Facts:

The National Highway Authority of India awarded a contract for the maintenance of a Project Highway on a BOT basis to M/s. T.K. (Concessionaire).

Subsequently, the Concessionaire awarded the work to M/s. UE (EPC Contractor), who then entered into a Construction agreement with the respondent (M/S. Teachtrans Construction India Private Limited) to execute the works.

A dispute arose between the appellant (Elite Engineering and Construction) and the respondent regarding the execution of the work.

The appellant invoked arbitration, contending that the arbitration clause from the agreement between the EPC Contractor and the respondent was implicitly incorporated into their contract.

The respondent contested the existence of an arbitration agreement between them.

Issues:

Whether the arbitration clause from the agreement between the EPC Contractor and the respondent was incorporated into the contract between the appellant and the respondent.

The proper interpretation of the relevant clauses in the contract between the parties.

Held:

The Supreme Court cited Section 7(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which allows an arbitration clause in an independent document to be imported into a contract by reference. However, such incorporation is valid only if the reference clearly makes the arbitration clause a part of the contract.

The Court agreed with the High Court's interpretation, stating that the intention was not to make the arbitration clause a part of the contract between the appellant and the respondent. The clauses referenced in the contract only incorporated specific conditions and sub-conditions related to the works and quality, not the arbitration clause.

The Court emphasized that clauses referring to termination are distinct from those related to dispute resolution. Disputes may arise independently of contract termination and are a separate matter. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision that the arbitration clause was not incorporated into the contract between the appellant and the respondent.

Facts:

A loan was granted by a non-financial company (not covered under the SARFAESI Act) to the respondent borrower.

Subsequently, the non-financial company merged with the appellant-company, a financial company covered by the SARFAESI Act.

The appellant initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act for the recovery of the loan.

Issues:

Whether the provisions of the SARFAESI Act could be invoked in this case where the company granting the loan was not covered by the Act at the time of granting the loan.

Whether proceedings under the SARFAESI Act were barred if a case was filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, invoking an arbitration clause.

Held:

The loan, debts, and financial assets stood vested in the appellant pursuant to the amalgamation scheme filed under Sections 391 and 394 of the Companies Act, 1956. Upon sanctioning of the scheme, all assets including loans, recoveries, security, interest, financial documents, etc., got transferred to and vested in the appellant. The respondent borrowers became borrowers of the appellant as if the financial assistance was granted by the appellant to them.

The debt with underlying securities was considered the asset of the predecessor company, which had the right to transfer/assign its assets to any person without seeking consent of the borrower.

The court rejected the argument that the merger was devised solely to bring the provisions of the SARFAESI Act into effect for the recovery of dues from the borrowers.

Proceedings under the SARFAESI Act are to be placed on a higher pedestal, given that the Act provides a speedy remedy to banks and financial institutions without recourse to the court of law. Merely because steps were taken under the Arbitration Act did not foreclose the remedy under the SARFAESI Act.

The respondent was treated as a 'borrower', the arrangement was classified as a 'security arrangement', the agreements created 'security interest', and the appellant became a 'secured creditor' under the SARFAESI Act.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, affirming the application of the SARFAESI Act and prioritizing its provisions over general laws.

Facts:

The appellant, M/S. Universal Cylinders Limited, manufactured cylinders for Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) storage. The appellant supplied cylinders to government-owned companies based on provisional prices determined by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (MoP & NG). Subsequently, the prices were revised downwards, leading to an excess amount being charged by the appellant. The government companies deducted this excess amount from the payments due to the appellant, leading the appellant to seek a refund of the sales tax paid on the excess amount.

Issues:

Whether the appellant was entitled to a refund of the sales tax paid on the excess amount charged for cylinders supplied to government-owned companies.

Held:

The court held that the appellant was under a legal obligation to receive only the price finally fixed by MoP & NG, and therefore, the excess amount charged could not be retained. The court further held that the appellant was entitled to a refund of the sales tax paid on the excess amount.

The court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and directed the refund of the sales tax paid on the excess amount charged by the appellant. The court reinstated the order of the Deputy Commissioner and granted the appellant interest on the refund amount at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the Deputy Commissioner's order until payment.

Facts:

The dispute arose between NHAI and M/S. Progressivemvr (JV) regarding the interpretation of a price adjustment formula in a contract for road construction. The contract included a clause for price adjustment to accommodate fluctuations in material costs during project execution.

Issues:

Whether the base rate or the prevailing rate should be used in the price adjustment formula.

Held:

The Court analyzed the relevant clauses of the contract and interpreted that the intention of the formula was to consider the base cost while calculating the price adjustment.

The purpose of the price adjustment clause was to account for fluctuations in material costs from the time of bidding, supporting the use of the base rate in the calculation.

The Court addressed the issue of conflicting interpretations by different Arbitration Tribunals in similar cases. It held that while Arbitration Tribunals may have taken different views, the interpretation favoring NHAI was plausible and consistent with contractual terms.

The Court ruled in favor of NHAI, stating that the base rate should be used in the price adjustment formula.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeals and held that the base rate should be applied in the price adjustment formula. It also addressed the issue of conflicting interpretations by Arbitration Tribunals and established its interpretation as governing pending cases.

Facts:

The appellant, Pankaj Jain, had applied for release on bond under Section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, arguing that since he was not arrested during the investigation, the trial court was obligated to release him on bond. However, the trial court rejected his application. The appellant then sought bail before the Special Judge, C.B.I., but the request was not accepted as the appellant had not previously filed any bail application before the trial court. The matter was brought before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the trial court was obligated to release the appellant on bond under Section 88 of the Cr.P.C.

Whether the appellant was entitled to bail.

Held:

The Court held that Section 88 of the Cr.P.C. does not confer an automatic right upon any person present in court. The discretionary power vested in the court by Section 88 is aimed at ensuring the appearance of individuals before the court. The use of the word "may" in Section 88 indicates discretionary power, and the term "any person" encompasses a wide range of individuals, including witnesses.

The court further stated that the discretion conferred upon the court under Section 88 extends to accepting a bond from an accused or any person present in court. The decision of the Special Judge, C.B.I., and the High Court to reject the appellant's request for release on bond under Section 88 was upheld as there was no infirmity in their decision.

Regarding the appellant's request for bail, the Court noted that the appellant had previously been granted liberty to file a bail application before the trial court but had failed to do so. Therefore, the trial court was directed to first consider the appellant's bail application. Once the appellant files a bail application, it should be promptly considered, taking into account his claim of disability and other relevant grounds.

Decision: The Court disposed of the appeal, affirming the trial court's decision to reject the appellant's application for release on bond under Section 88. Additionally, the trial court was directed to consider any bail application filed by the appellant.

Facts:

The appellant filed a complaint alleging fraud, forgery, and threats by the respondents regarding a disputed land transaction. Despite the police's inaction, the Magistrate dismissed the complaint citing lack of evidence. Upon appeal, the Sessions Court remanded the case for further inquiry. Subsequently, the Magistrate took cognizance of the offenses, leading to revision before the High Court.

Issues:

The legality of the remand order passed by the Sessions Court.

The legality of the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the matter.

Held:

The Court clarified that the Sessions Court's remand order did not amount to taking cognizance. The observations made by the Sessions Court were seen as justification for remand rather than taking cognizance. The High Court's conclusion on this matter was deemed erroneous.

The Court reiterated the standard required for a Magistrate to take cognizance, emphasizing the need for independent application of mind. It was emphasized that the Magistrate's order should reflect a satisfactory evaluation of the material before him.

The Court cautioned against the Magistrate's reliance on observations made by the higher court on the merits of the case. The need for the Magistrate's independent assessment was emphasized.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the impugned judgment. The trial court was directed to consider the complaint afresh, emphasizing that it should proceed without being influenced by any observations made by the higher courts.

Facts:

Rajeshwar Mahto, an employee of Birla Corporation Ltd., challenged his termination through legal proceedings under the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947.

During the pendency of the appeal, the Supreme Court issued an interim order dated 04.05.1999, directing the Corporation to pay Rajeshwar Mahto his full wages last drawn from 01.05.1998 onwards until the final disposal of the appeal.

The final order dated 31.10.2000 allowed the Corporation's appeal and dismissed Rajeshwar Mahto's claims. However, the order also noted an offer by the Corporation to settle the matter by paying Rs. 2 lakhs to Rajeshwar Mahto.

Rajeshwar Mahto filed a contempt petition alleging that the Corporation did not comply with the interim order of 04.05.1999.

Issues:

Whether the Corporation complied with the interim order dated 04.05.1999?

What is the legal effect of the interim order under Section 17-B of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, in the context of subsequent appeal outcomes?

What is the appropriate relief to be granted to Rajeshwar Mahto?

Held:

The court held that the order dated 04.05.1999 remained valid and enforceable independently of the final judgment on the appeal. Therefore, the Corporation was obligated to comply with it.

After considering various factors including the nature of the controversy, the Court determined that Rajeshwar Mahto was entitled to a total sum of Rs. 7,50,000 towards all his claims arising from his employment dispute with the Corporation.

The Court directed the Corporation to pay this amount to Rajeshwar Mahto in full and final settlement. It also ordered Rajeshwar Mahto to vacate the Corporation quarter within three months, after which the payment would be made within one week of his vacating the quarter.

Facts:

The case arose from a batch of MAs/IAs stemming from a judgment dated 15 December 2016 in State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Balu, Civil Appeal 12164-12166/2016, and subsequent orders dated 31 March 2017 and 11 July 2017.

The main issue revolved around the interpretation of paragraph 7 of the order dated 11 July 2017, which dealt with the sale of liquor along and in proximity to highways.

Issues:

The interpretation of the term "municipal areas" as used in paragraph 7 of the order dated 11 July 2017.

The parties sought clarification to determine whether areas governed by local self-governing bodies should be included within the ambit of "municipal areas" for the purpose of the order.

Held:

The Court clarified that the term "municipal areas" in the order dated 11 July 2017 should not preclude state governments from determining its applicability to areas covered by local self-governing bodies and statutory development authorities.

State governments were allowed to make this determination based on relevant factors such as proximity to urban agglomerations and level of development.

License holders were granted the liberty to submit representations to the state governments for consideration.

Decision: The applications were disposed of with the above observations, aiming to prevent further litigation and clarify the application of the Court's earlier orders regarding the sale of liquor near highways.

Facts:

The facts of the case revolve around the challenge to the appointment of respondent nos. 2 and 3 as Additional Judges of the High Court. These appointments were contested on two primary grounds: the duration of the appointments being less than two years, and the eligibility of the appointees who were retired members of the judicial service.

Issues:

Whether the appointments of respondent nos. 2 and 3 as Additional Judges for a period of less than two years violate Article 224 of the Constitution?

Whether the retired members of the judicial service, as in the case of respondent nos. 2 and 3, are eligible for appointment as Additional Judges under Article 217(2)?

Held:

The Court examined the first issue and referred to the observations made in the S.P. Gupta case regarding the tenure of appointment of Additional Judges. The Court clarified that the appointment of Additional Judges for a period of less than two years, especially when approaching superannuation, does not contravene Article 224.

Paragraph 2: Regarding the second issue, the Court interpreted Article 217(2)(a) and emphasized that eligibility is based on having held a judicial office for at least ten years, irrespective of whether the individual holds such an office at the time of notification under Article 224. This interpretation was supported by Explanation (a) to Article 217(2).

Decision: Based on the above analysis, the Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the appointment of respondent nos. 2 and 3 as Additional Judges of the High Court.