for exercising the weak right of pre-emption is the deposit of the sale consideration amount and the 10% levy. Full amount deposition is mandatory, and no discretion is given to the pre-emptor.

The respondent did not provide material to substantiate a plea questioning the stated consideration's market value. Allowing a pre-emptor to deposit smaller amounts could lead to speculative litigation.

The requirement to exercise the right within the stipulated time is sacrosanct. No extension of time is permitted, even through Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Once the time period is sacrosanct, the deposit of the full amount within that time is equally crucial. No extension can be granted to the respondent to exercise the right.

The respondent is entitled to the refund of the deposited amount, together with any interest earned, if applicable, as the speculative exercise has continued for fourteen years.

Facts:

Arvind Khanna, the respondent, was accused of receiving foreign contributions without permission from the government.

The defense claimed the funds were gifts from the respondent's father, Mr. Vipin Khanna.

Issues:

Whether the High Court, in a Section 482 CrPC petition, overstepped its jurisdiction by making findings on disputed facts.

The correctness of the respondent's defense needed to be determined during trial.

Held:

In a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court has recorded findings on several disputed facts and allowed the petition.( Para 19)

The assessment made by the High Court at this stage, when the matter has been taken cognizance by the Competent Court, is completely incorrect and uncalled for.( Para 21)

When it is mainly the defense of the respondent that the funds were received from his father, burden is on him to prove that he received such funds from his father.( Para 23)

The Supreme Court concludes that the High Court's order is not sustainable and that the High Court exceeded its power in exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.( Para 26)

Facts:

Appellant filed criminal appeals against the High Court's decision to quash complaints under various sections of IPC, CrPC, and NI Act.

Complaints alleged offenses including cheating, fraud, and criminal conspiracy related to a land procurement agreement.

High Court quashed complaints based on a subsequent agreement, citing novation of the contract.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in exercising powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash the complaints?

Whether there was novation of the contract based on the subsequent agreement dated 08.11.2012?

Held:

The court held that the power under Section 482 CrPC should be sparingly exercised and not when the case is not clearly made out or when the complaint is an abuse of process. The question of novation and its effects should be determined after a full-fledged trial. Mere filing of a civil suit or complaint under Section 138 of NI Act does not justify quashing criminal proceedings. The High Court erred in allowing the petitions and quashing the complaints. The criminal appeals were allowed, and the High Court's order was set aside, directing the trial court to proceed with the complaints on their merits.

Facts:

The appellant company entered into an agreement for the sale of a property.

The 2nd respondent, a former director, allegedly wrongfully withheld possession after the termination of his directorship.

Dispute arose regarding the company's right to recover possession of the property.

Issues:

Maintainability of an application under Section 630(2) during the pendency of a civil suit.

Timing of an order under Section 630(2) in relation to Section 630(1).

Entitlement of the company to seek possession.

Requirement of the accused's possession as a perquisite of service.

Held:

Maintainability during Civil Suit The court held that the pendency of a civil suit does not bar criminal proceedings under Section 630 if there is no bona fide dispute regarding the company's right over the property. The court referred to Atul Mathur v. Atul Kalra (1989) 4 SCC 514.

Timing of Order under Section 630(2) The court opined that interlocutory relief under Section 630(2) can be granted prior to the conclusion of the trial under Section 630(1) if the company has a prima facie right to possession. The court emphasized the need for a liberal interpretation of Section 630. Reference was made to Baldev Krishna Sahi v. Shipping Corporation of India Limited (1987) 4 SCC 361.

Entitlement of the Company The court clarified that Section 630 does not require the company to have ownership title to the property. The focus is on whether the accused wrongfully withheld possession, even if the property does not belong to the company but a third party. The court referred to Kannankandi Copal Krishna Nair v. Prakash Chunder Juneja (1994) 81 Comp Cas 104.

Requirement of Perquisite of Service The court held that Section 630 does not necessitate that the property should have been allotted as a perquisite of service. It is sufficient if the accused was put into possession as an officer/employee and wrongfully withholds the property after cessation of employment.