Facts:

Land leased to Govind, Sadashiv, and Nivrutti.

Agreement to Sell in 1956, not culminating in a sale deed.

Section 32 of the Bombay Tenancy Act deems tenants as purchasers.

Certificate issued under Section 32M in favor of Govind, Sadashiv, and Nivrutti.

Disputes over mutation in Nivrutti's name contested by Laxman's family.

Suit filed in 2003 claiming joint family rights.

Issues:

Validity of joint family rights in the land.

Whether the civil court should stay proceedings and refer to the Mamlatdar under Section 85 and 85A.

Held:

The court rejected the contention that the civil court should have referred the matter to the Mamlatdar. It emphasized that the Kabuliyatnama did not include Laxman as a tenant, and the certificate under Section 32M did not include his name. There was no ambiguity about Laxman's tenancy rights. The legal proceedings initiated by Laxman's grandsons were deemed an attempt to re-open a matter that could not be directly challenged – the certificate under Section 32M. The appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between the Commissioner of Income Tax, Karnal, and Carpet India, Panipat, regarding the interpretation of Section 80HHC of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The appellant contends that supporting manufacturers should be treated on par with direct exporters for the purpose of claiming deductions under Section 80HHC.

Issues:

Whether supporting manufacturers are entitled to deductions under Section 80HHC of the Income Tax Act, and if so, whether their eligibility is on par with direct exporters.

The court also considers the applicability of previous judgments, including Commissioner of Income Tax, Thiruvananthapuram vs. Baby Marine Exports, Kollam.

Held:

The court highlights the distinct parameters and schemes for claiming deductions under Section 80HHC for exporters (Section 80HHC(1)) and supporting manufacturers (Section 80HHC(1A)). The court emphasizes that the statutory scheme treats these entities differently.( Para 5)

The court overturns the decision in C.I.T. v. Satish Kumar Gupta, stating that it cannot be relied upon to conclude that supporting manufacturers are to be treated on par with direct exporters for the purpose of deduction under Section 80HHC.( Para 6)

The court allows the appeals in favor of the Revenue, setting aside the impugned judgments. In certain cases, the respondents are given the opportunity to demonstrate, with necessary facts, that they qualify as direct exporters and can avail of deductions under Section 80HHC(1) read with (3). These matters are remanded to the Appellate Tribunal for further consideration.( Para 7)

Facts:

The plaintiffs claimed half of the suit property and sought a declaration of rightful ownership, confirmation of possession, and correction of the entry in the Record of Rights. Despite the specific claim for half the property, the Additional Deputy Commissioner decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs based on the majority award of the Panchayat. The appellate authority and the Single Judge upheld the decision, and the Division Bench dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court was called upon to consider the applicability and validity of Wilkinson's Rules and the Bihar Kolhan Civil Justice (Regulating and Validating) Act, 1978.

Issues:

The validity of Wilkinson's Rules, the correctness of the decree awarding more than half the property, and the applicability of the Bihar Kolhan Civil Justice Act.

Held:

Applicability of Wilkinson's Rules: The court found it unnecessary to delve into the applicability and validity of Wilkinson's Rules for two reasons.

Claim for Half Property: The court observed that the plaintiffs claimed only half of the suit property. As the decree awarded more than this, the court held that it needed to be set aside to the extent that it exceeded the claim.

Bihar Kolhan Civil Justice Act: The court considered Section 2 of the Bihar Kolhan Civil Justice Act, validating past actions under Wilkinson's Rules and concluded that, given the Act's provisions, it was difficult to set aside the concurrent judgments based on Wilkinson's Rules.

Conclusion: The appeal was disposed of in accordance with the findings, emphasizing the need to set aside the decree exceeding the plaintiffs' claim for half the property.

Facts:

Appellant Khuman Singh convicted under Section 302 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act.

Deceased Veer Singh, belonging to "Khangar" Scheduled Caste, objected to the appellant grazing buffaloes in his field, leading to a verbal altercation.

Appellant attacked the deceased with an axe during the altercation, causing his death.

Appellant sentenced to life imprisonment by the trial court, affirmed by the High Court.

Issues:

Validity of the conviction under Section 302 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act.

Consideration of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC regarding sudden fight without premeditation.

Held:

The court found no evidence to establish that the offense was committed solely on the grounds of the victim belonging to a Scheduled Caste.

Conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act set aside; appellant acquitted of this charge.

Conviction under Section 302 IPC modified to Section 304 Part II IPC, considering the incident as a sudden fight without premeditation.

Appellant, having served more than twelve years in jail, sentenced to the period already undergone.

The appeal was partly allowed, and the appellant ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

Facts:

The appellant-Steward faced suspension on charges of embezzlement and misappropriation, leading to the registration of a First Information Report (FIR). Subsequently, a second FIR and a conviction under Section 379 IPC occurred. A Memorandum was issued, removing the appellant from service from the date of his conviction. After a decade, the first FIR was quashed due to a compromise. The appellant later sought retiral benefits through a representation.

Issues:

Whether the application challenging the Memorandum, filed after 13 years, was within the prescribed limitation.

The relevance of successive representations in saving limitation.

The nature of the cause of action concerning the quashing of the first FIR.

The applicability of forfeiture of pensionary benefits and its relation to a continuing cause of action.

Held:

Sub–Section (3) of Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is applicable when there is sufficient cause for the delay in filing an appeal beyond the period of limitation. The tribunal's finding that the Original Application was filed within limitation was deemed patently erroneous. Successive representations do not save limitation.

Removal under Rule 19(i) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 leads to the forfeiture of retiral benefits. The Memorandum's challenge had to be initiated within the prescribed limitation, or sufficient cause for the delay needed to be demonstrated.

The High Court rightly considered the settlement leading to the quashing of the first FIR. The order of dismissal under Rule 19(i)of CCS(CCA) Rules, 1985 was challenged after a significant delay, and the entitlement to gratuity and provident fund was not raised or considered.

The quashing of the first FIR did not create a fresh cause of action. The law of limitation is based on public policy, aiming to conclude stale disputes. A person should not be allowed to agitate claims after an extended delay.

Cessation of employer–employee relationship by an order of termination gives rise to a cause of action when the order is passed. Forfeiture of pensionary benefits due to a punitive order is not a continuing cause of action. Any sympathy for the appellant was considered misplaced.

The High Court's judgment and order were upheld, affirming the importance of adhering to prescribed limitations in legal proceedings.

FACTS:

Land was acquired for highway construction under the National Highways Act, 1956.

Disputes arose regarding the compensation determined by the competent authority under Section 3G(1) of the Act, 1956.

The respondent filed an application for the appointment of an Arbitrator under Section 3G(5) to the Central Government.

The Central Government appointed an Arbitrator after the respondent filed an application under Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996.

ISSUES:

Whether the application under Section 11 of the Act, 1996, is maintainable when Section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956 provides for the appointment of an Arbitrator by the Central Government.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the Act, 1956, being a special enactment, prevails over the Act, 1996. The power to appoint an Arbitrator is exclusively vested in the Central Government under Section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956. The Court rejected the argument that the right of appointment was forfeited due to delay. The orders of the High Court were set aside, and the Central Government was directed to appoint an Arbitrator within 30 days. The appointed Arbitrator was instructed to adjudicate the dispute within a reasonable time but no later than six months after the respondent's presence in the proceedings.

REFERRED CASES:

Deep Trading Company vs. Indian Oil Corporation and Others, 2013(4) SCC 35

Gujarat Urja Vikash Nigam Ltd. vs. Essar Power Limited, 2008(4) SCC 755

Facts:

A dispute over water distribution for agricultural fields was brought before the Authorities under the Rajasthan Irrigation and Drainage Act, 1954.

The Appellant lost before the Authority and subsequently filed a suit challenging the order, which was dismissed by the Trial Court.

The Appellant appealed to the First Appellate Court, which allowed the appeal. The private Respondents then filed a Second Appeal in the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain and decide disputes related to watercourses under the Rajasthan Irrigation and Drainage Act, 1954.

Whether the High Court erred in its interpretation of Section 53 of the Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court found an error in the High Court's interpretation and clarified that Section 53(2) explicitly allows the Civil Court to entertain and decide disputes related to watercourses.

The Civil Court's jurisdiction is subject to the condition that it cannot pass orders regarding crops sown or growing at the time of the order.

The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the High Court for reconsideration on merits.

The Second Appeal would be treated as filed in 2008 and given priority accordingly.

Facts:

Arbitration proceedings initiated based on an agreement dated 28th April 2000.

Dispute arose regarding the time limit for the conclusion of arbitral proceedings.

Appellants argued that the arbitrator's mandate terminated as per the agreement's time limit.

High Court held that the appellants waived their right to an extension of time.

Issues:

Whether the time limit specified in the arbitration agreement is binding.

Whether the appellants waived their right to enforce the time schedule.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the time limit agreed upon in the arbitration agreement is binding. The court emphasized the importance of parties adhering to agreed-upon time limits in arbitration proceedings. As per Sections 14 and 15 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and the terms of the agreement, after the expiry of four months, the arbitrator became unable to perform the functions, and the mandate stood terminated. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. The respondents were given the liberty to address their grievances through appropriate legal avenues.

Facts:

The State of Karnataka acquired 78 acres 16 guntas of land, including survey no.30 measuring 5 acres 33 guntas, for public purposes.

The appellant cooperative society was granted possession of a portion of the acquired land, including survey no.30.

Respondent no.3 claimed ownership of survey no.30 and sought de-notification of the remaining 3 acres 5 guntas (disputed property).

The High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the withdrawal notification issued by the State Government.

Issues:

The validity of the de-notification order, the misuse of de-notification powers affecting planned development, and the balance between private interests and public good in layout formation.

Held:

The interprets Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, emphasizing the government's power to withdraw from acquisition proceedings when possession has not occurred. The purpose of this section is clarified, highlighting the prevention of forced acquisition when it ceases to be beneficial for the intended purpose. (Para 27)

, the court expresses concern over the misuse of de-notification powers by the State Government, particularly affecting planned development in cities like Bangalore.( Para 33)

Outlines the historical context, with the State Government initiating acquisition proceedings in 1982 and executing an agreement in 1984 to acquire 78 acres 16 guntas, including survey no.30.( Para 34

Highlights the approved layout plan issued by the government, indicating meticulous planning for the development of the layout, including civic amenities, open spaces, and roads.( Para 35 )

The court notes that the disputed property is within the layout and earmarked as a civic amenity. De-notification could jeopardize the planned development of the layout, causing public inconvenience.( Para 36)

Emphasizes that the government should refrain from de-notifying land acquired for layout formation, and the courts should be strict in considering landowners' pleas for de-notification, prioritizing public good over private interests.( Para 38 )

Criticizes the arbitrary nature of the de-notification order, considering the appellant's objections and the adverse impact on the layout's planned development.( Para 45 )

The court directs the appellant to reserve the disputed property for civic amenities and a playground, prohibiting any allotment or sale. Competent authorities are instructed to develop the remaining portion for the benefit of the general public.( Para 55)