Facts:

The appellant, a State Cooperative body, serves as the apex body of Cooperative Banks in Chhattisgarh. The first respondent is a District Central Cooperative Bank. The dispute centers around the appointment of the CEO of the first respondent. The Division Bench of the High Court held that the appellant had no role in CEO appointments, and such power lay with the Registrar only after the District Central Cooperative Bank's failure to make the appointment within a specified period.

Issues:

Whether the appellant had the authority to appoint the CEO of the first respondent?

Whether the amendments brought about by the 2016 Amending Act altered the provisions of CEO appointments for Cooperative Banks?

How should the conflict between the provisions of Section 49-E(2) and Section 54(3) be resolved?

Held:

Section 54 deals with the appointment of Managers, Secretaries, and officers of societies. Sub-section (1) empowers societies to make appointments based on qualifications. Sub-section (2) requires Apex and Central Societies to maintain a cadre of officers as directed by the State Government.

Section 49-E pertains to CEO appointments under specific circumstances. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 49-E override contrary provisions and apply when the State Government has contributed to share capital, given loans, etc. CEO appointments are covered under this provision.

Central Societies under Section 49-E(2) appoint CEOs from the cadre if created under Section 54.

Section 54(3) empowers the State Government to specify societies for cadre officers' appointment by Apex or Central Societies. The notified class must appoint cadre officers as deputed.

The 2016 Amending Act inserted clauses (a) and (b) into Section 54(3), specifying CEO eligibility and the Registrar's appointment authority. Clauses (a) and (b) apply solely to Cooperative Banks, and their introduction does not negate Section 49-E.

Section 49-E(2) stipulates CEO appointment from cadre officers of Section 54 if applicable.

Notification under Section 54(3) operates regulatory control over Central Societies under Section 49-E(2), specifying CEO appointment sources.

Courts must harmonize conflicting provisions; both Section 49-E(2) and Section 54(3) must be upheld. Section 54(3) notifications grant State Government regulatory power.

The State Government can specify Cooperative Banks' CEO appointments from Apex Society's cadre. Notified Apex Society provides a panel; RBI eligibility criteria apply. CEO appointment from cadre is mandatory under Section 49-E(2).

First respondent is a Central Society under Section 49-E(2). Notification obligates Cooperative Banks to appoint CEOs from cadre created by State Cooperative Bank. The appointment of CEO by the appellant was ratified by the Registrar and BoD, aligning with Section 54(3).

FACTS:

The appellants had been granted compassionate appointments, but their appointments were canceled upon the discovery that they were made in contravention of the Karnataka Civil Services (Appointment on Compassionate Grounds) Rules, 1996, as amended from 01.04.1999. The amendments introduced a stipulation that a minor dependent of a deceased government employee must apply within one year from the date of death and must have attained the age of eighteen on the day of application. Prior to the amendment, a minor could apply within one year of attaining majority.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellants' appointments were valid under the unamended provisions of Rule 5.

Whether the amended provisions of Rule 5 were applicable to the appellants' cases.

Whether the appellants' claims could be considered under the transitory provision of Rule 9(3).

Whether the norms prevailing on the date of consideration or on the date of the government employee's death should apply to compassionate appointments.

Whether the appellants were entitled to continuation of their appointments.

HELD:

The Court considered the contentions of the parties and the relevant legal principles in making its decision. The Court held:

The appellants' claims could not be considered under the unamended provisions of Rule 5 as they applied for compassionate appointments well beyond one year from the date of their respective parents' deaths, and the amended provisions had become operational.

The norms applicable on the date of consideration of the application should be the basis for compassionate appointment, and a dependent cannot demand consideration based on the norms prevailing on the date of the government employee's death.

The transitory provision of Rule 9(3) did not cover the appellants' cases as their applications were filed in contravention of Rule 5 as amended in 1999.

Compassionate appointment is a concession and not a right, and the criteria laid down in the rules must be satisfied by all aspirants.

The appellants were ineligible for compassionate appointment under the amended provisions of Rule 5, and their appointments were justifiably canceled.

Facts:

Respondent No. 2, not a party to certain court proceedings, filed an RTI application seeking information and certified copies of relevant documents. The Public Information Officer of the Gujarat High Court informed respondent No. 2 that, according to Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court Rules, an affidavit stating the grounds for requiring the certified copies was necessary. The Appellate Authority upheld this decision.

In a second appeal, the Chief Information Commissioner directed the Public Information Officer to provide the requested information. Respondent No. 1 (High Court) challenged this order, leading to conflicting decisions between the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench held that when valid rules govern a particular field, applying fresh rules under the RTI Act would create confusion.

Issues:

Can a third party seek information and certified copies of documents from the Gujarat High Court under the RTI Act?

Is Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court Rules inconsistent with the provisions of the RTI Act?

Held:

The Court held that Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court Rules does not obstruct a third party from obtaining copies of documents from court proceedings. The Rule simply provides a different procedure for obtaining information, requiring the third party to file an application/affidavit stating reasons for the request. This is to ensure that the information is sought for genuine reasons or public interest. (Para 27)

The Court emphasized that the RTI Act recognizes the need to protect institutional interests and confidentiality of sensitive information. It found that the procedure to obtain certified copies under the High Court Rules is not cumbersome and serves to prevent misuse of court processes and information. (Para 28)

The Court clarified that the High Court Rules' mechanism for obtaining information is not inconsistent with the provisions of the RTI Act. Instead, they complement each other. The information/certified copies on the judicial side should be obtained through the mechanism provided under the High Court Rules, rather than invoking the provisions of the RTI Act. (Para 38)

Facts:

The case involves a writ petition challenging the detention orders issued under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act. The detention orders were made by a specially empowered officer. The detenues, represented by their counsel, contended that their right to representation against the detention orders had been violated.

Issues:

Whether the detenues had the right to make representations against the detention orders made by a specially empowered officer under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act.

Whether the Detaining Authority had the obligation to consider the representation independently or wait for the Advisory Board's report.

Whether the delay in considering the representation by the Detaining Authority violated the detenues' constitutional rights.

Held:

Majority Opinion (Uday Umesh Lalit and Indu Malhotra, JJ.):

The detenues have the right to make representations against detention orders made by a specially empowered officer under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act. This right is in addition to the right to make representations to the State Government and the Central Government (Para 12).

The Detaining Authority is obliged to consider the representations without waiting for the opinion of the Central Advisory Board. The specially empowered officer has no statutory role to play at the stage when the Advisory Board's report is received. The report is meant for the appropriate Government's consumption, and confidentiality is mandated (Para 22-23).

In cases where the representation is received before or after the Advisory Board's reference, the Detaining Authority must consider the representation promptly. Inaction on the Detaining Authority's part to consider the representation causes prejudice to the detenues and violates their constitutional rights (Para 26-28).

Dissenting Opinion (Hemant Gupta, J.):

The Detaining Authority, whether the Central Government, State Government, or a specially empowered officer, has the jurisdiction to consider representations against detention orders independently of the Advisory Board's recommendation (Para 3).

The consideration for revocation of a detention order is distinct from the Advisory Board's assessment of sufficient cause for detention. The Detaining Authority should prudently defer the decision on the representation while the matter is being reviewed by the Advisory Board (Para 23).

Facts:

The appellant's husband owned a vehicle insured by the respondent. The vehicle was involved in an accident, leading to the death of the appellant's husband and daughter. The respondent rejected the claim, asserting that the driver did not possess a valid driving license. The appellant filed consumer complaints seeking compensation.

Issues:

Whether the insurance company's liability is absolved due to the driver's invalid/fake driving license.

What level of care/diligence is expected of the employer/insured when hiring a driver with a driving license.

Held:

The court referred to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, specifically Section 149(2)(a)(ii), which addresses the conditions of driving licenses. The court discussed the extent of care an employer should exercise when hiring a driver, and whether the insurance company can avoid liability due to the driver's invalid license.

The court cited the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Lehru & Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 338 and the case of Pepsu RTC vs. National Insurance Co., (2013) 10 SCC 217, emphasizing that the insurer cannot avoid liability merely on the ground of the driver's invalid license. The insurer must prove negligence or failure on the part of the insured to fulfill policy conditions regarding driver competence.

The court ruled that while hiring a driver, the employer must verify the driver's license and assess their competence. If the driver presents a seemingly genuine license, the employer need not further investigate its authenticity unless there's reason to doubt. The court deemed it unreasonable to place the onus on the insured to verify licenses with transport authorities across the country.

The court held that if the insurer proves that the insured was aware of the fake license but still allowed the person to drive, the insurer's liability ceases. In this case, the driver's license was purportedly issued by a licensing authority, but its authenticity couldn't be verified. The court found the insured had not been negligent and allowed the appeals, holding the insurer liable to indemnify the appellant.

REFERRED CASES:

National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Swaran Singh & Ors., (2004) 3 SCC 297 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 733

Pepsu RTC vs. National Insurance Co., (2013) 10 SCC 217

United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Lehru & Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 338 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 641

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the classification of a specific parcel of land described as 'Shamlat Patti Dhera & Khubi'. The appellant, Patram, argued that the land, though described as 'shamilat' land, was actually a patti owned by his ancestors for over a century. The land was not being utilized for common village purposes, and thus, according to him, it should not be categorized as 'shamilat deh' under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961.

Issues:

Whether the land in question qualifies as 'shamilat deh' under the definition provided in Section 2(g) of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961.

Held:

The court analyzed the definitions and provisions in the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, particularly focusing on Section 2(g) which defines 'shamilat deh'. The court noted that terms like 'taraf', 'patti', 'panna', and 'thola' represent different divisions within a village based on caste, religion, occupation, etc. The court discussed the absence of a comma after the word 'shamilat' in a specific section and concluded that this was likely a typographical error. The court interpreted that 'shamilat deh' should be read along with 'taraf', 'patti', 'panna', and 'thola'. A land could only be considered 'shamilat deh' if it met one of these conditions. If the term 'shamilat' was missing from any of these descriptions, the land could not be categorized as 'shamilat deh'.

Based on the evidence presented, including historical records and the fact that the land was not utilized for the common benefit of the village community, the court held that the land in question did not qualify as 'shamilat deh' under the Act. As a result, the court allowed the appeal, setting aside previous judgments, and ordered that the appellant's name be entered in the ownership column with the entry 'shamlat patti'.

Facts:

The plaintiffs (respondents) filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration of ownership over a property, survey entry No. 11/1 of a village, and the removal of the 'Forest department' name from the records. The State of Goa (defendants) opposed the claim, asserting that the property belonged to the Forest Department.

Issues:

Whether the recording of the plaintiffs' names alongside the Forest Department's in the survey entry was legally valid.

Whether the plaintiffs' failure to disclose the 1975 records correction proceedings in their suit affected their claim.

Whether the evidence presented by the State regarding the property's status as forest land was sufficient to support their counter-claim.

Held:

The Court observed that despite one of the plaintiffs withdrawing their claim in 1975, their names were recorded alongside the Forest Department's name, which was deemed illegal.

The plaintiffs' failure to disclose the relevant 1975 records correction proceedings in their suit was noted as a failure to justify the continuation of their claim.

The additional evidence presented by the State indicated that only the Forest Department's name was recorded regarding the property. The Court concluded that the counter-claim by the State was well-founded.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal by the State, directing the removal of the plaintiffs' names from the survey entry No. 11/1 of the village

Facts:

The appellants filed a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure alleging breach of trust in a charitable medical trust created for public purposes. They claimed that the trust's objects were not being fulfilled, the trustees were mismanaging the trust, and the trust was being treated as a private family trust. The appellants sought various reliefs, including the framing of a proper scheme for administration and the appointment of qualified medical professionals as trustees.

Issues:

Whether the suit filed by the appellants falls within the ambit of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Whether the reliefs sought in the suit were for vindicating public rights or personal/private rights of the plaintiffs.

Held:

The Court examined the conditions of Section 92: (i) the trust must be created for public charitable or religious purposes; (ii) there must be a breach of trust or a need for court direction in the trust's administration; and (iii) the reliefs claimed must be those enumerated in the section. The Court noted that the trust was created for public charitable purposes and that the second condition was met as the appellants alleged mismanagement and breach of trust. The Court analyzed the reliefs sought and found that the principal relief sought the framing of a proper scheme of administration, involving trustees from the medical profession and the public. The Court held that this relief aimed to achieve the trust's charitable objectives and was not a vindication of personal rights.

The Court referred to the case of Sugra Bibi vs. Hazi Kummu Mia, wherein it was held that the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff indicate whether the suit is brought in a representative capacity on behalf of beneficiaries. Applying this principle, the Court concluded that the suit was indeed brought by the appellants in a representative capacity to protect the trust's public charitable objectives.

Facts:

The appellants were Deputy General Managers in Canara Bank, accused of causing wrongful loss to a complainant in a loan transaction. The complainant's loan was classified as a 'Non-Performing Asset' (NPA), leading to auction proceedings for a secured asset. The complainant alleged under-valuation of the property and challenged auction notices in various legal forums.

Issues:

Whether the complainant's allegations against the appellants merit a criminal complaint and investigation, given the recourse available under the SARFAESI Act for addressing grievances related to loan transactions and auction proceedings.

Held:

The Court, after reviewing the facts and legal provisions, observed that the SARFAESI Act is a comprehensive legal framework that regulates the actions of secured creditors like banks, including the process of auctioning secured assets. It notes that the Act provides remedies and forums for addressing disputes and grievances related to loan transactions and auctions. The Court also highlighted the principle that the power of quashing criminal proceedings should be exercised sparingly and only in rare cases.

The Court refers to a previous writ petition filed by the complainant challenging an auction notice and highlights that the learned Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court had considered the matter and rejected the complainant's contentions, while affirming the recourse available under the SARFAESI Act.( Para 10)

The Court further emphasizes that the SARFAESI Act is not immune to challenge or questioning, as it provides checks and balances. The Court cites a relevant decision that indicates the powers of the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) to set aside actions taken by secured creditors, thereby validating the avenues for addressing disputes.( Para 17)

The Court observes that the present complaint and investigation initiated by the complainant appear to be an intimidatory tactic and an abuse of process, especially given that the complainant had previously pursued legal remedies and failed to diligently avail the available avenues under the SARFAESI Act.( Para 18)

Decision: The Court quashes the complaint, order, and FIR against the appellants, citing that the proceedings initiated are not justified in light of the available legal avenues for addressing the grievances. The Court allows the complainant to pursue remedies under the SARFAESI Act if desired and allows the appeal.