Facts:

The case concerned the issue of pension entitlement for employees under the State Bank of India Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) framed in 2000. The central question was whether employees completing 15 years of service were entitled to pension benefits as per the terms of the scheme.

Issues:

Whether the Central Board of Directors' acceptance of the memorandum for pension payment created a binding obligation on the State Bank of India (SBI) to provide pension benefits to employees completing 15 years of service?

Whether the SBI's reliance on its failure to amend the rules and its unilateral decision to deny pension benefits were valid arguments to invalidate its earlier decision?

Held:

The court held that once the Central Board of Directors of the SBI accepted the memorandum proposing pension payment to employees completing 15 years of service, the SBI was bound by a binding obligation to implement the pension scheme. The court criticized the SBI's attempt to invalidate its own decision by claiming a failure to amend the rules. The court emphasized that the SBI could not act unfairly or unreasonably based on misrepresentation.

The court interpreted the contractual nature of the scheme in the context of the facts and decisions made by the Board of Directors. There was no ambiguity regarding the admissibility of pension when considering the memorandum and the scheme together. In case of ambiguity, the court ruled in favor of employees, and any clarification denying pension benefits was deemed unenforceable, illegal, and contrary to the law.

The eligibility clause of the VRS scheme explicitly stated that employees with 15 years of pensionable service were entitled to benefits, including pension. The court rejected the SBI's claim that the draft scheme did not stipulate 15 years of service as eligibility. The court held that various documents and correspondence confirmed that the decision to grant pension benefits upon completion of 15 years of service was well-established.

Facts:

Canara Bank granted a term loan secured by a mortgage on a partnership firm's property and a guarantor's land. The guarantor also created an equitable mortgage through deposit of title deeds. The loan was not repaid, leading to a decree by the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT). The guarantor's subsequent application to set aside the decree was dismissed. Years later, the respondents-plaintiffs filed suits challenging the DRT's decree.

Issues:

Whether the suits filed by the plaintiffs were liable to be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of the CPC.

Held :

The court deliberated on whether the suits filed by the plaintiffs were to be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of the CPC.

The court noted that both the DRT's decree and the Recovery Officer's order were appealable under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. It cited precedent (O.C. Krishnan) indicating that remedies under the RDDBFI Act must be exhausted before approaching the High Court under Article 227.

The court analyzed the pleadings and allegations, finding that the fraud claims related to the partnership deed, not the mortgage created by the guarantor. It noted that the plaintiffs' claims were based on sale deeds executed after the property had already been mortgaged to the bank.

The court concluded that the plaintiffs' suits were vexatious and filed with malafide intentions to escape the DRT's judgment. It found the allegations of fraud illusory and aimed at evading the DRT's decree. The court held that the plaintiffs' claims were factually incorrect and rejected the suits under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of the CPC.

O.C. Krishnan and others (Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993) - The court cited this case to emphasize the necessity of exhausting remedies under the RDDBFI Act before approaching the High Court under Article 227.

Facts:

The Maharashtra State Electricity Regulatory Commission (MERC) quashed several circulars issued by the Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. (MSEDCL) before its formation. These circulars aimed to impose "take or pay" obligations, minimum off-take requirements, and additional tariffs for captive power plant holders. MSEDCL was directed to make refunds to certain parties (respondents 3 to 7).

Issues:

Whether MERC had the authority to invalidate circulars issued by MSEDCL before its establishment.

Whether the circular dated 2.9.1999, which remained in force until 28.4.2000, should be considered in light of MERC's earlier order and observations.

Whether a refund of charged amounts should be ordered and whether it would lead to unjust enrichment.

Held:

Issue 1: Validity of Circulars: The Court held that circulars issued before the establishment of MERC could not be quashed based solely on the argument that MSEDCL lacked the power to issue them without the Commission's approval. The Court relied on the precedent set by Binani Zinc Limited v. Kerala State Electricity Board and Ors. (2009) 11 SCC 244, which stated that the State Electricity Board held the power before the Commission's formation.

Issue 2: Merits of Circular dated 2.9.1999: The Court noted that the circular dated 2.9.1999 needed to be considered in light of MERC's previous order and observations. MERC and APTEL were required to examine the impact of their prior orders on the circulars and to consider MSEDCL's submissions for circular approval. The Court emphasized that circulars were integral to tariff proposals.

Issue 3: Unjust Enrichment and Refund : Considering the period during which the circular dated 2.9.1999 was in effect, the Court observed that respondents 3 to 7 had used the supplied electricity to manufacture products whose costs were passed on to consumers. Ordering a refund would result in unjust enrichment, as these costs were already part of product prices. Therefore, the Court held that a refund would not be appropriate in this context.

Decision (Para 28): The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside MERC's and APTEL's orders. It deemed that the circulars and policy decisions issued before MERC's establishment were wrongly invalidated. Moreover, in light of the circumstances, the Court held that the order regarding the refund of the recovered amount should also be set aside.

Facts:

Advocates in the District of Dehradun and several districts of Haridwar and Udham Singh Nagar, Uttarakhand, were boycotting courts on all Saturdays. The High Court directed the District Bar Associations to end the strike and resume court attendance. The State Bar Council was instructed to take disciplinary action against the office bearers. District Judges were to report non-compliance for possible contempt action.

Issues:

Whether the right to strike/boycott courts is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

Whether the strikes/boycotts unjustifiably interfere with the justice delivery system and violate the rights of litigants and the principles of speedy justice.

Held:

The Court noted that despite prior decisions (Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India, Common Cause v. Union of India, Krishnakant Tamrakar v. State of M.P.) discouraging lawyer strikes, such actions persisted. The advocates were boycotting courts on Saturdays in various districts. The Court highlighted that litigants were the ultimate sufferers and expressed shock at the data showing frequent strikes. The Court opined that working on these days would have served the interest of speedy justice and timely criminal trial completion.

The petitioner's argument that strikes are a form of peaceful expression under Article 19(1)(a) was addressed. The Court ruled that the right to freedom of speech can't detrimentally affect litigants or the justice system. Strikes cannot be justified as an exercise of this right and nobody has an absolute right to boycott courts. Such actions also compromise the rights to speedy justice enshrined in Articles 14 and 21. The Court upheld the High Court's directions and concluded that boycotting courts amounted to contempt.

Facts:

Brindavan Agro Industries Pvt. Ltd. (the respondent) applied for credit facilities from Bank of India (the appellant) and revised its credit requirements multiple times. The bank debited processing charges from the respondent's account, which the respondent objected to.

Issues:

Whether the bank's actions were consistent with its procedures and circulars regarding processing charges.

Whether the respondent's request for waiver of 50% of charges was valid.

Whether the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) and State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (SCDRC) orders were justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the bank's actions were in accordance with its procedures and circulars. The respondent was aware of the processing charges and had sought a waiver of only 50% of the charges. The orders of NCDRC and SCDRC were set aside, and the bank's appeal was allowed. However, the court directed the bank to refund a specific amount (Rs. 9.16 lakhs) within two months from the date of the order.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the bank's appeal, set aside the orders of NCDRC and SCDRC, and directed the bank to refund Rs. 9.16 lakhs to the respondent within two months.

Facts:

The Government of Maharashtra had established the Maharashtra Finance and Accounts Service, including various posts, in the Finance Department. Different resolutions were issued over the years, outlining procedures for recruitment, promotions, and pay scale adjustments. A crucial resolution of October 24, 2004, granted the pay scale of Deputy Accountant to Junior Clerks under specific conditions. However, this resolution was later withdrawn by a resolution dated September 11, 2008, causing a dispute among the employees.

Issues:

The validity of the withdrawal of the Government Resolution dated 24.10.2004 by the subsequent Government Resolution dated 11.09.2008.

The entitlement of Junior Clerks to the pay scale of Deputy Accountant based on the Government Resolution dated 08.06.1995, despite the withdrawal of the resolution dated 24.10.2004.

The possibility of recovering excess payments made to the employees and the impact of the undertaking given by the employees.

Held:

The Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal did not err in upholding the withdrawal of the Government Resolution dated 24.10.2004 by the subsequent Resolution dated 11.09.2008. The resolutions were issued by the State Government in the exercise of its executive powers, and such service conditions can be modified by the Government.

The Government Resolution dated 08.06.1995 only entitled Junior Clerks to the pay scale of the next promotional post, which was that of Senior Clerks. It did not entitle them to the pay scale of Deputy Accountant, which was the promotional post for Senior Clerks.

The High Court's judgment permitted the respondents to recover excess payments made to the petitioners after 11.09.2008 by way of monthly instalments. However, recovery of benefits received prior to 11.09.2008 was restrained. The undertaking given by the employees obligated them to refund the amount if the High Court upheld the Government Resolution dated 11.09.2008. The appellants were entitled to retain benefits until the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal rejected their application on 04.12.2014, after which recovery could be initiated for excess payments received thereafter.

Facts:

In Writ Petition (Civil) No. 190 of 2018, Arun Kumar Gupta, a judicial officer, challenged his compulsory retirement by the High Court of Jharkhand. The petitioner faced allegations of using sexist language during lectures and causing physical harm to a washerman. In Writ Petition (Civil) No. 391 of 2018, another judicial officer's record was being examined, including allegations of integrity issues and questionable knowledge of law.

Issues:

The nature of compulsory retirement of judicial officers and its consequences.

Whether the allegations against Arun Kumar Gupta were sufficient to justify his compulsory retirement.

The significance of adverse entries related to integrity in the context of judicial officers.

The role of the Screening Committee and the Standing Committee in making decisions about compulsory retirement.

The extent and limits of the power of judicial review in such cases.

Held:

The court established that an order for compulsory retirement of a judicial officer is not punitive and lacks civil consequences. The entire record of the judicial officer must be considered, giving more weight to the more recent records. The court clarified that subsequent promotions do not nullify earlier adverse records, especially concerning integrity. [(Para 16)]

In the case of Arun Kumar Gupta, allegations of using sexist language and causing physical harm to a washerman were deemed serious. The court noted that these allegations were sufficient to justify the decision for his compulsory retirement. The subsequent exoneration was considered questionable due to a lack of thorough investigation. [(Para 18-19)]

Emphasizing the importance of integrity for judicial officers, the court held that even a single lapse in integrity is not acceptable. Adverse entries related to integrity retain their significance at all stages of the officer's career. [(Para 22)]

The court highlighted that decisions regarding compulsory retirement involve collective judgment, first by the Screening Committee and then by the Standing Committee. The decisions are made by senior judges of the High Court, and the power of judicial review should be exercised cautiously, unless mala fides or glaringly unsupportable facts are present. [(Para 22-23)]

FACTS:

Sadhusharan Yadav defaulted on a loan and his mortgaged land was sold in an auction.

Respondent-writ petitioners, claiming to be bona fide purchasers of the land, filed an application to set aside the sale under Section 28 of the Act.

The application was filed within the stipulated time but without the required deposit.

The Certificate Officer allowed the deposit to be made after the specified time.

ISSUES:

Whether an application under Section 28 of the Act can be entertained without the required deposit?

Can the Certificate Officer extend the time for deposit?

HELD:

The interpretation of Section 28 of the Act is crucial. The section requires that the application for setting aside a sale, made within thirty days from the sale date, must be accompanied by the specified deposit. The word "deposit" implies that the deposit is to be made before or simultaneously with the application, within the thirty-day period. There's no authority to extend this time limit.( Para 6)

Section 28 is a concession for the defaulter, and strict compliance is necessary. The sale cannot be set aside unless the entire specified amount is deposited within thirty days. Allowing deposits after the thirty-day period would defeat the purpose of the provision.( Para 7)

The High Court allowed the writ petition on the premise of the Certificate Officer's discretion, which we find invalid. The authority lacks power to extend the deposit time. The judgment of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench is erroneous.( Para 8)

The appeal is allowed, and the impugned order is set aside. The application under Section 28 stands rejected. The respondent-writ petitioners are entitled to a refund of their deposit.( Para 9)

Facts:

The respondent, Mukesh Poonamchand Shah, an employee of LIC, was convicted of various criminal offenses, including those under the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Indian Penal Code. He was initially penalized through a disciplinary inquiry by LIC and later was convicted in a criminal case.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's issuance of a notice to show cause under Regulation 39(4) of the 1960 Regulations, based on the respondent's criminal conviction, is valid despite an earlier disciplinary penalty.

Whether the High Court's direction to withhold a final decision on the notice pending the criminal appeal is legally justified.

Held:

The Court upheld that the notice to show cause issued by LIC based on the respondent's criminal conviction was valid under Regulation 39(4) of the 1960 Regulations.

The Court reasoned that a prior disciplinary penalty for misconduct does not prevent LIC from issuing a separate notice under Regulation 39(4) based on the criminal conviction.

The Court cited precedents like Dy Director of Collegiate Education (Admn) vs. S Nagoor Meera, K C Sareen vs. CBI, and State of Haryana vs. Balwant Singh to support the view that disciplinary action can be taken based on criminal conviction even if the sentence is suspended during an appeal.

The Court clarified that the conviction itself was not stayed pending the appeal; only the sentence was suspended.

The Court concluded that the appellant's issuance of the notice was within its jurisdiction, and the High Court's direction to withhold a final decision during the criminal appeal lacked a valid legal basis.

REFERRED CASES:

Dy Director of Collegiate Education (Admn) vs. S Nagoor Meera, (1995) 3 SCC 377

K.C. Sareen vs. CBI. (2001) 6 SCC 584

Lt Governor, Delhi vs. HC Narinder Singh, (2004) 13 SCC 342

State of Haryana vs. Balwant Singh, (2003) 3 SCC 362