Facts:

Dasarath Singh, an auto-rickshaw driver, was allegedly murdered during the commission of a felony - the stealing of the auto-rickshaw by some unknown passengers. The auto-rickshaw was reported stolen, and the driver's body was recovered, but the vehicle was never found. The insurance company compensated the owner for the loss of the auto-rickshaw.

Issues:

Whether the death of Dasarath Singh was an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle, allowing the claimants (wife and children) to seek compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.

Held:

The Court analyzed the circumstances and concluded that the murder of Dasarath Singh was accidental, occurring in the process of committing the theft of the auto-rickshaw. The stealing of the vehicle was the object of the felony, and the murder was incidental to the act of stealing. (Para 14)

The Court rejected the contention that murder, by definition, cannot be an accident. It distinguished between intentional felonious acts leading to murder and accidental murder, emphasizing the proximity of cause. In this case, the murder was accidental. (Para 11)

The Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision that the claimants were entitled to compensation under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act. (Para 19)

Regarding the maintainability of the appeal filed by the Insurance Company, the Court referred to a precedent (Shankarayya case) and held that the Insurance Company was not entitled to file an appeal without obtaining leave from the tribunal. (Para 20)

Facts:

Respondent 'B' was promoted as Inspector on an officiating basis with a condition not to claim seniority until duly selected.

Another officer ('R'), junior to 'B', was promoted as Inspector and subsequently as Dy. S.P.

'B' filed a writ petition claiming seniority from the date of his officiating promotions, which the High Court allowed.

'B' also claimed promotion to Dy. S.P. from the date 'R' was promoted, which was granted by the High Court.

Another officer ('K') filed a writ petition claiming promotion to Inspector, asserting that his junior ('B') was promoted.

Issues:

Validity of granting seniority and promotion to 'B' based on his officiating promotion.

Non-joinder of parties and the effect on the claim for seniority.

The concept of equality in the context of promotions and seniority.

Held:

The High Court erred in granting seniority and promotion to 'B' based on his officiating promotion, which was ad hoc and not in accordance with the rules.

Non-joinder of parties, especially the seniors affected by the relief claimed, should normally result in the dismissal of the petition unless specific reasons justify non-impleadment.

The concept of equality is positive and cannot be enforced in a negative manner. Illegally granted benefits cannot be claimed by others based on equality.

The judgments of the High Court were set aside, and promotions of 'B' were not disturbed in the interest of justice.

Despite setting aside the judgments, promotions of 'B' cannot be the basis for similar rights for others.

Delay in filing the appeal was condoned, considering the need for substantial justice and the potential impact on various individuals.

Facts:

The case involves a batch of eight appeals where the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board is the Appellant. The central issues are whether the High Court, under Article 226, can award compensation for deaths caused by electrocution due to the improper maintenance of electric wires. Additionally, the judgment examines whether the High Court can appoint an arbitrator under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to determine compensation and subsequently make the arbitrator's award a rule of the court.

Issues:

Can the High Court, under Article 226, award compensation for deaths caused by electrocution due to the negligence of the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board?

Can the High Court appoint an arbitrator under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to decide the quantum of compensation and make the award a rule of the court?

Held:

The court, referring to precedent in Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) and Others Vs. Smt. Sukamani Das and Another, emphasized that when disputed questions of fact are involved, a petition under Article 226 is not a suitable remedy. The court stated that negligence needs to be established first by the claimant in cases of tort.

The court acknowledged that not every case of tortuous liability requires a civil suit. When negligence is evident and there is an infringement of Article 21, the High Court can proceed under Article 226.

The court addressed the second question, stating that the High Court's reference to an arbitrator must comply with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The court clarified that the Act does not allow for the court's intervention in referring a matter to arbitration. The award made under the Act is considered a decree and should be enforced accordingly.

Disputed questions of fact arose in the present case, and the High Court's intervention in entertaining writ petitions and referring the matter to arbitration was deemed improper. The court held that the High Court could not have proceeded to have the matter adjudicated by an arbitrator in violation of the provisions of the new Act.

The court restrained the Appellant from recovering any amount from the Respondents, which had been paid to them based on the High Court's judgments.

Facts:

Mesrs. Kolay Biscuits Company Private Limited created a mortgage in favor of Union Bank of India in 1965.

The company was declared a sick unit under the Sick Industrial Companies Act in 1991.

The factory was closed down in 1980.

The bank filed a title mortgage suit for recovery.

Company was ordered to be wound up in 1991, and the official liquidator was appointed.

Auction sale of the company's assets was initiated.

Issues:

Adequacy of the auction price.

Duty of the court in confirming sales.

Handling of valuation reports.

Whether the property could be sold as a going concern.

Held:

The Court found that the attention of the Company Judge was not focused on the fact that the company had been closed since 1980.

The Court criticized the non-application of mind to material facts and unjustified reliance on statements without proper verification.

The Court emphasized the duty of the court to disclose valuation reports to secured creditors and other interested parties.

It was observed that the valuation report was not reliable, and the court did not apply its mind to its content.

The Court held that the sale of the company as a going concern was without a proper basis and unjustified.

The Division Bench's sympathy for workers without proper verification was deemed inappropriate.

Non-disclosure of the valuation report to creditors before auction was considered unjustifiable.

The Court highlighted the duty to ensure properties are sold at a reasonable price, considering market value.

The auction sale was set aside, and the Official Liquidator was directed to recover possession and refund the amount deposited by the auction purchaser.

The Court directed the Official Liquidator to resell the property after obtaining a fresh valuation report and giving a copy to secured creditors.

Facts:

The case involves the promotion of Junior Engineers to Assistant Engineers in Telecommunication circles in India.

Prior to 1966, promotions were made based on executive instructions outlined in paragraph 206 of the Post and Telegraph Manual Volume IV.

The recruitment rules of 1966 came into force, changing the promotion criteria to be in accordance with a qualifying departmental examination.

Discrepancies arose regarding the preparation of eligibility lists, specifically concerning the interpretation of paragraph 206 of the Post and Telegraph Manual and the recruitment rules.

The judgment refers to various applications, interventions, and contempt petitions filed by different parties.

Issues:

Interpretation of the relevant provisions of the recruitment rules and instructions for the promotion of Junior Engineers to Assistant Engineers.

Conflict between the judgment of the Allahabad High Court and the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition No. 3384-86/1986.

Reversion of Parmanand Lal based on the orders of different tribunals.

Held:

The Court reaffirms the decision in Civil Appeal No. 4339 of 1995, stating that eligibility lists must be prepared according to the year of recruitment and not the year of confirmation.

Emphasizes that statutory recruitment rules prevail over administrative instructions, and the procedure outlined in the recruitment rules must be followed.

Acknowledges that individuals who have already benefited from previous judgments, such as Parmanand Lal, will not be affected by the decision.

Drops contempt proceedings against Departmental Authorities due to bona fide difficulties but directs them to proceed in accordance with the law and the court's observations within six months.

Facts:

The appellant availed an overdraft facility from the respondent bank by pledging shares. Subsequently, the appellant requested the bank to sell a portion of the pledged shares to clear the overdraft. However, the bank delayed the sale, resulting in a decline in share prices and financial loss for the appellant.

Issues:

Whether the grant of an overdraft facility by a bank constitutes 'service' under the Consumer Protection Act?

Whether the delay in disposing of pledged shares amounts to a 'deficiency' in service?

Whether the appellant is entitled to claim compensation?

Held:

Grant of overdraft facilities by a bank qualifies as 'service' under the Consumer Protection Act, as the bank charges interest for providing such facilities.

The delay in disposing of pledged shares, causing financial loss to the customer, constitutes a 'deficiency' in service by the bank.

The appellant is entitled to claim compensation for the loss incurred, along with interest.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission's decision dismissing the claim is set aside.

Facts:

Respondent No. 1 filed a suit for partition of a dwelling house in Indore.

Two portions of the house belonged to an undivided family; one portion was sold to a stranger (non-applicant No. 3), and the other portion was bought in a court auction by the appellant.

A preliminary decree was passed in appeal for partition, followed by a final decree.

Execution proceedings were initiated by respondent No. 1, and a Commissioner was appointed for partition.

Issues:

The crucial question was the maintainability of the application under Section 4 of the Partition Act filed by respondent No. 1, the decree-holder.

Held:

The appellant, a stranger purchaser, had not filed any application for separating his share throughout the proceedings.

The conditions for the applicability of Section 4, as laid down in a previous decision, were not met, particularly the requirement that the stranger transferee must sue for partition.

The absence of an application from the appellant for separating his share rendered respondent No. 1's application under Section 4 not maintainable.

The decision of the Trial Court, treating the application as not maintainable, was upheld.

Facts:

Students who qualified for medical degree courses under the All India quota of 15% migrated to different states for their undergraduate studies. They encountered difficulties when seeking admission to postgraduate courses, as various states had framed admission rules that restricted their ability to pursue studies either in the migrated state or their home state.

Issues:

The challenge to admission rules that hindered students who migrated for undergraduate studies from pursuing postgraduate courses in their home state.

Held:

The court held that students who had pursued undergraduate courses outside their home state should be allowed to participate in the entrance examination held in their home state for postgraduate courses, irrespective of any preference criteria adopted for selection. The court emphasized the need for uniformity in postgraduate courses across the country.

University-wise preference is permissible, but college-wise preference is not. Reservation of 70% to 80% has been sustained even when students from different universities appear for a common entrance test.( Para 9)

Different criteria adopted by states for admission encroach upon the rights of students who qualified under the 15% All India quota, leading to difficulties in pursuing postgraduate studies in their home state.( Para 11)

Allowing students of the home state to participate in the entrance test for postgraduate courses would bring about uniformity and remove a small disadvantage, thereby striking a balance.( Para 13)

The court directed states, union territories, and universities to allow students who had pursued courses outside their home state to participate in the entrance examination held in their home state.( Para 14)

Facts:

The deceased, a woman, was married three years prior to the incident.

She was found dead in her matrimonial house, and marks of asphyxia were observed.

Accusations under Sections 304-B, 306, and 498-A IPC were made against the husband and close relatives.

The Trial Court convicted the accused, but the High Court acquitted them.

Issues:

Applicability of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act regarding dowry death presumption.

Admissibility of the deceased's statements under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act.

Whether the accused could be held guilty without direct evidence of the cause of death.

Held:

The law stipulates that in the case of a woman's death within 7 years of marriage, with evidence of cruelty or harassment related to dowry, a presumption of dowry death arises under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act.

The term "soon before" is relative, implying proximity, and not synonymous with "immediately before." The prosecution must establish a proximate and live link between cruelty/harassment and the consequential death.

The prosecution proved persistent dowry demands and continuous cruelty by the husband. Contradictions were minor and did not affect credibility.

Death by suicide within 7 years of marriage, not under normal circumstances, leads to the applicability of Section 304-B IPC.

Section 32 of the Evidence Act allows statements of the deceased, if connected with the cause of death, to be admissible. Proximity to the actual occurrence is essential.

Respondents 3, 4, and 5, being in-laws, cannot be held guilty solely for the husband's fault. Overt acts must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The High Court erred in acquitting the accused-husband based on minor discrepancies. Conviction under Section 304-B IPC upheld, but the sentence reduced to 7 years. Conviction under Section 306 IPC upheld, sentence reduced to 5 years. Conviction under Section 498-A IPC confirmed.