Facts:

Appellant, a Judicial Officer, dismissed for passing orders favoring a lady lawyer and her clients due to a proximate relationship.

Suspension on 08.02.2001, dismissal on 15.01.2004.

Appellant challenges dismissal in writ petition, dismissed by the High Court.

Issues:

Validity of the penalty imposed on the appellant.

Interpretation of the term 'gratification' under Rule 5 of Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979.

Held:

The court emphasizes the first proviso of Rule 5, which mandates the penalty of removal or dismissal for accepting gratification other than legal remuneration.

Integrity is deemed crucial for judicial officers, and their behavior both inside and outside the court must adhere to high standards.

The officer's proximate relationship with a lady lawyer led to biased judicial orders, constituting a different form of gratification.

Judges must maintain impeccable integrity, and deviation from this standard warrants severe consequences.

The appeal is dismissed, upholding the officer's dismissal from service.

Facts:

The case involves the claim for grant-in-aid benefits by employees under the Orissa (Non–Government Colleges, Junior Colleges, and Higher Secondary Schools) Grant-in-Aid Order, 1994, following its repeal in 2004 and subsequent orders.

Issues:

Whether grant-in-aid can be claimed as a matter of right after the completion of the prescribed period.

The effect of the repeal of the Order of 1994 by the Order of 2004.

The constitutional implications under Article 14 concerning equality.

Held:

Grant-in-aid cannot be claimed as a matter of right but depends on fulfillment of various conditions. The Director has the authority to examine cases concerning posts filled up before June 1, 1994, and availing the benefit of grant-in-aid is discretionary for institutions.( Para 8)

The Order of 2004 repealed the Order of 1994, saving only the block grant for posts sanctioned before the repeal. Private institutions receiving grant-in-aid continue to receive it, but those not receiving it are entitled to block grant under specific conditions.( Para 21)

The repeal of a statute does not save a mere hope or expectation. Only rights acquired or accrued are unaffected. The right to obtain relief under a repealed act is not saved unless explicitly provided.( Para 24)

There is no concept of negative equality under Article 14. If a person does not have a right, they cannot claim equal treatment. The judgment rejects the argument for parity based on orders passed for other persons.( Para 30)

The provisions in the Order of 2004 make it clear that only the block grant is saved for institutions receiving grant-in-aid before the repeal. Orders in favor of employees based on the Order of 1994 are not sustainable.( Para 32)

Facts:

The case involves the deputation of the 71 Armoured Regiment for T-90 Tanks conversion training at Pokhran Firing Range.

Two pistols were reported missing at the conclusion of the conversion exercise, leading to charges of theft against the accused.

Confessional statements played a pivotal role in the prosecution's case.

Issues:

The admissibility of confessional statements made by the accused.

The validity of the retraction of the confessional statements.

Interpretation of Army Order No. 256 of 1972.

Compliance with Rule 58 of the Army Rules, 1954.

Exercise of jurisdiction by the Armed Forces Tribunal.

Held:

Confessional Statements and Misinterpretation (Para 1-3): The Tribunal misread Army Order No. 256 of 1972, erroneously holding that confessional statements made to the Army were inadmissible. The court clarified that statements made before an Army Officer are not hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. Confessions were made orally before Squadron Commander (PW-1) and Second-in-Command (PW-6), with written confessions recorded and supported by video evidence.

Retraction of Confessional Statements and Rule 58 (Para 4-5): The accused's retraction, citing coercion, beatings, and threats, was deemed of no consequence as prosecution witnesses were not cross-examined regarding these allegations. Rule 58, providing an opportunity for the accused to explain incriminating circumstances, was discussed, emphasizing that such statements are not evidence unless confronted during cross-examination.

Power of the Tribunal and Exercise of Jurisdiction (Para 6): Section 15 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act grants wide powers but does not confer jurisdiction to reverse findings based on a different view. The Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by setting aside the order of conviction without legal grounds.

Decision: Criminal appeals filed by the Union of India were allowed, and those filed by the accused were dismissed. The sentence imposed on the accused was reduced to the extent already undergone.

Facts:

The Bihar State Housing Board (appellant) advertised the allotment of a health center plot and invited applications.

The respondent applied but was not allotted a plot initially.

Legal proceedings ensued, leading to discussions on alternative plots and issues surrounding the allotment process.

Issues:

The right of the respondent to plot allotment.

The legality of offering alternative plots without fresh advertisement.

The acceptance and subsequent dispute of the allotment price by the respondent.

Held:

The court emphasized the lack of inherent right to allotment based on prior application.( Paragraph 26)

The court observed the irregularity of allotting alternative plots without a fresh advertisement but acknowledged the operational hospital on the allotted plots.( Paragraph 27)

The court held that, despite the irregularities, the respondent, having accepted the offer and paid initial amounts, is estopped from disputing the allotment price.( Paragraph 28)

The court exercised Article 142 powers, allowing the respondent to avoid interest if the entire balance sale consideration is paid within six months.( Paragraph 32)

Facts:

The Portuguese Civil Code, originating from foreign law, became applicable to the domiciles of Goa through the Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Ordinance, 1962, and the Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Act, 1962.

Issues:

The status of the Portuguese Civil Code in Goa, the applicability of principles of private international law, and the scope of inheritance laws for Goan domiciles, especially in properties located outside Goa.

Held:

The Civil Code, while of Portuguese origin, is deemed an Indian law after the conquest and annexation of Goa. It is enforced in Goa through an Act of the Indian Parliament, making it an integral part of Indian laws. [Para 14-18]

The Portuguese Civil Code applies to properties of Goan domiciles wherever situated in India, and the Indian Succession Act or other laws are not applicable to such Goan domiciles. [Para 25-31]

Grant of probate by the High Court in Bombay, Goa, is limited to determining the genuineness of the will and does not affect inheritance rights governed by the Portuguese Civil Code. [Para 32-34]

The Portuguese Civil Code prevails over general laws of succession, being both a special and local law, and governs all properties of Goan domiciles within or outside Goa. [Para 30-31]

Decision: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the decision of the Single Judge of the High Court, and the order of the Court of Comarca Judge in Inventory Proceedings is restored. [Para 35]

FACTS:

The appellant issued an advertisement on 11.8.2013 for the recruitment of Teachers Grade III.

The last date for submission of the application form was 4.9.2013.

The respondent, Trilok Ram, applied for the position during his ongoing B.S.T.C. Course, despite not having the requisite qualification as of the last date for submission.

The controversy arose regarding the interpretation of Rule 266(3) and the validity of the proviso.

ISSUES:

Whether the proviso to Rule 266(3) remained intact after the substitution of Rule 266(3) by the notification dated 11.5.2011.

Whether the advertisement's requirement for possessing qualifications as of the last date was in accordance with the statutory rules.

HELD:

The Court emphasized that when a provision is substituted, it undergoes repeal, and a new provision takes its place.

Legislative history and subsequent amendments demonstrated that after the substitution on 11.5.2011, the proviso was not reintroduced.

The proviso, which had provided certain eligibility conditions, ceased to exist post the substitution in 2011.

The advertisement's requirement for candidates to possess qualifications as of the last date was deemed consistent with the statutory rules.

The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's judgment was set aside.

REFERRED CASES:

Koteswar Vittal Kamath vs. K. Rangappa Baliga & Co., (1969) 1 SCC 255

Qudrat Ullah vs. Municipal Board, (1974) 1 SCC 202

Rajasthan vs. Mangilal Pindwal reported in AIR 1996 SC 2181

Facts:

During the proceedings, NMR workers claimed that they were coerced into signing papers related to a VSS, leading to their alleged wrongful termination. The Labour Court ordered their reinstatement, but the employer appealed.

Issues:

The allegations of fraud and undue influence in the implementation of the VSS. The adequacy of pleading and evidence related to these allegations were pivotal.

Held:

The Court emphasized that an erroneous decision within the authority of the Tribunal does not warrant a writ of Certiorari unless it relates to a collateral matter affecting jurisdiction. [Para 21 and 29]

The Court clarified that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is supervisory, intended to correct jurisdictional excesses, and cannot be used as an appellate remedy. [Para 29]

The judgment distinguished between fraud and misrepresentation, emphasizing the need for specific pleadings and evidence in cases involving serious allegations. [Para 44]

Order VI Rule 4 of the CPC, while not directly applicable, was considered relevant for its salutary principles in guiding the pleading requirements. [Para 46]

The Court held that the NMR workers failed to provide sufficient pleadings regarding fraud and undue influence, rendering the Labour Court's award infirm. [Para 78]

Documentary evidence presented by the employer was deemed substantial, indicating voluntary participation of the workers in the VSS. [Para 83]

The Labour Court's finding of the VSS being thrust upon the workers was deemed unsupported by evidence, and no case was established for invoking Section 33A r/w Section 33. [Para 81]

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Labour Court's award. It concluded that the employer had presented ample evidence, and the workers failed to prove their case, rendering the Labour Court's decision infirm.

Facts:

The suit property was a three-storeyed structure in Almora, Uttarakhand.

Dispute originated around 1872 when three brothers owned the property, and subsequent transactions led to the plaintiff's claim of full ownership.

The defendants, claiming to be tenants, contested the suit, denying the plaintiff's ownership and asserting that defendant no.3 was the mortgagee.

Issues:

Dispute over ownership and possession of the property.

Maintainability of the appeal filed by tenant-defendants challenging the finding of the trial court on ownership when the mortgagee-defendant no.3 did not contest the decree.

Held:

The court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the trial court's decree in favor of the appellants (plaintiffs). The key holdings are as follows:

The trial court correctly decreed in favor of the plaintiff, holding that full ownership of the property was acquired by the plaintiff's predecessor.

The High Court erred in allowing the appeal by tenant-defendants, holding that their appeal was not maintainable when the alleged mortgagee-defendant no.3 had not challenged the decree.

Tenants cannot challenge the finding of ownership when the mortgagee has not contested it. The appeal filed by tenant-defendants was deemed not maintainable on the issue of ownership.

Facts:

The case involved three establishments seeking exemption under Section 16(1)(d) of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner denied the exemption, asserting that the establishments were effectively part of the same parent establishment.

Issues:

Whether the three establishments were entitled to exemption under Section 16(1)(d) of the Act, considering the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner's rejection based on their functional integrality.

Held:

Civil Appeal No. 4475/2010 pertained to BCCL, Jaipur, considered a branch office of BCCL, Mumbai. The appeal was dismissed with costs of Rs.50,000/-.

Civil Appeal No. 4476/2010 involved an agreement dated 25.7.1986 between the parties. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner's decision.

It was conceded that BCCL, Jaipur was part of BCCL, Mumbai. The connection of the other two establishments with BCCL, Mumbai or BCCL, Jaipur did not invalidate the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner's order.

In the given factual situation, the test applied was one of functional integrality or general unity of purpose rather than direct unity of ownership, management, and control.

Functional dependence between the companies, common office space, and shared staff were emphasized. The agreement between BCCL, Mumbai, and TPHL demonstrated their functional integrality.

SVPL, though a separate legal entity, showed functional integrality with BCCL, Mumbai. The appeal by SVPL was dismissed.

The nature of communications and orders suggested that all three establishments were working towards a common objective, meeting the functional integrality test.

The distinction between BCCL, Mumbai, and BCCL, Jaipur was not significant. The nature of working of SVPL and the other two entities demonstrated functional integrality.

The Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, being a beneficial legislation, aimed to exclude the infancy period to provide new establishments a period to establish their business.

The findings affirmed the functional integrality and general unity of purpose test in the facts of the case.

The liability of each establishment was deemed co-extensive with BCCL, Mumbai. Varying costs were imposed on the three appellants.