Rape – Acquittal Reversed – Section 376 IPC – Conviction Restored – The accused were convicted by the trial court based on the credible testimony of the prosecutrix and corroborating medical and forensic evidence – High Court acquitted them on speculative and unsustainable grounds, disbelieving the prosecutrix without sufficient basis – Supreme Court held the acquittal was perverse and unsupported by the evidence – Held: Conviction restored, accused to serve remaining sentence [Paras 1–3, 8–9].

Appreciation of Evidence – Prosecutrix’s Testimony – No Need for Corroboration – Legal Principle Reaffirmed – High Court rejected the victim’s evidence due to minor discrepancies and speculative doubts regarding injury and semen origin – Supreme Court reiterated that credible testimony of a rape victim does not require corroboration – Held: Where the prosecutrix's account is trustworthy and consistent, it should not be discarded on trivial grounds [Paras 4–7].

Medical and Forensic Evidence – Supports Prosecution Case – Corroboration of Victim’s Version – Injuries on prosecutrix's person and forensic reports confirming presence of semen and blood on her clothes supported her narrative – High Court erred in dismissing such objective findings on hypothetical conjectures – Held: Medical and chemical evidence corroborate victim’s version of sexual assault [Paras 5–6].

Judicial Approach – Sensitivity in Rape Trials – Duty of Courts Emphasised – Supreme Court condemned the High Court’s insensitivity and reliance on unfounded assumptions – Cited precedent in State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh to reaffirm that courts must adopt a sensitive approach in rape cases and not be swayed by minor contradictions – Held: Broader probabilities and victim dignity must guide judicial analysis [Para 7].

Final Decision – Appeal Allowed – Conviction and Sentence Restored – Supreme Court allowed the State’s appeal, set aside the High Court’s acquittal, and restored the trial court’s conviction and sentence of five years’ imprisonment – Accused directed to be re-arrested to serve remainder of sentence [Para 9].

Criminal Law - Right to Speedy Trial – Article 21 of Constitution – Judicial Guidelines Not Binding Limitations – Directions Invalid – In several corruption cases, accused were acquitted by Special Courts for non-commencement of trial within two years as per directions in Raj Deo Sharma – High Courts reversed acquittals without notice – Held: Although right to speedy trial is fundamental under Article 21, judicially fixed time-limits in Common Cause and Raj Deo Sharma amount to impermissible judicial legislation – Such fixed bars contradict the Constitution Bench ruling in A.R. Antulay – Held: Speedy trial must be determined on facts of each case; time limits may act as reminders but are not binding – Criminal proceedings cannot be terminated solely on lapse of time [Paras 1–5, 26–34].

Judicial Legislation – Separation of Powers – Time-Limits for Trials Impermissible – Judiciary Cannot Legislate – Held: Courts cannot enact general legal rules or cut-off dates for criminal trials in absence of legislative provision – Time-limits laid down in Common Cause and Raj Deo Sharma decisions were ultra vires the judicial function and encroached into legislative domain – Such bars scuttle justice and undermine victims’ rights [Paras 26–30].

Binding Precedent – Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay Prevails – Later Smaller Benches Cannot Override – Held: Judicial discipline demands that benches of lesser strength follow the law laid down by larger benches – Since A.R. Antulay (five-Judge Bench) held that time-limits for trials cannot be fixed, contrary views in Common Cause and Raj Deo Sharma (two/three-Judge Benches) are not good law and are overruled [Paras 31–32].

Remand – Violation of Natural Justice – High Court Orders Without Notice to Accused Set Aside – Appeals Allowed – Held: High Courts erred in allowing State appeals and reversing acquittals without issuing notice to accused – Such orders violate principles of natural justice – Matter remanded to High Court for fresh hearing after notice to accused [Paras 1–4, 34].

Criminal Law – Murder - Circumstantial Evidence – False Defence – Section 302 IPC – Conviction Upheld – The appellant was convicted for strangulating his wife and falsely reporting her death as suicide – He admitted in his statement under Section 313 CrPC that he was present in the house at the time of incident – Medical evidence showed ligature marks incompatible with hanging and consistent with strangulation – Appellant’s conduct was unnatural and his defence unsupported by physical or forensic evidence – Held: Circumstances conclusively point to guilt – Conviction upheld [Paras 1–6].

Medical Evidence – Conflict with Defence – Cause of Death Not Consistent with Suicide – Post-mortem report revealed anti-mortem ligature mark horizontally placed, ruling out hanging – Doctor’s evidence negated the claim of suicide and supported prosecution case of strangulation – False version by accused further established culpability [Para 4].

Failure to Report Incident – Delay in Informing Police – Appellant did not immediately report his wife’s death to police and only did so after villagers' insistence – Such delay and absence of spontaneous reaction indicative of guilt – Conduct inconsistent with that of an innocent person discovering suicide [Para 4].

Civil Law - Summary Suit – Leave to Defend – Order 37 CPC – Leave Granted – Respondent filed a summary suit under Order 37 CPC based on a document termed as an indemnity/guarantee signed by the appellant bank's manager – Trial Court and High Court denied leave to defend, holding the defence as sham – Supreme Court held that triable issues existed regarding the nature of the document and allegations of fraud – Held: Leave to defend ought to have been granted as serious disputed questions of fact and law arose, including whether the document was a guarantee or indemnity [Paras 6–13, 16].

Bank Liability – Nature of Document – Indemnity vs. Guarantee – Triable Issue – Document signed by the bank manager merely affixed a stamp below a clause referring to joint liability – Appellant argued the document was not recorded officially and was executed beyond the manager's authority – Supreme Court observed that whether the document created a guarantee or indemnity required examination – Held: Summary procedure under Order 37 CPC not applicable to indemnity bonds; thus, leave to defend was wrongly denied [Paras 12–14].

Indemnity Bond – Not Covered Under Order 37 CPC – Proof of Loss Essential – Court clarified that while claims on guarantees may fall within Order 37 CPC, indemnity bonds do not – Indemnity entails proving actual loss before enforcement – Held: Even if document is construed as a guarantee, it is not unconditional; hence, claim does not qualify for summary procedure [Paras 14–15].

Fraud Alleged – Defence Not Sham – Summary Rejection Improper – Appellant alleged collusion between its former manager and the second respondent, and that the document was fraudulent and outside banking procedures – No denial of these averments by the respondent – Held: Allegations of fraud constitute valid triable issue, justifying grant of leave to defend [Paras 7, 13].

Precedents Distinguished – No Unconditional Bank Guarantee Involved – Respondent relied on ONGC v. SBI regarding unconditional bank guarantees – Supreme Court distinguished that case, holding the present document was neither unconditional nor clearly a bank guarantee – Held: ONGC ruling not applicable to present facts [Para 15].

Final Decision – Appeal Allowed – Leave to Defend Granted – Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Trial Court and High Court, and granted leave to defend to the appellant bank – Directed filing of written statement and expedited trial proceedings – Clarified that observations are prima facie and do not affect merits of the case [Paras 16–18].

Constitutional Law - Minority Rights – Scope of Article 30(1) – Clarification Sought – Eleven-Judge Bench Formulated Questions – The Full Bench was constituted to reconsider and clarify issues arising out of earlier rulings in St. Stephen’s College and Unni Krishnan cases – The Bench framed eleven comprehensive questions involving the definition of minorities, the scope of educational rights under Article 30(1), and the regulatory powers of the State – Held: Questions reformulated to cover the meaning of minority, extent of administrative autonomy of minority institutions, and reconciliation of minority rights with regulatory mechanisms [Para 1].

Religious and Linguistic Minorities – Identification and Rights – Article 30(1) – Rights Not Absolute – Questions were raised whether the mere establishment or administration by members of a minority group qualifies an institution for minority status – Further, whether such status entitles it to autonomy in admissions, staff appointments, and fee structures – Held: Minority rights are subject to reasonable regulation to maintain academic standards and fairness in access to education [Para 1].

Professional Education – Minority Institutions – Regulatory Oversight – Full Bench sought to determine whether professional education (such as medical and engineering) could be claimed exclusively under Article 30(1) and to what extent State regulation of admissions and fees is permissible – Held: Answer deferred pending detailed adjudication, but reformulated questions indicate the State's regulatory interest remains significant [Para 1].

Right of Admission – State Aid and Autonomy – Distinction Between Aided and Unaided Institutions – Key issue framed was whether receiving State aid limits the autonomy of minority institutions in admissions and administrative policies – Held: Receipt of aid may attract regulatory conditions, particularly regarding non-discrimination and fairness in public interest [Para 1].

Cross-State Minority Claims – Applicability of Minority Status Across States – Issues raised about whether a linguistic or religious group that is a majority in one State can claim minority rights in another State – Held: Referred for adjudication, but prima facie indicates the territorial and contextual nature of minority status under the Indian Constitution [Para 1].

Precedents Reconsidered – Validity of St. Stephen’s and Unni Krishnan Judgments Questioned – Court indicated that the principles laid down in St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi and Unni Krishnan v. State of A.P. need reconsideration, particularly in the context of admissions, reservations, and State regulation – Held: Decision on whether these cases were correctly decided deferred to final ruling [Para 1].

Decision – Order Passed for Reframing of Questions – No Final Determination Yet – The Court reframed the key constitutional questions for broader consideration and reserved final judgment – Held: Proceedings to continue based on reframed questions covering minority identity, institutional autonomy, and State regulatory powers [Para 1].

Criminal Law – Duty of Appellate Court – Sections 325, 326, 34 IPC – Appeal Allowed; Remand Ordered – Appellants convicted under Sections 326, 325 read with Section 34 IPC – High Court dismissed their criminal appeal with a brief order stating that there was no error in trial court findings, without discussing prosecution or defence evidence – Held: In a criminal appeal, the appellate court is duty-bound to independently reappraise the evidence and cannot dispose of the matter merely by affirming the trial court’s view – Such disposal denies accused their valuable right of appeal – Impugned judgment set aside; matter remitted to High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law [Paras 3-5].

Right of Appeal – Valuable Safeguard – Appellate scrutiny ensures fairness in conviction and sentencing – A cryptic order without examining evidence amounts to miscarriage of justice and is “unknown to law” [Para 4].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – High Court order set aside – Matter remitted to High Court to hear and decide appeal afresh after proper appraisal of evidence and hearing parties [Para 5].

Constitution Bench reference - Binding Precedent – Larger Bench vs Smaller Bench – Article 141 – Two-Judge Bench cannot take a view contrary to a prior Three-Judge Bench – The Court traced earlier PMS doctors’ litigation: Allahabad High Court and a Three-Judge Bench (24.11.1992) upheld counting seniority of temporary doctors from initial appointment – Later Two-Judge Bench orders (23.03.1995; 26.07.1996) holding seniority only from regularisation under Rule 7 directly conflicted – Held: Pronouncement of law by a Bench of larger strength binds a Bench of lesser strength; smaller Bench cannot overrule/differ; proper course is reference to larger Bench – The Two-Judge orders do not lay down the correct law [Paras 16-18, 20-23, 24].

Regularisation Rules, 1979 – Rule 7 – Inapplicability when contrary to Larger Bench Law – Three-Judge Bench approval of High Court view allowing seniority from initial appointment stood as binding declaration – Two-Judge reliance on Rule 7 to restrict seniority to date of regularisation held impermissible being contrary to binding precedent [Paras 16-18, 24].

Judicial Discipline – Reference Procedure – Bench Strength Hierarchy – For disagreement with a coordinate/larger Bench, the matter must be referred to an appropriate larger Bench; ensures certainty and consistency in law [Paras 20-23].

Scope of Present Decision – Merits Not Decided – Court confined to resolving conflict and effect thereof; inter se rights of parties and correctness of Dr. Mathur left open for decision by a Three-Judge Bench hearing the writs; intervention applications also left to that Bench [Paras 13, 25].

Decision – Two-Judge Bench orders dated 23.03.1995 & 26.07.1996 declared not reflecting the correct law, being in conflict with Three-Judge Bench judgment dated 24.11.1992 – Writ petitions to be listed before a Bench of three learned Judges for final disposal [Paras 24, 26].

Article 30(1) – Minority Educational Institutions – Reference to Larger Bench – Eleven-Judge Bench – Questions Reframed – The Court, after hearing parties, reformulated comprehensive questions on (i) who are “minorities” and the unit for determination, (ii) scope of the right to establish and administer, including admissions/selection procedures in aided and unaided institutions, (iii) territorial location and whether preferences can be extended across States, (iv) whether non-minorities in one State can set up in another State and claim minority status, (v) indicia to identify minority institutions, (vi) whether establishment or administration alone suffices, (vii) extent of State/University regulation of admissions, (viii) correctness of St. Stephen’s ratio, (ix) meaning of “religion” for Article 30(1) including sect/denomination claims, and (x) reconsideration/modification of Unni Krishnan (save primary education as fundamental right) – Prior precedents flagged for reconsideration – No final pronouncement on merits at this stage; matters to be heard and decided on the reframed questions – Decision: Reference questions settled; merits reserved [Order framing issues].

Minority Status – Unit of Determination – Inter-State Operation – Questions set for decision on whether minority status is State-specific; if institutions founded in State ‘A’ can extend preferences to co-religionists/linguistic groups from other States where they are non-minorities – Outcome: Issues reserved for authoritative ruling [Order framing issues].

Admissions & Regulation – Aided vs Unaided – Whether right to lay down admission procedure is part of administration under Article 30(1) and the effect of State aid – Whether State/University can regulate admissions in minority institutions – Outcome: Issues flagged; to be decided by the Bench [Order framing issues].

Precedents – St. Stephen’s & Unni Krishnan – Correctness Questioned – Court expressly put in issue the continuing validity of St. Stephen’s (1992) and Unni Krishnan (1993) scheme (except recognition of primary education as a fundamental right) – Outcome: To be reconsidered in the reference [Order framing issues].

Establishment vs Administration – Indicia – Whether minority character is derived from founder’s identity or from administration; tests/indicia to treat an institution as “minority educational institution” – Outcome: Questions posed for determination [Order framing issues].

Decision – Reference – Eleven-Judge Bench reframed and consolidated the questions for final adjudication on the ambit of Article 30(1) and related regulatory issues – No final relief granted on merits; adjudication to follow on the settled questions.

Acquisition Law - BDA Acquisition – Applicability of L.A. Act Section 11A/Section 6 – Not Applicable – The appellant sought to quash BDA acquisition contending that the award passed beyond Section 11A’s period caused lapse – Held: BDA Act is a special, self-contained code for planned development (List II Entry 5); it provides its own scheme for declaration (Section 19), execution and lapsing (Section 27) – By necessary implication, L.A. Act Sections 6 and 11A do not apply to BDA acquisitions; lapsing is only per Section 27 when scheme not substantially executed within 5 years of Section 19(1) declaration [Paras 10-11, 15].

Legislation by Incorporation/Reference – BDA Act vs L.A. Act – Not Supplemental/pari materia – Section 36 BDA does not bind to future L.A. amendments – Unlike Karnataka House Sites Act (considered in Mariyappa), the BDA Act is complete as to acquisition for its purposes; amendments like Section 11A cannot be imported absent express intendment; U.P. Avas distinguished; Narasimhan principles applied [Paras 12-15].

Compensation & Procedure Under Improvement Acts – “So far as applicable” – Prior rulings (Narayanaiah; P. Govindan; Farid Ahmed) affirmed that general L.A. principles (e.g., compensation determination) apply unless excluded by special procedure; however, limitation provisions of Sections 6/11A are excluded for BDA by necessary implication [Paras 8-11].

Delay/Laches – Owner’s Conduct – Appellant’s own litigation and interim orders impeded timely progress; cannot found a plea of lapse or inequity – No merit [Para 16].

Decision – Appeal Dismissed – High Court view following Khoday Distilleries approved; acquisition sustained; no costs [Paras 11, 17].