FACTS:

The appellant, a Chit Fund Private Limited Company, had a dispute with the respondents over non-payment of installments.

The matter was referred to arbitration, but the award was set aside because the reference to arbitration was deemed improper, lacking notice to the respondents.

The appellant filed a civil suit, but it was held to be time-barred.

ISSUES:

Whether the period spent in pursuing the matter before the arbitrator can be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

HELD:

The learned Counsel for the appellant argued that the entire period spent before the arbitrator should be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

The contention is not accepted. Referring to Section 37(5) of the Arbitration Act, the court emphasizes that the exclusion is applicable from the commencement of arbitration to the date of the court's order.

Section 37(5) and Section 37(3) are to be read together. "Commencement of arbitration," as per Sub-section (5), is defined in Sub-section (3), requiring notice to the other parties. In this case, no notice was issued, making the reference to arbitration improper.

Since the reference to arbitration was held improper in earlier proceedings, the period spent pursuing the remedy before arbitration cannot be excluded. The decision of the High Court is affirmed, and the appeal is dismissed.

REFERRED CASES:

Facts:

The case pertains to the assessment year 1983-84, involving M/S. THE MALABAR INDUSTRIES CO. LTD. (Appellant) and the COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, KERALA STATE (Respondent). The appellant, a public limited company, entered into an agreement for the sale of a rubber plantation estate. The purchaser failed to adhere to the payment schedule, leading to an extension with compensation/damages for loss of agricultural income. The Commissioner, after examining records, found the nil assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to revenue.

Issues:

Was the Tribunal justified in holding that there was evidence before the Commissioner that the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to revenue?

Was the Tribunal justified in holding that Rs. 3,66,649 was a taxable receipt for the assessment year 1983-84?

Held:

The Commissioner's exercise of jurisdiction under Section 263(1) is warranted when the Assessing Officer's order is both erroneous and prejudicial to revenue. Loss of tax, if due to an erroneous order, is considered prejudicial. The Commissioner correctly invoked Section 263(1) as the income tax Officer's order lacked application of mind and resulted in loss of tax lawfully payable.

The second contention, regarding Rs. 3,66,649 being agricultural income, was rejected. The High Court's finding that the amount was a taxable receipt under 'income from other sources' was upheld. The resolution passed by the appellant was not placed before the Assessing Officer, and there was no material supporting the claim of compensation for loss of agricultural income.

Facts:

The dispute spans over half a century, originating from a 1943 document (Ex. P-1) labeled as "Otti and Kuzhikanam." The appellant claimed redemption of the mortgage, asserting Ex. P-1 was a usufructuary mortgage. The respondent contended that the earlier lease persisted despite Ex. P-1. Trial courts decreed in favor of the appellant, culminating in a final decree for redemption.

Issues:

Whether the rights of the lessee would continue after the redemption of the mortgage. The interpretation of Ex. P-1, the nature of the transaction, and the applicability of Section 12(1) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act were key points of contention.

Held:

The trial court's findings, upheld in appeal, had conclusively determined that the respondent was in possession as a mortgagee, not a tenant. The High Court, during execution proceedings, erred in revisiting these settled issues.

Section 12(1) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act allows proof that a transaction ostensibly a mortgage is, in substance, a lease. However, this does not permit the court to supersede findings that the earlier lease terminated with the mortgage transaction.

The respondent failed to establish that Ex. P-1 was a lease, not a mortgage. The nomenclature, absence of rent stipulation, and the acknowledgment of a substantial mortgage amount favored the conclusion that it was a mortgage.

The reasoning of the High Court, suggesting the survival of the earlier lease, lacked merit. The parties, by executing Ex. P-1 in 1943, had clearly intended a change from a lease to an "Ottikuzhikanam" arrangement.

The decree-holder was entitled to the fruits of the decree for redemption. The impugned order of the High Court was set aside.

Facts:

Respondents filed a partition suit for Plot No. 64/1/A and other properties, which was decreed in 1969.

The Collector, under Section 54 of CPC, was referred the matter for partition since one property was assessed to land revenue.

The Appellant challenged the Collector's order under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code.

Deputy Secretary allowed the revision but was later challenged by the Respondents in a civil suit.

The civil suit was decreed, and subsequent appeals were dismissed, leading to a second appeal.

Issues:

Whether the order passed by the Collector is challengeable under the Bombay Land Revenue Code, and if so, what is the proper procedure for such challenge?

Held:

The contention is that the Collector, being a Revenue Officer, is amenable to the jurisdiction of the State Government under Sections 203 and 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code.

Reliance is placed on the decision in Paygonda Survgonda Patil's case, emphasizing that the Collector is a revenue officer, and decisions/orders by the Collector can be appealed under Section 203, even if not related to land revenue matters.

The court disagrees with the Mysore High Court's view and holds that there is a substantial question of law involved.

The second appeal is remanded to the High Court for a fresh disposal on its merits after notice to the parties.

Facts:

Sohan Lal Sachdev, deceased, represented by Mrs. Hirinder Sachdev, was the landlord of premises at 49, Golf Links, New Delhi.

The first floor and Barsati floor were let out to Sachdeva Guest House for running a guest house.

New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC) demanded electricity and water charges at 'non-domestic rates' from 1-10-1981, arguing that the usage for running a guest house is 'commercial.'

Issues:

Whether the use of premises for running a guest house can be termed as 'domestic use' for the purpose of electricity charges by NDMC?

Whether NDMC is competent to charge electricity consumption on non-domestic rates?

Held:

The Trial Judge initially held that running a guest house cannot be termed as a 'commercial user' but allowed NDMC to charge non-domestic rates.

On appeal, the Senior Civil Judge and the first Appellate Court agreed with the Trial Judge, upholding NDMC's right to charge non-domestic rates.

The High Court, however, reversed the decisions, stating that the use of the premises for running a guest house without kitchen facilities is for 'residential purposes,' and NDMC cannot charge based on commercial use.

The Supreme Court, analyzing Section 23 of the Electricity Act, determined that the user of the premises by the owner is relevant, not the purpose for which the guest uses electricity.

The Court concluded that the use of the premises for a guest house is for 'commercial purpose,' allowing NDMC to charge electricity rates applicable to commercial use.

Facts:

Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, imposes a ceiling limit on landholding.

Moosakutty Haji declared his lands, and the Taluk Land Board determined the excess land, directing him to surrender it.

Appellants claimed that certain lands were erroneously recorded under Moosakutty Haji's possession, presenting Certificates of Purchase granted to tenants under Section 72K.

Issues:

Validity and conclusiveness of Certificates of Purchase in the face of Taluk Land Board's determination of excess land.

Interpretation of Section 72K and the evidentiary value of Certificates of Purchase.

Held:

The Court emphasizes that Section 4 of the Evidence Act defines "conclusive proof," barring evidence to contradict or vary it.

Conclusive proof can only be challenged on grounds of fraud or collusion; no such allegations were made in this case.

Refers to Chettian Veetil Ammad case, stating that a Certificate of Purchase must be treated as conclusive proof, and its evidentiary value cannot be disregarded unless inaccurate on its face or procured fraudulently.

Criticizes the High Court for not considering the legal implications of Section 72K and placing an unwarranted burden on the appellants to prove the validity and correctness of Certificates of Purchase.

The Taluk Land Board should have given due weight to the Certificates of Purchase, and the burden was incorrectly placed on the appellants to substantiate their validity.

Appeals allowed, upholding the appellants' claims regarding the lands in question.

Facts:

On 30-06-1997, a massacre occurred in a village in Madurai District, resulting in the death of six individuals from a Scheduled Caste community.

Thirty-four persons were arrested in connection with the incident, and many were subsequently granted bail by orders of the Madras High Court.

Advocates filed petitions before the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court seeking the cancellation of bail, but the Division Bench found them not maintainable.

Issues:

Whether advocates, who were not parties to the case, could file representations for the cancellation of bail and whether such petitions could be entertained by the High Court.

Held:

The Division Bench questioned the maintainability of the petitions filed by advocates, emphasizing the availability of statutory remedies for aggrieved parties.

The Judges expressed concern about the potential flood of similar petitions, leading to delays in genuine cases.

The Division Bench closed the suo motu proceedings initiated by the Chief Justice, citing the improper use of such petitions and the availability of statutory remedies.

Facts:

Appellant and Krishnanendu tried for the murders of Subhash Chandra Pal, his wife, father, and mother.

Appellant convicted under Sections 302 read with 120-B and 201 IPC; Krishnanendu convicted under Sections 302 read with 109 IPC.

Both sentenced to death.

Issues:

Challenge to the conviction and sentence by the Appellant.

Compliance with Section 306(4) CrPC regarding the approver's examination.

Held:

Compliance with Section 306(4) CrPC: The contention that the approver (Sudipa) should have been examined in an open court in the presence of the accused is rejected. The phrase 'examination of a witness' does not necessitate cross-examination at that stage. The purpose is to provide an opportunity for the accused to challenge the approver's evidence during the trial.

Contradictions and Improvements in Sudipa's Evidence: Minor contradictions were noted, but the Courts deemed them natural given the extensive timeline of events. Sudipa's detailed testimony during the trial was considered consistent and reliable.

Death Sentence Justification: The High Court's reasoning for imposing the death sentence was based on the perceived avarice and calculated cruelty in the murders. However, the unexpected killings of Sudipa's father and grandparents were seen as acts of confusion and fright.

Decision: The death sentence for the appellant is reduced to life imprisonment. The Court emphasizes that given the circumstances, the death penalty is not warranted.

Facts:

The State Government, exercising powers under Section 432, issued circulars for the remission of sentences. This circular granted special remission to prisoners in jail and remission to convicts on parole or furlough, excluding those convicted of rape or dowry death. The respondents included individuals on bail and one convicted under Section 376 IPC.

Issues:

Whether respondents on bail are entitled to remission under the circular?

Whether a person convicted under Section 376 IPC is entitled to remission under the circular?

Held:

Entitlement of Respondents on Bail: The circular specifically applies to prisoners undergoing sentence, including those on parole or furlough. Respondents on bail do not fall within the ambit of the circular. The court cannot create another category not entitled under Section 432 of the Code.

Entitlement of Respondent Convicted under Section 376 IPC: The circular, authorized under the law, outlines limitations and exclusions. A person convicted under Section 376 IPC is not entitled to remission under this circular. The decision to grant remission must be well-informed, reasonable, and fair.