Facts:

The appellant, a subsidiary of Kolhapur Sugar Mills Ltd., was issued a fresh license for sugar manufacture. After a claim, the excise authorities allowed a rebate of excise duty. Subsequently, a notice was issued under Rule 10A, asking the appellant to show cause why the erroneously allowed rebate should not be recovered. On August 6, 1977, Rules 10 and 10A were omitted, and a new Rule 10 was introduced without a savings clause.

Issues:

Whether the proceedings for the recovery of the rebate of excise duty can continue after the deletion of the rule under which it was initiated.

Held:

The proceedings lapsed after August 6, 1977, and any order passed thereafter is considered non-existent.

Section 6 of the General Clauses Act 1897 is not applicable to the omission of a Rule; it applies to the repeal of an Act or Regulation made after the commencement of the General Clauses Act.

The absence of a savings clause means that pending proceedings would lapse on the deletion of the rule under which they were initiated.

Decision: The court held that the proceedings for the recovery of the rebate of excise duty wrongly allowed could not continue after the deletion of the rule under which they were initiated.

Facts:

Second respondent hired trucks to transport broken rice.

Appellant paid freight as instructed by carriers and consignor.

Consignment lost; second respondent claimed Rs. 93,925.55, settled at Rs. 64,137 by insurance.

Second respondent executed Letter of Subrogation and Special Power of Attorney in favor of the first respondent.

First respondent filed a complaint under Consumer Protection Act against the appellant for the loss of consignment.

Issues:

Whether the first respondent was subrogated or assigned the rights of the second respondent.

Whether the first respondent qualifies as a 'consumer' under the Consumer Protection Act.

Held:

The Letter of Subrogation included assignment language, granting full power to the first respondent to recover the claim in its own name. This constituted an assignment.

The loss had already occurred; the first respondent, having acquired rights solely for the purpose of recovering compensation, does not qualify as a 'consumer' under the Consumer Protection Act.

The appeal is allowed, setting aside the judgment and order. The complaint is dismissed.

Facts:

The appellants are the legal representatives of a subsequent purchaser involved in a suit for specific performance filed by Bachna. Bachna sought specific performance of an earlier agreement to sell a property. She had not initially pleaded readiness and willingness, but later introduced this plea through an amendment.

Issues:

Whether Bachna and her legal representatives were at all material times ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement, as required by Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act.

Held:

The court refers to the judgment in Jugraj Singh's case but disagrees with its interpretation. It emphasizes that Section 16(c) applies to any party seeking specific performance, not limited to the vendor/defendant.

The obligation imposed by Section 16 is on the court not to grant specific performance if the plaintiff fails to prove readiness and willingness. It clarifies that any defendant can contend and establish non-compliance with Section 16(c).

The court holds that the decision in Jugraj Singh's case is erroneous and remands the suit to the trial court to determine whether Bachna and her legal representatives had proven their readiness and willingness.

The appeal is allowed, and the judgments and orders of the lower courts are set aside. The suit is remanded to the trial court for expeditious decision, within six months.

Facts:

Allegations of corruption against public servants in Madhya Pradesh.

Investigations initiated under Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

High Court quashed investigations citing non-compliance with Section 17 of the Act.

Issues:

Validity of investigations under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Interpretation and application of Section 17 of the Act.

Held:

Court emphasizes the importance of fair and lawful investigations into criminal offenses.

Quoting State of Haryana vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal, the Court highlights that a defect or illegality in investigation does not directly affect the competence or procedure of cognizance or trial.

Referring to H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh vs. The State of Delhi, the Court asserts that a defect in investigation should not nullify the cognizance or trial unless it results in a miscarriage of justice.

The Court distinguishes the present case from the precedent (State of Haryana vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal), indicating that the Superintendent of Police in this instance demonstrated awareness and applied his mind before authorizing the investigation.

Disagrees with the High Court's finding that the Superintendent of Police's order was mechanical, holding that the order, even if in a proforma, indicated sufficient application of mind.

Allows the appeals, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and directs the Trial Court to proceed with the trial according to law.

Facts:

Respondent sued for the recovery of excess demurrage charged by the Railway.

Trial Court decreed in favor of the respondent.

First additional district judge set aside the decree.

High Court declared a Goods Tariff Rule as ultra vires the Railways Act, 1890.

Issues:

Absence of pleading on the validity of the Goods Tariff Rule.

High Court's jurisdiction to decide the vires of the rule not pleaded in the original case.

Held:

The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by considering the validity of the Goods Tariff Rule not pleaded in the original case.

Settlement law dictates that a question outside the pleadings or not forming part of the issues cannot be decided by the court.

The scope of the suit was limited, and the High Court's declaration of the rule as ultra vires went beyond the pleadings.

The trial court's distinction between "general siding" and "private siding" upheld – demurrage charges applicable only to wagons not unloaded within prescribed free time for private sidings.

The appeal is partly allowed – High Court's decision on the rule set aside, but the trial court's decree affirmed. No costs ordered.

Facts:

Cochin International Airport Ltd. (CIAL) invited offers from various companies for ground handling services at the new Cochin Airport.

Several companies, including Air India and Cambatta Aviation Ltd., submitted proposals.

A committee evaluated the offers and recommended Cambatta for the contract.

However, CIAL decided to have a detailed discussion with Air India before making a final decision.

Cambatta protested this decision, and CIAL allowed Air India to revise its offer.

Eventually, CIAL awarded the contract to Air India.

Cambatta challenged this decision in the Kerala High Court, alleging bias, favoritism, and violation of principles of natural justice.

Issues:

Whether CIAL acted fairly and reasonably in its decision-making process for awarding the ground handling services contract.

Whether there was any undue influence exerted by Air India or the Ministry of Civil Aviation in CIAL's decision.

Held:

The Supreme Court reiterated that the award of a contract is essentially a commercial transaction and that price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. Public bodies must adhere to their own norms and procedures but are not bound by the highest or lowest offer.

The Court found that CIAL acted fairly and bona fide in the financial and overall interest of CIAL. There was no evidence of undue influence, arbitrariness, or mala fides in CIAL's decision-making process.

The Court held that CIAL's decision to award the contract to Air India was not arbitrary, illegal, or opposed to the principles of natural justice.

The appeals by Air India and CIAL were allowed, and the judgment of the Kerala High Court was set aside.

Facts:

The Board introduced amendments to its regulations, specifically Regulations 66(a) and 66(b), to address mass copying in examinations.

The Chairman of the Board canceled an entire examination session in 1993 due to mass copying and violations of the examination's integrity.

Candidates who took the exams challenged this decision in the High Court, which allowed the cases and issued directions regarding the handling of such matters.

Issues:

Does the notification dated January 27, 1993, violate Article 14 of the Indian Constitution?

Are the powers granted to the Chairman by the notification arbitrary in nature?

Does the notification provide for a different agency as a repository of power, violating the scheme of the Act?

Is the notification dated January 27, 1993, vague?

What are the contours of rules of natural justice in cases of mass copying?

Does the notification dated January 27, 1993, suffer from an infirmity regarding the source of information on mass copying?

Is the notification dated January 27, 1993, invalid, and to what extent? Is the notification dated June 29, 1993, also invalid?

What are the findings of the Court?

Held:

The High Court's judgment, which quashed the notifications issued by the Board, was held to be unsustainable and was set aside by the Supreme Court. The Court found that both the Board and its Chairman had the authority to issue the notifications and take action against mass copying.

The Court emphasized that the Board, as an expert body, is entrusted with maintaining high standards of education and ensuring the proper conduct of examinations. Decisions made by such expert bodies should be respected by the judiciary.

In cases of mass copying, the examination authorities are not required to conduct detailed quasi-judicial inquiries before withholding results or canceling exams. They are expected to take necessary action to maintain academic standards and discipline.

The Board's notifications were deemed relevant and not arbitrary or discriminatory. The High Court's intervention and its attempt to dictate how the Board should handle such matters were considered erroneous.

The appeals were allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and it was made clear that actions already taken by the authorities in accordance with the High Court's judgment regarding any candidate or group of candidates should not be disturbed based on that judgment.

Facts:

In this case, a foreign national (H), a Bangladeshi citizen, was gang-raped by multiple individuals, including railway employees, at a railway station and a rented flat. A petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution by a practicing advocate on behalf of the victim, seeking compensation and other reliefs.

Issues:

Whether compensation could be awarded in a writ petition under Article 226 for a rape offense involving railway employees.

Whether the victim, being a foreign national, was entitled to constitutional rights and relief under public law.

The extent of vicarious liability of the government for acts of its employees in commercial activities.

The concept of locus standi in public interest litigation.

Held:

The court held that public law remedies can be available even in cases involving public functionaries and the violation of fundamental rights, regardless of the availability of private law remedies (Bodhisatwa v. Ms. Subdhra Chakroborty; Common Cause v. Union of India).

The victim, despite being a foreign national, was entitled to constitutional rights, especially the right to life and dignity, under Article 21 of the Constitution and international human rights principles (Universal Declaration of Human Rights).

The government could be vicariously liable for acts of its employees, even in cases involving commercial activities, as railway operations were considered commercial activities (Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of U.P.).

The argument that liability under the law of torts arises only when the act complained of was performed in the course of official duty was deemed invalid (Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of U.P.).

The court affirmed that the concept of locus standi in public interest litigation allows individuals to file petitions in public interest, even if they are not directly connected to the victim (S.P. Gupta v. Union of India).

The appeal having no merit is dismissed.

Facts:

The first appellant is a practicing advocate, and the second appellant is his wife, who worked as the Matron of a Girls' Hostel run by the Social Welfare Department.

A complaint was filed by Kumari G. Swetha, a resident of the hostel, alleging that the first appellant had attempted to outrage her modesty on a specific date.

The police filed a charge-sheet directly before the Sessions Court, designated as the Special Court for offenses under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, within the territorial limits of the district.

The charge-sheet included charges under the Act as well as the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The police later revised the charge-sheet, removing one of the IPC charges.

Issues:

Whether the Special Court, designated under the Act, had the authority to take cognizance of offenses without the case being committed to it by a magistrate.

The secondary issue related to the procedure followed in filing the charge-sheet directly before the Special Court.

Held:

The Court established as a "Special Court" under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, is essentially a Court of Session. Its designation as a Special Court does not change its character or powers as a Court of Session.

The trial in such a Special Court can only be conducted in accordance with the procedures outlined in Chapter XVIII of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), which pertains to "Trial before a Court of Session."

Section 193 of the CrPC prohibits all Courts of Session from taking cognizance of any offense as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a magistrate.

The Special Court, even though designated as such under the Act, cannot take cognizance of offenses under the Act directly, without the case being committed to it by a magistrate. Neither the CrPC nor the Act provides otherwise.

Sections 4(2) and 5 of the CrPC, which deal with the application of the Code to offenses under other laws, do not negate the requirement of committal to a Special Court under the Act.

The judgment disapproves of a contrary view taken by the Kerala High Court and emphasizes that, in the absence of specific provisions in the Act, the CrPC's provisions, including Section 193, apply.

The High Court's order setting aside the proceedings initiated by the Special Court under the Act is affirmed. However, the direction given by the High Court regarding framing charges is not supported. The Special Court is to decide the appropriate action after hearing both sides and is free to pass appropriate orders, including considering pleas for discharge.