The Inspector General of Police, Kashmir Zone, issued an invitation for tenders for the supply of commercial vehicles to be used for the transportation of troops and equipment during the Financial Year 2020-2021.

Four parties submitted their bids in response to the tender invitation.

The Tender Opening Committee found that respondent no. 1 (M/S. New J.K. Roadways) did not meet the qualifying requirements of the technical bid.

Consequently, the appellant (M/S. Galaxy Transport Agencies) was deemed eligible and was awarded the contract for the supply of commercial vehicles.

Respondent no. 1 challenged the decision of the Tender Opening Committee by filing a writ petition.

Issues:

The case were whether the appellant satisfied the eligibility criteria and whether the tendering authority's interpretation of the tender conditions should be upheld without interference from the court.

Held:

The court examined Condition No. 31 of the N.I.T. and concluded that it necessitated the submission of a list of "both HMV/LMV" (Heavy Motor Vehicles/Light Motor Vehicles) as part of the bid.

The court emphasized that the interpretation of tender conditions by the tendering authority should not be subjected to second-guessing by the court in judicial review proceedings, as per previous rulings on the matter.

Accordingly, the Division Bench's decision to challenge the tendering authority's interpretation and assert that respondent no. 1 was wrongly disqualified was overturned.

With regard to Condition No. 27 of the N.I.T., which stipulated a minimum work experience of 5 years with a value not less than Rs. 2 crores, the court found that the Tender Opening Committee correctly evaluated the appellant's eligibility.

The court observed that unless arbitrariness or mala fide intentions were alleged against the tendering authority, the court should not interfere with the expert evaluation of a tender, especially in technical aspects, during writ proceedings.

The Division Bench's independent assessment of the appellant's work experience, which substituted the evaluation by the expert Tender Opening Committee, was considered inappropriate.

Facts:

The case involved writ petitions seeking to declare the "Gowari" caste as "Gond Gowari," a Scheduled Tribe, mentioned in Entry 18 of the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950.

Issues:

• Whether the High Court had the authority to entertain the claim of the caste "Gowari" to be declared as "Gond Gowari," a Scheduled Tribe, and consider evidence to adjudicate such claim?
• Whether there is any conflict in the ratio of the judgments in B. Basavalingappa v. D. Munichinnappa and State of Maharashtra v. Milind?
• Whether the High Court had the power to adjudicate whether the Scheduled Tribe "Gond Gowari" is no longer in existence and became extinct before 1911?
• Whether "Gowari" caste is the same as "Gond Gowari" included in Entry 18 of the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950?
• Whether the High Court correctly determined that "Gond Gowari" shown in Entry 18 is not a sub-tribe of "Gond"?

Held:

The High Court lacked authority to entertain the claim of "Gowari" caste to be declared as "Gond Gowari," a Scheduled Tribe.

There is no conflict between the judgments in B. Basavalingappa and State of Maharashtra v. Milind.

The High Court could not have decided that "Gond Gowari" Tribe became extinct before 1911.

"Gowari" caste is distinct from "Gond Gowari" included in Entry 18 of the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950.

The High Court's conclusion that "Gond Gowari" is not a sub-tribe of "Gond" is incorrect.

The admission and employment of "Gowari" community members based on Scheduled Tribe certificates between 14.08.2018 and the date of this judgment shall not be affected.

The High Court's judgment declaring "Gowari" as "Gond Gowari" is set aside, and the writ petitions are dismissed.

Facts:

By the Honorable Supreme Court of India in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The petition aimed to address issues related to the proper treatment of COVID-19 patients and the dignified handling of dead bodies in hospitals during this crisis. Various advocates represented the parties involved, including the Attorney General, Solicitor General, Additional Solicitor General, and several other advocates.

Issues:

The need to address fire safety measures in COVID-19 hospitals.

Provisioning of adequate resources for the treatment of COVID-19 patients.

Enforcement of Guidelines and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to prevent violations.

Deployment of additional police personnel at crowded places to ensure compliance with COVID-19 protocols.

Consideration of permissions for gatherings and celebrations during the pandemic.

Mechanism to monitor the number of attendees at functions and gatherings.

Implementing more testing measures to control the spread of COVID-19.

The implementation of weekend curfews and measures to seal containment zones.

Compliance with guidelines issued by the Election Commission of India for political gatherings during the pandemic.

Held:

In its order, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of fire safety in COVID-19 hospitals (para. number needed). The Court directed the State Governments to make more provisions for the treatment of COVID-19 patients (para. number needed) and take strict and stern action against those violating the Guidelines and SOPs (para. number needed). The deployment of more police personnel at crowded places was recommended (para. number needed), and permissions for non-essential gatherings and celebrations were not to be granted (para. number needed). A mechanism to monitor the number of attendees at such functions was to be established (para. number needed). The Court also stressed the need for increased testing, implementation of weekend curfews, and measures to seal containment zones (para. number needed). Additionally, the Court called for compliance with guidelines issued by the Election Commission of India for political gatherings during the pandemic (para. number needed). States and Union Territories were granted four weeks to submit affidavits detailing the measures taken in response to the COVID-19 pandemic

Facts:

The appellant and two others filed nominations for the Council of States elections. One elected member of the Assembly cast his vote in favor of one of the winning candidates at 9:15 a.m on 23.03.18, but he was convicted and sentenced in a criminal case later that same day. The appellant secured 2599 value of votes, while the other two candidates secured 2601 and 2600 value of votes. An objection was raised regarding the validity of the vote cast by the convicted elected member, which was rejected. Consequently, the appellant was declared defeated, and the other two candidates were declared duly elected. The appellant filed an election petition seeking a declaration that the vote cast by the convicted member was improperly received.

Issues:

• Whether the vote cast by the convicted elected member at 9:15 a.m on 23.03.18 was valid.
• Interpretation of the phrase "the date" in Section 8(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
• Applicability of the de facto doctrine and principles of legality.

Held:

The Court held that a Member of the Legislative Assembly should be treated as innocent until proved guilty, and holding them disqualified before conviction would violate their substantive right. Therefore, the vote cast by the convicted member at 9:15 a.m on 23.03.18 was rightly treated as valid. (Para 11-13)

The interpretation of the phrase "the date" in Section 8(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 has to be in sync with the Constitutional scheme of Article 191(1)(e). The conviction should be the cause of disqualification, and the period of disqualification starts from the date of conviction until six years after release. (Para 18-20)

The principles of legality apply in cases of disqualification, and the phrase "the date" in Section 8(3) should be interpreted based on the penal provisions under which the person was convicted. (Para 30, 32, 33)

Cases of insurance law have no relevance to disqualification cases. (Para 41, 42)

The disqualification under Section 8(3) is a consequence of conviction, and a consequence can never precede the cause. (Para 43)

Article 193 deals with penalties for erring members, and disqualification for which a penalty is prescribed under Article 193 also invites civil consequences. However, the act done by the elected member is not necessarily invalidated, except in certain circumstances. (Para 47, 48, 53)

The de facto doctrine applies to acts performed by officers de facto within their assumed official authority, protecting public and private interests. (Para 55)

The Court dismissed Civil Appeal No.611 of 2020, upholding the validity of the vote cast by the convicted elected member, and allowed Civil Appeal No.2159 of 2020, setting aside the findings of the High Court on certain issues. (Para 58-62)

Facts:

Two candidates, one belonging to the OBC-Female category and another from the SC-Female category, participated in the selection process for constables in Uttar Pradesh Police in 2013. They scored marks above the cut-off for the General Female category. Both claimed selection in the General Female category, but their claim was rejected by the State based on a High Court order that reserved special category candidates within their respective quotas, even if they scored higher marks than the last candidate selected in the open category.

Issues:

Whether the 'seconds view' held by the High Courts of Allahabad and Madhya Pradesh, which supported the reservation of special category candidates to the extent of their respective quotas, is valid?

Whether the 'first view' held by the High Courts of Rajasthan, Bombay, Uttarakhand, and Gujarat, which allowed candidates from backward classes to compete for open category posts based on merit, is correct?

Held:

The 'second view' is not based on any authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court and does not prioritize merit. Selections in public employment must be based purely on merit, subject to any permissible reservations. Any selection resulting in candidates with lower merit getting selected against the open/general category is against principles of equality. The 'second view' is disapproved and rejected. (Para 31-32)

Reservations, both vertical and horizontal, are methods of ensuring representation in public services. The open category should remain open to all candidates based on merit, regardless of their eligibility for reservation benefits. The 'first view' is correct and rational. (Para 33)

Candidates from the OBC Female category who scored higher marks than the last selected candidate in the General Female category must be offered employment as constables in Uttar Pradesh Police. However, the claims of the SC Female category candidates were rejected as none of them had secured more marks than the last selected candidate in the General Female category. (Para 37)

Facts:

The present case revolves around a dispute between the petitioner, Mr. Suresh Shah, and the respondent, Hipad Technology India Private Limited. The petitioner is the landlord, and the respondent is the tenant of a commercial property. The lease agreement between the parties contains an arbitration clause, which provides an alternate mode of dispute resolution. Subsequently, a dispute arose between them regarding the termination of the lease under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. In accordance with the arbitration clause, the petitioner nominated a sole arbitrator and issued a notice to the respondent. However, the respondent neither replied to the notice nor objected to the proposed arbitrator.

Issues:

• Whether disputes between a landlord and tenant under the Transfer of Property Act are arbitrable when the lease agreement contains an arbitration clause?
• Whether disputes arising under the Rent Act are arbitrable?

Held:

Disputes under the Transfer of Property Act: After examining the provisions of Sections 111, 114, and 114A of the Transfer of Property Act, the court noted that determination of a lease could occur due to various reasons, including forfeiture arising from the tenant's breach of the lease agreement, which may involve non-payment of rent. In such circumstances, if the lease is determined by forfeiture, the landlord can sue to eject the tenant. However, under Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, the court, instead of passing a decree for ejectment, may pass an order relieving the lessee against the forfeiture if the lessee pays or tenders the rent in arrear. Section 114A of the Act further provides a condition for issuing a notice before filing a suit of ejectment, allowing the lessee an opportunity to remedy the breach. The court clarified that while these provisions provide some protection to the tenant before eviction, they do not render the disputes non-arbitrable. Thus, if the lease agreement includes an arbitration clause, the landlord can invoke it to seek resolution before an arbitrator. The arbitrator can consider the relevant circumstances and act in accordance with the law while passing the award. (Para 16)

Disputes under the Rent Act: The court emphasized that in cases where eviction or tenancy is governed by the Rent Act, and the premises fall under the purview of its provisions, the disputes are non-arbitrable. The Rent Act provides statutory protection against eviction and grants exclusive jurisdiction to specific courts to decide on eviction and other related disputes. These courts consider various factors like the landlord's bonafide requirement and the comparative hardship faced by the parties. In such cases, only the courts specified in the Rent Act can adjudicate the disputes, and the arbitration clause, if any, in the lease agreement cannot override this statutory protection. (Para 18)

Decision: The court allowed the petitioner's prayer for the appointment of a nominated sole arbitrator in the instant case, as the dispute between the parties was arbitrable under the lease agreement. (Para 19)

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between ANGLO AMERICAN METALLURGICAL COAL PTY LTD. (Appellant) and MMTC LTD. (Respondent) over the supply of coal. The Majority Award found that the Appellant was able to supply the contracted quantity of coal, but the Respondent was unwilling to lift the coal due to a market slump. The Respondent subsequently attacked the Appellant, alleging non-supply by the Appellant during the Fifth Delivery Period. The Division Bench upheld the Respondent's claim, leading to the present appeal.

Issues:

• Whether the Majority Award, which considered the entirety of the correspondence and oral evidence, was a possible view based on the facts.
• Whether the provisions of patent ambiguity and latent ambiguity under the Evidence Act, 1872, apply to the facts of the case.
• Whether the Majority Award is sustainable under the law as it stood before the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015.

Held:

The Majority Award, after examining the correspondence and oral evidence, arrived at a possible view on the Respondent's breach and the quantum of damages. The Division Bench's approach of solely relying on three emails without considering the entire context of correspondence and the LTA was flawed.

The Evidence Act's provisions on patent ambiguity are not applicable, as the three critical emails were part of the overall correspondence and needed to be read in the context of the entire LTA. However, the provisions on latent ambiguity could apply, and the Majority Award's reliance on Mr. Wilcox's evidence was valid.

The Majority Award is sustainable under the law as it stood before the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015.

Decsion: The court upheld the Majority Award's findings, stating that it was a possible view based on the evidence presented. The Division Bench's approach of relying solely on three emails without considering the context of the Long-Term Agreement (LTA) and other correspondence was deemed flawed. The appeal was dismissed, and the decision clarified the application of the Evidence Act to the documents exchanged in a contract.

Facts:

The promotion of an incumbent teacher to the post of Professor under the Career Advancement Scheme (CAS).

The teacher joined the constituent college of Karnataka University on October 28, 2013, as an Associate Professor. Before that, he served as an Associate Professor in an affiliated college of the University from January 1, 2006, to January 1, 2009.

The promotion to the post of Professor under CAS was granted to him from October 28, 2013.

The incumbent teacher filed a writ petition seeking promotion from January 1, 2009, claiming that he had completed the eligibility criteria on that date.

The Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court allowed his case and directed the University to grant him promotion from January 1, 2009.

Issues:

• The interpretation of the term "College" for the purpose of CAS promotions.
• The question arose whether the promotion should be granted from the date of entry into the University's service (October 28, 2013) or from January 1, 2009, when the incumbent teacher was working in an affiliated college.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the term "College" in the context of CAS promotions should be interpreted in accordance with the preamble of the relevant statute governing promotions, not the definition of "College" under section 2(2) of the Act.

It was clarified that "College" referred to in the statute pertains only to "Constituent College" and not "Affiliated College."

The Court upheld the University's decision to grant promotion to the incumbent teacher from the date of entry into the University's service (October 28, 2013) and not from January 1, 2009.

The High Court had erred in ordering promotion from January 1, 2009, as the teacher was not in effective service of the University during that period.

Facts:

Respondents had booked flats with the appellant-builder, but the flats were not delivered on time. They filed a consumer complaint before the National Commission, seeking a refund of their money. The appellant received the notices in June 2020 and filed a written statement/reply on 31 August 2020, which was beyond the 45-day period prescribed under Section 38 of the Consumer Protection Act.

Issues:

• Whether the National Commission can allow the filing of a written statement beyond the prescribed 45-day period?
• Whether the order dated 23 March 2020, passed by the Supreme Court for the extension of the limitation period due to the Covid-19 pandemic, applies to the present case?

Held:

The court observed that while it is true that a written statement cannot be allowed to be filed beyond the period of 45 days as per Section 38 of the Consumer Protection Act, the Supreme Court's order dated 23 March 2020 extended the limitation period in all proceedings, irrespective of whether it was prescribed under general or special laws and whether it was condonable or not. This extension was effective from 15 March 2020 until further orders.

The court further noted that the original 30-day limitation period for filing the written statement had expired on 12 August 2020, and the extended period of 15 days expired on 27 August 2020, while the order dated 23 March 2020 was still in effect. Thus, the limitation for filing the written statement in the present proceedings before the National Commission would be deemed to have been extended by the Supreme Court's order.