Illegitimate Sons – Right to Maintenance – Mitakshara Law – Recognition of Status – Held entitled – Under Mitakshara law, illegitimate sons of a regenerate class father are entitled to maintenance throughout their lives in recognition of their status as family members, even though excluded from inheritance – The doctrine of “compassionate allowance” is inappropriate, the true position being entitlement to maintenance as of right [Paras 2-3].

Quantum of Maintenance – Factors to be considered – Income of family properties, past support, and earning capacity of claimants – Trial Court fixed Rs. 100 per mensem – High Court enhanced to Rs. 200 – Supreme Court held High Court erred by considering post-death change of circumstances and ignoring losses in business and earning capacity of plaintiffs – Proper rate fixed at Rs. 125 per mensem for each plaintiff [Paras 4-6].

Decision – Appeal No. 26 partly allowed – High Court decree modified to grant Rs. 125 per mensem maintenance to each plaintiff – Appeal No. 27 dismissed – No costs in Supreme Court, but proportionate costs to plaintiffs in courts below [Para 7].

Appeal against Conviction for Murder – Article 134 Constitution – CrPC Sections 208, 209, 287, 342 – Evidence Act Section 1 – Acquittal on Benefit of Doubt – Two brothers convicted of murdering Shiv Singh – One (Bheru) consistently admitted firing; the appellant (Hate) consistently denied complicity – Supreme Court held that the prosecution evidence did not dispel reasonable doubt when tested against the defence version and supporting circumstances – Conviction set aside and appellant acquitted [Paras 1-3, 6-7, 26-27].

Accused’s Statements under CrPC – Evidentiary Value – Must be Treated as Evidence – Statements recorded under Sections 208, 209 and 342 CrPC are substantive material to be “received in evidence and treated as evidence” – Courts must consider exculpatory portions with the same weight as inculpatory ones – Owing to presumption of innocence, a reasonable defence consistent with probabilities must be accepted unless the prosecution proves it false beyond reasonable doubt – Fundamental approach ignored by courts below [Para 8].

Medical Evidence vs. Ocular Testimony – Non-Recovery of Projectiles – Inability to Exclude Defence – Doctor opined that three anterior gunshot wounds could have been caused by a single discharge – Failure to recover shot/pellets deprived the court of crucial differentiation between the double-barrel breech-loader and the muzzle-loader – Medical evidence did not negate the defence that only one person (Bheru) fired both shots [Paras 3-4, 10].

Recovery and Condition of Weapons – Corroboration of Defence Version – Double-barrel gun (Art. D) found buried; muzzle-loader (Art. E) found openly displayed – Seizure memo and witness (P.W. 13) indicated only one gun was loaded, consistent with defence that the double-barrel had been discharged twice and the muzzle-loader remained unused – Investigative lapse in not examining barrels for fouling noted – These circumstances lend credence to defence [Paras 11-15].

Eye-Witness Credibility – Inconsistencies and Attempts to Align with Physical Exhibits – Key eye-witnesses inverted who held which weapon and invented an assault with a broken gun-butt inconsistent with lack of head injury and with which gun was broken – Their accounts conflicted with the committal-stage case and with distances/movements shown on the sketch map – Such vacillation undermines reliability against the appellant [Paras 17-23].

Circumstantial Conduct Evidence – Second Shot Not Seen by Prosecution Witnesses – Several witnesses heard two shots but none saw the second despite being within sight; this fits quick successive discharges from a double-barrel gun and undermines the version that there was a time gap allowing observation between shots – Supports defence narrative [Para 24].

Use of Abscondence – Duty to Put to Accused under Section 342 CrPC – Courts below relied on abscondence but this incriminating circumstance was never put to the accused – It is imperative to put each material fact to the accused and afford an opportunity to explain; failure vitiates reliance on that circumstance [Para 25].

Standard of Proof – Reasonable Doubt Where Defence is Reasonable and Probable – When an accused offers a reasonable, probable defence supported by some prosecution evidence, the burden on the prosecution is heavier; where its case is weak and vacillating, benefit of doubt must follow – Departure from this rule corrected on appeal [Para 26].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Conviction and death sentence of appellant set aside – Appellant to be released forthwith [Para 27].

Contract – Suit for damages for breach of contract - Frustration – Sections 32 and 56, Contract Act – Appeal Allowed – Settlement required delivery of 61 bales by a date certain, with language that goods would be delivered “as soon as they are prepared” and “as soon as they are supplied to us by the said Mill” – Held: words regulate manner and time of performance and describe goods, they do not make supply by the mill a condition precedent – Performance not contingent under Section 32, nor rendered impossible under Section 56 – High Court’s contrary view erroneous – Trial court decree for damages restored [Paras 2, 5-10, 12-15].

Construction of Commercial Contracts – “As and when supplied by the mill” – Not a Contingency but a Mode of Performance – Privy Council in Harnandrai v. Pragdas applied – Converting timing/installation language into an “if and when” condition precedent rewrites the contract – Parties did not contemplate non-supply altogether; reference to mills is descriptive and procedural – Commercial parties can bind themselves to procure goods at all events, it being a matter of price and market expectations [Paras 6-9].

Frustration/Impossibility – Burden and Admissions – Defendant’s own admission that 61 bales had not been sold to others when notice was received shows capacity to perform – Mill practice (orders placed and fulfilled against order book) required proof that an order was placed and yet not supplied – No such proof offered – Mere surmise that supply within time might not be possible is insufficient – Non-performance attributable to promisor’s default defeats plea of frustration [Paras 10-12, 14].

Statutory Framework – Primacy of Sections 32 and 56 – Courts must look primarily to the Contract Act – Section 32 governs contingent contracts; Section 56 voids agreements impossible in themselves and contracts that become impossible/unlawful after formation – No “absolving power” outside statute; implied term as to continued state of things arises only where contract and surrounding circumstances compel that inference – Not attracted on facts [Paras 5, 12-13].

Precedents – British Movietone and Tamplin – Scope – Viscount Simon (approving Earl Loreburn in Tamplin): court may infer foundational implied condition only where parties must have so proceeded; otherwise no discharge – Applied to reject frustration here where mills continued and goods could be procured or had not been otherwise appropriated [Paras 12-13].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Judgment of the High Court set aside – Trial court decree restored – Appellant entitled to costs throughout [Paras 15-16].

Civil Writ - Article 226 – Interim Relief as Sole Relief – Not Permissible – The Orissa High Court declined to decide parties’ rights yet granted interim directions maintaining possession to bridge the Section 80 CPC notice period – Held: Article 226 cannot be used to grant interim relief as the only and final relief; interim orders can be made only in aid of, and ancillary to, a main relief upon adjudication of rights – Language of Article 226 does not permit such action [Paras 6-7].

Foundation of Writ Jurisdiction – Existence of Right – The existence and determination of a legal right is the foundation for issuing writs/directions under Article 226 (“for the enforcement of… rights… and for any other purpose” must be read contextually) – Where the Court expressly refrains from deciding rights, writ relief cannot be granted [Para 6].

Finality of High Court’s Order – Interim Directions Disposed the Petitions – Though time-limited, the High Court’s order finally disposed of the petitions; hence appeals were maintainable – The characterization of relief as “interim” does not detract from its final nature when no other adjudication is made or kept pending [Para 6].

Section 80 CPC – No Bypass via Article 226 – Directions were issued merely to circumvent the 60-day notice requirement; such use is outside the scope of Article 226 – Proper course would have been to determine rights and, pending such determination, maintain status quo if warranted [Para 7].

Decision – Appeals allowed – High Court’s orders dated 2 August 1951 (and related stay order) set aside – Writ petitions dismissed; respondents to pay costs of the appeals [Paras 5, 8].

Mortgage Suit – Attestation Defect – Limitation for Personal Decree – Section 20, Limitation Act; Order 7 Rule 6 & Order 41 Rule 33 CPC – Appeal Allowed – Suit Dismissed – Plaintiffs sued on a simple mortgage; trial court refused sale for defective attestation but granted personal money decree; High Court upheld money decree while holding attestation good yet declined mortgage relief for want of cross-objection – Held: (i) bond not duly attested and cannot rank as a mortgage; (ii) personal remedy time-barred as Section 20 requires written acknowledgment of part-payments existing prior to suit; later admissions in written statement do not cure limitation; (iii) question of granting mortgage decree under Order 41 Rule 33 does not arise – Appeal allowed; suit dismissed; parties to bear own costs [Paras 2-5, 7-12, 14-16].

Limitation – Section 20 (Part-Payment) – What Extends Time – Payment must occur within limitation and be proved only by acknowledgment “in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by,” the payer – The acknowledgment may be made after expiry of the original period, but it must exist before the suit is filed; oral proof excluded; written statement admissions filed after institution cannot be relied upon to revive a time-barred claim – Order 7 Rule 6 requires the plaintiff to plead grounds of exemption existing at the date of suit – Held, personal decree barred [Paras 7-12].

Amendment of Pleadings – Relation Back – Amended averments form part of original plaint, but cannot introduce post-suit events to save limitation – No acknowledgment in writing prior to filing was pleaded or proved; Section 20 not attracted [Paras 10-12].

Mortgage – Attestation – Invalid When Witnesses Sign Before Execution – Evidence showed witnesses attested at the mortgagee’s village when the deed was written (8 April 1927), but executants signed later at Katihar on registration date (12 April 1927); attestation thus not contemporaneous with execution – Bond cannot be treated as a mortgage [Paras 14-15].

Appellate Powers – Order 41 Rule 33 CPC – When Not Invoked – In absence of valid attestation, no mortgage decree could be passed; therefore, the plea to grant mortgage relief under Order 41 Rule 33 despite no cross-objection does not arise [Paras 13, 15].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Judgments and decrees of courts below set aside – Plaintiffs’ suit dismissed – Each party to bear own costs in all courts [Para 16].

Land Revenue – Government Resolution of 1865 – Invalid Grant but Long Possession – Effect – Government gave land to Municipality for market free of rent; no formal grant executed as required by statute – Municipality built Crawford Market at large expense and remained in possession over 70 years without paying assessment – Held: possession under colour of invalid grant matured into title by limitation; title included incident of rent-free holding for market purpose – Immunity from assessment became inseparable incident of title; constituted a “right in limitation” under Section 8, Bombay Act II of 1876 [Paras 2-3, 10-11].

Section 8, Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 – “Specific Limit” Includes Nil – High Court correctly held and Supreme Court affirmed that total exemption from assessment falls within “specific limit” preserved – Section 8 protects both partial limitation and total exemption [Paras 11, 13].

Rent vs. Land Revenue – Distinction Not Open – Contention that “rent” in Resolution did not include “land revenue” rejected – Not raised in pleadings or issues; correspondence showed both parties understood “rent” as including land revenue – Government estopped from raising new plea [Para 12].

Estoppel and Equity – Section 115 Evidence Act – Representation by Government that land was rent-free, acted upon by Municipality, could not be repudiated after decades – Equity requires Government not to resile from assurance; otherwise it would amount to legal fraud – Courts bound to enforce honesty and good faith against State action [Paras 29-31].

Adverse Possession – Effect on Title and Assessment – By over 60 years’ uninterrupted possession under invalid grant, Municipality perfected title to land but adverse possession cannot extinguish Crown’s prerogative right to assess land revenue – However, right to hold rent-free arose as incident of prescribed title, not by extinguishment of prerogative [Paras 21-23, Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. concurring].

Judicial Opinions – Majority (Das J., C.J. Kania, Bose J., Aiyar J.) held appeal to fail – Minority (Patanjali Sastri J.) dissented, holding no exemption right was established and appeal should succeed [Paras 14-24].

Decision – Appeal dismissed by majority – High Court decree upheld – Respondent Corporation entitled to hold Crawford Market site perpetually rent-free for market purposes – Costs awarded against Collector [Para 13, 33].

Taxation Law - Bad Debt – Section 10(2)(xi), Income-tax Act – Debt of Earlier Firm Taken Over into Assessee’s Money-Lending Business – Deduction Allowed – On dissolution/closing of a prior partnership, assessee took his half share in a decree debt (₹8,197), opened debtor’s account in his own HUF money-lending books, credited later recoveries, and wrote off ₹5,880 as irrecoverable – Held: On the materials (book entries and conduct), the amount became a loan of the assessee’s money-lending business; write-off allowable as bad debt u/s 10(2)(xi) – No novation by debtor was necessary after a final decree; treatment in books sufficed [Paras 2-3, 6-8].

Book Entries and Evidence – There Was Material to Support Tribunal’s Finding – Opening a fresh debtor account for ₹8,197 in assessee’s business, crediting post-transfer recoveries (₹2,332) there, and issuing discharge for such recoveries showed the debt was integrated into the stock-in-trade of the assessee’s business – Tribunal’s conclusion was a possible view; High Court rightly answered reference in assessee’s favour [Paras 2-3, 8-9].

Capital vs. Trading Asset – Contention Rejected – Department’s plea that the decree debt became a capital asset on take-over and thus outside Section 10(2)(xi) was negatived – In money-lending, assigned/allocated receivables can constitute trading assets when brought into the business and dealt with as loans; deduction admissible on write-off [Paras 5, 8-9].

“No Novation” Objection – Not Required Post-Decree – High Court correctly held that after a final decree there is no scope for “novation”; debtor’s assent is unnecessary where the creditor’s business books treat the receivable as a business loan and subsequent recoveries are accounted accordingly [Para 6].

Decision – Reference answered in favour of assessee – Appeal dismissed with costs; bad-debt deduction of ₹5,880 under Section 10(2)(xi) upheld [Para 9-10].

Reassessment – Section 34 of the Income-tax Act – Notice to HUF After Partition – Valid – Escaped income of HUF for year 1939-40 sought to be assessed in 1944 – Though partition order under Section 25A(1) had been passed, ITO issued notice in name of HUF and served on karta – Held: assessment could proceed as if family still existed; no need to issue notice to each member individually – Proceedings valid [Paras 2, 4].

Assessment Procedure – Section 25A(1) and (2) – Apportionment Mandatory – ITO must first assess total income of HUF as if no partition occurred, then apportion tax liability among members according to shares of family property allotted – In present case, omission to apportion was an error; fresh demand notices must be issued individually to members under Section 25A(2) – Such apportionment is imperative [Para 5].

Recovery of Tax – Liability of Divided Members – Not Contingent on Default – Proviso to Section 25A(2) permits recovery from any member without waiting for default by another – Contrasted with Section 26, which expressly provides recovery on default – Absence of similar language in Section 25A(2) shows each member is directly liable for his share of tax; Government can recover from any [Para 6].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Reassessment under Section 34 valid; however, ITO must apportion tax and issue separate demands in compliance with Section 25A(2) – Appellant to pay costs [Paras 5-7].

Specific performance - Contract Formation – Negotiations and Counter-Offer – Mere Statement of Lowest Price – No Concluded Contract – Specific performance denied – Defendant’s cable “won’t accept less than Rs. 10,000” was not a counter-offer but a statement of minimum price – Plaintiff’s letter of 14th August confirming his “offer” of Rs. 10,000 could not amount to acceptance – Both intermediaries (agents Youngman and White) treated the communication as requiring Defendant’s acceptance – Following Harvey v. Facey, mere statement of lowest price does not amount to offer – No concluded contract existed [Paras 4–6].

Agency – Role of Intermediaries – Interpretation of Correspondence – Agents correctly proceeded on basis that Defendant’s assent was essential – Cable of 26th August (“May I sell?”) confirms no binding authority – No bias proved against Plaintiff; Youngman did not act prejudicially – Allegations of prejudice rejected [Para 7].

Relief – Compensation for Breach – In absence of concluded contract, no decree for specific performance or damages can be granted – Judicial Commissioner’s decree awarding Rs. 3,000 compensation set aside – Suit dismissed [Para 7].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Judgment and decree of Judicial Commissioner set aside – Plaintiff’s suit dismissed – No order as to costs [Para 7].