Facts:

The borrower/landlord had mortgaged a secured asset to the bank to secure a credit facility. Due to the borrower's failure to repay, SARFAESI Act proceedings were initiated, leading to a magistrate's order for the bank to take possession of the secured asset. Subsequently, a tenant, claiming tenancy rights, sought a stay on the possession order.

Issues:

The validity of the tenant's tenancy claim during SARFAESI Act proceedings. Key questions included the existence and timing of the tenancy, compliance with legal requirements for tenancy protection, and the sufficiency of evidence supporting the tenant's claim.

Held:

SARFAESI Act Objective and Mechanism: The court emphasized the SARFAESI Act's objective of efficient debt recovery, highlighting its self-executory mechanism for banks. Section 13, as a pivotal provision, involves a notice triggering the recovery process, with consequences for the borrower's ability to create further encumbrances.

Reconciliation of Acts: The judgment outlines the reconciliation between SARFAESI Act, Transfer of Property Act, and Rent Act. It establishes conditions for protecting tenancy rights based on the timing and validity of the tenancy in relation to the creation of the mortgage.

Doubtful Tenancy Claim: The court expressed doubts about the tenant's bona fide tenancy claim due to insufficient evidence, including uncertainties regarding the date of creation of tenancy and discrepancies in the stated period of tenancy.

Lack of Conclusive Evidence: Emphasis was placed on the lack of conclusive evidence supporting the tenant's claim, such as a registered lease deed or relevant documents like tax receipts.

Timing of Tenancy Claim: The court noted that the tenant raised the issue of tenancy only after SARFAESI Act proceedings were initiated, suggesting a potential attempt to defeat the bank's rights.

Tenant-in-Sufferance: It was held that, in the absence of a valid tenancy, the tenant could be treated as a 'tenant-in-sufferance,' with no legal rights akin to trespassers.

Non-extension of Rent Act: The court concluded that the operation of the Rent Act cannot be extended to a 'tenant-in-sufferance' vis–a–vis the SARFAESI Act due to the operation of Section 13(2) read with Section 13(13).

Final Decision: The court dismissed the tenant's appeal, directing the tenant to hand over possession of the secured asset to the bank within a stipulated time due to the lapse of seven years from the deadline date.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the interpretation of built-up area as defined in Item No. 8 of the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification dated 14.09.2006.

Issues:

Whether the non-consideration of a judgment in the "NOIDA Park case" led to incorrect conclusions by the court regarding the interpretation of built-up area in the EIA Notification.

Held:

The court clarified that the observations in the NOIDA Park case were made in a different context, and the main dispute in that case did not involve the issue of covered construction being treated as built-up area. The court in the present case held that all covered construction should be deemed as built-up area, and municipal laws regarding Floor Space Index (FSI) or Floor Area Ratio (FAR) are not relevant. The earlier judgment in the NOIDA Park case was deemed to have no impact on the present case, and the application was dismissed accordingly.

Facts:

Plaintiff and defendant no. 2 are brothers.

Plaintiff alleges that the defendants obtained a sale deed fraudulently from their father, who was old, infirm, and living with the defendants.

The suit was initially dismissed, but the appellate court allowed the appeal.

The High Court reversed the order of the first appellate court, restoring the dismissal of the suit.

Issues:

Whether the deceased's physical and mental condition allowed him to execute the sale deed.

Whether undue influence was exerted by the defendants in obtaining the sale deed.

Held:

The deceased, although old and infirm, was not completely physically and mentally incapacitated.

The plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for undue influence, as there were no specific details or circumstances pleaded.

The onus for rebuttal lay on the plaintiff, and the evidence presented was insufficient.

Mere allegations of undue influence due to family care were considered extreme, and no reverse burden of proof was inferred.

The court emphasized the need for proper pleading and relevant evidence to establish elements of undue influence.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the concurrent findings of the lower courts, and there was no interference with the decision.

Facts:

An agreement for the sale of land was entered into on May 13, 1964, between Mohinder Kaur and Bahadur Singh.

Possession was handed over on the same day, and the sale deed was contingent on the resolution of a pending appeal.

The agreement included a clause (Clause 3) stating that if the appeal decision took more than a year, the buyer (Bahadur Singh) would pay customary rent for the land.

The appeal was decided on January 17, 1977, approximately 13 years later.

Issues:

Whether the promise to pay rent was reciprocal or an independent promise?

Whether the failure to pay rent affected the right to claim specific performance?

The discretionary nature of specific performance under Sections 16(c) and 20 of The Specific Relief Act.

Held:

The promise to pay rent was considered reciprocal and an essential part of the agreement.

Bahadur Singh failed to pay rent for 13 years and denied liability in 1978, causing undue hardship.

Equity was against Bahadur Singh, and he forfeited the right to claim specific performance.

The court exercised its discretionary power, emphasizing fairness and reasonableness.

The appeals were allowed, the lower court judgments were set aside, and the suit for specific performance was dismissed.

No relief was granted for the alternative plea of refund.

Facts:

The petitioner retired as the Acting Chief Justice of the Gauhati High Court.

He sought pensionary benefits applicable to a retired Chief Justice.

Dispute arose regarding the calculation of pension under the High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner, having served as the Acting Chief Justice, is entitled to pension benefits equivalent to those of a Chief Justice?

The interpretation of Rule 7 of Part I of the First Schedule of the 1954 Act.

Held:

Section 14 of the 1954 Act provides for pension payable to Judges. Rule 7 of Part I of the First Schedule is crucial for computing the pension, treating service as an Acting Chief Justice as if it were service rendered as Chief Justice.( Para 5.2)

Rule 2 of Part I of the First Schedule outlines the pension computation. The court emphasizes that for the 14 months of service rendered as Acting Chief Justice, the pension is to be calculated as if the petitioner served as Chief Justice.( Para 6)

The court distinguishes between a Chief Justice appointed under Article 217 and an Acting Chief Justice appointed under Article 223, stating that the latter is not equated with the former except for the limited purpose of salary computation.( Para 6.3)

The court concludes that the petitioner is not entitled to pensionary benefits, including the ceiling applicable to a retired Chief Justice, except for the period of service rendered as Acting Chief Justice.( Para 7)

Facts:

The dispute involves sharing of rent for leased spaces between the owners and developers.

Appellants filed petitions under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking arbitration in accordance with Clause 19 of the Addendum.

The lower courts dismissed the applications, stating that the disputes under Section 23 of the Societies Registration Act were not covered by Clause 19.

Issues:

Whether the dispute related to the sharing of rent falls within the scope of Clause 19 of the Addendum.

Whether the lower courts erred in not referring the dispute to arbitration.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the dispute, involving the sharing of rent, is related to the agreements and Addendum.

Clause 19 of the Addendum, which provides for arbitration, is applicable to the dispute.

The lower courts committed a grave error in not referring the dispute to arbitration.

The appeals were allowed, and the applications under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act were granted.

Facts:

The appellant, P. Chidambaram, was accused of irregularities in FIPB clearance. The CBI registered an FIR, and the Enforcement Directorate initiated a case under PMLA.

Issues:

The grant of anticipatory bail, perusal of materials during investigation, and the interference of the judiciary in the interrogation process.

Held:

The court held that it can peruse materials during investigation for various purposes, including considering bail applications. However, the court refrained from opening a sealed cover to avoid prejudice.

The court emphasized its power to peruse materials for the satisfaction of its conscience, especially during the consideration of bail applications.( Para 53)

The court clarified that the interrogation and determination of the adequacy of answers are within the domain of the investigating agency, and the court should not conduct a mini-trial.( Para 58)

Anticipatory bail is an extraordinary remedy and should be sparingly exercised, particularly in cases of economic offenses.( Para 67)

The court, considering the stage of investigation and materials collected, concluded that it was not a fit case to grant anticipatory bail.( Para 76, 77, 81)

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the refusal of anticipatory bail.

Facts:

The appellant is the Commissioner of Customs, Bangalore.

The respondent is M/S Motorola India Ltd., a leading manufacturer of pagers.

The case involves an appeal from the order of the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal regarding the violation of conditions in a customs exemption notification.

The exemption notification (Notification No. 30/1997-Customs) exempted materials imported for manufacturing pagers from customs duty.

Issues:

Whether an appeal under Section 130 of the Customs Act lies before the High Court or Section 130E of the Customs Act.

Whether the respondent breached the conditions of the exemption notification by not utilizing imported materials for the declared final product.

Held:

The appeals should be considered under Section 130 of the Customs Act rather than Section 130E.

The issues do not involve questions related to the rate of duty, valuation of goods, classification of goods, or broader issues of general public importance.

The case is purely inter-se between the parties and should be adjudicated based on the available facts.

The appeals are allowed, and the orders of the High Court are set aside.

The appeals are remitted back to the High Court for de novo consideration on their own merits.

No order as to costs.

Facts:

The petitioner, Dr. Ashwani Kumar, filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking a legislative framework against custodial torture based on the UN Convention. The petitioner argued that custodial torture is a crime against humanity and violates Art.21.

Issues:

Whether the court should invoke jurisdiction under Arts.141, 142 for the protection and advancement of human dignity in the context of custodial torture.

Held:

The court acknowledged its authority to lay down general rules/guidelines in extraordinary cases of human rights violations. However, the court emphasized that a mere allegation of human rights violation or environmental concerns is not a sufficient basis for judicial intervention. It argued that directions should be issued with great care and circumspection.

The court stated that issuing directions when a matter is already pending consideration with the executive or Parliament would be inappropriate, as it might be interpreted as judicial participation in the legislative process. It asserted that any direction at this stage would undermine the role assigned to the judiciary under the Constitution.

The judgment emphasized the importance of respecting the constitutional separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. It discussed the powers and functions of each branch and highlighted the need for interdependence and coordination for effective governance.

The court concluded that the judiciary should not encroach upon the fields reserved for the legislature and the executive. It clarified that judges, while interpreting statutes and exercising judicial review, do not legislate but ensure the legality and validity of legislation and governmental actions.