Facts:

The respondents were tried for offenses under Sections 302, 380, 457, 120-B read with Section 34 IPC.

Acquittal by the Additional Sessions Judge, later appealed by the State in the High Court.

High Court's dismissal of the appeal due to non-compliance with mandatory directions in Section 306 Cr.P.C.

Issues:

Validity of trial and committal proceedings, particularly the examination of the approver.

Interpretation of Section 306(4)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Held:

The purpose of Section 306 is to obtain evidence during investigation, inquiry, or trial.

The Chief Judicial Magistrate can tender pardon at any stage of the investigation or trial.

Conditions for tendering pardon include a full and true disclosure of circumstances within the approver's knowledge.

A person accepting pardon is examined, and if the case is committed for trial to the Court of Sessions, Section 307 empowers the Sessions Court to tender pardon.

High Court's interpretation that approver's statement must be recorded before filing the challan is not supported by the text of Section 306.

Examination of the approver can occur before or after submission of the charge sheet, and summoning the accused for cross-examination is not mandatory.

Section 465 Cr.P.C. comes into operation, and the trial is not vitiated if objections could and should have been raised earlier.

The mandatory language of "shall" in Section 306(4)(a) does not automatically vitiate the trial if not strictly adhered to.

Decision: The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside, and the appeal is allowed. The case is remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with the law.

REFERRED CASES:

Suresh Chandra Bahri Vs. State of Bihar with Gurbachan Singh, AIR 1994 SC 2420 : (1994) CriLJ 3271 : (1994) 4 JT 309 : (1994) 3 SCALE 197 : (1995) 1 SCC 80 Supp : (1995) 1 SCC 80 : (1994) 1 SCR 483 Supp : (1994) 2 UJ 782

Sanjay Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 1978 SC 514 : (1978) CriLJ 642 : (1978) 2 SCC 39 : (1978) SCC(Cri) 172 : (1978) 2 SCR 861 : (1978) 10 UJ 379

A. Deivendran Vs. State of T.N., AIR 1998 SC 2821 : (1998) CriLJ 814 : (1997) 8 JT 619 : (1997) 6 SCALE 516 : (1997) 11 SCC 720 : (1997) 4 SCR 591 Supp : (1998) AIRSCW 285 : (1997) 9 Supreme 237

In Re : Chief Judicial magistrate, (1988) CriLJ 812

Kalu Khoda and Others Vs. The State, AIR 1962 Guj 283 : (1962) 3 GLR 654

Uravakonda Vijayaraj Paul Vs. The State and Others, (1986) CriLJ 2104

Facts:

The dispute arose during consolidation proceedings regarding certain plots. A predecessor-in-interest, 'D,' claimed Sirdari rights based on a lease executed in his favor under Section 191 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. The appellants contested, arguing that the plots never vested in the State.

Issues:

The primary issues revolved around the vesting of land, specifically whether the land appurtenant to the Staff Quarter of the Sugar Mill vested in the State and subsequently in the Gaon Sabha. The legality of the lease executed by Gaon Sabha was also in question.

Held:

Vesting of Property: The Notification under Section 4 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act excludes well, trees, buildings, or building sites, along with appurtenant land, from vesting in the State. Easement rights under Section 7 continue for the person enjoying them before the vesting.

1.2. Section 117 of the Act outlines the conditions for the vesting of land in the Gaon Sabha. The property initially vested in the State under Section 4 can subsequently vest in the Gaon Sabha through a notification under Section 117. Thus, it must first vest in the State before transferring to the Gaon Sabha.

1.3. The land in dispute, being the land appurtenant to the Sugar Mill's Staff Quarter, was held not to have vested in the State. The Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer (Consolidation) confirmed its status as appurtenant to the Sugar Mill. As a result, the Gaon Sabha lacked jurisdiction to lease the plots to the respondent.

Jurisdiction of Consolidation Authorities: The jurisdiction of Consolidation Authorities was not affected as the lease by Gaon Sabha was void from inception due to the absence of vested rights.

Facts:

The respondent imported copper scrap for use as raw material in the manufacture of copper oxychloride.

Exemption from additional customs duty (countervailing duty or CVD) was sought under Customs Notification No. 35/81 CE dated 1-3-1981.

Duty was paid at the time of clearance, and a refund application was later filed by the respondent.

The Assistant Collector rejected the refund claim, leading to a writ petition filed by the respondent in the Bombay High Court.

Issues:

Whether the doctrine of unjust enrichment is applicable to raw material imported and consumed in the manufacturing process.

Held:

The High Court accepted the respondent's contention that the exemption notification provided complete exemption from excise duty on copper for use in the manufacture of chemicals.

The High Court held that the question of unjust enrichment does not arise in cases of captive consumption of imported raw material.

The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court, emphasizing that the principle of unjust enrichment is applicable to imported raw material consumed in the manufacture of a final product.

Section 27 of the Customs Act was discussed, highlighting that the burden of proof lies on the person claiming the refund to show that the incidence of duty has not been passed on to the buyer.

The Court clarified that even in cases of captive consumption, the principle of unjust enrichment applies, and the importer must demonstrate that the duty incidence has not been passed on to any other person.

The Court allowed the appeal filed by the Union of India, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and held that the doctrine of unjust enrichment is applicable in the case of imported raw material used for captive consumption.

Facts:

Sir Adamji Peerbhoy established a trust in 1883 A.D. for the Dawoodi Bohra Community.

The trust property included a plot of land at Queens Road, Bombay, which was later used for charitable purposes, including the construction of a mosque and a building.

The trust faced challenges and requisitions over the years, leading to the establishment of Saifee Hospital Trust in 1973.

Disputes arose regarding the restricted nature of the trust in the 21st century and its alignment with constitutional principles.

Issues:

Whether the charitable trust founded by Sir Adamji Peerbhoy needed a change of object under the Cy-pres doctrine to make it secular.

The constitutional mandate of secularism and its impact on the original trust established in the 19th century.

Held:

The Court acknowledged the Cy-pres doctrine, emphasizing the need to preserve the donor's charitable intention as much as possible.

The Court considered the historical context and the establishment of Saifee Hospital Trust, leading to the litigation.

Agreed minutes of the order were presented, confirming the City Civil Court's orders with modifications.

Specific directions were given regarding the reservation of beds in the proposed Saifee Hospital for the Dawoodi Bohra Community.

Conditions were set for the construction and maintenance of the Sanatorium Wing, ensuring it remains a comfortable place for the Musafirs.

The use of the land for the Saifee Hospital and the Sanatorium was addressed, with specific conditions regarding gates and entrances.

Directions were given for the renewal of the lease, with conditions to be followed by the lessee and sub-lessee.

Facts:

The appellants claimed Sirdari rights over plots in three villages, disputed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The recorded tenure-holder, Jethu, was considered to have died a civil death, leading to the question of property vesting in the Gaon Sabha.

Issues:

Validity of the Deputy Director's decision to vest property in the Gaon Sabha.

Applicability of Section 11-C in consolidation proceedings.

Nature of Escheat and its application in the absence of heirs.

Held:

The Deputy Director's decision to vest the property in the Gaon Sabha was justified based on the principle of Escheat. Section 11-C mandated recording in the Gaon Sabha's name even without their objection during consolidation proceedings.

Clarification that Section 11-C applies irrespective of whether the property originally belonged to the Gaon Sabha or a tenure-holder. Escheat is affirmed as a valid principle, reverting property to the State in the absence of heirs.

Section 48 grants wide powers to the Deputy Director to examine the regularity and correctness of proceedings. Reopening the case for scrutiny was justified, especially when entries were found fictitious or in violation of statutory provisions.

The appeal is dismissed without costs due to a lack of merit.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of the 46th Constitutional Amendment related to the definition of 'sale' and 'works contract.'

The Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., issued a Circular opining that the job done by photographers amounts to a "works contract" post the constitutional amendment.

The Assessing Officer re-assessed the turnover of the assessees based on the Circular, leading to demand notices.

Issues:

Whether the work done by photographers, including taking photographs, developing, and printing films, falls under the category of a 'works contract' for the purpose of sales tax.

Held:

The High Court, relying on a previous judgment, held that to the extent of the photo paper used, there is a transfer of property in goods, making it a "works contract."

The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, stating that the occupation of a photographer is essentially one of skill and labor, and there is no primary intention to transfer goods in the contract.

The Court emphasized that the 46th Amendment allows states to levy sales tax on goods and materials used in works contracts but does not empower microscopic division of contracts involving incidental materials.

The Court held that unless there is a primary intention to sell and purchase goods in a works contract, the state cannot impose sales tax.

Given that the work done by photographers is more in the nature of a service contract, the stand taken by the respondent-state cannot be sustained.

The appeals were allowed, and the assessment orders and demand notices were quashed.

Facts:

Appellant issued a cheque to Respondent No. I.

Cheque returned with "insufficient funds" remark.

Respondent No. I issued a notice of demand within 15 days, claiming the cheque amount and additional charges.

Appellant failed to meet the demand.

Complaint filed by Respondent No. I before the Metropolitan Magistrate.

Issues:

Magistrate deemed the notice invalid, as the demanded amount exceeded the cheque amount.

High Court allowed the revision, setting aside the Magistrate's order.

Held:

The notice specified the "said amount" (cheque amount) clearly. Additional amounts claimed were severable; if the cheque amount was paid, criminal liability under S.138 would be absolved.. The notice, when read as a whole, met the legal requirement for demand on the "said amount." Specific claims towards interest, costs, etc., were considered severable and did not invalidate the notice. An omnibus demand without specifying the due amount might render the notice invalid.

Decision: Dismissing the appeal, the Court held that the notice was valid as the "said amount" was clearly stated, and additional claims were severable.

Facts:

The appellant, an auto-rickshaw driver, was intercepted while transporting gunny bags containing Charas. The search was based on prior information, but the searching officer failed to record it in writing and send a copy to his superior. The appellant admitted the recovery, but disputed knowledge of the contraband.

Issues:

Compliance with procedural requirements under Sections 42 and 50 of the NDPS Act.

Presumption of culpable mental state under Section 35.

Burden of proof on the accused to show lack of knowledge.

Held:

Compliance with Procedural Requirements: Non-compliance with Section 42 rendered the action of the searching officer suspect. While it may not vitiate the trial, it causes prejudice to the accused.

Presumption of Culpable Mental State: The burden of proof under Section 35 lies with the accused. The appellant's burden can be discharged by relying on materials in prosecution evidence, eliciting answers through cross-examination, or adducing other evidence. Non-recording of vital information and other circumstances favored the appellant, rebutting the presumption.

Burden of Proof: The accused successfully discharged the burden of proof, showing a lack of knowledge about the contraband. Rebutting the presumption under Section 35, the appellant is not liable for the charged offenses.

Facts:

The appellant, a landholder, contested the classification of their land as private forest under the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975. An initial order by the Deputy Collector favored the appellant, citing water-logging and the timing of the notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act, 1927. The Revenue Tribunal, Maharashtra, on appeal by the State, overturned the decision and remanded the matter for further inquiry.

Issues:

Interpretation of Section 2(f)(iii) of the Maharashtra Act, 1975.

Whether the notice under Section 35(3) served before the Act's commencement suffices for land classification.

The exclusion of 2 hectares under Section 2(f)(iii) in the absence of a final notification under Section 35(1) of the Forest Act, 1927.

Held:

The Deputy Collector's decision, emphasizing the necessity of notice service before the Act's commencement, was overturned by the Revenue Tribunal. The Court concluded that Section 2(f)(iii) doesn't mandate the same procedural steps as Section 35(1) of the Forest Act, 1927. The legislature's intent was to exclude 2 hectares from vesting when notice under Section 35(3) was issued before the Act's commencement.

Decision: The Court modified the order, directing the Deputy Collector to specify the 2 hectares of land the appellant could retain. Any excess land would be subject to relevant land ceiling laws. The appeal was disposed of with this modification.