Excise Valuation – Cost of Wooden Crates – Section 4 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 – Packing costs includible unless durable and returnable – Assistant Collector included cost of wooden crates in assessable value of glass sheets – Collector (Appeals) and CEGAT held otherwise – Allahabad High Court reversed, holding crates necessary for marketability and not durable/returnable – Held: Packing costs are includible under Section 4(1) unless falling within exception under Section 4(4)(d)(i) – First question answered against assessee; cost of crates includible [Paras 3–10].

Durable and Returnable Packing – Wooden Crates – Obligation to Accept Return Sufficient – Invoice clause obligated appellant to refund Rs. 140 per crate if returned intact – Legal principle is that actual return is irrelevant; only obligation to accept return matters – Wooden crates, even dismantled, could be reused – High Court erred in requiring evidence of actual return – Held: Wooden crates are durable and returnable packing; their cost not includible in assessable value – Appeal partly allowed; High Court judgment set aside on this point [Paras 11–18].

Decision – Appeal partly allowed – Costs of wooden crates held excludible from assessable value of glass sheets due to obligation of return – Impugned judgment of High Court set aside to this extent – No order as to costs [Paras 17–18].

Civil Writ - Article 12 – BCCI’s status as “State” – Tests from Pradeep Kumar Biswas applied – Petition under Article 32 dismissed (majority) – The Court held BCCI is not created by statute, receives no financial assistance, is not under deep and pervasive governmental control, and its monopoly in cricket is not State-conferred or State-protected – Mere regulatory permissions for foreign tours or hosting teams are not “pervasive control” – Hence BCCI is not “other authority” under Article 12 – Writ under Article 32 not maintainable [Paras 23–26, 30, 33, 36].

Fundamental Rights – Article 19(1)(g) – Enforceability only against “State” – Private regulation of a profession by BCCI does not convert it into “State” – Violation of Art. 19(1)(g) must be claimed against State; private bodies do not become “State” merely by impacting that right – Petitioners first must establish BCCI is “State” to invoke Art. 32; they failed [Para 28].

Public Function vs. Public Law Remedy – Writ under Article 226 against private body – Even if BCCI performs some public duties (team selection, discipline, organizing international fixtures), that does not ipso facto make it “State” for Article 12 – However, High Courts can issue writs under Article 226 to “any person or authority” performing public duties – Appropriate remedy against BCCI lies under Article 226 or ordinary civil law, not Article 32 [Paras 31–33].

Governmental Control – Nature and degree – “Regulatory” vs. “pervasive” – Need for financial, functional, and administrative domination – Government’s grant of permissions for foreign tours/hosting and its policy stance are regulatory; absence of deep, particular, and pervasive control over BCCI’s affairs means Article 12 not attracted [Paras 21–24, 30].

Comparative and Doctrinal References – Expansion of “State” concept – Courts traced evolution from Rajasthan SEB; Sukhdev; Ramana Dayaram Shetty; Ajay Hasia; Pradeep Kumar Biswas – Reiterated that Ajay Hasia tests are indicative, not conclusive; cumulative “pervasive control” remains key – Mere performance of some public functions is insufficient for Article 12 [Paras 18–22].

Dissent – Purposive and evolving interpretation of Article 12 – BCCI as “other authority” – Justice S. B. Sinha (dissent) reasoned that cricket’s unique national significance, BCCI’s de facto State recognition, exclusive control (de facto monopoly), power to select “Team India” using national symbols, regulation of livelihoods and speech, and “outsourced” public functions satisfy a broader public-function/monopoly/entwinement test – Concluded BCCI is a State actor and Article 32 petition is maintainable; law needs expansion to cover powerful private regulators performing public duties [Paras 55–104, 195–201, 230–281, 307].

Decision – By majority, BCCI is not “State” within Article 12; the Article 32 petition is dismissed – Court clarifies that remedies may lie under Article 226 against BCCI for public-duty violations – Dissent would have held BCCI to be “State” and Article 32 maintainable [Paras 33, 36; dissent Paras 280–281, 307].

Taxation Law - Sale vs Works-Contract – Installation of Lifts – Held to be Sale – Assessee entered into contracts for manufacture, supply, erection and installation of elevators – Claimed deduction under Sections 5F and 5G of the APGST Act treating transactions as works-contracts – Assessing authority treated it as sale under Entry 82 – Supreme Court held: Predominant intention was transfer of chattel for price – Installation merely incidental – Contracts constituted "sale", not "works-contract" [Paras 1–5, 11].

Interpretation of Composite Contracts – Principle of Substance Over Form – Reiterated that no standard formula exists to distinguish sale from works-contract – Must examine intention of parties, nature of obligations, and predominant object – If property passes after delivery of finished product, it is a sale – Held: In present case, materials were supplied in knocked-down condition and assembled at site – Labour and skill merely ancillary [Paras 5–6, 10–11].

Taxability Under Entry 82 – Lifts Treated as Goods – Inclusion under First Schedule – Contracts satisfied twin tests under Section 2(1)(n): transfer of property for consideration and in course of business – Assessee exhibited models, accepted custom orders and delivered finished goods – Installation followed supply – Held: Sale of lifts taxable under Entry 82 – Not entitled to benefit under Sections 5F or 5G [Paras 7–11].

Constitutional Validity – Relevance of Article 366(29A) – Background of 46th Constitutional Amendment discussed – Held: Explanation VI to Section 2(1)(n) inserted to align with Article 366(29A) to tax deemed sales – However, not every transaction involving supply and service is a works-contract – Substance of contract must reveal dominant intention – On facts, intention was to transfer goods, not perform service [Paras 8–9].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – High Court Judgment Reversed – Supreme Court held that the transactions entered into by Kone Elevators were contracts for sale, not works-contracts – Taxable under Entry 82 of the First Schedule – Orders of Sales Tax Tribunal and High Court set aside – No costs awarded [Para 12].

Compromise Decree – Order 23 Rule 3 CPC – Mandatory Procedure Not Followed – First appellate court reversed trial court decree by relying on compromise (Exhibit D1) allegedly executed at police station – Held: Since compromise was made during pendency of suit, court could have acted on it only by following mandatory procedure under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC – No such compliance or satisfaction recorded – Compromise cannot be treated as legally binding without judicial endorsement – Matter remitted for fresh decision [Paras 3, 6].

Pleadings and Procedural Compliance – Absence of Proper Pleadings and Issues – High Court and appellate court erroneously held that plaintiff failed to plead against compromise – Held: Defendant’s written statement only made a bald reference to compromise – No specific issue framed at trial – Plaintiff deemed to have denied allegations – Appellate court failed to notice procedural lapses and drew adverse inference unjustly [Para 6].

Validity of Compromise – Document Executed in Police Station – Legal Scrutiny Required – Compromise allegedly executed on plain paper in police station – No registration or stamping discussed – Held: Courts below failed to consider legal implications of such informal documents – Additional scrutiny required when compromise affects substantive property rights [Para 6].

Final Decision – Orders Set Aside – Appeal Allowed – High Court’s dismissal of second appeal and judgment of first appellate court set aside – Matter remanded to District Judge, Panipat, for fresh adjudication on merits in accordance with law – No costs awarded [Paras 7-8].

Labour Law - Industrial Disputes – Trainee / Apprentice terminated on closure of scheme – Section 6N, U.P. Industrial Disputes Act – Award upholding retrenchment restored – Respondent appointed as trainee under State-sponsored scheme; scheme withdrawn; notice pay and retrenchment compensation tendered and received – Held: Even assuming respondent was a ‘workman’, termination was a simple retrenchment in full compliance with Section 6N; Labour Court’s findings on facts could not be displaced – High Court erred in interfering [Paras 1–7, 12, 16–17, 23].

Apprentice vs. Workman – Apprentices Act, 1961 – No right to absorption – Court reiterates that an apprentice is not a “workman” and has no statutory right to regularisation; if Apprentices Act applies, labour laws do not – On facts, even on the assumption of “workman” status, employer complied with Section 6N [Paras 14–16; cases cited: Mukesh K. Tripathi; U.P. SEB v. Shiv Mohan Singh].

Regularisation – Completion of 240 days – No automatic right – Appointments under a scheme/daily wages and not per rules cannot be regularised merely for 240 days’ work – High Court’s reliance on alleged parity with 11 trainees misplaced; those were selected in 1986 after interview; respondent did not qualify; services of all remaining trainees ended with scheme closure [Paras 9–13, 17–21; cases cited: A. Umarani; Pankaj Gupta; Executive Engineer ZP Engg. Divn. v. Digambara Rao; Mahendra L. Jain].

Unfair Labour Practice – No discrimination proved – Letter dated 7.11.1987 showed call to resume duty due to absence, not interview; termination letter dated 16.11.1987 recorded scheme withdrawal – High Court’s inference of victimisation and unfair labour practice unsustainable against Labour Court’s factual findings [Paras 10–13, 17].

Relief – Reinstatement – Co-terminus scheme – Even where Section 6N breach is alleged, reinstatement is ordinarily not directed if employment is co-terminus with a scheme – All the more so when Section 6N is complied with – Award restored; no costs [Paras 22–23].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – High Court judgment set aside; Labour Court award upholding termination sustained – No order as to costs [Para 23].

Juvenile Justice – Relevant Date for Determination of Age – Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 – Date of Offence Held Relevant – Conflict between Umesh Chandra (three-judge bench) and Arnit Das (two-judge bench) resolved – Held: Correct law is that relevant date for reckoning age is date of commission of offence, not date of production before court – Liberal and purposive interpretation required to advance object of beneficial legislation – Arnit Das overruled [Paras 6–19, 76–88].

Juvenile Justice – Applicability of 2000 Act to Pending Cases – Sections 20, 64, 69 of 2000 Act – Retrospective Beneficial Operation Permitted – Though 1986 Act repealed, pending proceedings deemed to continue under 2000 Act – Distinction between male and female juveniles removed; age threshold uniformly raised to 18 years – Section 20 creates legal fiction: even if not juvenile under 1986 Act, if below 18 years as on 1.4.2001, benefit of 2000 Act available – Application does not violate Article 20(1) – Confirmed by Rules 61, 62 of 2007 Model Rules – Limited retrospective application upheld [Paras 20–35, 89–99].

Evidence – Determination of Age – Section 35, Evidence Act – Model Rules under 2000 Act Not Binding – Court must determine age by appreciating evidence under ordinary evidentiary rules – School certificates admissible under Section 35 but not conclusive without corroboration – Burden under Section 106 applies – Central Government’s Model Rules have no legislative force; only State Governments empowered to frame rules [Paras 110–114].

Constitutional & International Law – Articles 14, 21, Human Rights Obligations – Juvenile Justice statutes to be construed consistently with UN Standard Minimum Rules (Beijing Rules) – Emphasis on rehabilitation, privacy, expeditious trial, parental presence, protection from incarceration with adults – Beneficial construction must not be frustrated by narrow interpretation – Ex post facto prohibition under Article 20(1) not attracted when later law mollifies rigour of punishment [Paras 47–70, 100–109].

Decision – Appeal Allowed in Part – (i) Relevant date for reckoning age of juvenile is date of offence, not date of production; (ii) Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 applies to pending proceedings under 1986 Act if accused had not completed 18 years on 1.4.2001; (iii) Model Rules not binding; court to apply Evidence Act principles in age determination – Matter remitted for application accordingly [Paras 36–37, 115–117].

Rape – Statutory Minimum Sentences – “Adequate and Special Reasons” – High Court’s Reduction Set Aside – Conviction under Sections 376(1)/450 IPC affirmed by High Court but custodial sentence reduced to period undergone solely because accused were from rural areas – Held: Sections 376(1) & 376(2) prescribe minimum sentences – Court may go below minimum only for “adequate and special reasons” recorded in the judgment – Rural background and lapse of time are neither adequate nor special – High Court’s order unsustainable and set aside [Paras 6–7, 19–22].

Sentencing – Undue Leniency – Proportionality and Societal Conscience – Courts must impose sentences reflecting gravity of offence and society’s cry for justice – Undeserved sympathy undermines public confidence – For offences against women and other crimes impacting social order, exemplary treatment may be required – Principles reiterated with reference to Sevaka Perumal, Mahesh, Dhananjay Chatterjee, Ravji and Ghanshyam Singh [Paras 9–17].

Rape – Nature of the Offence – Penetration Standard – Legislative Intent – Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983 introduced sweeping changes to curb rape with an iron hand – Even the slightest penetration is sufficient; emission unnecessary – Rape causes enduring mental scar and is an obnoxious act of the highest order [Paras 7–8].

Appellate Power – Article 136 – Interference with Sentence – Where High Court ignores statutory mandates and records no legally sustainable reasons for lowering sentence below minimum, Supreme Court will interfere and restore legality – Respondents directed to surrender to serve remainder of sentence [Para 22].

Decision – Appeal allowed – High Court’s reduction of sentence to period undergone set aside – Respondents to surrender forthwith to serve the remainder of sentence; convictions remain undisturbed [Para 22].

Competition Commission – Selection of Chairperson/Members – Rule 3 of the 2003 Rules – Separation of Powers – Judicial Primacy Sought – Adjudication Deferred - Petitioner (advocate) assailed Rule 3 as unconstitutional, urging CJI-led selection and a judicial Chair; Union described CCI as an expert/regulatory body and placed on record proposed amendments to provide a CJI-headed selection mechanism and an appellate judicial body – Held: In view of proposed amendments having a clear bearing, it is inappropriate to decide the challenge at this stage; all issues left open to be urged after amendments, if any, are enacted [Paras 3–5, 7–8].

Suggested Institutional Design – Regulatory vs. Adjudicatory Functions – Court’s Observations – Without deciding merits, Court suggested it “might be appropriate” to consider creating two separate bodies, one expert/advisory/regulatory and another adjudicatory, followed by an appellate body, to address separation-of-powers concerns – Observation left to policy/Parliamentary wisdom [Para 6].

Writ Relief – No Pronouncement on Validity – Liberty Reserved - Writ petition closed without ruling on validity of the Act/Rules; liberty reserved to re-approach post-amendment with specific pleadings and challenges to particular provisions [Paras 5, 7–8].

Criminal Law - Section 302, 120B, 294, 307, 323, 34, 341, 353, 370, 380, 394, 397, 457, 506B of the IPC - Murder of Trade Union Leader – Circumstantial Evidence Against Industrialists Inadequate – Acquittal Upheld – Deceased, a labour rights leader, was allegedly murdered by conspiracy among local industrialists and hired killers – Trial court convicted A-1 to A-5 and A-9 based on circumstantial evidence and motive – High Court acquitted all – Held: Suspicion and motive not sufficient – No direct or clinching evidence connecting industrialists – Entries in deceased’s diary and travel to Nepal for arms insufficient to prove conspiracy – High Court’s view plausible and not perverse – Acquittal of A-1 to A-8 confirmed [Paras 1–18].

Extra-Judicial Confession – Admissibility – Section 30 of Evidence Act – Confession of A-9 Paltan Mallah naming other accused not corroborated by independent evidence – Such confession admissible only as corroborative – In absence of substantive evidence, cannot convict others based solely on co-accused’s confession – High Court rightly discarded confessions against other accused [Paras 18, 34].

Recovery of Weapon – Admissibility Despite Alleged Illegality – Discovery of Firearm at Instance of A-9 – Valid – A-9 led police to recovery of country-made pistol and cartridges buried near his house – Objection that seizure violated procedural safeguards under CrPC rejected – Held: Illegality in search does not render evidence inadmissible per se – Courts have discretion – No serious prejudice shown – Recovery legally admissible [Paras 25–33].

Ballistic Evidence – Scientific Opinion Corroborates Prosecution Case – Expert evidence linked recovered firearm to pellets found in victim’s body – Despite being a country-made firearm, expert gave conclusive opinion – Defence argument based on lack of grooves and foreign literature rejected – Held: Opinion of expert based on test-fire and microscopic comparison admissible – Conviction of A-9 sustainable on this ground [Paras 35–38].

Confession and Corroboration – Reliable Extra-Judicial Confession to Independent Witness – A-9 made confession to PW-105 (relative) and PW-124 (school headmaster) – Both witnesses found credible – Supported by independent recovery and ballistic expert’s findings – Held: Confession voluntary and reliable – Establishes guilt of A-9 [Paras 34–38].

Decision – Conviction of A-9 Restored – Others Acquitted – Death Sentence Commuted – Supreme Court held that only A-9 Paltan Mallah’s guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt – Rest of the accused acquitted by High Court rightly – Death sentence of A-9 commuted to life imprisonment considering long delay – Appeals partly allowed, conviction of A-9 under Section 302 IPC restored – Others' acquittal confirmed [Paras 39–40].