Arbitration – Decree on Modified Award – Scope under Arbitration Act, 1940 – After an award was filed in court under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, the parties entered into a compromise modifying the award's terms – Court passed a decree incorporating the modified terms – Held: Even though the Arbitration Act limits the court’s power to modify an award under Section 15, the parties are not barred from settling their disputes differently, and the court is not precluded from incorporating such a lawful compromise under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC into the decree – Such a decree is not a nullity and can be executed [Paras 20-31].

Compromise – Validity of Compromise Modifying Arbitration Award – Court can record a compromise reached after filing of the award and incorporate it into the decree – Power to do so flows from combined reading of Section 41 of the Arbitration Act and Section 141 CPC – No requirement that all alterations to an award must be confined to Section 15 of the Arbitration Act, provided the parties mutually consent [Paras 26, 31].

Execution – Objection to Executability of Decree – Objection by Judgment-Debtor that decree was void as it was based on a modified award and not the original – Rejected – Decree was passed with consent, modifying only the mode of payment and adjusting agreed income tax liability, not altering substance of the award – Execution allowed [Paras 13-14, 32].

Procedural Law – Scope of Section 41 of Arbitration Act – Section 41 read with Order 23 Rule 3 CPC permits a court to record a compromise even in arbitration proceedings after the award is filed – Agreement modifying the award may form part of the operative decree or be appended in a schedule – Executability depends on inclusion in the operative portion [Paras 30-31].

Practice and Procedure – Late Argument Before Supreme Court – Objection as to maintainability of decree on the ground that compromise could not be recorded post-award not raised before courts below – SC entertained and decided the issue to resolve conflicting views across High Courts [Paras 20-21].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Decree passed on compromise modifying award held valid and executable – No bar under Arbitration Act to such compromise – Appellant to pay costs.

Constitutional Law – Article 20(3) – Right against self-incrimination – Scope and applicability – Specimen handwriting, thumb impressions, fingerprints and other physical identifiers taken during investigation – Whether amounts to compelled testimony – Held: "To be a witness" under Article 20(3) does not include giving of thumb impressions, palm impressions, footprints, or specimen handwriting – Such acts do not involve imparting personal knowledge of facts and hence not protected under Article 20(3) [Paras 11-13, 36-39]

Compulsion – Meaning of "Compelled" in Article 20(3) – Mere police custody or questioning by police does not amount to compulsion – Compulsion implies duress or coercion in the form of threat, violence, inducement, or physical constraint – Voluntary actions during custody without coercion are not protected by Article 20(3) [Paras 16-18, 41]

Self-Incrimination – Nature of Evidence – Testimonial vs Physical Evidence – Distinction drawn between 'personal testimony' and mechanical acts like writing samples or fingerprinting – Evidence such as signature or handwriting is not self-incriminatory per se, as it does not by itself establish guilt – Only statements conveying personal knowledge that have a tendency to incriminate fall within the bar of Article 20(3) [Paras 12-13, 36-37]

Evidence Act – Section 27 – Discovery based on accused's statement while in custody – Whether hit by Article 20(3) – Held: Section 27 is constitutionally valid – Information leading to discovery is admissible unless obtained through compulsion – Voluntary disclosure during custody not barred by Article 20(3) [Paras 14, 40]

Criminal Procedure – Police Custody – Presumption of Compulsion – Rejected – No presumption of compulsion merely because statement was made while in custody – Burden on accused to show actual compulsion or coercion in facts of the case [Paras 1-2, 17-18]

Interpretation of "Accused" – Person must be formally accused at the time of making statement to invoke Article 20(3) – Protection not available to statements made before such formal accusation [Paras 15, 43]

Judicial Precedent – Clarification and Restriction of M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra – Supreme Court clarifies that “furnishing evidence” under Article 20(3) does not extend to non-testimonial physical acts – Earlier interpretation in M.P. Sharma holding that ‘to be a witness’ includes all modes of furnishing evidence held to be too broadly stated and partly overruled [Paras 10-13, 35]

Decision: Reference answered – Article 20(3) does not bar obtaining handwriting, fingerprints or other physical identifiers from an accused – Section 27 of the Evidence Act not unconstitutional – Appeals to be heard on merits [Para 19]

Constitutional Law – Article 14 – Equality before Law – Discretion under Section 19 of Slum Areas Act – Challenge on ground of unguided and arbitrary power – Held: Though Section 19(3) does not expressly lay down guidelines, its operation is controlled by the object and purpose of the Act as reflected in the Preamble and operative provisions – Sufficient legislative guidance exists – Discretion is not unguided or discriminatory – Act valid [Paras 18–24]

Delegated Legislation – Validity of Delegation under Section 19(3) – Allegation of excessive delegation – Held: Legislative policy and objectives clearly indicated – Detailed criteria not necessary – Delegation upheld – No abdication of essential legislative function [Paras 24–25]

Fundamental Rights – Article 19(1)(f) – Right to Property – Restriction on execution of eviction decrees – Reasonableness – Held: Restriction imposed by Section 19 is temporary and justified by public interest – Prevention of slum displacement without alternate accommodation is a legitimate legislative objective – Test of reasonableness satisfied – Not violative of Article 19(1)(f) [Paras 26–29]

Rent Control – Section 13 and Section 15 of Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act – Right of re-entry by tenant if premises vacated for reconstruction – Refusal of tenant to vacate nullifies such right – Section 19 of Slum Act comes into play after decree is passed – Both statutes operate harmoniously [Paras 3–7, 32]

Doctrine of Harmonious Construction – Conflict between Rent Control Act and Slum Areas Act – Both contain non obstante clauses – Held: Slum Areas Act is a special legislation applicable to declared slum areas – Applies in addition to Rent Control Act – Section 19 overrides to extent of inconsistency [Paras 31–32]

Administrative Law – Quasi-Judicial Function – Competent Authority under Section 19(3) – Bound to follow principles of natural justice and procedure – Decisions subject to appeal under Section 20 – Held: Sufficient safeguards exist against arbitrary exercise of discretion [Paras 22, 29]

Social Welfare Legislation – Protection of Slum Dwellers – Prevention of Eviction Without Rehabilitation – Held: Law must be responsive to post-partition urban housing crisis and influx of population – Temporary curbs on landlord’s rights are constitutionally valid in broader interest of public welfare and orderly redevelopment [Paras 27–29]

Decision: Section 19 of the Slum Areas Act upheld – Not violative of Articles 14 or 19(1)(f) – Writ petition dismissed – No costs awarded [Paras 33–34]

Constitutional Law – Article 14 – Discretionary Power – Section 19 of the Slum Areas Act – Validity of Legislative Guidance – Challenge to Section 19(3) of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 on ground that it vests arbitrary power in competent authority to permit or refuse execution of eviction decrees – Held: Provision constitutionally valid – Guidance to competent authority found in policy and purpose of Act as disclosed by its preamble and operative provisions – Object is improvement and clearance of slums and protection of tenants until alternate accommodation becomes available – Discretion is canalised, not arbitrary – Does not offend Article 14 [Paras 18–23].

Delegated Legislation – Excessive Delegation – Discretionary Power – Legislative Policy and Purpose – Power under Section 19(3) not excessive delegation – Legislature has indicated clear policy to prevent eviction of slum dwellers until relocation – Absence of detailed criteria does not vitiate law – Discretion limited by legislative intent and subject to appellate review under Section 20 – No abdication of legislative function [Paras 24–25].

Fundamental Rights – Right to Property – Reasonable Restrictions – Article 19(1)(f) and (5) – Restriction on landlord’s right to obtain possession of property is reasonable and in public interest – Protection to slum dwellers promotes social welfare and prevents creation of new slums – Restriction temporary and proportionate, though duration indefinite – Indefiniteness not fatal – Reasonableness judged in context of post-partition housing crisis and social necessity – Restriction within permissible limits under Article 19(5) [Paras 26–29].

Statutory Interpretation – Conflict between Rent Control Act and Slum Areas Act – Effect of Non Obstante Clauses – Sections 38 of Rent Control Act and 39 of Slum Areas Act both contain non obstante clauses – Special provisions of the Slum Areas Act prevail – Section 19 applies to decrees obtained under Rent Control Act and operates in addition thereto – Both enactments harmoniously construed [Paras 31–32].

Judicial Review – Scope under Article 32 – Court confined to constitutionality of impugned section, not to correctness of administrative orders – Orders of competent authority consistent with legislative policy – Section 19 not ultra vires Constitution [Paras 11, 23].

Decision: Petitions dismissed – Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 upheld as constitutionally valid – No order as to costs [Paras 33–34].

Criminal Conspiracy – Misappropriation of Military Stores – Army Officer Convicted – Accused No. 1, Major E.G. Barsay, conspired with others to smuggle military stores from Dehu Vehicle Depot for illegal sale – Scheme meticulously planned during superior’s leave – Appellant arranged staff transfers, vehicle assignments, and dummy paperwork to facilitate theft – Held: Conspiracy established beyond reasonable doubt – Conviction under Section 120B IPC and Section 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act upheld [Paras 2-8, 54-79].

Army Law – Concurrent Jurisdiction – Court-Martial vs. Criminal Court – Objection raised that only court-martial could try accused under Army Act – Rejected – Held: Army Act Sections 125-127 envisage concurrent jurisdiction – No action taken by commanding officer under Section 125 – Special Judge under Criminal Law (Amendment) Act had valid jurisdiction – Section 7 of the 1952 Act overrides Army Act for listed offences [Paras 17-27, 36-37].

Procedural Law – Validity of Sanction – Sanction under Section 6(1)(a) Prevention of Corruption Act issued in name of Central Government and signed by Deputy Secretary – Held: Complies with Article 77(1) of Constitution – Valid sanction established through oral and documentary evidence [Paras 38-44].

Investigation – Objection to Legality under Section 5A – Investigating officer authorized by Inspector General of Police, Delhi Special Police Establishment – Technical failure to record reasons for bypassing magistrate’s approval – Held: Investigation irregular but not illegal – No prejudice caused – Conviction not vitiated [Paras 45-47].

Criminal Procedure – Framing of Charges – Conspiracy Charges Involving Public and Private Persons – Valid – Non-public servants may be charged for abetment under Section 109 IPC read with Prevention of Corruption Act – Conviction under Section 5(2) upheld despite omission of Section 34 IPC – No prejudice caused to accused [Paras 50-53].

Witness Testimony – Credibility of Trap Witness – Lawrence acted as decoy and gave detailed account of conspiracy – Courts treated him as interested but not tainted witness – His testimony corroborated in material particulars by independent evidence – Held: Sufficient to sustain conviction of accused No. 1 [Paras 61-79].

Appeal by State – Acquittal of Accused Nos. 2 and 3 – Evidence against them insufficiently corroborated – High Court’s findings accepted – No interference warranted under Article 136 of Constitution [Paras 80-81].

Decision: Appeal by Accused No. 1 dismissed – Conviction and sentence confirmed – Appeal by State against acquittal of Accused Nos. 2 and 3 also dismissed.

Income Tax – Reference under Section 66 – Scope of Jurisdiction – High Court’s jurisdiction under Section 66 is confined to questions of law arising out of the Tribunal's order – Such questions must have been raised before or dealt with by the Tribunal – Held: A question neither raised before the Tribunal nor dealt with by it cannot be said to arise out of its order and is not entertainable by the High Court [Paras 1, 10, 40].

Taxation – Applicability of Amendment – Section 10(2)(vii), Fourth Proviso – Tribunal applied the Fourth Proviso introduced by the Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1946 to tax compensation received for loss of a ship – High Court held proviso not retrospective and not applicable to assessment year 1946-47 since it came into force only on 04/05/1946 – Assessment year commenced on 01/04/1946 – Held: Tribunal erred in applying the amended provision; compensation not taxable [Paras 6, 43, 44].

Interpretation – What Constitutes “Question of Law Arising out of Order” – Supreme Court laid down exhaustive principles on when a question of law can be said to arise out of the Tribunal's order – Held: (1) If raised and dealt with, clearly arises; (2) If raised but not dealt with, deemed to arise; (3) If not raised but dealt with, arises; (4) If neither raised nor dealt with, does not arise even if it can be inferred from facts found [Paras 39, 40].

Income Tax – Capital Receipt vs Revenue Receipt – Compensation for war loss of capital asset (ship) – Exceeds original cost – Whether taxable – Held: Amount of Rs. 9,26,532 would be taxable only if the Fourth Proviso applied – As it was not in force at the start of assessment year 1946-47, the amount remained a capital receipt and could not be taxed [Paras 2, 44, 46].

Reference Jurisdiction – Power of Tribunal and High Court – Scope of s.66(1) and s.66(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 – High Court acts in advisory capacity and cannot enlarge Tribunal’s reference – However, new legal contention within scope of question as framed may be entertained – Held: In present case, High Court correctly entertained argument on applicability of proviso since it was implicit in the question referred [Paras 41, 43, 44].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Assessment held invalid – Compensation received not taxable – High Court judgment upheld.

Negotiable Instruments – Presumption of Consideration – Burden of Proof – Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act – Rebuttal by Circumstantial Evidence – Held: The statutory presumption under Section 118 that every negotiable instrument or endorsement is made for consideration is rebuttable – The burden initially rests on the plaintiff to prove execution, whereafter the presumption shifts to the defendant – Such presumption may be rebutted not only by direct evidence but also by circumstantial evidence and adverse presumptions under Section 114 of the Evidence Act – If the party in possession of relevant documents deliberately withholds them, the court may presume that such evidence would have been unfavourable to him – Such adverse inference can rebut the presumption under Section 118 – Custodian-General rightly held that the endorsement of the promissory note was not supported by consideration [Paras 4–9].

Evidence – Burden of Proof – Section 101, 114 of the Evidence Act – Non-production of Documents – Adverse Inference – Burden of proof initially on plaintiff to establish execution and consideration – Once execution proved, presumption under Section 118 arises, but may be displaced by proof of circumstances showing absence of consideration – Failure to produce account books or examine material witnesses who could prove transaction allows court to presume, under Section 114(g), that such evidence would be adverse to the plaintiff’s case – The Custodian-General’s inference based on withholding of account books and non-examination of partner was justified [Paras 5–8].

Administrative Law – Custodian-General – Powers under Section 40 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act – Scope of Judicial Review – Custodian-General’s findings based on legal principles and proper appreciation of evidence – His conclusion that the endorsement lacked consideration not perverse or erroneous – Supreme Court will not interfere under Article 136 when finding of fact is based on proper application of evidentiary principles [Para 9].

Decision: Appeal dismissed with costs – Endorsement of promissory note held unsupported by consideration – Custodian-General’s order upheld [Para 10].

Mines and Minerals – Scope of Coal Bearing Areas Act – Applicability to Worked or Dormant Mines – Notification under Section 4 – Whether Limited to Virgin Land – Held: Act applies not only to virgin land but also to dormant collieries and previously worked mines not actively operated at the time of notification – Notification under Section 4 is not ultra vires merely because land was worked in the past – Interpretation of “unworked land” in preamble does not restrict the express language of the statute [Paras 1–24]

Statutory Interpretation – Use of Preamble – Role in Construing Statutes – Held: Preamble may aid construction when language is ambiguous, but cannot override clear statutory provisions – Sections 4(1), 4(4), and 5(b) indicate Parliament's intent to include previously worked or dormant mines within ambit of Act [Paras 5–8, 10–13, 24]

Fundamental Rights – Article 19(1)(g) and Reasonable Restrictions – Validity of Temporary Prohibition on Mining Operations – Held: Restriction under Section 5(b) preventing mining for 2–3 years due to prospecting is reasonable and in public interest – Parliament is competent to legislate based on technical requirements of prospecting duration [Paras 25]

Constitutional Law – Article 31(2) – Adequacy of Compensation – Challenge to Act on Ground that Compensation Does Not Cover Mineral Rights – Held: Act provides compensation based on principles laid out in Sections 13 and 14 – Even though value of minerals is excluded under Explanation to Section 13(5), such exclusion cannot be questioned due to Article 31(2) bar on challenging adequacy of compensation [Paras 31–32]

Article 31A(1)(e) – Meaning of “Modification” – Temporary Suspension of Mining Rights – Whether Protected – Held: Temporary deprivation or suspension of mining rights qualifies as “modification” under Article 31A(1)(e) – Petitioners cannot challenge Act for lack of compensation under Article 31(2) where rights are modified by law [Paras 26–28]

Property Law – Severance of Mineral Rights – Contention that Worked Mines Form Separate Tenement – Rejected – Held: No legal severance arises merely due to working of mine by lawful owner/lessee – No requirement for separate compensation for mineral estate where land and minerals held as single tenement [Paras 22–23, 33]

Writ Jurisdiction – Non-Citizen Company’s Rights – East India Coal Co. Ltd. Incorporated in UK – Entitlement under Article 31 – Held: Protection under Article 19 not available to non-citizen companies – But Article 31 protections apply even to foreign incorporated entities [Para 1]

Decision: Act is intra vires – Notification under Section 4 upheld – Petitions dismissed with costs – One hearing fee divided between petitioners [Paras 34–36]

Criminal Law – Sentence of Transportation for Life – Nature and Legal Effect – Petitioner convicted for murder under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to transportation for life – Held: Even before the 1955 amendment, such sentence did not necessarily involve deportation overseas – As per Pandit Kishori Lal v. King Emperor, transportation for life is to be treated as rigorous imprisonment for life and can be served in Indian prisons [Paras 5-6]

Penal Code – Section 53A – Retrospective Effect – After the 1955 amendment to the IPC, sentence of transportation for life is to be treated as rigorous imprisonment for life – Held: Petitioner, though sentenced prior to amendment, must be dealt with under the amended Section 53A as if sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life [Paras 6-7]

Remission – Scope and Effect – Remissions earned by a life convict under prison rules do not ipso facto entitle the convict to release – Held: Remission of sentence under Section 401 CrPC is within the exclusive domain of the appropriate Government – Even if remissions earned equate to 15 or 20 years of sentence, release requires formal remission order – No automatic substitution of life sentence to fixed term [Paras 8-16]

Prison Rules – Interpretation of Bombay Jail Manual – Rules equating life imprisonment to 15 years for remission calculation held to be only for working out remission benefits – Not to be construed as altering substantive sentence – Release conditional on Government order under Section 401 CrPC [Paras 10-15]

Article 32 – Habeas Corpus – No Right to Release Without Formal Remission – Petitioner’s claim of unlawful detention rejected – Held: Life imprisonment continues unless remitted by appropriate authority – Writ of habeas corpus not maintainable when detention is legal under unremitted sentence [Paras 16-18]

Decision: Petition dismissed – Petitioner continues to be under lawful custody – Remissions earned do not automatically reduce life sentence – Release subject to appropriate Government’s discretion under Section 401 CrPC – No relief under Article 32 [Paras 18-19]