False Promise of Marriage Vitiates Consent Under Section 90 IPC: High Court

Kerala High Court dismissed a criminal revision petition filed by the accused challenging the Special Court's rejection of his discharge application under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.). Justice A. Badharudeen upheld the Special Court's finding that prima facie evidence existed to frame charges against the accused under Sections 376(2)(n) and 376(2)(f) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The case revolved around allegations that the accused repeatedly had sexual intercourse with the victim under the false promise of marriage. The Court ruled that consent obtained under false pretenses of marriage is invalid under Section 90 IPC, and sufficient material was available to proceed with the trial.

The petitioner, Stephin Raj, sought discharge from a case alleging repeated sexual intercourse with the victim under a false promise of marriage. The Special Court dismissed his discharge application, finding prima facie evidence against him. Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Kerala High Court, arguing that the relationship was consensual and that the prosecution materials did not establish a prima facie case.

The High Court, however, upheld the Special Court’s order and emphasized the limited scope of judicial scrutiny at the stage of discharge under Section 227 Cr.P.C.

The prosecution alleged that the accused, a distant relative of the victim, made a false promise to marry her in December 2018 and engaged in sexual intercourse multiple times between December 2018 and June 2019. The victim also alleged that the accused persuaded her to send explicit photographs and later retracted his promise of marriage after his engagement to another woman.

Following this, the victim attempted suicide and subsequently filed a complaint leading to the registration of a case under Sections 376(2)(n) and 376(2)(f) IPC. The accused sought discharge on the grounds that the relationship was consensual.

The Court held that the victim’s consent for sexual intercourse, obtained under a false promise of marriage, is invalid under Section 90 IPC, which states that consent given under a misconception of fact is not valid consent.

"The prosecution materials prima facie show that the accused repeatedly subjected the victim to sexual intercourse on the basis of a false promise of marriage. Such consent, if any, stands vitiated under Section 90 IPC," the Court observed.

The Court further noted that the victim's statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and other prosecution materials corroborated the allegations of repeated sexual assault on the false pretext of marriage.

The Court reiterated the principles governing discharge under Section 227 Cr.P.C.:

At the discharge stage, the trial court must evaluate whether there is sufficient ground to presume that the accused has committed the alleged offense.
The trial court is not required to examine the sufficiency or probative value of the evidence but must proceed on the assumption that the prosecution materials are true.
Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Sheoroj Singh Ahlawat v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 476, the Court stated:
"At the stage of framing charges, the court must presume the materials placed by the prosecution to be true and evaluate whether a prima facie case exists to proceed with the trial."

The Court found that the Special Court applied the correct principles and rightly concluded that there was sufficient prima facie evidence to frame charges under Sections 376(2)(n) and (f) IPC.

The accused argued that the Special Court failed to consider a complaint filed by the victim before the Yuvajana Commission, wherein she allegedly admitted that the relationship was consensual.

Rejecting this contention, the Court held:
"At the stage of discharge, the court is restricted to examining the materials placed by the prosecution and cannot consider evidence produced by the accused. The non-consideration of the victim’s complaint was, therefore, justified."

The Court reaffirmed that the trial court’s role at the discharge stage is limited to evaluating the prosecution’s materials and does not extend to examining the accused's defense.

The Court referred to its recent decision in Sandeep G. v. State of Kerala, (2024 SCC OnLine KER 3564), which held that:
"At the stage of framing charges, even a strong suspicion against the accused is sufficient to proceed to trial. Probative value and credibility of evidence can only be tested during the trial."

Applying this principle, the Court held that the Special Court correctly relied on the prosecution materials to conclude that there was a prima facie case to frame charges against the accused.

The High Court dismissed the criminal revision petition, upholding the Special Court’s order refusing to discharge the accused under Section 227 Cr.P.C.

The Court directed the Special Court to proceed with the trial.

Date of Decision: January 6, 2025