Income Tax – Recalling of Earlier Order – Section 254(2) of Income Tax Act – Powers under Section 254(2) limited to rectifying mistakes apparent from record – ITAT’s jurisdiction does not extend to re-hearing appeals on merits – High Court’s affirmation of ITAT’s recalling order erroneous – Detailed submissions on merits by parties does not confer jurisdiction on ITAT to recall orders – Appeals allowed, ITAT’s and High Court’s orders set aside [Paras 1-7].

Jurisdictional Limits – Mistake Apparent from Record – ITAT can only rectify errors apparent from record – Full re-hearing on merits exceeds ITAT’s Section 254(2) powers – Assessee’s remedy for erroneous merits decision lies in appeal, not recall [Paras 3-6].

High Court’s Review – Incorrect Affirmation – High Court’s grounds for dismissal invalid – ITAT overstepped Section 254(2) jurisdiction – Detailed merit-based re-hearing improper [Paras 6-7].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court’s judgment and ITAT’s order recalling earlier order set aside – Original ITAT orders restored – Assessee may appeal High Court’s original orders within six weeks [Paras 7-9].

Tax Law – Pre-deposit Requirement – Appellant deposited amounts under protest before the assessment order – Contended that these should be adjusted against the pre-deposit required under Section 26(6A) of the MVAT Act for filing an appeal – Supreme Court held that the plain language of the statute requires a deposit of 10% of the disputed tax liability in addition to any amounts paid under protest – Consequently, appellant was required to pay 10% of the tax disputed at the time of filing the appeal [Paras 1-14].

Interpretation of Tax Statutes – Strict Construction – The court emphasized the need for strict and literal interpretation of taxing statutes – Highlighted that if the legislature intended for protest payments to be set off, it would have explicitly provided so – Reaffirmed that a taxing statute should be construed strictly without inferring intentions or considering substance over form [Paras 11-12].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court's judgment set aside – Appellant's appeal to the tax authority restored subject to verification of compliance with the 10% pre-deposit requirement as interpreted [Para 13].

Criminal Law – Bail – High Court released the accused on bail at the interim relief stage despite serious charges under the IPC and MCOCA – Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in granting interim relief without considering the gravity of the offenses and the Special Judge’s detailed order refusing bail – Interim bail granted while the writ petition was pending on the vires of MCOCA was improper [Paras 1-14].

Forum Shopping – Accused initially filed bail application before the Single Judge, withdrew it when relief was not forthcoming, and subsequently approached the Division Bench under the guise of challenging the MCOCA provisions – Supreme Court condemned this as forum shopping, emphasizing that it undermines the judicial process [Paras 2-10].

MCOCA Provisions – The High Court's order virtually exonerated the accused from MCOCA offenses at the interim stage, which is impermissible – The High Court should not have made detailed observations on the merits of the sanction to invoke MCOCA at this stage [Paras 9-9.2].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court's order releasing the accused on bail set aside – Accused directed to surrender forthwith – Non-bailable warrant to be issued if the accused fails to surrender [Paras 11-12].

Sexual Misconduct – Disciplinary Proceedings – Allegation of sodomy by respondent, a Head Constable in BSF – Commandant directed preparation of additional RoE to clarify the date of incident – SSFC found respondent guilty and demoted him – High Court quashed disciplinary proceedings and reinstated respondent – Supreme Court held Commandant had jurisdiction to order additional RoE, and SSFC not required to record reasons for findings under Rule 149 – Appeal allowed [Paras 1-35].

Jurisdiction of Commandant – Clarification of Evidence – Commandant acted within jurisdiction under Rule 48 and Rule 51 by seeking additional RoE to clarify date of incident – Additional RoE did not constitute insufficiency of evidence but was clarificatory in nature [Paras 16-23].

Recording of Reasons – Rule 149 – SSFC not mandated to record reasons for findings under Rule 149 – Consistent with the principles in Union of India v. Dinesh Kumar (2010) 3 SCC 161 and S N Mukherjee v. Union of India (1990) 4 SCC 594 – High Court’s interpretation incorrect [Paras 25-29].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court’s judgment set aside – Respondent’s writ petition dismissed – Emphasis on avoiding hyper-technical invalidation of proceedings in sexual misconduct cases to uphold Article 21 rights [Paras 30-35].

Negotiable Instruments – Dishonour of Cheque – High Court declined to quash the complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act against appellants – Prima facie case established that appellants, directors of the company, were triable for dishonour of cheque – Section 141 of the NI Act stipulates that persons in charge of and responsible to the company for its conduct are deemed guilty – The matter of compliance with Section 141 is a trial issue, not a pre-trial determination – Appeal dismissed [Paras 1-46].

Section 138 NI Act – Security Cheque – Cheques issued as security, when due, can constitute debt or other liability – Distinguished from cheques issued for advance payment which do not create liability if transaction is canceled – Whether cheques were for security or enforceable liability is a matter of trial [Paras 18-27].

Magistrate’s Procedure – Section 202 CrPC – Inquiry mandatory when accused resides outside jurisdiction – High Court erred in non-application of mind by the Magistrate – Magistrate should have conducted inquiry as per Section 202 before issuing process [Paras 31-40].

Vicarious Liability – Section 141 NI Act – Managing directors and responsible officers prima facie liable if company commits offense under Section 138 – Liability at trial to be determined if directors were responsible for company’s conduct at the relevant time [Paras 42-44].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – High Court’s decision upheld – Magistrate’s discretion to issue process confirmed – Matters of defense to be addressed at trial [Para 45-47].

Arbitration – Maintainability of Fresh Reference – High Court quashed Tribunal's order dismissing reference as not maintainable – Tribunal held reference not maintainable since dispute already adjudicated by Housing Commissioner – High Court's referral to Housing Commissioner was a consent order – Housing Commissioner’s award attained finality as it was not challenged – Fresh reference for the same claims not maintainable – Appeals allowed, High Court's judgment set aside [Paras 1-20].

Consent Order – Estoppel – High Court’s order referring dispute to Housing Commissioner was consented by parties – Respondent participated in arbitration – Award not challenged – Consent order binding as issue estoppel – Subsequent reference for same claims not permissible [Paras 13-16].

Jurisdiction – Special vs. General Law – The 1983 Act provides special statutory arbitration for works contracts in M.P. – Arbitrator appointed by High Court under general arbitration agreement – High Court's special jurisdiction prevails over general Arbitration Act – Tribunal’s dismissal of reference upheld [Paras 8-10].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court's order quashing Tribunal’s decision set aside – Tribunal’s dismissal of reference petition restored [Para 20].

SARFAESI Act – Waiver and Estoppel – Borrower repeatedly requested restructuring of loans post notices under Sections 13(2) and (4) – Bank deferred SARFAESI action in consideration of Borrower's promises – Borrower's conduct amounted to waiver of statutory rights under Section 13(3A) – Equitable estoppel bars Borrower from challenging Bank’s actions – Appeals allowed, High Court’s judgment set aside [Paras 10-18].

Mandatory Compliance – Section 13(3A) – High Court found Bank failed to respond to Borrower's representations under Section 13(3A) – Supreme Court noted Borrower's intentional relinquishment of rights through repeated conduct – Violation of Section 13(3A) not significant in light of Borrower's actions [Paras 10-13].

Valuation of Mortgaged Property – Machinery and Land – Borrower contested valuation and sale process – Valuation report dated 19.02.2018 was not disputed – Machinery, building, and land sold together for higher than reserve price – Separate valuation or auction not required [Paras 19-20].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court’s judgment set aside – DRT's decision upholding the sale under SARFAESI Act restored [Para 21].

Service Law – Pension Determination – Appellant, a lecturer, sought to include his practice at the Bar as qualifying service for pension under Rule 25(a) of KSR – Respondent University denied the benefit citing a proviso inserted after his appointment – Supreme Court held the proviso could not be applied retrospectively to the appellant who joined before its insertion – Discriminatory denial of benefit since similarly situated employees received it – Appeals allowed, High Court’s judgment set aside [Paras 1-37].

Rule 25(a) KSR – Retrospective Application – Proviso inserted in 1985 limited Rule 25(a) benefits to posts requiring law qualification and Bar experience – Appellant appointed in 1984, before proviso – Proviso cannot apply retrospectively without express direction – Appellant entitled to benefit under Rule 25(a) as originally framed [Paras 25-27].

Discriminatory Treatment – Similar Situations – Another faculty member received benefits under Rule 25(a) without applying the proviso – University’s selective application of proviso to appellant was arbitrary and violated equality principles under the Constitution – Equal treatment required for similarly situated employees [Paras 28-33].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court's judgment set aside – University directed to calculate and pay shortfall in appellant's pension considering his Bar practice, with interest at 5% p.a. from date of superannuation [Paras 34-37].

Criminal Law – Unlawful Assembly – Appellant convicted under Sections 147, 148, 149, 201, and 302 IPC – Role assigned to appellant was only pointing out the house where the victim was hiding – Testimonies of key witnesses did not implicate appellant beyond this role – Presence of appellant explained by proximity of his house to the incident – Supreme Court held mere act of pointing out the hiding place did not constitute participation in unlawful assembly – Acquittal warranted [Paras 1-15].

Testimonies and Evidence – PW-1 to PW-15 – Majority did not mention appellant – PW-1, PW-4, and PW-5 noted appellant pointed out victim’s location – PW-7 hostile but corroborated pointing out – PW-8’s testimony based on hearsay – Inconsistency in testimonies and lack of direct evidence against appellant [Paras 5-9].

Legal Principles – Constructive Liability – Constructive liability under Section 149 IPC requires more than passive behavior – Court emphasized against convicting innocent bystanders – Mere proximity or passive conduct insufficient for conviction [Paras 10-14].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Conviction under Sections 147, 148, 302, 201, 149 IPC set aside – Appellant acquitted and ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case [Para 15-16].