Criminal Law  – TADA Confession, Conspiracy & Death Penalty – Sections 15 TADA, 120B IPC, Articles 72/161, CrPC Sections 432–433A – Majority (Pasayat, Agrawal, JJ.) upheld conviction based on a voluntary Section 15 confession of the maker without need of corroboration, affirmed findings on conspiracy and confirmed death sentence applying the ‘rarest of rare’ test; noted availability of constitutional/executive clemency – Dissent (Shah, J.) held the confession unsafe as sole basis due to procedural lapses and lack of independent corroboration; would acquit – Outcome: Appeal dismissed; death reference confirmed [Paras 1, 4–10, 12–33, 34–36; dissent Paras 37–63].

TADA – Nature of “Terrorism” – Sections 2, 3 – Intention to overawe Government/strike terror; beyond ordinary law-enforcement capacity – Comparative/UN definitional discussion – Application context-specific [Paras 1–3].

Confession under TADA – Section 15 vs. Evidence Act – Admissibility and Voluntariness – Confession to police officer (not below SP) is substantive evidence if voluntary – Prosecution must prove safeguards; once voluntariness established, no corroboration needed to convict the maker; prudence for co-accused remains [Paras 4–6].

Retraction & Procedural Objections – Delay in retraction as afterthought – Computer-typed confession and typed certificate; non-dispatch to ACMM – Held directory irregularities causing no prejudice; forwarding to Designated Court is the mandatory core – Presumption of regularity under Section 114 Evidence Act applies [Paras 7–10].

Criminal Conspiracy – IPC Sections 120A/120B – Essence is agreement/meeting of minds; overt act not necessary for serious offence – Proof can rest on circumstantial evidence; secrecy recognised – Principles from Halsbury, Russell, Glanville Williams endorsed [Paras 12–23].

Use of Confession – Scope & Corroboration – Confession of accused alone can sustain his conviction if voluntary and truthful; corroboration advisable for co-accused; acquittal of co-accused does not ipso facto exculpate maker [Paras 24–29].

Sentence – Death Penalty – ‘Rarest of rare’ – Bachan Singh/Machhi Singh applied – Multiple deaths, diabolic execution, societal shock – Death sentence affirmed [Paras 30–32].

Clemency – Articles 72 & 161; CrPC 432–433A – Constitutional clemency powers are distinct and unfettered by statutory remission constraints; observations in Ram Deo Chauhan reiterated [Para 33].

Decision – Appeal dismissed; conviction and death sentence confirmed; death reference answered accordingly – Dissent would acquit and set aside conviction [Paras 34–36; dissent Paras 37–63].

Criminal Law – Reversal of Acquittal – Sections 302/149 IPC – Conviction Upheld – Trial court acquitted the accused invoking right of private defence under Section 100 IPC – High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the accused after finding their claim of self-defence unsustainable – Supreme Court held the High Court rightly reappreciated the evidence and found that the trial court had ignored material and admissible evidence – Held: High Court’s conviction of the accused under Sections 302/149 IPC was justified [Paras 1, 4–7, 14].

Right of Private Defence – Claim Rejected – Sections 96 and 100 IPC – Accused Found to Be Aggressors – Trial court’s finding that injuries on accused entitled them to private defence was rejected – High Court found injuries minor and sequence of assault indicated that the accused were aggressors – Held: Right of private defence cannot be claimed by aggressors – No fault in High Court’s interference with acquittal on this ground [Paras 4–6].

Appellate Jurisdiction – Powers of High Court – Section 378 CrPC – Interference Permissible – High Court has full power to reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal – Supreme Court held that where trial court ignores admissible evidence or draws conclusions based on extraneous considerations, High Court is duty-bound to interfere – Held: Interference by High Court in acquittal appeal was valid and justified [Para 7].

Unlawful Assembly – Common Object – Section 149 IPC – Existence Proven – Appellants contended that each accused acted individually – Supreme Court held that common object does not require prior meeting of minds – Accused armed with deadly weapons, shared animosity, and coordinated attack demonstrated common object – Held: Conviction under Section 149 IPC was proper [Para 9].

FIR and Eyewitness Evidence – Non-Mention of Names – Not Fatal – Argument that all accused were not named in FIR was rejected – Names were mentioned in FIR and confirmed by reliable eye-witnesses – Relationship of witnesses with deceased not a valid ground to discard evidence – Held: Testimonies of PWs 7, 12, and 22 credible and trustworthy – Statement of PW7 valid despite absence from FIR [Paras 10–13].

Final Decision – Appeal Dismissed – Conviction Sustained – Supreme Court found no merit in the appeal – Held: Conviction under Sections 302/149 and 148 IPC sustained – Appeal dismissed [Para 14].

Motor Vehicles Permits – Liberalised Policy – Section 80 & 80(2) – High Court Orders Set Aside; STAT Orders Restored – Appellants’ mini-bus permits were stalled by relying on a State Scheme ratio and by remitting matters despite Section 80’s mandate – Held: Section 80(2) obliges authorities to “ordinarily” grant permits; attempts to perpetuate “permit-raj” are contrary to the liberalised regime – Appeals Allowed [Paras 2-6, 12].

Section 99 Scheme – Preconditions – Clause 7/7-A Cannot Curtail Permits Absent STU Operation – The State may frame a scheme only where STU will operate services on an area/route, to the exclusion (complete/partial) of others, following prescribed publication and particulars – Clause 7-A neither discloses STU operation nor satisfies Section 99 requirements – Outcome: Clause 7-A not in conformity with Section 99; cannot restrict permits [Paras 6-11].

Ratio 50:50 (STU:Private) – Inapplicability to Village/Feeder Routes – Reading Clause 7 with 7-A to impose a 50:50 cap is misconceived – Without a valid Section 99 scheme earmarking STU operation, no numerical capping or reservation of routes for future STU operation is permissible – Outcome: RTA cannot refuse permits by invoking 50:50 ratio [Paras 7-11].

Due Process for Section 99 Scheme – Mandatory Steps – For any curtailment of private permits the State must: form public-interest satisfaction; specify nature of services, area/route and particulars; publish in Official Gazette and regional press – Non-compliance vitiates reliance on the scheme – Outcome: No lawful bar to grant of appellants’ permits [Paras 9-10].

Precedent Applied – Jagdip Singh v. Jagir Chand – Governing Law Reaffirmed – Supreme Court’s earlier ruling squarely covers the controversy; liberalised permitting under Section 80 prevails absent a valid Section 99 scheme – Outcome: Appeals allowed following Jagdip Singh [Paras 2, 5, 8-11].

Decision – Appeals Allowed – High Court judgments set aside – STAT orders in favour of appellants restored – No order as to costs [Para 12].

Criminal Law - Sentence for Rash and Negligent Driving – Sections 304A, 279, 337, 338 IPC – Appeal by State Allowed – Respondent convicted for rash and negligent driving causing death of four persons and injury to one – Trial Magistrate awarded six months’ imprisonment under Section 304A IPC – High Court modified sentence to fine of ₹5,000 – Held: High Court erred; findings about tyre burst unsupported by evidence – Sentence must be proportionate to gravity of offence and have deterrent effect – Respondent directed to undergo simple imprisonment of six months as imposed by Trial Magistrate – No separate sentence for Sections 279, 337, 338 IPC maintained [Paras 2-8].

Sentencing Policy – Undue Leniency Deprecated – Courts must balance discretion with societal interest – Lenient treatment in fatal accident cases may set unhealthy precedent and erode deterrence – Sentences should reflect seriousness of rash driving offences [Paras 7-8].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Sentence of six months’ simple imprisonment under Section 304A restored – Other directions of Trial Magistrate maintained [Para 8].

Tenancy Law - Great Eastern Hotel Eviction – Forcible Dispossession – Rule of Law – Sections 3 & 4, Great Eastern Hotel (Acquisition of Undertaking) Act, 1980 – Article 226 – Appeals Dismissed – The State of West Bengal forcibly evicted tenants from shops, offices, and godowns in the Great Eastern Hotel premises by using police force, claiming that tenancies stood terminated upon acquisition under the 1980 Act and that possession could be resumed in “public interest.” The Calcutta High Court held such eviction to be illegal and directed restoration. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed – Held: The Act of 1980 did not extinguish tenancies or authorise eviction by force; landlord–tenant relationship continued with the Government stepping into the shoes of the erstwhile company – “Such steps” under Section 4(8) mean due legal process, not police action – Public interest argument rejected as the venture was commercial – Forcible dispossession violates the rule of law; eviction can only be in accordance with due process – Appeals dismissed [Paras 10-13, 15-21, 25].

Forcible Eviction – Rule of Law – Sections 4(7), 4(8), 1980 Act – Article 226 – State Action Quashed – Executive cannot dispossess tenants by force; steps under Section 4(8) require recourse to lawful procedure – Appeals dismissed; High Court judgment upheld [Paras 10-13, 18, 21, 25].

Vesting and Contracts – Effect of Sections 3(1), 4(1), 4(2), 1980 Act – Tenancy Not Extinguished – Landlord-tenant relationship is not an “encumbrance” under Section 4(1) nor a “contract” under Section 4(2); tenancies survived acquisition – State became landlord in place of the company [Paras 15-17].

Hotel Authority – Acceptance of Rent/Notices – Binding on Government – Though lands/buildings not transferred under Section 3(2), Hotel Authority acted on behalf of Government; acceptance of rent and issuance of circulars bound the State [Paras 14, 17].

Scope of Section 4(8), 1980 Act – No Police Power – “Steps” for securing possession do not include force; only lawful procedures available – Extra-judicial eviction impermissible [Para 18].

Public Purpose – Long Title of 1980 Act – Insufficient to Authorise Forcible Eviction – Running a star hotel is commercial, catering to affluent customers, not the general public – No element of overriding public interest – Argument rejected [Paras 19-21].

Analogy to Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Section 47 Inapplicable – Oral notice insufficient – Possession cannot be taken under Section 47 analogy; eviction without opportunity to be heard is illegal [Para 22].

Government Premises Act, 1976 – Section 6A – Inapplicable – Respondents were tenants; provision applies only to unauthorised occupants “not being a tenant” – Cannot be invoked against respondents [Paras 23-24].

Precedents – Possession by Due Course of Law – Bishan Das v. State of Punjab and Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh applied – State prohibited from resuming possession otherwise than by due process [Paras 11-12, 18, 21].

Decision – Appeals Dismissed – Forcible eviction held illegal – High Court judgment upheld – Parties to bear own costs [Para 25].

Planning Control – Sections 46, 53, 54, 56 & 137, 1979 Act – Appeal Dismissed – The appellant constructed a second floor over an existing hotel building at Digha relying on an earlier Gram Panchayat sanction – After constitution of the Digha Planning Authority and interim guidelines under Section 56, notices under Sections 54 and 53(1) were issued to stop and demolish unauthorised development for want of permission under Section 46 – Single Judge quashed the notices but Division Bench reversed and directed the appellant to seek permission – Held: “Development” includes additions/alterations and roofing to existing buildings and attracts Section 46 permission even absent an operative development plan – Interim provisions under Section 56 and the overriding clause in Section 137(2)(b) prevail over prior Panchayat sanction – Appeal dismissed with liberty to apply under Section 46 per High Court directions [Paras 2-7, 8-15, 19-24, 29-32].

Development – Meaning and Scope – Sections 2(3), 2(7), 2(12) read with Section 46 – Addition of Second Floor is Development – Raising a further floor amounts to building operations and material alteration/enlargement – Hence “development” on/over land requiring prior permission under Section 46 – Outcome: Permission under Section 46 mandatory [Paras 19-21].

Section 46 – Applicability Without Operative Development Plan – Section 46(3)(i) & Section 56 – The authority, while considering permission, has regard to the development plan “if it has come into operation” or to “any other material consideration” – Interim provisions under Section 56 guide decisions pending an operative plan – Outcome: Section 46 applies even before plan notification [Paras 21-23].

Coastal Setback/Interim Guidelines – Section 56 – Para 8(1) of Interim Provisions – No development within 500 meters of high tide line except continuation of existing/approved buildings with authority’s approval – Further floor within the restricted belt required prior approval – Outcome: Construction without approval is unauthorised [Para 24].

Prior Panchayat Sanction vs. Planning Act – Section 137(2)(b) (Overriding Clause) – After the 1979 Act became applicable to the area, earlier permissions under other laws do not legalise development for which permission under the 1979 Act has not been obtained – Fresh approval required where interim provisions control – Outcome: Prior Panchayat sanction does not save subsequent additions contrary to interim regime [Paras 29-30].

Section 51 (Revocation/Modification) – Field of Operation – Section 51 addresses revocation/modification of permissions lawfully granted, not ongoing unauthorised development contrary to interim provisions – No duty on owner to trigger Section 51 – Here, notices under Sections 54/53(1) targeted new unauthorised works, not completed earlier works – Outcome: Section 51 inapplicable on facts [Paras 25-28].

Decision – Appeal Dismissed – High Court’s directions affirmed – Appellant may apply for permission under Section 46; authority to decide by reasoned order after hearing; interim protection and status quo as directed; directions operative from 01/04/2002 [Paras 31-32].

Electricity Act - Tariff Determination – Section 26 A.P. Electricity Reforms Act – Brief of Judgment – Annual tariff for 01.04.2000–31.03.2001 upheld by the High Court; appeal became infructuous as period expired, yet issues on Section 26 addressed – Held: Annual tariff fixation is governed by Section 26(5) with notification under Section 26(6); Section 26(9) applies only to intra-year amendments/new tariffs – Differentiation among consumer categories and cross-subsidy are expressly permitted under Section 26(7) – Judicial review under Article 226 is limited to testing legality, procedure and arbitrariness; courts are not appellate tariff authorities – Appeals dismissed with costs [Paras 4–12].

Section 26(5) vs. Section 26(9) – Distinct procedural fields – Licensee must file expected revenue from charges at least three months before the ensuing financial year; Commission must accept or propose modifications within 90 days – Section 26(9) is triggered only where a new tariff or amendment is proposed during a financial year (filing three months before the “proposed date of implementation”), resolving the apparent overlap by contextual reading – Tariff becomes effective seven days after publication under Section 26(6) [Paras 6–9].

Consumer Classification & Cross-Subsidy – Permissible under statute – While undue preference is barred, Section 26(7)(a) allows differentiation by load/power factor, consumption, time-of-use, paying capacity and the need for cross-subsidisation; tariffs must be just, reasonable and efficiency-promoting and consistent with the Act/licence – Higher industrial tariffs despite lower cost-to-serve do not per se constitute undue preference if within Section 26(7) parameters [Paras 5, 10].

Judicial Review – Article 226 – Limited supervisory role – Court examines whether the Commission followed due process and acted within law; policy choices in tariff and cross-subsidy are ordinarily not interfered with absent arbitrariness or illegality – High Court’s detailed appraisal sustained [Paras 11–12].

Decision – Appeals dismissed with costs – Clarified that annual tariffs proceed under Section 26(5) (with Section 26(6) publication), mid-year amendments under Section 26(9), and consumer categorisation/cross-subsidy are statutorily sanctioned under Section 26(7) [Paras 4, 9–12].

Land Acquisition – Section 6(1) Limitation – Fresh Period After Quash – Not Available – Competing three-Judge views resolved by Constitution Bench – Held: The limitation in the first proviso to Section 6(1) runs only from the date of the original Section 4(1) notification; quashing a Section 6 declaration does not generate a fresh limitation period – Only the period covered by a court-ordered stay is excluded (Explanation 1) – Courts cannot add to the statute (no casus omissus) – Earlier contrary views in Narasimhaiah and Nanjudaiah overruled; A.S. Naidu and Oxford English School affirmed – Decision to operate prospectively: awards already made and compensation paid not to be reopened – Subsequent Section 6 declarations in the case quashed [Paras 6–7, 9–11, 12–15, 17–18].

Section 6(1) Proviso – Limitation is Peremptory – The first proviso fixes an outer limit (three years for certain historical notifications; one year for post-1984 notifications) from publication of Section 4(1); Explanation 1 only excludes time during which action under the Section 4(1) notification stood stayed – No other exclusion can be read in – Purpose is to avoid prejudice to landowners as compensation is pegged to the Section 4(1) date [Paras 6–7, 11].

Quash of Section 6 – No “Fresh” Clock – Overlap with Section 5A urgency irrelevant – Once a Section 6 declaration is quashed, it becomes non est; State may issue a fresh declaration only if still within the original statutory period (after due procedure), else acquisition fails – Administrative inconvenience or higher compensation cannot justify re-writing the limitation [Paras 10–11].

Casus Omissus – Judicial Limits – Language of Section 6(1) is plain; courts cannot supply omissions or create a new limitation linked to receipt of the High Court’s order – Reading such a period would add a non-prescribed category beyond clauses (i) and (ii) of the proviso, impermissible in law [Paras 12–15].

Income-tax Analogies – Distinguished – Pooran Mal (Section 132(5)/(11)) turned on waiver and a different statutory scheme; National Taj Traders and Grindlays Bank not apposite to Section 6 limitation – Cannot transpose principles to land acquisition timelines [Paras 8–9].

Stare Decisis – Inapplicable – Madras FB in K. Chinnathambi Gounder pre-dated the 1984 amendment; had the legislature intended to save time post-quash, it would have said so expressly (it only saved “stay” periods) – Maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit not attracted [Para 16].

Prospective Operation – To protect finality and settled positions, the ruling applies prospectively: cases where awards have been made and compensation paid will not be re-opened – In the present matters, subsequent Section 6 declarations are quashed [Para 18].

Taxation Law - Tariff/Market Regulation – Brief of Judgment – Karnataka APMC levy on rice – Control Order under Essential Commodities Act – No Repugnancy – The appellants (rice millers/commission agents) challenged market fee on rice levied by Market Committees under the Karnataka APMC Act, urging that the Karnataka Rice Procurement (Levy) Order, 1984 covered the entire field and, by virtue of Section 6 of the Essential Commodities Act, excluded the APMC Act; they also raised issues of (i) whether levy sales to Government/agent are “sales”, and (ii) whether, after levy on paddy, rice can again be subjected to market fee – Held: Following Food Corporation of India v. State of Kerala, levy sales to Government/agent are “sales”; paddy and rice are distinct commodities and each can attract market fee; crucially, the Control Order compels procurement of 33⅓% of rice and regulates delivery/release certificates but does not create a comprehensive marketing machinery—APMC Act regulates the broader marketing framework (markets, licensing, facilities, fees) – Hence no overlap or inconsistency; Section 6 ECA not attracted – Appeals dismissed [Paras 4, 16-17].

Repugnancy – Essential Commodities Act, Section 6 – Field Occupation Test – The Control Order addresses compulsory acquisition of a portion of output and movement controls; it does not regulate general marketing of the remaining two-thirds of rice nor market infrastructure/facilities – The APMC Act governs establishment and administration of markets, licensing, facilities, and levy of market fee – As the instruments operate in distinct fields on the same subject, there is no repugnancy or trenching; both can co-exist [Paras 16-17].

Paddy vs. Rice – Separate Commodities – Market Fee – Paddy and rice are different commodities – Levy on paddy does not immunize subsequent sales of rice from market fee – Market fee can be levied on both, subject to statutory scheme [Para 4].

Levy Sales – Character as “Sale” – Procurement to State/its agent under levy order constitutes “sale” for purposes of the APMC levy – Principle reaffirmed from Food Corporation of India v. State of Kerala [Para 4].

Distinguishing Belsund Sugar – Comprehensive Special Regime Absent – In Belsund Sugar (Bihar), a special State Sugarcane Act plus Central Control Orders fully covered the field and the State exempted sugar mills from the core market-fee provision—hence the Market Act yielded – In Karnataka, the rice levy order is limited, no parallel comprehensive State Act or exemption under the APMC Act exists; therefore the APMC levy stands [Paras 8-15, 16-17].

Decision – Appeals and connected writ petitions dismissed – Levy of market fee on rice under the Karnataka APMC Act upheld – No order as to costs [Para 18].