Facts:

The case involves an appeal by Uber India Systems Pvt. Ltd. against the Competition Commission of India. The appellant was alleged to be abusing its dominant position in the relevant market, particularly in the National Capital Region (NCR), by offering unreasonably high incentives to drivers, resulting in a loss per trip.

Issues:

The primary issue is whether Uber's actions constitute an abuse of dominant position under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002. The court also considered the definition of 'dominant position' as per Explanation (a), predatory pricing under Section 4(2)(a), and other relevant provisions.

Held:

The court decided not to interfere with the appeals based on the information provided, specifically a statement indicating that Uber was incurring a loss of Rs. 204 per trip for certain cars in its network. The court observed that this information prima facie suggests an abuse of dominant position under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002.

In reaching this decision, the court referred to the definition of 'dominant position' in Explanation (a), which involves a position of strength enabling an enterprise to operate independently of competitive forces or affect competitors or the market in its favor. The court also noted that if an enterprise is making a loss for trips made, it could prima facie fall under the definition of abuse of dominant position.

The court emphasized the prohibition of unfair prices, including predatory pricing, under Section 4(2)(a). If a dominant position directly or indirectly imposes an unfair price, abuse of dominant position is attracted.

The appeals were dismissed with no orders as to costs, and the Director General was requested to complete the investigation within six months from the date of the judgment.

Facts:

The case involved seven accused, including appellant-accused 'M' and 'S.' Initial charges were not framed against 'M' and two others, but subsequent proceedings under Section 319 Cr.P.C. resulted in charges being framed. An attempt under Section 321 Cr.P.C. to withdraw the case against them was declined. The trial court relied on the testimony of injured eye-witnesses (PWs 5 and 6), medical evidence, and rejected the defense plea of alibi and false implication, leading to the conviction of all seven accused.

Issues:

The reliability of the prosecution's case, the rejection of the plea of alibi, and the impact of the Governor's pardon on the proceedings.

Held:

Although two accused were acquitted with the benefit of doubt, their acquittal does not mitigate the prosecution case against the remaining five accused, including the appellants. Acquittal of co-accused is not determinative of the guilt of others. The substance of the prosecution case remains intact.( Para 9)

The prosecution's case heavily relies on the testimony of injured eye-witnesses PW-5 and PW-6. Their consistent and reliable accounts, along with medical evidence, formed the basis of the conviction. The defense's attempt to discredit these witnesses was unsuccessful, and the trial court's reliance on their testimony was upheld.( Para 10)

The defense introduced a plea of alibi, supported by a witness (DW 5) and a complaint, but the trial court rejected it after thorough evaluation. The absence of the plea during cross-examination and the appellant's failure to assert non-presence at the crime scene in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. weakened the alibi.( Para 11)

The appellant's plea of alibi lacked credibility, as witnessed by DW-9 and other defense witnesses. The trial court and High Court rightly discarded these witnesses as unreliable. The plea of alibi was considered an afterthought and dismissed accordingly.( Para 12)

The absence of the recovery of the weapon used by the appellant-accused 'M' does not undermine the prosecution's case. The appellant's role as the leader of the unlawful assembly was established beyond doubt, justifying the conviction.( Para 13)

The unlawful assembly, comprising at least five accused, including the appellants, had a common object to attack and cause harm to the complainant party. The motive was linked to the appellant-accused 'M's pursuit of a rape and murder case. The assembly's actions constituted an unlawful assembly, engaging in rioting with deadly weapons and causing grievous bodily injuries.( Para 14)

Facts:

Appellant faced discharge due to seven instances of absence from duty with punishments ranging from 2 to 28 days of rigorous imprisonment.

Show-cause notice issued, and the appellant's reply mentioned family problems as the cause for mistakes.

Commanding Officer recorded the appellant as a habitual offender.

Issues:

Whether the discharge based on absence from duty was justified.

Adherence to para 5(a) of the Circular dated December 28, 1988, in conducting the enquiry.

Held and Decision:

The judgment emphasized the importance of an impartial enquiry before discharging a member from the armed forces.

Para 5(a) of the Circular dated December 28, 1988, outlined the enquiry process, excluding a court of inquiry but requiring a semblance of a fair decision-making process.

The appellant had the opportunity to provide an explanation but failed to do so, offering vague family circumstances.

The court found that the appellant had been given adequate opportunity to put forth his defense, satisfying the parameters laid down in para 5(a).

Absence from duty on multiple occasions with imposed punishments of imprisonment supported the conclusion that the appellant was a habitual offender.

In light of these factors, the order of discharge was considered justified.

Facts:

At the relevant time, respondent No.2 faced a default of Rs. 6.7 Crores and was declared an NPA by the bank. A Recovery Certificate was issued in 2001, leading to a Section 7 petition filed by Respondent No.1 before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). The NCLT admitted the petition, and an appeal to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) was subsequently dismissed.

Issues:

• Whether the default by Respondent No.2 is time-barred under the Limitation Act?

• Applicability of Section 23 of the Limitation Act to save limitation.

Held:

The court cites para 27 of B.K. Educational Services Private Limited vs. Parag Gupta and Associates, stating that the right to sue accrues when a default occurs. If the default happened over three years before filing the application, it would be barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act.( Paragraph 3)

The appellant argues for the applicability of Section 23 of the Limitation Act. The court rejects this, citing Balkrishna Savalram Pujari and Others vs. Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan & Others, which distinguishes between a continuing wrong and a continuing right. The court holds that the Recovery Certificate in 2001 effectively and completely injured the appellant's rights, initiating the limitation period.( Paragraph 4)

Concluding that the claim is time-barred, the court sets aside the orders of the NCLT and NCLAT. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.( Paragraph 5)

Facts:

The employee in question served in a work-charged establishment for approximately 37 years before being regularized. Upon superannuation, the employee sought pension benefits, which were denied.

Issues:

Whether the period of work-charged services could be included in the qualifying service for the grant of pension.

Held:

Qualifying Service Definition (Paras 10 and 11): The court emphasized that qualifying service, as per Regulation 368 of Uttar Pradesh Civil Services Regulations, entails holding a substantive post on a permanent establishment. Rule 3(8) clarified that continuous, temporary, or officiating service followed by confirmation in the same or any other post is included in qualifying service. However, periods of temporary and officiating service in a non-pensionable establishment, work-charged establishment, and service in a post paid from contingencies do not count. The Note appended to Rule 3(8) allowed for counting service in work-charged, contingency paid, and non-pensionable establishments under specified exigencies.

Exclusion of Service (Paras 12, 13, and 14): Regulations 370 and 361 of Civil Services Regulations excluded service in a non-pensionable establishment, work-charged establishment, and a post paid from contingencies from qualifying service. Para 669 of the Financial Handbook Vol. VI further restricted pension entitlement for members of work-charged establishments.

Misuse of Work-Charged Employment (Para 29): The court criticized the misuse of the concept of work-charged employment for regular and perennial work. The appointment was made on a monthly salary with no qualitative difference from regular employees.

Unfair Treatment (Para 30): The Court deemed it unfair for the state government to take work on a work-charged basis for an extended period, depriving employees of their due emoluments and pensionary benefits.

Reading Down of Note to Rule 3(8) (Para 33): The Note to Rule 3(8) was deemed irrational and discriminatory. The court read down the Note, allowing for the counting of work-charged services even before regularization.

Striking Down of Regulations (Para 34): The provisions of Regulation 370 and instructions in Para 669 of the Financial Handbook were struck down as a result of the reading down of Rule 3(8).

Directive for Regularization (Para 35): Some employees who had not been regularized despite long service were directed to be treated as regular for pension purposes. However, they were not entitled to claim any dues for the difference in wages.

Conclusion on Qualifying Service (Para 36): In light of the read-down Note to Rule 3(8), services rendered in the work-charged establishment were deemed qualifying service for pension purposes.

Facts:

The case involves JBIMS, a department of the University of Mumbai, granted autonomous status for five years. The autonomous status, effective from 2014-15 to 2018-19, allowed 85% seat admissions based on merit from Maharashtra universities and 15% from the all-India quota. JBIMS sought an extension of autonomous status, facing delays in processing, leading to confusion during the 2019-2020 admissions.

Issues:

The delay in processing JBIMS's application for extension, the confusion in its status during the 2019-2020 admission process, and the subsequent legal challenge by students from other universities in Maharashtra.

Held:

The Court clarified that JBIMS, as a department of the University of Mumbai, did not need UGC approval for autonomous status, as it applies directly to the university under Section 122 of the Maharashtra Public Universities Act, 2016 (Para 11.2).

Despite the Directorate of Technical Education treating JBIMS as non-autonomous for 2019-2020 admissions, the Court held that the autonomous status had not been revoked or surrendered. The delay in the extension application processing contributed to the confusion (Para 11.5).

The decision emphasized that for the academic year 2019-2020, admissions must be conducted according to the High Court's judgment, treating JBIMS as an autonomous department of the University of Mumbai. The Directorate of Technical Education and CET-Cell were directed to follow the merit list for admissions (Para 12, 13).

Facts:

The challenges posed by the increasing number of vehicles, leading to a severe shortage of parking spaces in residential areas.

The court notes the failure of the government to provide sufficient public transport and highlights the need for comprehensive parking policies.

Issues:

Inadequate parking space in residential areas and the resulting impact on the social fabric and neighborhood harmony.

Lack of proper planning and infrastructure to accommodate the growing number of vehicles.

The need for regulatory measures to address parking issues in various areas, including transport hubs, institutional areas, and commercial zones.

Held:

The court directs municipal corporations and authorities to clear pavements from encroachments, making them usable for pedestrians.

Notifies the draft rules for the Delhi Maintenance and Management of Parking Places Rules 2019, with a compliance deadline of 30.09.2019.

Emphasizes the duty of all concerned to enforce the parking rules once notified.

Directs the Government of NCT to ensure proper assessment of parking needs for the next 25 years before granting permission for new structures.

Recommends the evaluation and effectiveness of the pilot project in Lajpat Nagar, with reports to be submitted by 30.12.2019.

Urges consideration of the viability of introducing RFID tags, parking guidance systems, and last-mile connectivity, with a report submission deadline of 30.09.2019.

Facts:

Appellant, Ex-Sepoy Ram Khilawan, discharged on August 31, 1993, due to "CNS (IN) Seizure."

Discharge under Rule 13(3)(III)(iii) of Army Rules, 1954, for medical unfitness, not under residual clause (v).

Discharge proceeded without reference to Invalidating Medical Board.

Issues:

Whether the discharge of the appellant adhered to the prescribed procedure under Army Rules?

Applicability of Rule 13(3)(III)(v) in the discharge.

Held:

The discharge of the appellant was not under the residual clause (v) but under clause (iii) of Rule 13(3)(III) of the Army Rules. As the discharge was solely based on medical unfitness, it required adherence to the procedure laid down in Rule 13. Since the discharge proceeded without reference to the Invalidating Medical Board, it was deemed legally unsustainable.

The appellant, in accordance with General Principles of Army Order 46 of 1980, is entitled to be retained for ten years, and he would be deemed to be discharged only on October 22, 1997. Consequently, the appellant became entitled to pension, in addition to the disability pension granted for a period of five years. However, no arrears of salary were granted for the period up to the date of discharge due to "no work, no pay." Arrears of pension for a period of three years prior to filing the Writ Petition were directed to be paid to the appellant within six months from the date of the order.

FACTS:

The appellant filed a suit under Section 6 of the Wakf Act, 1954, disputing the declaration of a property as Wakf-Al-Allah.

The Survey Commissioner's report confirmed the property as Wakf-Al-Allah, published in the Official Gazette on December 2, 1965.

The appellant filed the suit on January 17, 1967, beyond the one-year limitation period prescribed by the Act.

ISSUES:

Whether the suit filed by the appellant is barred by the limitation period under the Wakf Act, 1954.

Whether the nature of the Wakf property can be challenged beyond the limitation period.

HELD:

The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' decisions, confirming that the suit was time-barred. The key points include:

The property was declared Wakf-Al-Allah by the Survey Commissioner, and the list published on December 2, 1965.

The appellant's arguments regarding the nature of the Wakf and the applicability of Section 56 were rejected.

The Court affirmed that the suit was filed beyond the statutory one-year period, as per Section 6 of the Wakf Act.

The Court found no error in the lower courts' decisions and affirmed the dismissal of the appeal.