Criminal Law - Murder – Section 342 CrPC – Duty to Put Each Incriminating Circumstance – Trial Vitiated – At Sessions, the Judge merely read the committal examination and asked if it was correct – He did not question the accused about material circumstances emerging at trial (presence at Deohri, motive, extra-judicial confessions, dying declarations, and human blood on recovered articles) – Section 342 requires fair, simple, separate questions on each circumstance to enable explanation – Gross non-compliance caused grave likelihood of prejudice – Conviction set aside – Retrial de novo directed [Paras 20-22, 24-33, 39-44].

Prior Depositions – Section 288 CrPC “Subject to” Evidence Act – Confrontation Under Section 145 Mandatory – Depositions of two alleged eye-witnesses recorded at committal were brought on record under Section 288 without confronting them with those prior statements as Section 145 requires – Such prior statements, used to contradict and as substantive evidence, were inadmissible – Only Narindar Singh was properly confronted – Omission further weakened the prosecution case [Paras 33-38].

Cognizance on Police Report – “Incomplete Challan” – Sections 173(1), 190, 193 – Valid – The report of 2 October 1949, though termed “incomplete”, set out parties, nature of information, and witnesses acquainted with the circumstances; later challans named only formal witnesses – Magistrate properly took cognizance – No illegality [Paras 11-13].

Right to Counsel at Committal – Section 340(1) CrPC – Opportunity, Not Obligation to Provide – Accused was unrepresented when three witnesses were examined on 3 October – However, the inquiry continued thereafter; the accused never asked for counsel or complained; Section 340(1) imposes a duty to afford opportunity, not to supply a lawyer – No violation made out [Paras 14-15].

Committal Inquiry – Sections 208(2), 209, 342 – Examination Generally Adequate Though Form Imperfect – Questions resembled cross-examination but sufficiently served the limited purpose of determining whether grounds existed for commitment – Committal upheld [Paras 16-18].

Decision – Conviction and death sentence set aside – Case remanded for retrial de novo in the Sessions Court; committal to stand [Paras 39-44].

Appeal Against Acquittal – Scope of High Court’s Power – Sections 417 & 423 CrPC – Presumption of Innocence Reinforced – The High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the accused on detailed reappraisal of evidence – Held: Though the High Court’s powers in an appeal against acquittal are as wide as in an appeal against conviction, interference is not justified unless the acquittal is manifestly unreasonable or perverse – The presumption of innocence continues and great weight must be attached to the view of the trial judge who saw and heard witnesses – The High Court erred in setting aside the acquittal [Paras 3, 7].

Appreciation of Evidence – First Information and Conduct of Witnesses – Section 154 CrPC – Telegram Sent Immediately After Incident Omitted Names of Assailants – The omission to name accused in the earliest report and improbabilities in the prosecution version, including sparing use of spears, presence of witnesses at close range despite threat by armed assailant, and unexplained absence of witnesses from the police investigation, support the Sessions Judge’s inference that prosecution witnesses were not eye-witnesses – High Court brushed aside these infirmities without adequate reasons – Sessions Judge’s view more sound [Paras 5-6].

Principle – Interference with Acquittal – Judicial Restraint – Interference with an acquittal should be only for compelling reasons and not on a mere balancing of probabilities or because another view is possible – In the present case, no such compelling reason existed – The Sessions Judge’s acquittal was restored [Paras 6-8].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Order of High Court Convicting Appellants Set Aside – Order of Acquittal by Sessions Judge Restored – Appellants Acquitted and Directed to be Released [Para 8].

Revision Against Acquittal – Scope of High Court’s Power – Sections 417 and 439 CrPC – High Court exceeded jurisdiction – Appeal lay to High Court against acquittal only at the instance of Government under Section 417 – A private complainant cannot secure reversal of acquittal through revision under Section 439 by re-appraisal of evidence – Findings of fact of Sessions Judge could not be disturbed merely because the High Court considered them “perverse” – High Court acted beyond its revisional powers [Paras 6-7].

Power of High Court in Revision – Section 439(4) CrPC – Prohibition against Conversion of Acquittal into Conviction – Although the High Court formally directed only a retrial, its strong observations branding the Sessions Judge’s judgment as perverse and defective in perspective virtually prejudged the matter – This amounted to indirectly converting an acquittal into conviction, contrary to Section 439(4) – Such interference is impermissible [Paras 7-8].

Principle – Findings of Trial Court – Trial Court’s appreciation of evidence must ordinarily prevail unless there is clear error of law – Characterising judgment as perverse is not by itself sufficient to justify revisional interference – High Court cannot sit in appeal over acquittal under the guise of revision [Paras 6-7].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Order of High Court setting aside acquittal and directing retrial set aside – Acquittal by Sessions Judge restored [Para 8].

Criminal Law - Merchandise Marks Act – False Trade Description – Overall Result – Company’s Conviction under Section 6 Sustained – Directors Acquitted – IPC Convictions Set Aside – The label “Anne French Cleansing Milk – 4 Old Bond St. London W1” on goods admittedly manufactured in India amounted (at least indirectly) to a description of the place/country of manufacture and was untrue in a material respect – Company failed to bring itself within Section 6 exceptions – However, convictions under IPC Sections 486/482/487 and under Section 7 of the Act were unsustainable for want of foundational proof – Directors’ convictions set aside for lack of evidence of guilty intention – Costs order also set aside [Paras 1-2, 4, 7-11].

Directors’ Liability – Mens Rea and Evidentiary Burden – Acquittal of Directors – Sections 6 M.M. Act & 486 IPC – Convictions of directors could not stand where the record disclosed no evidence of guilty intention beyond their status as directors – High Court’s later observation that it would not have convicted them if review were possible underscored the evidentiary lacuna – Prosecution cannot be permitted to fill gaps by remand or additional evidence at a late stage – Convictions and sentences of directors quashed; costs order against them revoked [Paras 3-4].

False Trade Description – “Place or Country” of Manufacture – Construction of Label – Sections 2(2)(b), 2(3) & 6, Merchandise Marks Act – The address “4 Old Bond St. London W1,” placed as it was on a toilet preparation label, directly or at least indirectly indicated the place/country where the goods were made – With the goods made in India, the description was untrue in a material respect – In absence of proof of any exception under Section 6, company rightly convicted [Paras 7-9].

Application of False Description – Proof by Circumstantial Evidence – Section 6, M.M. Act – It is not necessary to prove by direct evidence that the company physically affixed the labels – Admission that the company manufactured and sold the goods with the printed labels sufficed; a company acts through agents and the “application” element can be established circumstantially – Conviction under Section 6 upheld [Para 10].

IPC Offences and Section 7 of the Act – Foundational Requirement of Genuine/Counterfeit Mark or True Article – Failure of Proof – Convictions under IPC Sections 486, 482, 487 and under Section 7 of the Act unsustainable where there was no evidence of any genuine mark/true article against which counterfeit/false marking could be assessed – Those convictions and sentences set aside; costs order also set aside [Para 11].

Hindu Widow’s Surrender – Mesne Profits – Limitation – Appeal Dismissed – Deed styled “release” by widow in favour of daughter (next reversioner) and son-in-law (stranger) held not to amount to valid surrender accelerating inheritance – Plaintiffs, as nearest reversioners, entitled to possession; mesne profits award from date of widow’s death sustained under Order 20 Rule 12 CPC – Reversioner’s suit governed by Article 141 Limitation Act; no prior setting aside of alienation required – Conditional decree against certain defendants coupled with interest on reimbursable sum upheld – Appeal dismissed with costs [Paras 7-11, 17, 22-24, 25].

Hindu Law – Surrender/Relinquishment by Widow – Surrender must efface widow’s estate wholly in favour of husband’s next heir alone – A composite “release” in favour of next heir jointly with a stranger is not a valid surrender – No acceleration in favour of daughter when the instrument simultaneously carves out interest for son-in-law – Transaction at most evidences intent to benefit the stranger, not legal renunciation – High Court view affirmed [Paras 11-13, 17].

Nobokishore Principle – No Further Extension – Alienation by Widow with Reversioner’s Consent – The Bengal doctrine (Nobokishore v. Harinath) treats widow’s alienation of the whole estate to a stranger with immediate reversioner’s consent as resting on a double fiction; even assuming its correctness, it is not to be extended – Present case falls outside it: (i) no conveyance of the entire estate to a stranger with reversioner’s consent, (ii) daughter did not execute or consent as transferor, (iii) instrument purported to benefit daughter and stranger jointly – Attempt to validate partial transfer to a stranger via implied surrender rejected [Paras 14-17, 19-21].

Mesne Profits – Reversioner vs. Widow’s Alienee – Starting Point – A widow’s alienation is voidable at reversioner’s election; upon widow’s death, reversioner may sue for possession without first setting aside the alienation – Suit governed by Article 141; transferee’s possession is unlawful from date of widow’s death – Mesne profits therefore awardable from that date – Distinction drawn from Mitakshara father’s alienation cases (Article 125) – Conditional decree against defendants 2 & 3 appropriately balances equities by allowing interest on reimbursable amount while awarding mesne profits [Paras 22-23].

Decision – Appeal Dismissed – High Court decree for possession and mesne profits affirmed; conditional deposit and interest directions maintained – Costs to respondents [Paras 24-25].

Hindu Joint Family – Separation vs. Joint Status – Burden of Proof – Where one coparcener’s separation is admitted, no presumption of continued jointness among others – Separation or unity must be proved on facts – In present case, mortgage deeds of 1879, 1885, and 1898 (Exs. 2, 2(a), 2(b)) recited partition among all three brothers – Clear evidence of separation during lifetime of father Sheo Narain – Later joint business and acquisitions created tenancy-in-common, not Mitakshara coparcenary – Defendant no. 1 acquired no right by survivorship; plaintiff entitled to succeed [Paras 8, 11-15, 23].

Evidence – Admissibility of Statements in Old Documents – Section 32(3) Evidence Act – Statements in mortgage deeds by deceased coparcener admitting separation are admissible as declarations against proprietary interest – Such statements regarding separation among all coparceners treated as integral part of same declaration – Admissibility upheld; earlier documents decisive against claim of jointness [Paras 13-14].

Joint Dealings and Business – No Proof of Coparcenary – Ram Narain and Ram Saran carried on cloth and money-lending business jointly; jointly purchased properties; described in suits as “joint family” – Such transactions only evidence of joint dealings, not proof of legal coparcenary – Expressions used in plaints and depositions explained as for business convenience; references to shares inconsistent with Mitakshara coparcenary – Do not negate earlier separation [Paras 16-21].

Settlement Records and Accounts – Entries Inconclusive – Mixed recording of lands in sole and joint names indicated tenancy-in-common rather than coparcenary – Relinquishment and endowment deeds (Exs. G and 1) showed Ram Narain’s absolute ownership and power of disposition – Accounts and minor expense entries equivocal; do not establish joint family status [Paras 22].

Decree and Remand – Plaintiff entitled to succeed as heir, but properties and mesne profits not adjudicated – High Court erred in granting decree without deciding issues on correctness of schedule and claim for mesne profits – Case remanded for determination of issues 7 and 8 by High Court or Trial Court – Findings of separation affirmed; decree for possession and mesne profits to be settled accordingly [Paras 24-26].

Decision:

Findings of High Court affirmed that Ram Narain died separate from defendant no. 1 – Defendant’s claim of survivorship rejected – Case remanded for determination of properties properly recoverable and ascertainment of mesne profits – Plaintiff entitled to costs of appeal; further costs to abide result [Paras 25-26].

Appeal against dismissal of suit to avoid compromise decree – O.32 R.7 CPC and O.6 R.4 CPC – Compromise decree in 1924 partition suit challenged for coercion/undue influence and want of proper sanction – Held: Trial court then had Order 32 Rule 7 in view and granted permission noting benefit to minors – subsequent “approval” need not precede negotiations; omission would at most render it voidable at minor’s option, not a nullity – Unfairness alone cannot upset a decree absent fraud/negligence of guardian – Present suit dismissed; partition issues to be agitated in the earlier pending suit [Paras 14-26, 23, 25, 39].

Order 32 Rule 7 – Court’s sanction for minors – Form and timing – Entry recording that permission is granted because compromise is for minors’ benefit suffices – No rigid form required; judge’s satisfaction apparent from orders dated 17–18 Nov 1924 – Sanction need not be obtained before negotiations commence; absence of sanction renders compromise voidable, not void – Allahabad FB distinguished; Patna view (requiring pre-negotiation sanction) disapproved [Paras 14-23].

Decrees based on compromise – Can a minor set aside a partition merely for unfairness? – No – A decree (consent or otherwise) binds the minor properly represented unless fraud or negligence of next friend/guardian ad litem is shown – Rule permitting avoidance for mere unfairness applies to partitions not effected by decree [Paras 24-26].

Pleadings – Fraud, undue influence, coercion – Particulars mandatory – Allegations must be specifically and separately pleaded with full particulars; general averments insufficient – Order 6 Rule 4 CPC applied – Here, coercion/undue influence not separately pleaded; particulars lacking [Paras 27-33].

Evidence – Coercion/undue influence not proved – Only one witness suggested any threat; not corroborated – Multiple contemporaneous factors negate compulsion: engagement of two pleaders, rejection of first draft, reading over and assent, repeated reliance on compromise by plaintiff’s father in later suits, long delay without challenge including after adversary’s death – No proof of inequality in values at time of compromise [Paras 34-36].

Partition relief – Proper forum – Though some properties admittedly remained undivided, determination to be pursued in the previously instituted partition suit between the same parties – Present declaratory suit dismissed without prejudice to pursuing partition there [Paras 37-39].

Decision – Appeal dismissed with costs – Dismissal without prejudice to plaintiffs’ right to seek partition of properties alleged to be omitted from the 1924 decree in the pending suit [Para 39].

Civil Law - Lease - Holding Over – Section 116 TPA – Acceptance of Rent Before Expiry Not Sufficient – No Assent to Continued Possession – Lease ended by efflux of time; rent for 1937–38 was paid and accepted nearly a year before expiry and both sides proceeded on footing of expiry on 23 February 1938 – Section 116 requires acceptance of rent or other assent after determination and as equivalent to assent to continued possession – No such assent here; at most, parties impliedly extended term to 31 March 1938 to align with financial year – No notice under Section 106 necessary; ejectment decree upheld [Paras 14–21].

Construction of Lease Clauses – Forfeiture/Retention – Clause 11 (Part I) applies only to premature termination for breach; inapplicable on normal expiry – Clause 1 (Part III) governs expiry by efflux: lessee may keep bricks etc. for 3 months; “bricks and other materials” left thereafter vest absolutely in lessor – “Other materials” means building materials (e.g., bricks, tiles), not engines, trucks, kilns, tramway lines, plant or machinery – Decree modified accordingly; removal time for machinery etc. granted [Para 22, 24].

Injunction – Title to Materials Vested – Permanent injunction restraining removal of bricks and other (building) materials proper once title vested in lessor; authorities distinguishing cases where plaintiff lacked possession/title inapplicable [Para 23].

Decision – Appeal substantially dismissed with costs – Clarified that only building materials (bricks, tiles and similar articles manufactured on site) vest in respondent; appellants allowed three months from date of decree to remove boilers, engines, trucks, kilns, railway and tram lines, etc. [Para 24].

Criminal writ - Preventive Detention – Article 19(1)(a) vs Article 22 – Detention Held Valid – Petitioners contended that detention for making speeches affecting public order infringed their right to free speech under Article 19(1)(a) and was therefore unconstitutional – Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle laid down in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras that a law relating to preventive detention is to be tested under Articles 21 and 22, not Article 19 – Held: Detention under valid law not open to challenge on the ground that it incidentally restricts Article 19 rights – No inconsistency found between earlier decisions in Romesh Thappar and Brij Bhushan cases and Gopalan [Paras 5–6].

Preventive Detention – Grounds of Detention – Article 22(5) – Grounds Not Vague – Petitioners argued that the grounds communicated were too vague and lacked particulars of the allegedly prejudicial speeches – Supreme Court held that time, place, and general nature of speeches (inciting Hindu-Muslim disaffection) were communicated and sufficient for representation – Held: Grounds were not vague and requirements of Article 22(5) were met – Suggestion that offending passages must always be included was rejected [Paras 7–10].

Preventive Detention – Duration of Detention – Validity of Indefinite Order – Petitioners contended that orders were invalid as they did not specify period of detention – Supreme Court reiterated that Section 12 of the Preventive Detention Act limits maximum detention to one year – Held: Detention order not invalid for want of specific period – Such orders are not indefinite in nature due to statutory maximum [Para 11].

Preventive Detention – Allegations of Malice – Burden of Proof on Detenu – Petitioners alleged political motive behind detention to stifle opposition to ruling party – Supreme Court held that allegations of mala fide conduct must be clearly proved – District Magistrate denied mala fides and affirmed detention was for public order – Held: Petitioners failed to discharge burden of proof regarding mala fide action [Para 12].

Preventive Detention – Dissenting Opinions – Orders Held Invalid by Minority – Justice Mahajan and Justice Bose dissented – Held: Grounds lacked sufficient particulars for effective representation – Failure to provide substance of offending speeches rendered right under Article 22(5) illusory – Detention held illegal – Suggested standard: Offending words or substance must be disclosed where feasible, especially in political speech cases [Mahajan J.: Paras 18–21; Bose J.: Paras 22–33].

Decision – Majority Upholds Detention – Writ Petitions Dismissed – The majority of the Supreme Court upheld the detention orders as valid under the Preventive Detention Act – Held: Grounds communicated were adequate and detention lawful – Petitions under Article 32 dismissed [Paras 13, 17].