FACTS:

A notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued in 1998 for acquiring land in Maharashtra.

The Special Land Acquisition Officer passed an award in 2000, fixing the compensation rates for different types of land.

The respondents filed a reference under Section 18 of the Act, challenging the compensation awarded.

The Reference Court rejected the valuation report presented by the respondents, citing issues with the categorization of custard apple trees.

The High Court partially allowed the appeal, relying on the valuation report and a similar report accepted in a different reference case.

ISSUES:

The primary issue is the correctness of the valuation report and the compensation amount awarded for the acquired land.

The appellant raises concerns about the competency, eligibility, and reliability of the witness who prepared the valuation report.

HELD:

The Supreme Court criticized the High Court for not properly analyzing the evidence and contentions raised by the appellant. The Court emphasized that the witness was extensively cross-examined on aspects such as competency, eligibility, and the reliability of the valuation report. The High Court's reliance on a similar report accepted in a different case was deemed inappropriate. The case is remanded back to the High Court for reconsideration, allowing both parties to present their arguments and evidence afresh.

REFERRED CASES:

Chindha Fakira Patil (dead) through LRs. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Jalgaon, (2011) 10 SCC 787

Facts:

A criminal case was registered for various offenses against the appellant and other accused persons.

The appellant filed a discharge application under Section 227 Cr.P.C., claiming lack of material for the case against him.

The investigation was entrusted to the National Investigation Agency (NIA), and a charge sheet was submitted.

The trial Court dismissed the discharge application, and the High Court confirmed the decision.

Issues:

Whether there was sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

Whether the court should conduct a mini-trial at the discharge stage.

Whether a prima facie case of conspiracy existed among the accused persons.

Held:

The court emphasized that the trial Judge must exercise judicial discretion to determine whether a case for trial has been made out, without holding a mini-trial.

The court found prima facie material of conspiracy among the accused persons, justifying the framing of charges.

Legal principles related to Section 227 CrPC were cited, emphasizing the court's role in evaluating the material for a prima facie case.

The court observed that its remarks should not prejudice the rights of the parties during the trial.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the judgments of the trial Court and the High Court.

FACTS:

On October 1, 2018, the Central Government filed a petition under Sections 241 and 242 before the Tribunal, alleging mismanagement by the Board of IL&FS.

Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) and Registrar of the Companies conducted investigations, revealing mismanagement, financial irregularities, and fraudulent accounting practices.

The Tribunal suspended the IL&FS Board and appointed a new Board to oversee operations.

The Central Government subsequently filed a petition under Section 130 of the Companies Act, seeking to reopen and recast the financial statements of IL&FS and its group companies.

ISSUES:

Whether the conditions precedent for invoking Section 130 were satisfied.

The interplay between Section 130, Sections 241/242, and Sections 211/212 of the Companies Act.

Compliance with the proviso to Section 130 concerning notice and representation.

HELD:

The Tribunal, satisfied with mismanagement and fraudulent accounting findings by SFIO and ICAI, passed the order under Section 130. The word "or" in the section allows action if either condition precedent is met. Considering the larger public interest and substantial public funds, the Tribunal's decision was deemed justified.( Para 10-11)

Observations made under Sections 241/242 are relevant for Section 130. The Tribunal's order highlighted mismanagement and fraudulent accounts, supporting the invocation of Section 130.( Para 12)

Compliance with the proviso to Section 130 necessitates notice to relevant authorities and consideration of representations. In this case, the suspended directors' opposition did not violate principles of natural justice.( Para 13)

The order suspending directors on October 1, 2018, remains unchallenged and operational, reinforcing the validity of subsequent actions.( Para 15)

Considering a subsequent RBI report and the ongoing public interest, the Tribunal's order under Section 130 stands justified, meeting the conditions precedent and ensuring financial transparency.( Para 18)

Final Result : Dismissed

REFERRED CASES:

Calcutta Discount Company Vs. Income Tax Officer, (1961) AIR(SC) 372

Chairman, All India Railway Recruitment Board Vs. K. Shyam Kumar, (2010) 6 SCC 614

Mannalal Khetan Vs. Kedar Nath Khetan, (1977) 2 SCC 424

Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi, (1978) 1 SCC 405

Swadeshi Cotton Mills Vs. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 664

T.P. Senkumar Vs. Union of India, (2017) 6 SCC 801

Facts:

Private respondents' lands acquired for MRTS Railway Project by the Government of India (Railways).

The High Court directed the State Government to consider providing alternative housing sites to the affected private respondents.

State Government rejected the private respondents' request for alternative housing sites.

Private respondents challenged the rejection through writ petitions.

Issues:

Whether the private respondents are entitled to alternative housing sites for lands acquired for the MRTS Railway Project.

Held:

The High Court's direction was based on an erroneous assumption that the State Government was obligated to provide alternative housing sites despite the absence of any policy or legal obligation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

The cited Supreme Court decisions were distinguished as inapplicable to the present case, where the acquisition was for a Central Government project, not for the development of housing schemes.

The Court held that the private respondents had been duly compensated under the 1894 Act and were not entitled to further relief from the State Government or Tamil Nadu Housing Board.

The policy regarding alternative housing site discretionary power of the State Government was discontinued from 2011, and the private respondents' claim should be decided based on the policy as it existed at the relevant time.

The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the writ petitions were dismissed.

FACTS:

Appellants, Rotarians, traveling from Giridih, Jharkhand, to Patna, Bihar, for a Rotary Club meeting.

Vehicle stopped at Rajauli Check Post, Bihar, for routine check.

Appellants subjected to a breath analyzer test, alcohol found.

Arrested under Section 53(a) of Bihar Excise (Amendment) Act, 2016.

ISSUES:

Whether a private vehicle can be considered a "public place" under Section 2(17A).

Interpretation of the term "consumes liquor" under Section 53(a).

Applicability of the offense when consumption occurs outside Bihar.

HELD:

The definition of "public place" under Section 2(17A) includes any place accessible to the public, even a private vehicle on a public road.

The word "consumes" in Section 53(a) requires liquor consumption within the State of Bihar for the offense to apply.

Introduction of Section 37(b) in Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016 allows charges if found drunk in Bihar, even if consumption occurred outside.

The court cannot decide if consumption occurred in Bihar; appellants given liberty to file a discharge application before the Magistrate.

Decision left to the Magistrate based on materials on record.

REFERRED CASES:

Confederation of India Alcoholic Beverage Companies & Anr. vs. Manoj Kumar & Ors., (2016) 4 PLJR 369

Manikandan vs. State of Kerala, (1999) 2 KLT 592

Facts:

The appellants filed a suit, and the respondents sought the rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the CPC, arguing that it disclosed no cause of action. The lower court bifurcated the plaint, and the High Court opined that the suit could continue against the company (defendant No. 1) alone.

Issues:

Whether it is permissible for the civil court to reject the plaint against specific defendants while allowing it to continue against others under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the CPC.

Held:

The court emphasized that the plaint must be rejected as a whole or not at all, and it is not permissible to reject the plaint against specific portions or defendants under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC.

The court examined the reliefs claimed by the respondent (Axis Bank Ltd.) in their notice of motion, seeking the rejection of the plaint only against them. The court found this relief to be a jurisdictional error, emphasizing that the plaint must be rejected as a whole or not at all.

The court noted that even if some reliefs against the bank are barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, such objections can be raised at a later stage using other remedies, and the court should consider them on their merits.

The court allowed the appeals, set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench, and restored the order of the Single Judge dismissing the notice of motion. The notice of motion filed by the bank to reject the plaint against them was dismissed with liberty to the bank.

Facts:

The appellant was driving a car involved in a road accident, resulting in severe injuries and the death of a Cabinet Minister.

The appellant suffered permanent disabilities, including hemiplegia.

The appellant filed a claim petition seeking compensation.

Issues:

Determination of compensation for the appellant's injuries and disabilities.

Liability of the insurance company in light of the drivers not having valid licenses.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) and subsequently enhanced by the High Court was insufficient considering the severe disabilities suffered by the appellant. The Court increased the compensation to:

Loss of future earnings: Rs. 32,40,000/-

Hospitalization and medical expenses: Rs. 7,50,000/-

Future medical expenses and attendant charges: Rs. 10,00,000/-

The total compensation awarded was Rs. 50,90,000/-. The insurance company was directed to pay this amount within 12 weeks, with the right to recover it from the owners/drivers of the offending trucks.

Facts:

The appellant, Pradeep Ram, was subject to a legal proceeding where further cognizable and non-bailable offenses were added. The investigating agency sought the arrest of the accused after the addition of these offenses. The accused was already on bail in connection with another case.

Issues:

The permissibility of arresting an accused who is on bail after the addition of graver and non-cognizable offenses.

The appropriate sections under which an accused can be remanded during and after the investigation.

The re-registration of an FIR after the addition of offenses under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.

The legitimacy of further investigation by the National Investigation Agency.

Held:

The court clarified that under Sections 437(5) and 439(2) of the Cr.P.C., the arrest of an accused already on bail is permissible after the addition of serious offenses. The court has the discretion to order arrest without canceling the earlier bail, and the addition of serious offenses is a valid circumstance for such action.( Paragraph 21)

The judgment emphasizes that the re-registration of the FIR after the addition of offenses under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act is not considered a second FIR, especially when these offenses were not part of the initial charges.( Paragraph 42)

The court supports the permissibility of further investigation by the National Investigation Agency, stating that such investigation is valid when offenses under the 1967 Act were not added during the framing of charges in the previous FIR.( Paragraph 44)

The court distinguishes between the remand of an accused during investigation (Section 167(2)) and after cognizance has been taken (Section 309(2)), clarifying that in the present case, remand could only have been under Section 309(2).( Paragraph 63)

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming the validity of the arrest, re-registration of FIR, and NIA's jurisdiction for further investigation.

Facts:

The dispute originated from an agreement dated May 1, 2014, between the applicant and respondent no.1 for the printing of labels. The applicant contended that the arbitration agreement was an integral component of this agreement. Respondent no.2, a non-signatory party, was later involved in the arbitration proceedings as the parent/holding company of respondent no.1.

Issues:

Whether respondent no.2, being a non-signatory to the agreement, could be subjected to the proposed arbitration proceedings. Additionally, the applicant needed to establish respondent no.2's intention to consent to the arbitration agreement.

Held:

The court emphasized that the burden rested on the applicant to prove respondent no.2's intention to be a party to the arbitration agreement. The applicant's assertion that 'FR' acted on behalf of respondent no.2 collapsed, as respondent no.2 refuted any association with 'FR' and clarified that 'FR' was solely an employee of respondent no.1. Consequently, respondent no.2 was neither a signatory to the arbitration agreement nor had any causal connection with the negotiation process, rendering it not a party to the stated agreement.( Para 9)

The court determined that respondent no.2 was not involved in the negotiation process concerning the agreement dated May 1, 2014. The application against respondent no.2 failed, preventing the provisions for making reference to the sole arbitrator, assuming an international commercial arbitration, from proceeding. However, the applicant was advised to pursue domestic commercial arbitration against respondent no.1.( Para 10)

Decision: The application against respondent no.2 was disposed of, holding that respondent no.2 could not be subjected to the proposed arbitration proceedings. The applicant was directed to pursue arbitration against respondent no.1 as a domestic commercial arbitration.