Facts:

The appellant, Kadiyala Rama Rao, is a stranger auction purchaser of a house property sold in court on 31st July 1978.

The property was sold in pursuance of a mortgage deed dated 4.6.1975 in C.S. No. 1245 of 1973 in the court of District Munsif, Rajamundhry, Andhra Pradesh.

The respondents filed an application to set aside the auction sale on 26th August 1978, which was rejected by the District Munsif on 31st August 1978.

The sale was confirmed on 31st July 1978, and the appellant took possession on 9th November 1978.

Issues:

The respondents filed a Revision Petition before the High Court under Section 115 of CPC, challenging the sale on the ground of salability, irregularities, and fraud.

The Revision Petition was allowed on 4th April 1980, and the appellant filed a Review Petition which was dismissed on 22nd December 1980.

The validity of the court sale and the jurisdiction of the court to set it aside under Order 21 Rule 90.

Held:

The provisions of Order 21 Rule 90 allow setting aside a sale based on material irregularity or fraud. The court emphasizes the need for substantial injury to the applicant due to such irregularity or fraud.

The Revision Petition was allowed on 24.4.1980, long after the completion of the sale, indicating a misconception of facts by the Learned Single Judge.

The Judgment-Debtor had no locus standi to challenge the sale on the ground of salability, as Order 21 Rule 90 specifically addresses material irregularity or fraud.

The Andhra Pradesh and Madras Amendment to Order 21 Rule 90 is considered, allowing the court to call upon the applicant to furnish security or deposit money to avoid the sale.

The Revision Petition was framed correctly, and the court holds that a revision application is maintainable against an order not appealable either before the subordinate court or the High Court.

The order of the Learned Single Judge is set aside, and the order of the Executing Court dated 31.8.78 confirming the sale is upheld.

No further orders are issued regarding possession, and no costs are awarded.

The Appeal is Allowed.

Facts:

The Legislative Assembly of Himachal Pradesh enacted the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972, to consolidate and amend laws related to land holdings.

Sub-section (1) of Section 26 empowers the State Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act.

The State Government framed the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules, 1973, in exercise of the delegated power.

Rule 3 defined areas subservient to tea plantation, including a proviso restricting the transfer of such land.

An amendment to Rule 3, via notification dated 4-4-1986, and a circular in 1990 imposed further restrictions on the transfer of land subservient to tea plantation.

Issues:

Whether the Act applies to land subservient to tea estates.

The constitutional validity of the amendment and circular restricting the transfer of such subservient land.

Held:

The Act does not apply to land subservient to tea estates, as explicitly stated in Section 5(g), which excludes tea estates from the Act.

The amendment imposing restrictions on the transfer of subservient land is ultra vires the rule-making power conferred by the Act. Delegated legislation must conform exactly to the powers granted, and the amendment goes beyond the legislative intent.

The prohibition on the transfer of subservient land does not serve the purpose of the Act, as such land is already excluded from the Act's provisions.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the judgment of the High Court. The proviso inserted into Sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules, 1973, by the notification dated 4-4-1986, and the circular order dated 21-8-90, are declared invalid and struck down as ultra vires the powers of the H.P. Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972. No order as to costs.

Facts:

The temple was founded in 1891 by P. Venkata Varada Doss.

An inquiry was initiated in 1934 regarding the nature of the temple, and it was declared an 'Excepted Temple' in 1935.

D. Venkatarangaiah, the brother-in-law of the founder, was nominated as the successor, and the temple's affairs were managed by him.

Venkatarangaiah executed a Will in 1941, appointing a Board of Five Trustees to administer the temple.

A legal dispute arose in 1972 regarding the hereditary nature of trusteeship.

Issues:

Whether the persons nominated as trustees after the commencement of the 1951 Act can be considered 'hereditary trustees' under the applicable acts.

The effect of the order dated 4-10-1935 and the Will of Venkatarangaiah on the trusteeship.

Held:

The court examined the definition of 'hereditary trustee' under the 1927 Act, 1951 Act, and 1959 Act.

The order dated 4-10-1935 declared the temple an 'Excepted Temple' under the 1927 Act during Venkatarangaiah's trusteeship.

Trustees nominated after the 1951 Act by the Board were not considered 'hereditary trustees' under the 1951 and 1959 Acts.

The court emphasized that any rights created under the 1927 Act by the Board did not continue after the 1951 Act.

The appellant, nominated as a trustee after 1951, was not a 'hereditary trustee.'

The court dismissed the appeal, confirming that trustees nominated after 1951 were not 'hereditary trustees.'

Facts:

The trial against four accused had progressed substantially with the examination of 54 witnesses. The Metropolitan Magistrate ordered the addition of two more accused at a later stage, leading to the potential re-commencement of the entire trial. The appellants challenged this decision.

Issues:

The validity of invoking Section 319 after the cross-examination of a significant number of witnesses.

The discretion of the court in adding new accused.

Consideration of evidence and its sufficiency in justifying the addition of the appellants.

Whether the circumstances warranted a de novo trial.

Held:

The court emphasized the discretionary nature of Section 319, cautioning against its casual use. Reasonable satisfaction from existing evidence is required to add new accused.

The court noted that suspicion alone is insufficient, and there must be a reasonable prospect of conviction.

The court expressed concern about wasting extensive evidence already collected and emphasized the need for judicious exercise of the court's power.

The order of the Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 319 was set aside, directing the trial to proceed with the existing accused.

Facts:

The appellant obtained a preliminary decree in a mortgage suit.

The decree specified payment terms, including four equal installments.

Defendants failed to make any payments, including the first installment due on March 31, 1969.

The appellant, invoking relevant provisions, sought a final decree for the sale of the mortgaged property.

The application for a final decree was dismissed on grounds of being time-barred.

Issues:

Whether the application for a final decree is time-barred.

The interpretation of Section 34 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act, 1960, in relation to the statute of limitations.

Held:

The right to apply for a final decree accrued on the date of the first default (March 31, 1969).

The period of limitation starts from the date the right to apply accrues, independent of the date of notice to the defendant.

The notice under Section 34 sent by the appellant was based on all defaults; no default was stated as waived or condoned.

Citing Nalini Kanto Bhattacharjee Vs. Mohan Chand Biswas, the court affirmed that the application for a final decree was time-barred.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs.

Facts:

The Madhya Pradesh Cattle (Control) Act, 1978, was enforced within the municipal limits of Jabalpur. In an earlier Public Interest Litigation (PIL), dairy owners were directed to shift their dairies to villages 'L' and 'G,' exempted from the Act. A subsequent PIL raised concerns about contamination of drinking water due to cow dung and waste. The Central Pollution Control Board recommended a bio-gas plant.

Issues:

Validity of the Notification dated 19.03.1999 excluding villages 'L' and 'G' from the "excepted villages" list.

Legality of establishing dairies in villages 'L' and 'G' in proximity to the main water pipeline.

Whether the petitioners have the right to challenge the Notification.

Held:

The municipal corporation's duty is to supply pure drinking water to citizens. The Act prohibits establishing dairies causing public nuisance. However, the petitioners had already invested in setting up a Gobar Gas Plant as directed by the court.

The validity of the Resolution and Gazette Notification cannot be adjudicated in this proceeding. Petitioners should initiate appropriate proceedings to challenge the Notification, providing a foundation for the challenge.

Due to the Notification, dairies in villages 'L' and 'G' cannot continue. Challenge to the Notification's validity should be pursued through proper proceedings.

Petitioners can challenge the Notification within three months. The interim order from this Court continues for an additional three months and two weeks.

Municipal Corporation must pay the petitioner for the Bio Gas Plant expenditure incurred during the proceedings, deducting any government subsidy. The benefits indicated by the High Court apply if the challenge to the Notification is rejected.

Final Result : Dismissed

Facts:

Property: Double storied building at Old Taluk Cutchery Road, Bangalore.

Agreement: Between M/s Vidyavati Kapoor Trust and M/s Rajatha Trust on 28-11-1990 for Rs. 1,55,00,000.

Pre-emptive Purchase: Initiated by the Appropriate Authority due to alleged undervaluation with an intent to evade tax.

Judicial History: Writ petitions filed, dismissed by Karnataka High Court, appealed to Supreme Court. Civil Appeal No. 3849 of 1991 allowed on 13-3-1996, relying on C.B. Gautam's case.

Issues:

Validity of the pre-emptive purchase under Section 269UE.

Sale of the property by the Central Government.

Challenges to the order of the Appropriate Authority.

Held:

The Constitution Bench in C.B. Gautam's case upheld the validity of provisions in Chapter XX C of the Income Tax Act.

The property had vested in the Central Government after the order of the Appropriate Authority. The order setting aside the judgment did not direct de novo proceedings.

No serious illegality or infirmity found in the order of the Appropriate Authority. Central Government had complied with the necessary procedures.

The property did not revest in the transferor. The contention that the order of the Appropriate Authority set aside by the court resulted in revesting was rejected.

The Central Government's failure to tender or deposit the full consideration did not stand, as the full amount was received by the transferor, and possession was delivered.

Facts:

In 1981, the Government of Gujarat declared a part of the forest area as a "Wild Life Sanctuary," covering 765.79 Sq. K.M.

The notification was cancelled in 1993, and a reduced area of 94.87 Sq. K.M. was declared as the "Chinkara Wild Life Sanctuary."

Petitioner challenged both notifications, and the High Court quashed them, reviving the 1981 notification.

State Government proposed a further reduction in sanctuary area for economic development, passed a resolution, and issued a notification in 1995.

Petitioner challenged again, leading to the current Supreme Court case.

Issues:

Legality of reducing the sanctuary area for economic development.

Consideration of ecological impact and economic development needs.

Held:

The State Legislature's decision, after due deliberation, is not to be invalidated unless substantial reasons exist.

The court directs a comprehensive study of the ecological impact, environmental aspects, and effects of limited mining over five years.

Permits restricted and controlled exploitation of mineral wealth, subject to court orders.

State Government to constitute an expert Committee for a comprehensive study, submit reports, and monitor pollution.

Restrains the State Government from allowing mining or cement plants within 10 kms of the old sanctuary area without court orders.

Facts:

Pursuant to the liberalization of the electricity sector in India, MOUs and Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) were entered into between the State Government, Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board (MPEB), and independent power producers (IPPs). The agreements aimed at establishing power projects and selling generated electricity to MPEB.

Issues:

MPEB's decision to prioritize projects offering the least tariff, impacting ongoing negotiations and agreements with IPPs.

IPPs sought escrow coverage, and a writ petition was filed to compel the respondents to grant such facility.

Held:

The court clarified that contracts under Sections 43 and 43A of the Electricity Act are statutory only to the extent that they involve the determination of tariff and other statutory requirements. Escrow accounts and agreements are not statutory obligations.

The court emphasized that MOUs and PPAs, while concluded contracts, did not confer legal rights on IPPs regarding escrow agreements. The execution of such agreements depended on mutual agreement between the parties.

The court acknowledged the amendments to the notifications under Section 43-A of the Electricity Act. While prospective, these amendments were relevant for MPEB in negotiating better terms with IPPs.

The court justified MPEB's decision to prioritize projects based on least tariff, considering it a rational criterion in the context of benefiting MPEB and the general public. The court rejected claims of arbitrariness.

The court declined a detailed examination of assumptions made by the Expert Committee regarding project costs, deeming them technical matters. Valid assumptions, not fanciful or arbitrary, justified the decision based on them.