Constitutional Law – Article 19 – Validity of Section 144 CrPC – Wide powers conferred on magistrates under Section 144 CrPC challenged as violative of the fundamental rights to free speech and peaceful assembly – Held: Powers under Section 144 are preventive in nature, meant to deal with urgent situations to maintain public order – Exercise of such power is judicial in nature and subject to revision – Not unconstitutional as it imposes reasonable restrictions within the ambit of Articles 19(2) and 19(3) [Paras 1, 19-22, 34]

Criminal Procedure – Section 144 CrPC – Scope and Nature – Section 144 confers powers on specified magistrates to issue prohibitory orders in urgent situations – Power can be exercised ex parte – Order must be in writing and contain material facts – Duration of order is limited to two months – Held: Section 144 is not arbitrary or unlimited – Contains adequate safeguards including right to challenge, revision, and requirement of judicial reasoning [Paras 7-13, 22-23]

Judicial Review – Adequacy of Remedies – Contention that Section 144 order cannot be fairly challenged since magistrate is “judge of his own cause” rejected – Remedies under Section 144(4), 144(5), and High Court’s revisional jurisdiction under Sections 435 and 439 CrPC ensure judicial oversight – Held: Safeguards inbuilt in statutory scheme sufficient to withstand challenge of being illusory [Paras 22-23]

Freedom of Speech – Prior Restraint – Use of anticipatory restrictions questioned as unreasonable – Court distinguishes Indian Constitution from U.S. framework – Held: Anticipatory restrictions permissible under Indian Constitution as fundamental rights are subject to reasonable restrictions in public interest – Doctrine of “clear and present danger” from U.S. law not applicable in Indian context [Paras 24-28]

Interpretation – “Provocative Slogans” – Vagueness Challenge – Order under Section 144 prohibiting provocative slogans not vague – Term to be interpreted in context – Held: Order sufficiently specific to avoid invalidation on grounds of vagueness or unreasonableness [Paras 30-33]

Industrial Dispute – Law and Order – Restrictions imposed in industrial unrest situation affecting city-wide peace – Order applicable to general public upheld – Held: Restriction on entire public in affected area justified in circumstances of mass unrest and practical difficulty in segregating individuals [Paras 30-32]

Decision: Petition dismissed – Section 144 CrPC upheld as constitutionally valid – Order passed by District Magistrate found reasonable and within scope of law – No relief granted – Special leave petition against Nagpur High Court judgment also declined [Paras 34-36]

Fundamental Rights – Protection against State Action – Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) – Petition under Article 32 against private bank – Not Maintainable – The petitioner alleged violation of his fundamental rights to property due to sale of his shares by the Central Bank of India Ltd., a company incorporated under the Companies Act – Held: Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) are directed against State action and not wrongful acts of private individuals – Violation of property rights by private persons is remediable only under ordinary law – Petition dismissed [Paras 3-4, 7-8].

Interpretation of Article 19(1)(f) – Scope – Article 19 confers freedoms against unlawful restrictions by the State – It does not protect citizens from acts of private parties – Wrongful deprivation of property by individuals not within its purview [Para 3].

Interpretation of Article 31(1) – Clause (1) read with “save by authority of law” – Prohibition is against unauthorised governmental action – Not intended to apply to private individuals – Absence of word “State” does not widen its scope to private disputes – Restoration of Section 299(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935 into Article 31(1) does not alter its scope [Paras 4-7].

Legislative Entries – Seventh Schedule – Argument that deprivation of property is beyond legislative competence rejected – Legislative power exists under general entries to enact laws authorising deprivation of property – Article 31(1) presupposes legislative authority for such action [Para 6].

Decision – Petition under Article 32 misconceived – Dismissed without costs [Paras 8-9].

Appeal against Acquittal – Section 417 CrPC – Scope of Appellate Powers – Presumption of Innocence Reinforced – The Sessions Judge acquitted the accused after detailed analysis of evidence, finding prosecution witnesses unreliable and defence of private right plausible – The High Court reversed the acquittal in a summary manner without displacing trial court’s reasoning – Held: In appeals against acquittal, the presumption of innocence stands reinforced, and trial court’s findings can be reversed only on substantial and compelling grounds – High Court erred in convicting the appellants [Paras 5, 13-14].

Prosecution Evidence – Fabricated Injuries – Credibility of Witnesses Doubtful – Evidence relating to Deva Sukh’s injuries found to be fabricated to counter the plea of private defence – Absence of his name in FIR, dying declarations, and initial witness statements created grave doubt – Once reliance is placed on fabricated evidence, prosecution case becomes highly suspicious [Paras 6-10].

Right of Private Defence – Possession over Land – Both Parties Prepared for Clash – Evidence showed that Ratan Singh’s men attempted to forcibly take possession of the disputed land despite Amin delivering possession to Surajpal Singh – Strong indications that appellants’ party was attacked first – Use of force by appellants fell within right of private defence – Prosecution version not trustworthy [Paras 11-12].

Decision – High Court’s conviction set aside – Appeal allowed – Appellants acquitted of all charges [Paras 15-16].

Criminal Trial – Joinder/Misjoinder of Charges – Sections 233, 234(1) & 235 CrPC – Appeal Dismissed – Appellant argued that trial was vitiated by misjoinder as he was effectively tried for four offences though only three charges framed – Held: The second charge (firing one shot at two persons) constituted a single “offence” as it arose from one act of firing – No illegality in trying the three charges together within the exceptions to Section 233 – Conviction and death sentence under Section 302 IPC affirmed [Paras 6-8, 10-11].

Meaning of “Offence” – Single Act Causing Multiple Effects – One Offence – Where only one bullet was fired, the “act” punishable constitutes one offence and cannot be artificially split into two attempts merely because two persons were aimed at or endangered – Courts should avoid a narrow or artificial approach to multiplication of offences from a single act [Para 8].

Section 234(1) CrPC – Multiple Offences of Same Kind within 12 Months – Applicability – Even assuming resort to Section 234(1), the total charges tried did not exceed three, since the “second charge” was one offence notwithstanding two named victims – Hence joinder proper and trial not vitiated [Paras 6-8].

Section 235(1) CrPC – Same Transaction – Clarification – Though argument in High Court invoked “same transaction,” Supreme Court determined the issue on Section 234(1) and the definition of “offence,” rendering the same-transaction inquiry unnecessary on the facts [Para 6].

Precedents – Single Offence from Single Act – Followed – Theft of several bullocks at the same time treated as one offence; misappropriation of several account books as one offence; attempt to cheat a group by one representation as one offence; one false statement implicating two persons as one offence; firing several times at two constables treated as one offence – Principles applied to hold single act of firing here is one offence [Para 8].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Conviction under Section 302 IPC and death sentence maintained; acquittals on Section 307 charges by the Sessions Judge unaffected – No merit in other grounds [Paras 5, 9-11].

Mortgage – Contribution vs Subrogation – Sections 82 & 92 TPA; Section 43 Contract Act; Order 34 Rule 2(1) CPC – Appeal partly allowed with remand – Co-mortgagor redeeming the decree by sale of his separate property claimed personal contribution in equal thirds under Section 43 – Held: Contribution arising out of a mortgage is governed by the special law in the Transfer of Property Act – Section 82 (ratable contribution out of the mortgaged properties) and Section 92 (subrogation) apply – Section 43 of the Contract Act (general law) is excluded absent a “contract to the contrary” – Relief to be moulded as a mortgage decree under Order 34 based on subrogation, not as a personal decree [Paras 31-44, 55-57, 61].

Special Law Prevails over General – Section 82 TPA excludes Section 43 Contract Act – Where the right to contribution stems from a mortgage, the statutory mortgage code (TPA read with CPC) governs – Parties may vary by contract to the contrary, but in its absence, courts cannot import extrinsic equitable or contractual principles to modify Section 82 [Paras 41-44].

Equitable Apportionment by “Benefit Derived” Rejected – Statutory Scheme Controls – Though apportioning by benefits received may seem fair, equitable doctrines cannot override the statute – Privy Council and High Court authorities affirm that mortgage rights (including redemption and contribution) are statutory in India [Paras 39-40].

Alleged Inter Se Agreement Not Proved – Burden and Evidence – Defendants’ plea of a prior oral agreement to apportion liability by benefits failed – Only testimony was of an interested defendant; contemplated writing and registration not executed; key witness (co-defendant Naku) withheld; draft not signed – On probabilities and evidentiary shortcomings, no “contract to the contrary” established [Paras 46-53].

Form of Relief – Subrogation and Mortgage Decree – Though plaint claimed personal money decree, pleadings and prayers (declaration of charge and Order 34 decree) substantively invoke subrogation – Court may grant appropriate mortgage relief notwithstanding inartistic drafting, absent prejudice – Decree to declare sums due (Order 34 Rule 2) and proceed to sale/redemption as per Section 82 allocations [Paras 55-57, 61].

Remand – Computation and Moulding of Decree – Case remanded to ascertain (i) sums paid in satisfaction of the 12 June 1936 mortgage, (ii) interest at contract rate up to decree, (iii) values of mortgaged properties at the date of the mortgage – Liability of each defendant to be computed separately under Section 82; capped at Rs. 40,253-11-10 plus interest against each, with usual mortgage decree for sale and rights of redemption – Costs to abide final result; parties to bear own costs in Supreme Court [Paras 58-63].

Decision – Case remanded – Directions issued for enquiry and for drawing up mortgage decree on subrogation basis under Sections 82 and 92 TPA; appeal otherwise disposed of with no personal decree against defendants [Paras 58-63].

Hindu Succession – Stridhan of Unmarried Woman – Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 – Act Inapplicable to Female Propositus – Appeal Dismissed – Dispute over succession to Bhimabai’s estate; rival claims by sister’s sons (plaintiffs) and paternal uncle’s son by adoption (defendant no. 4) – Held: Even assuming the estate was non-watan and constituted Bhimabai’s stridhan, succession is governed by general Mitakshara rules for a maiden’s property; Act II of 1929 applies only to succession to the separate property of a Hindu male and cannot be invoked for a female’s stridhan – Paternal uncle’s son ranks higher than sister’s sons; defendant no. 4 preferred; appeal dismissed [Paras 5-7, 8].

Scope of Act II of 1929 – Textual Limits – Section 1(2) confines operation to Mitakshara succession “in respect only of the property of males” not held in coparcenary and not disposed by will – The four additional heirs (son’s daughter, daughter’s daughter, sister, sister’s son) are statutory heirs only in that limited context – They cannot be interposed to alter the order of heirs to a female’s stridhan [Para 6].

Method of Determining Heirs to a Maiden’s Stridhan – Father’s Sapindas by Propinquity – Under Mitakshara (and Mayukha in Bombay) on failure of uterine brothers, mother and father, succession goes to the father’s sapindas, then mother’s, by propinquity – On that footing, a paternal uncle’s son precedes a sister’s son; the 1929 Act cannot be used indirectly to reorder the father’s heirs for this purpose [Paras 6-7].

Watan Character and Resumption – Issue Not Decided – Although arguments addressed on whether Government “resumption” (1923 resolution) destroyed the watan character, the Court found it unnecessary to decide, as defendant no. 4 prevailed even on the assumption that the estate was non-watan and Bhimabai’s absolute stridhan [Para 5].

Decision – Plaintiffs not nearest heirs; defendant no. 4 has preferential right – Appeal dismissed; no order as to costs inter se; Court of Wards to have costs out of estate as between attorney and client; orders of courts below as to costs to stand [Para 8].

Criminal Trial – Conviction for Uncharged Offence – Sections 236–237 CrPC – Section 326 IPC – Conviction Upheld – Accused charged under Section 307 IPC but evidence established an offence under Section 326 IPC – Held: Where facts could have justified framing alternative charges under Sections 307 and 326 IPC, Section 237 CrPC authorises conviction for the offence proved though not charged – Conviction under Section 326 IPC proper [Paras 3-5].

Practice and Procedure – Section 237 CrPC Explained – Privy Council Applied – Begu v. The King Emperor affirmed the principle that a conviction can be entered for an offence disclosed by evidence even without a specific charge, if an alternative charge could have been framed under Section 236 – Procedure held proper [Para 5].

Non-Examination of Witnesses – Adverse Inference – Jury Properly Directed – No Failure of Justice – Absence of certain neighbours or search-witness did not vitiate the trial – Sessions Judge expressly directed jury they could draw an adverse inference if they deemed fit – Existing evidence, if believed, was sufficient to sustain conviction [Para 7].

Charge to Jury – Judicial Comment on Defence – No Prejudice – Sessions Judge’s strong remarks about an unsubstantiated defence were coupled with clear caution that the jury must decide independently – On the record the defence story was rightly rejected [Paras 8-9].

Accused’s Examination – Section 342 CrPC – Test is Prejudice – Examination Adequate in a Simple Case – Accused must show material prejudice from any deficiency – None pleaded in appellate grounds nor shown on record – Three focused questions covered the case sufficiently – No miscarriage of justice [Para 10].

Decision – Appeal Dismissed – Conviction under Section 326 IPC and three years’ rigorous imprisonment affirmed – Enhancement rule discharged [Paras 2, 6, 11-12].

Succession to the impartible Bodinaickanur Zamindari - Impartible Zamindari – Overall Succession Dispute – Mitakshara & Primogeniture – All Appeals Dismissed – Estate held to retain joint family character; widow’s claim to zamindari rejected; third branch (Rajaya) entitled to succeed by lineal primogeniture; Boothipuram held separate/self-acquired of Kandasami devolving on widow; pannai lands/buildings upheld as strīdhanam of Kamuluammal; release of 1934 vitiated by fraud – Final result: all appeals fail and are dismissed with costs [Paras 3, 19-21, 22-25, 32-41, 45-47].

Impartible Estate – Whether converted into separate property by 1890 arrangement – Not proved – Documents (Exs. P-17, P-18) and contemporaneous statements show only postponement of Kandasami’s possession during widow’s life; no intention to change character from joint family impartible estate; widow’s plea that zamindari became separate property of Kandasami/Kamaraja II rejected [Paras 25-26, 32, 36, 38-40].

Partition vs. Alienation in Impartible Estate – Power to alienate does not imply power to partition – Holder’s alienation power cannot be used to infer a power to divide or disrupt impartible character – Argument that Kandasami effected division by allotments rejected [Para 37].

Test for Disruption/Renunciation – Clear intention by junior members to surrender expectancy required – Mere allotments for maintenance or arrangements for possession do not suffice – On facts, no renunciation of survivorship by junior branches; zamindari remained joint family property for purposes of succession [Paras 32-36].

Boothipuram Village – Character and Devolution – Separate/self-acquired property of Kandasami under family arrangement – Taken out of zamindari by common consent and given absolutely; devolved on his son as separate property; widow (Chinnathayi) entitled as heir to husband – Trial Court view reversed, High Court affirmed, Supreme Court concurs [Paras 22-23].

Pannai Lands & Buildings – Strīdhanam of Kamuluammal – Devolution on grand-daughters; 1934 release in favour of Kamaraja II vitiated by fraud – Pannai lands ceased to be part of joint family estate; possession to widow (Chinnathayi) as strīdhanam heir; contrary claim of zamindar rejected [Para 21].

Effect of Release by Junior Branch (Ex. P-17) – No extinguishment of survivorship rights – General words construed in context; release confined to then-present claims (recognition of Kandasami as next heir) and not future contingent survivorship – Valid relinquishment must be in favour of head/all branches; here release in favour of widow, a non-coparcener – Claim of fourth branch (Kulasekara) fails; third branch (Rajaya) succeeds [Paras 41-45].

Decision – Appeals Dismissed – Claims of widow to zamindari and of fourth branch negatived; decree in favour of third branch (Rajaya) to zamindari maintained; Boothipuram to widow; pannai lands/buildings to strīdhanam heirs; all appeals dismissed with costs [Paras 45-47].

Tenancy – Lease by Receiver – Section 106, Transfer of Property Act – Monthly tenancy inferred – Defendant’s father originally held land under Prodhan’s patta (1913) – Kabuliyat executed in 1924 before Receiver was inoperative – Rent payments in 1925 and 1926 accepted by Receiver on behalf of estate created fresh tenancy – Held: tenancy from month to month arose, not annual lease – Notice to quit valid – Plaintiff entitled to possession [Paras 3, 12-16].

Prodhan’s Patta and Kabuliyat – Invalidity – Prodhan had no authority to settle zamindari land; patta void – Kabuliyat of 1924 ineffective as lease under Section 107, Transfer of Property Act – Covenant for perpetual renewal vague and beyond Receiver’s authority – No permanent tenancy created; adverse possession claim rejected [Paras 4-5, 8-9].

Mode of Rent Payment – Annual rent vs. monthly tenancy – Annual rent payment alone does not alter legal character of tenancy – Section 106 lays down rule of construction; tenancy for building purposes presumed monthly – Mere annual expression of rent does not create annual tenancy without registered lease – Law will not substitute an invalid contract with another arrangement [Paras 13-15].

Res Judicata and Consistency – Earlier litigation (1937 suit) already determined tenancy to be month-to-month under Section 106 – Defendant’s later admissions confirm this – No case made that annual rent implied one-year tenancy – Consistent judicial findings binding [Para 16].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Plaintiff’s right to possession upheld – Defendant held monthly tenant since 1924 – Proper notice to quit validly terminated tenancy – Costs awarded to plaintiff [Paras 16-17].