Facts:

Cheques issued by the appellant were dishonoured.

Notice demanding payment issued, and when not paid within 15 days, a complaint filed under Section 138 of NI Act.

Companies approached the Board for Industrial Finance and Reconstruction (BIFR) seeking declaration as sick companies under SICA.

Argument raised that during BIFR proceedings, no prosecution can be maintained.

Issues:

Whether the offence under Section 138 of NI Act was completed before the commencement of proceedings under Section 22(1) of SICA?

Does Section 22(1) of SICA bar prosecution proceedings against sick companies?

Held:

If the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act was completed before the proceedings under Section 22(1) of SICA, the prosecution is not barred by SICA.

The word "suit" in Section 22(1) does not extend to criminal prosecutions. SICA does not expressly exempt sick companies from prosecution under NI Act.

The ban in Section 22(1) is conditional, and with the consent of the BIFR or the Appellate Authority, proceedings can be initiated.

Decision: Dismissal of the appeals. The High Courts' decisions not to discountenance the plea of companies were upheld.

Facts:

The appellant, Commissioner of Income Tax, challenges the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay.

The respondent, Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation, is an Indian resident company involved in the business of exporting tea.

Issues:

The disallowance of the respondent's claim for weighted deduction under Section 35-B.

The claimed expenditure of Rs. 1,95,935/- is related to the export of tea from East Africa to the United Kingdom.

Held:

The court outlines the conditions for claiming benefits under Section 35-B, emphasizing the nature of the assessee, time frame, expenditure type, and specific sub-clauses.

The court rejects the view that export must be directly from India, stating that the language of the provision and authorities do not support this interpretation.

Mr. Verma contends a lack of factual finding regarding the specific sub-clause (viii) under which the expenditure is claimed.

The court, after reviewing orders and submissions, upholds the High Court's decision, stating that there is no dispute regarding the nature of the expenditure.

The court dismisses the appeals with costs.

Facts:

The election held on 22nd May 1995, had three candidates: Jivendra, Manvendra, and Smt. Gayatri Verma.

None of the candidates secured the required quota of 16 first preference votes.

Jivendra declared elected after drawing lots as no candidate secured the quota.

Issues:

The correctness of the election result, especially regarding the drawing of lots when none of the candidates obtained the quota.

Held:

The court analyzed Schedule II and its provisions for determining the election result.

Quota becomes relevant when there are more than two candidates.

The court affirmed that drawing lots is applicable only when two candidates get an equal number of first preference votes.

In this case, since neither Jivendra nor Manvendra secured the quota, drawing lots was not a valid method to determine the election.

The High Court's decision declaring a vacancy in the office of Adhyaksha was justified.

Appeals and SLP dismissed with no order as to costs.

Facts:

Six writ petitions were filed under Article 32 of the Constitution on behalf of "life convicts" whose prayer for premature release was rejected by the Government of West Bengal. The contention was that despite entitlement under relevant rules, the government rejected their plea on extraneous considerations.

Issues:

Whether life convicts, having completed 20 years of continued detention including remissions earned, are entitled to premature release.

Whether the government, in rejecting the prayer for premature release, adhered to the relevant rules and guidelines.

Held:

Life sentence does not inherently grant a right to premature release. However, if government rules or schemes exist for early release, those must be treated as guidelines for exercising power under Article 161 of the Constitution.

The State Government, as per West Bengal Rules, must consider circumstances, character of the crime, conduct in prison, and the probability of reverting to criminal habits when evaluating premature release requests.

The government's rejection based solely on police objections without considering all relevant points, including conduct-record in jail and socio-economic conditions, is improper.

The orders of the government suffer from infirmities and are quashed.

Authorities are directed to reconsider the cases for premature release of all "life convicts" in accordance with relevant rules and guidelines within one month.

Decision: The writ petitions are allowed to the extent indicated above.

Facts:

The appellants, represented by Pankaj Mehra and Another, challenged criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act. The companies in question argued that presenting a winding-up petition should exempt them from penal liability.

Issues:

Can a company escape penal liability under Section 138 of the NI Act by presenting a winding-up petition?

Does the mere presentation of a winding-up petition render all dispositions of the company's property void?

Does the issuance of a cheque amount to a disposition of property?

Does the legal enforceability of a debt cease when a winding-up petition is presented?

Held:

The court rejects the argument that the mere presentation of a winding-up petition makes all dispositions of the company's property void. A nuanced approach is needed to consider the practical aspects of business operations during winding-up proceedings.

The court emphasizes that a cheque is essentially an order on the banker and doesn't result in the immediate disposition of property. The drawing of a cheque is considered a step towards disposition but is insufficient to amount to disposition of property.

The court holds that the legal enforceability of a debt is not negated by the mere filing of a winding-up petition. Enforcement of debt due from a company is made subject to the conditions prescribed in the Companies Act.

The court interprets Section 536(2) of the Companies Act, stating that the word "void" does not necessarily mean ab initio void, and the court has the power to order otherwise.

The court discusses the presumption in favor of the holder under Section 139 of the NI Act and clarifies that the drawer's failure to make payment within the stipulated time completes the offense under Section 138, regardless of the reasons for the failure.

The court dismisses the appeals, upholding the decision of the Bombay High Court. The observation regarding Atash Industries (India) Limited's conduct is clarified, stating that it only applies to the writ petition and won't be counted against the company during the trial.

FACTS:

Respondent No. 1 dismissed for disobeying a transfer order.

Complaint filed with the Labour Commissioner.

Appellant claims respondent is not a workman.

Conciliation proceedings held; Joint Labour Commissioner recommends a reference.

State Government refuses the reference, stating respondent is not a workman.

High Court directs the State Government to make a reference.

ISSUES:

Whether respondent No. 1 qualifies as a workman.

Whether the State Government's refusal to make a reference is justified.

HELD:

The power under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act should be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. Delay in issuing a demand notice must be considered regarding the existence of an industrial dispute.

Mere issuing of a demand notice does not automatically give rise to an industrial dispute; a stale dispute cannot be referred under Section 10 of the Act.

The State Government has the authority to determine if an employee qualifies as a workman before making a reference under Section 10. The Court cannot closely scrutinize this administrative act.

The State Government rightly considered the salary, duties, and powers of respondent No. 1, determining he was not a workman.

The question of whether an employee is a workman is an administrative matter for the Government; no judicial or quasi-judicial determination is involved.

The decision to make a reference under Section 10 is subjective and administrative; the Court cannot interfere unless irrelevant considerations are involved.

REFERRED CASES:

Sultan Singh Vs. State of Haryana and another, AIR 1996 SC 1007 : AIR 1995 SC 1007 : (1996) 1 CTC 169 : (1996) 73 FLR 955 : (1995) 9 JT 556 : (1996) LabIC 915 : (1996) 1 LLJ 879 : (1996) 1 SCALE 9 : (1996) 2 SCC 66 : (1995) 6 SCR 629 Supp

State of Madras Vs. C.P. Sarathy and Another, AIR 1953 SC 53 : (1953) 1 LLJ 174 : (1953) 4 SCR 334

Prem Kakar Vs. State of Haryana and Another, AIR 1976 SC 1474 : (1976) 3 SCC 433 : (1976) 3 SCR 1010 : (1976) 8 UJ 535

Facts:

Recruitment Rules outline the procedure for appointing officers in civil and criminal courts in a district.

Advisory Committee laid down criteria for short-listing candidates for peon positions, with the fourth criterion being challenged for disqualifying candidates with qualifications higher than the prescribed standard.

Appellants contested the High Court's dismissal of their writ petition seeking the quashing of the peon selection process.

Issues:

Validity of the criteria, especially the fourth criterion, for short-listing candidates for peon positions.

Whether disqualifying candidates with higher qualifications is rational and reasonable.

Compliance with constitutional provisions and Recruitment Rules.

Held:

The court finds the fourth criterion, disqualifying candidates with qualifications higher than Standard VII, unreasonable and not rational.

Emphasizes that higher qualifications should not be a disadvantage and such criteria may amount to another form of reservation.

Highlights the importance of maintaining reasonableness in the ratio between social justice and the need for higher education.

Rejects the argument that candidates with higher education are not interested in peon work, stating that disciplinary action can be taken if duties are not performed.

Rules that the fourth criterion violates the right of candidates with higher qualifications to be considered for the peon position.

Despite setting aside the High Court's judgment, the court does not disturb the appointments of candidates already selected.

Facts:

The Hindu Girls College advertised a post for a Hindi Lecturer.

Appellant and others applied; the Selection Committee recommended the appellant, but the Vice Chancellor disapproved and ordered re-advertisement.

Appellant reapplied without protest and filed a writ challenging the Vice Chancellor's order.

An interim order allowed the selection process but prohibited result declaration.

The Vice Chancellor approved another candidate, not aware of the interim order. The approval was withdrawn later.

Writ petitions by the appellant and the approved candidate were heard together, resulting in the dismissal of the appellant's petition and approval for the other candidate.

Issues:

Appellant's eligibility to challenge the Vice Chancellor's initial order.

Whether the appellant's conduct estopped her from seeking relief.

Held:

The appellant's conduct of reapplying without protest, appearing before the Selection Committee, and not challenging the initial order estopped her from seeking relief.

The High Court's refusal to grant discretionary relief was justified. The writ petition was rightly dismissed. The appeal failed, and no costs were awarded.

Facts:

The father of the respondent had executed a usufructuary mortgage deed in favor of the appellant for Rs. 10,000/- on 25-12-1967.

The property was given on lease for more than 10 years.

Respondents filed an application under the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act, 1979, seeking direction that the usufructuary mortgage had been completely discharged.

Appellant contended that the respondents could not be regarded as debtors under Section 3(3) of the said Act as the rental value of their property was not less than what is required.

Issues:

The interpretation of the expression "not less than Rs. 1200" in Section 3(3) of the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act, 1979.

Held:

The primary question is the meaning of the expression "not less than Rs. 1200" in the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act, 1979.

The proviso to Section 3(3) excludes certain categories from being regarded as debtors. Sub-clause (iii) deals with property owners assessed to property or house tax, provided the annual rental value is not less than Rs. 1200.

The High Court erred in concluding that the respondents were entitled to the benefit of the proviso even though the annual rental value was Rs. 1200. The expression "not less than Rs. 1200" means the minimum aggregate annual rental value should be at least Rs. 1200.

The Court holds that if the annual rental value of the property owned by a debtor is not less than Rs. 1,200, then he would be covered under Sub-clause (iii) of the proviso to Section 3(3) and would not be deemed a debtor.

The appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside, and the decision of the lower appellate Court is affirmed. No order as to costs.