Religious Endowment – Execution of Compromise Decree – Dispute between two sects of Kuruba community over custody of idols and performance of pooja to deity Lord Sangalappa Swamy – Compromise decree passed on 01.11.1933 provided for rotational pooja, joint trusteeship, and shared possession of idols and articles – Execution Petition filed in 2000 alleging non-compliance by respondents – Held: Appellants failed to prove breach or that respondents were ever in possession – Execution cannot be granted based on presumptions – High Court rightly set aside Executing Court’s order [Paras 1–2, 5–7, 23–28]

Civil Procedure – Execution of Decree – Onus on Decree-Holder – Decree-holder must prove willful disobedience or breach of decree by judgment-debtor – No evidence adduced to show rotation of idols occurred or that Rs.2,000/- was paid as per Clause (1) of decree – Decree not acted upon for decades – Mere long silence cannot be presumed as compliance – Held: Presumption cannot substitute proof in execution proceedings [Paras 24–26, 28]

Religious Practices – Implementation of Ritual Rotation – Compromise decree required rotation of idols every six months and alternating pooja every three months – Also required appointment of two trustees from each group – No material produced to prove appointment of trustees or maintenance of accounts – Admitted failure to implement decree – Held: Scheme under decree never operationalised – Absence of compliance points to continued exclusive possession by appellants themselves [Paras 25–27]

Evidence – Presumption vs Proof – Executing Court proceeded on presumption that respondents had custody due to absence of prior dispute – However, no documentary or independent evidence produced – Testimony of witnesses consisted of bare assertions – Appellants’ own witness admitted uncertainty regarding custody and non-payment of Rs.2,000/- – Held: Findings based on assumption without proof are legally unsustainable [Paras 24–26]

Execution of Consent Decree – Long Delay and Inaction – Compromise decree passed in 1933 – Execution sought only in 2000 – No proof of continuous implementation – No trustee system shown to have been followed – Non-payment of agreed amount by respondents evident – Held: Decree never acted upon – Execution barred due to lack of factual foundation [Paras 6, 7, 25–28]

Findings of Fact – High Court’s Interference with Executing Court – High Court reversed Executing Court’s order due to lack of evidence and reliance on mere inferences – Findings of fact revisited only where trial court’s findings are based on conjecture or are unsupported – Held: High Court committed no error in setting aside execution on factual grounds [Paras 13, 28–29]

Decision: Appeals dismissed – No interference warranted with High Court’s judgment setting aside execution of 1933 compromise decree – Execution Petition rightly held unsustainable for lack of proof [Para 29]

Motor Accident Compensation – Permanent Disability – Minor Victim – Multiplier Method – 14-year-old appellant sustained 77.1% permanent disability in a motor vehicle accident – High Court applied multiplier of 15, monthly income of ₹3,620 with 40% future prospects – Supreme Court affirmed multiplier and income but enhanced compensation under multiple heads – Held: Total compensation enhanced to ₹15,13,337/- from ₹7,48,883/- [Paras 3.3, 5.1, 5.4]

Assessment of Disability – Future Prospects – Court upheld High Court’s finding accepting 77.1% disability based on unopposed medical board certificate – Future prospects added at 40% in line with Pranay Sethi principles – Loss of future earning capacity assessed by applying disability percentage to enhanced notional income [Paras 3.2, 5.1]

Special Heads of Compensation – Pain and Suffering – Loss of Marriage Prospects – Medical Expenses – Applying Kajal v. Jagdish Chand, Sona (Minor), and other precedents, Supreme Court awarded ₹3,00,000 each towards pain and suffering and loss of marriage prospects – Also granted ₹40,000 for special diet and transport, ₹50,000 for future medical expenses, ₹40,000 for attendant charges – Held: Expenses beyond actual medical bills are permissible considering hospital stay and future treatment [Paras 5.2–5.3]

Tabular Summary of Compensation:

Loss of Future Earnings (with 77.1% disability): ₹7,03,337/-

Pain and Suffering: ₹3,00,000/-

Loss of Amenities: ₹80,000/-

Loss of Marriage Prospects: ₹3,00,000/-

Attendant Charges: ₹40,000/-

Special Diet and Transport: ₹40,000/-

Future Medical Expenses: ₹50,000/-

Total: ₹15,13,337/-

Interest and Directions – Additional Compensation – Supreme Court held appellant entitled to additional compensation of ₹7,64,454/- (i.e., over and above ₹5,75,883/- awarded by High Court) with 8% interest from date of application till realisation – Insurance company directed to deposit amount in appellant’s bank account within 8 weeks and file proof before Tribunal [Para 6–6.1]

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment of the High Court modified – Total compensation enhanced to ₹15,13,337/- with 8% interest – Additional ₹7,64,454/- to be paid by insurer within 8 weeks – Proof of payment to be submitted before Tribunal.

Criminal Law – Suspension of Sentence – Life Imprisonment – Section 389 CrPC – High Court’s Cryptic Orders – Failure to Consider Evidence, Role under Section 149 IPC, Gravity, Antecedents – State’s Non-appearance – Held: High Court orders unsustainable; bail cancelled; convicts directed to surrender; matters remanded for fresh consideration [Paras 17–23, 25–28].

Suspension of Sentence – Life Imprisonment – Legal Standard Under Section 389 CrPC – Court reaffirmed that suspension of life sentence requires demonstration of palpable or gross error in conviction, unlike fixed-term sentences where leniency may apply – High Court failed to apply these principles [Paras 14–17].

High Court Orders Found Cryptic and Unreasoned – Impugned orders merely noted submissions of counsel and labelled allegations as “general and omnibus” without analysing prosecution case, evidence, or individual roles – Held unsustainable for non-application of mind [Paras 18–19].

Requirement to Consider Prosecution Case and Evidence Before Granting Suspension of Sentence – High Court ought to provide overview of prosecution case, nature of evidence, and role of each accused before granting bail – Error compounded as conviction was under Section 149 IPC for unlawful assembly and murder [Paras 19–22].

Section 149 IPC – Collective Liability – High Court Ignored Legal Principles – When conviction is under Section 149 IPC, Court must examine whether accused were part of unlawful assembly with common object – Even non-participation in actual assault not relevant – High Court overlooked this dimension [Paras 20–21].

State’s Absence Before Supreme Court – Serious Concern – Despite service, State of Jharkhand did not appear – Court termed it “disturbing and unfortunate”; noted State failed to challenge High Court orders or assist High Court adequately during bail consideration [Paras 11, 26].

Criminal Antecedents and Commission of Murder Whilst on Bail Ignored – One convict (Rajesh Rai) allegedly committed the offence while on bail in a prior murder case – High Court failed to consider this relevant factor [Para 25].

Orders Set Aside – Fresh Consideration Directed – Supreme Court remitted applications under Section 389 CrPC to High Court for fresh hearing on merits in accordance with settled law – Bail cancelled [Para 23].

Direction to Surrender – Non-Compliance to Invite NBW – Convicts directed to surrender within 24 hours, failing which trial court to issue non-bailable warrants – High Court to hear suspension applications only after surrender certificate produced [Para 28].

Chief Justice of Jharkhand High Court to be Informed – Registry directed to forward order to Chief Justice for immediate attention in view of seriousness of lapse [Para 29].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court orders granting bail set aside – Convicts to surrender within 24 hours – Matters remitted to High Court for fresh adjudication under Section 389 CrPC [Paras 27–29].

Central Excise – Manufacture – Boilers in CKD Condition – Bought-Out Items – Final product (steam-generating plant) assembled at site using bought-out items and CKD parts – Such assembly results in immovable property – Held: Not “goods” within meaning of Section 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 – Excise duty not leviable – Valuation under Section 4 cannot determine excisability [Paras 33–44, 64].

Excise Law – Section 3 vs Section 4 – Valuation Follows Levy – Held: Section 3 is charging provision; Section 4 is machinery/valuation provision – Assessing excisability based on transaction value under Section 4 is impermissible – Transaction value relevant only if goods are excisable [Paras 41–43].

Movability – Immovable Property – Boiler Assembly at Site – Boiler parts embedded in earth using cement, bricks, asbestos and other materials – Boiler cannot be dismantled without substantial damage – Such structure is immovable – Therefore, not excisable goods under Central Excise Act [Paras 45–63].

Excise Valuation – Bought-Out Items – Cost of bought-out items delivered directly to buyer not includible in assessable value – These items never entered manufacturer’s factory and were not processed – No evidence of forming integral part of excisable goods – CESTAT erred in including their value [Paras 18–19, 66–69].

Limitation – Extended Period under Section 11A – No Wilful Suppression – All facts disclosed in statutory returns – Bought-out items duty paid by third-party vendors – No positive act of concealment or intention to evade duty – Held: Extended limitation period not invocable – Show cause notice time-barred and invalid [Paras 74–80].

CESTAT Order – Reversal of Lower Authorities – CESTAT erred in ignoring evidence and settled law – Failed to address immovability issue despite it being raised and accepted earlier – Wrongly relied on tariff headings to infer excisability [Paras 10–14, 65–67].

Excess Duty Collection – Not Determinative – Mere recovery of duty from buyer on bought-out items does not confer excisability – Proper remedy is under Section 11D, not valuation under Section 4 – Recovery mechanism distinct from liability [Paras 70–73].

Decision: Appeals allowed – CESTAT’s order set aside – Show cause notice held invalid – No excise duty payable on bought-out items or final boiler – No penalty or interest payable – Demand quashed [Paras 82–84].

Criminal Law – Culpable Homicide – Section 302 IPC – Conversion to Section 304 Part I – Appellant convicted for murder of deceased Louis Williams based on knife injuries inflicted during altercation – Trial Court and High Court convicted under Section 302 IPC – Supreme Court held: injuries not shown to be inflicted with intention to cause death – Death occurred 13 days later due to septicemia – No evidence of premeditation or intent to kill – Act done in anger and provocation – Conviction altered to Section 304 Part I IPC [Paras 6–7]

Mens Rea – Intention vs. Knowledge – Section 304 IPC – Court analysed distinction between murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Held: Where death is caused with knowledge but without intention to kill, Section 304 Part I applies – Appellant knew that injuries with knife could cause death in ordinary course – However, no specific intent to kill found – Act committed during late-night altercation following earlier dispute – Falls under second degree culpable homicide [Paras 5.6–6.2]

Evidence – Interested Witnesses – Credibility – Defence contended that only relatives of deceased were eyewitnesses – Gajraben (sister) and Rajesh (nephew) – Court held their testimony reliable – Supported by medical evidence – No material contradiction found – Conviction upheld on facts but altered on legal classification of offence [Para 5.2]

Medical Jurisprudence – Cause of Death – Delay in Fatal Outcome – Victim died 13 days after injury due to septicemia – Court held this did not negate causal link between injury and death – Injury sufficient in ordinary course to cause death – Medical cause of death confirmed prosecution case – Delay in death does not mitigate seriousness of offence [Paras 3.2, 6.3]

Sentencing – Sentence Already Undergone – Appellant had served over 14 years and was on bail – Court held sentence already undergone sufficient for conviction under Section 304 Part I IPC – No further imprisonment ordered – Bail bond discharged [Paras 8–10]

Decision: Appeal allowed in part – Conviction under Section 302 IPC set aside – Appellant convicted under Section 304 Part I IPC – Sentence of 14 years already undergone deemed sufficient – Bail bond discharged.

Civil Procedure – Rejection of Plaint – Maintainability of Appeal – Commercial Suit filed without Pre-Institution Mediation under Section 12A of CCA 2015 – Trial Court rejected plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Held: Rejection of plaint amounts to a 'decree' under Section 2(2) CPC – Such decree is appealable under Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – High Court erred in holding appeal to be non-maintainable [Paras 5, 9, 13-15, 20-21]

Commercial Courts Act – Section 13(1A) – Interpretation – Main provision permits appeals against judgments and orders of Commercial Court – Proviso restricts appeals only for interlocutory orders listed in Order XLIII CPC – Held: Rejection of plaint is not an interlocutory order and not covered by the proviso – Hence appeal lies under the main provision [Paras 16-17]

Distinction from Precedent – Bank of India v. Maruti Civil Works – Distinguished – In that case, rejection of application under Order VII Rule 10 or 11(d) was challenged – Court clarified only allowed orders under Rule 10 are appealable under Order XLIII – But rejection of plaint (not application) constitutes a decree, hence distinguishable and appealable [Paras 18-19]

Right to Remedy – Plaintiff whose plaint is rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC cannot be left remediless – Filing of a fresh suit not an appropriate alternative – Appeal is the proper remedy [Para 20]

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment of High Court set aside – Appeal before High Court held to be maintainable – Restored for decision on merits – No order as to costs.

DNA Testing – Presumption of Legitimacy – Criminal Proceedings – Section 112 Evidence Act – Right to Privacy – Constitution of India – DNA test sought to prove that appellant fathered child during subsistence of marriage between Respondent No.1 and her husband Abdul Latheef – Supreme Court held: statutory presumption under Section 112 protects child’s legitimacy unless non-access is proved – No material evidence of non-access or incapacity of husband produced – Birth and school records name Abdul Latheef as father – Mere allegation of extramarital affair or simultaneous access does not rebut presumption – DNA test cannot be ordered to displace conclusive proof without strong evidence [Paras 24–37]

Right to Privacy – Consent and Bodily Autonomy – DNA Test – Court reiterated that DNA testing infringes right to privacy under Article 21 – Such testing must satisfy test of legality, legitimate aim and proportionality – Respondent No.1’s willingness to undergo test does not override rights of appellant and the now-major child – No legitimate state interest shown – Held: direction for DNA test is disproportionate and unconstitutional [Paras 45–48]

Adverse Inference – Section 114 Evidence Act – Refusal to undergo DNA test – Respondent sought adverse inference against appellant – Court held: such inference can only arise if presumption under Section 112 is first rebutted – Since non-access not proved, no occasion arises to invoke Section 114 – Respondent cannot bypass requirement of displacing statutory presumption [Para 50]

Criminal Procedure – Sections 53 and 53A CrPC – Medical examination of accused – High Court relied on these provisions to justify DNA test – Court held: Sections 53 and 53A applicable only where examination directly relates to proving offence – Cheating and harassment charges do not require paternity proof – Use of DNA test in absence of nexus with alleged offence is unjustified and intrusive [Paras 55–57]

Judicial Discretion – Use of Scientific Tools – Court cautioned against routine or speculative use of DNA testing – Strong prima facie case and ‘eminent need’ must be shown – Held: Scientific advancement must not override legal safeguards – Ethical and psychological implications, especially for now-major child, must be considered – DNA test cannot be directed as a fishing inquiry or to satisfy mere suspicion [Paras 28–31, 51]

Collateral Issue – Paternity not central to criminal charge – FIR does not hinge on paternity of child – Child not party to proceedings – Direction for DNA test held to be irrelevant and disproportionate to charges under IPC and Tamil Nadu Act – Held: Paternity is at best a collateral issue and DNA test unnecessary for adjudication of cheating or harassment allegations [Paras 52–54]

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court judgment dated 10.05.2017 in Writ Appeal (MD) No.521 of 2017 set aside – Direction for DNA test quashed – Section 112 of the Evidence Act upheld – No adverse inference to be drawn from appellant’s refusal – Paternity not essential to establish offences alleged – No compelling investigative need shown.

Service Tax – Real Estate Agent – Meaning and Scope – Agreements entered into by the respondent with Sahara India Commercial Corporation Ltd. (SICCL) for procurement, documentation, and facilitation of land transfer at a fixed average rate per acre – No separate consideration or commission for services – Profit/loss entirely contingent on difference between land purchase cost and fixed average price – Held: Transactions were outright sales of immovable property, not services – Respondent not a 'real estate agent' under Section 65(88) nor a 'real estate consultant' under Section 65(89) – Not liable for service tax [Paras 31–45]

Interpretation of MoUs – No Principal-Agent Relationship – Respondent assumed independent commercial risk, negotiated with landowners, and did not act on behalf of SICCL – MoUs did not specify commission, consultancy, or service fee – Held: MoUs created no fiduciary agency – Transactions were between principals [Paras 40–41]

Service – Exclusion under Section 65B(44)(a)(i) – Transfer of title in immovable property – Held: Such transactions excluded from the definition of 'service' under the Finance Act, 1994 – Respondent’s activities covered by this exclusion – No taxable service rendered [Paras 42–44]

Extended Limitation – Section 73(1) Proviso – Wilful Suppression – Held: No deliberate suppression or fraud established – All transactions conducted via banking channels and recorded in books – Respondent under bona fide belief that no service tax was payable – Invocation of extended limitation unjustified – Show cause notice time-barred [Paras 46–53]

Tribunal’s Order – Legally Correct – Tribunal rightly set aside demand and penalties – Commissioner erred in treating sale of land as taxable service – No interference warranted [Paras 45, 54–55]

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Demand and penalties quashed – Tribunal’s order upheld – Respondent held not liable for service tax – Extended limitation under Section 73(1) inapplicable.

Criminal Law – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Sanction for Prosecution – Effect of Departmental Exoneration – Held: Exoneration in departmental proceedings does not automatically lead to discharge in criminal cases, especially trap cases, due to different standards of proof; matter remitted to trial court to determine the competent sanctioning authority for the accused-appellant [Paras 32-33, 40, 42-43].

Criminal Law – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Departmental Proceedings – Exoneration – Effect on Criminal Prosecution – Accused-appellant, a Senior Inspector of Motor Vehicles, was exonerated in departmental proceedings on identical charges due to hostile witnesses – Held: Exoneration in departmental proceedings does not automatically warrant discharge in criminal cases, particularly trap cases, as the standard of proof differs significantly (preponderance of possibilities vs. beyond reasonable doubt); possibility of conviction in criminal trial remains even if witnesses turn hostile, as conviction can be based on the trap laying officer's testimony if credible [Paras 27-33].

Criminal Law – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Sanction for Prosecution – Competence of Authority – Section 19(1) PC Act – Issue: Whether the Commissioner of Transport was competent to grant sanction for prosecution of the accused-appellant, who claimed appointment by the State Government – Held: Section 19(1) mandates that if the appointing authority is the State Government, sanction must be accorded by the State Government; the Explanation to Section 19(4) regarding 'competency' applies only when the validity of sanction is under scrutiny before an appellate or revisional forum, not at the initial stage of determination by the Special Judge [Paras 34-38].

Criminal Law – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Sanction for Prosecution – Appointing Authority – Factual Dispute – Issue: Competing claims regarding whether the State Government or the Commissioner was the actual appointing authority of the accused-appellant, directly impacting the validity of the sanction order – Held: Due to the disputed factual scenario, the matter is remitted to the trial court for fresh adjudication on the limited issue of the actual appointing authority and its consequential bearing on the validity of the sanction order [Paras 39-40, 42-43].

Criminal Procedure – Discharge Application – Section 227/239 CrPC – Remittal for Re-determination – Trial Court had discharged the accused due to invalid sanction by the Commissioner of Transport, granting liberty to file a fresh chargesheet – High Court reversed, holding sanction valid – Supreme Court set aside High Court's finding on sanction and remitted to trial court – Held: Trial court to summon original records/contemporaneous documents regarding appointment, decide sanction validity; if sanction is found competent, trial proceeds; if not, chargesheet to be returned to the investigating agency for procuring fresh sanction from the appropriate authority [Paras 11, 13-15, 42-43].

Decision: – Appeals disposed of – Finding of High Court on validity of sanction set aside – Matter remitted to trial court for fresh determination of sanction issue – Contention regarding discharge based on departmental exoneration rejected – Trial court to determine appointing authority and validity of sanction, with liberty to summon records; if sanction invalid, chargesheet to be returned for fresh sanction [Paras 41-44].