Facts:

The respondent-Company was covered under the ESI Act and deposited contributions for employees but not for Directors receiving remuneration.

Corporation demanded contribution for Directors' remuneration; the respondent challenged it, citing a lack of precedent.

Issues:

Whether Directors receiving remuneration are considered "employees" under the ESI Act?

Held and Decision:

The definition of "employee" in Section 2(9) of the ESI Act is comprehensive, covering those employed for wages in connection with the work of the establishment.

The Court relies on the precedent in Apex Engineering (1998) 1 SCC 86, where a Managing Director receiving remuneration was deemed an "employee."

The Court rejects the argument that Directors are not employed for wages in connection with the work of the establishment, emphasizing the broad definition of "employee."

The ESI Act covers Directors if paid remuneration for duties entrusted to them, similar to Managing Directors.

The respondent failed to provide evidence disputing the remuneration paid to Directors.

The ESI Court and High Court erred in distinguishing the present case from Apex Engineering; the decision is set aside, and the respondent's application is dismissed.

Facts:

M/s. Prerana Motors (P) Ltd. is a dealer of Tata Motors.

Sales Tax is paid on the vehicles sold.

Warranty provided for free replacement of parts during the warranty period.

The dealer is obliged to keep a stock of spare parts for replacement.

Sales tax is paid on the stock of spare parts purchased from Tata Motors.

Defective parts sent back to Tata Motors, and credit note may be given for the said parts.

The customer does not pay for the replacement of the defective part.

Issues:

Whether sales tax is liable to be paid on the return of spare parts, considering that they are replaced for free and a credit note is issued.

Held:

The assessment order and the appeal went against the appellant/dealer.

Tribunal held in favor of the appellant/dealer, but High Court set aside the order, relying on Mohd. Ekram Khan & Sons case.

The crucial point for consideration is whether, in the case of a warranty for free spare parts replacement, sales tax would be payable on such a transaction based on a credit note.

Mohd. Ekram Khan & Sons case referred to credit notes as consideration for replacement, raising the question of whether credit notes can be treated as a mode of payment.

The matter needs to be considered by a larger Bench to determine if sales tax can be levied on replaced parts when there is no consideration for these parts.

Facts:

The resolution plan for KS&PIPL and IIL was rejected by the Committee of Creditors (CoC) as it did not secure the required 75% approval from financial creditors. The appellant challenged the rejection, leading to a legal dispute.

Issues:

The main issues revolved around the authority of the NCLT to analyze the commercial decisions of the CoC and the justifiability of rejecting a resolution plan by dissenting financial creditors.

Held:

Upon receiving a rejected resolution plan, NCLT is obligated to initiate liquidation under Section 33(1) and lacks authority to scrutinize the commercial decisions of the CoC.

The jurisdiction of NCLT and NCLAT is limited to reviewing the approved resolution plan, not reversing the commercial decisions of dissenting financial creditors.

The amended provision reducing the threshold requirement of voting share to 66% applies prospectively and cannot be retroactively enforced.

NCLAT's conclusion that the resolution plan lacked approval and liquidation was inevitable is upheld.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming the rejection of the resolution plan by the CoC.

Facts:

The appellant, Mysore Urban Development Authority, filed a civil suit against the respondent for declaration of title and permanent injunction regarding a specific land.

The trial court decreed the respondent's suit against the appellant.

The appellant filed a first appeal, which was dismissed in default due to the non-appearance of their counsel.

The appellant sought the restoration of the appeal under Order 41, Rule 19 of the Code, but the Appellate Court dismissed the application.

The appellant filed a writ petition under Article 227 before the High Court, challenging the order of the Appellate Court.

Issues:

Whether the Appellate Court and the High Court were justified in dismissing the application (M.A.No.77/2014) filed by the appellant-Authority and refusing to restore their first appeal.

Held:

The dismissal of the first appeal in default attracted the provisions of Order 41 Rule 19 of the Code, allowing the appeal to be re-admitted only on making out a sufficient cause preventing the appellant from appearing.

The order of refusal to readmit the appeal under Order 41 Rule 19 is expressly appealable under Order 43 Rule 1(t) of the Code to the High Court.

The appellant's remedy was to file an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(t) of the Code against the order of the Appellate Court, which dismissed their application.

The High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition, as it should have allowed it, giving the appellant the opportunity to have their appeal heard on merits.

The Courts should have recognized the value of the appellant's right to prosecute their appeal on merits and considered imposing costs instead of depriving them of this right.

FACTS:

The incident occurred on 15th January 1998, involving the assault of Guddu @ Shahzad by seven accused while returning from Meenawala Baba's Dargah. The appellant, Pappi @ Mehboob (Accused No.1), and others were charged under various sections of IPC.

ISSUES:

conviction of the appellant, considering the acquittal of co-accused and the credibility of eyewitness accounts.

HELD:

The Trial Court and the High Court both relied on the evidence of Yunus (PW-6) and Rashid (PW-9) in affirming the guilt of the appellant. The Trial Court noted other circumstances, including injuries suffered by the deceased and the recovery of swords, leading to the conviction of multiple accused.( Para 5)

The High Court acquitted co-accused Gyani, Hemu, and Laxman, citing their case similarity to Shamsu and Sabir, despite their names being mentioned in the FIR. The acquittal of Sabir was based on different grounds, including late disclosure by Yunus and the unreliability of a witness.( Para 6)

The Court rejected the appellant's argument that the acquittal of co-accused should lead to his acquittal. It emphasized the sufficiency of evidence against the appellant, particularly the direct evidence from eyewitnesses.( Para 8)

The medical report detailed 67 injuries suffered by the deceased, supporting the prosecution's case. The appellant's role in initiating the assault was established through eyewitness accounts, making a clear connection to the crime.( Para 9)

The Court rejected the appellant's argument questioning which injury was caused by him, emphasizing that the collective evidence pointed to a sustained and brutal assault resulting in the death of the victim.( Para 10)

The acquittal of co-accused based on doubt did not invalidate the otherwise reliable evidence against the appellant. The Court affirmed the finding of guilt against the appellant under Section 302 of IPC.( Para 13)

The Court appreciated the assistance of counsel on both sides.( Para 14)

REFERRED CASES:

Durga Burman Roy v. State of Sikkim, (2014) 13 SCC 35.

Sadananda Mondal v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 15 SCC 293.

Facts:

The ICICI Bank filed a complaint against a company, alleging a conspiracy to submit false bills of entry and transfer substantial sums through Hawala to Dubai and Hong Kong. The respondent's name did not initially appear in the FIR, but subsequent investigations implicated him.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in scrutinizing the case as a simple matter of forged bills of entry rather than a complex economic offense.

Another issue was the validity of the magistrate's satisfaction in issuing process against the accused.

Held:

The Court emphasized that at the process-issuing stage, the magistrate is primarily concerned with the allegations and need not explicitly state reasons for satisfaction.

Cognizance was based on a police report, and the magistrate's reliance on the charge sheet and materials provided was deemed lawful.

The Court clarified that the magistrate does not need to delve into the merits of the case during the issuance of the process.

The High Court's interference at such an early stage was deemed inappropriate.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order. It restored the magistrate's order taking cognizance based on the second supplementary charge sheet and issuing process to the respondent-accused.

Facts:

On 15 June 2004, MoEF issued guidelines regulating the diversion of forest land for non-forest purposes.

On 7 March 2008, the Government of Tamil Nadu approved the diversion of forest land for the construction of an intake well for drinking water purposes.

The National Green Tribunal received a complaint alleging the misuse of water for industrial purposes instead of the approved drinking water purposes.

Issues:

Whether the diversion of forest land for drinking water purposes was misused for industrial purposes.

Compliance with Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, and MoEF guidelines.

Held:

The Tribunal directed the TWAD Board to prohibit the use of water for industrial purposes and clarified the prohibition was only for industrial units.

The Court restored the position as per the interim order of the Tribunal, allowing the supply of water for industrial purposes, subject to fully meeting drinking water requirements.

The Collector was directed to monitor the decision to release water for industrial purposes, ensuring no compromise on drinking water and irrigation needs.

A joint meeting of the State Government and TWAD Board was ordered to resolve the proposal under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980.

The appeals were disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

An altercation took place on October 8, 2003, leading to the respondent shooting the victim with a firearm, resulting in bleeding injuries. The complaint highlighted a longstanding dispute between the parties over a love marriage and a disc cable connection business.

Issues:

The nature of injuries and whether they were grievous or life-threatening, impacting the applicability of Section 307 of the Penal Code.

Held:

The judgment emphasizes that proof of grievous or life-threatening hurt is not essential for an offense under Section 307. It cites various precedents, including State of Maharashtra v Balram Bama Patil, to establish that the intention of the accused can be deduced from surrounding circumstances, not solely relying on the severity of injuries.

Decision: The High Court's judgment is set aside, and the Trial Court's order of conviction under Section 307, along with a sentence of three years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 1000, is restored. The appeal by the State is allowed, and the respondent is directed to surrender to serve the sentence.

FACTS:

The petitioners, representing PTOs/HGOs, challenged certain eligibility conditions and provisions in the Haj Policy 2019-2023.

The Government of India, following a detailed process and consultation, formulated the Haj Policy, taking into account suggestions from stakeholders.

ISSUES:

Dispute over eligibility conditions and provisions in the Haj Policy.

Grievances raised by PTOs/HGOs regarding the financial criteria, documentation requirements, and other aspects of the Policy.

HELD:

The judgment emphasized the significance of the Haj pilgrimage for the Muslim community, highlighting the regulatory measures implemented by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the bilateral agreement between India and Saudi Arabia.

The Court acknowledged the grievances of PTOs/HGOs and detailed the modifications made in the Haj Policy, including the removal of certain eligibility conditions and simplification of documentation.

The judgment highlighted the exhaustive process of formulating the Policy, including invitations for suggestions, comments, and a mid-term review provision after two years.

The Court rejected the challenge to the eligibility criteria for HGO categories, emphasizing the importance of both experience and financial strength for PTOs, particularly given the responsibility of arranging various aspects of the pilgrimage.

The judgment underscored the limited scope of judicial review in policy matters, citing precedents that established the court's reluctance to interfere with policy decisions unless they are against the law or manifestly arbitrary.

REFERRED CASES:

Benett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, (1972) 2 SCC 788.

Maharashtra State Board of Secondary & Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Nandlan Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566.

Union of India and Others v. Rafique Shaikh Bhikan and Another, (2013) 4 SCC 699.