Taxation Law - Promissory Estoppel – State representation to abolish purchase tax on milk – Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 – Enforceability despite absence of notification – Held: Binding on the State – Highest executive authorities including Chief Minister and Finance Minister publicly announced abolition; circulars issued by Excise Commissioner directed field officers not to levy tax – Respondents altered their position by passing on benefit to farmers – In such circumstances, Government estopped from retrospectively levying purchase tax for 1996–97 – Equity requires enforcement of promise [Paras 3–13, 37, 47–48].

Promissory Estoppel – Scope and Limitations – Doctrine applicable against Government in contractual, administrative or statutory functions – Subject to two conditions: (i) clear and unequivocal promise, and (ii) alteration of position by promisee – Cannot compel act contrary to statute; but where statute confers power to exempt, Government bound to exercise it in equity – Discretion under “may” in Section 30 of the Act not absolute, must be exercised fairly [Paras 24–31, 36–38, 44–45].

Conflict in Case Law – Jit Ram Shiv Kumar’s restrictive view disapproved in Godfrey Philips – ITC Bhadrachalam Paperboards not followed as inconsistent with larger Bench rulings – Larger Bench authority in Godfrey Philips applied – Representation enforceable despite absence of statutory formality – Rule of law requires Government to stand on same footing as private individual [Paras 32–35, 42–46].

Public Interest Exception – Burden on Government to show overriding public interest to defeat estoppel – No such overriding equity shown – Representation made after considering financial implications and with intent to aid milk producers – Subsequent withdrawal not justified [Paras 30, 47].

Decision – Appeals dismissed – High Court order upholding respondents’ plea of promissory estoppel affirmed – No costs [Para 48].

Validity of Delhi notification dated 31.12.1999 – Motor Vehicles – Section 67 (State power to fix fares) vs. Section 72(2) (permit conditions) – Notification largely upheld, but Paragraph 3(b) quashed – State validly revised service charges payable by private operators for use of DTC bus shelters/terminals per permit Condition 17; however, compelling private operators to honour all DTC concessional passes is ultra vires Section 67 – High Court modified; partial relief granted with transition for student passes [Paras 18–26, 27–33, 35–36].

Section 67 Power – Scope and Limits – Directions may validly fix fares/freights and incidentally vary permit conditions only within statutory remit – Section 67(1)(d) read with (i) cannot be used to impose non-fare obligations like compulsory acceptance of another operator’s passes absent permit authorization by STA – Mandatory text must be followed (CIT v. Ghaswala; Dhananjaya Reddy) [Paras 18–19, 29–31].

Permit Conditions & User of Bus Stands – Condition 17 requiring use of DTC bus stops/terminals and payment of service charges “as determined by STA in consultation with DTC from time to time” is intra vires – Variation through Section 67 notification is permissible (B. Srikantiah; Sree Gajanana) – Enhanced charges (Rs. 2,500 p.m. for shelters; Rs. 5,000 p.m. for terminals) sustained [Paras 21–26].

Rules 75–76 & Section 72(2)(xx), (xxii), (xxiv) – Operators must halt only at notified stands; fees for use may be fixed; RTA/STA may vary/attach permit conditions after notice – Scheme history (1992/1995/2002) consistently contemplated service charges and constrained halting points [Paras 16–17, 21–24].

Concessional Passes – Paragraph 3(b) Ultra Vires – Permit Condition 13 requires honouring only those concessional passes “authorised for these buses” by STA; DTC’s own passes cannot be foisted on private operators via Section 67 – “Social obligations/uneconomic competition” rationale rejected; large classes of DTC passes are commercial instruments (advance tickets) not Article 38-driven subsidies; State cannot shift DTC burdens to private rivals (“rob Peter to pay Paul”) [Paras 27–33].

Fares for Passes – What Section 67 Permits – Government may prescribe fare levels for concessional passes generally (Paragraph 2 of notification) where operators issue such passes; this is within “fares and freights” power [Paras 32–33].

Decision – Appeal Allowed in Part – Notification dated 31.12.1999 upheld except Paragraph 3(b) which is quashed as ultra vires; operators to continue honouring concessional passes for disabled persons, freedom fighters, war widows and dependants; respondents to frame a lawful scheme for student passes within four months, failing which Paragraph 3(b) stands quashed w.e.f. 31.08.2004 [Paras 35–36].

Order 2 Rule 2 CPC – Earlier injunction suit withdrawn – Whether liberty reserved – Bar misapplied – Appeal Allowed – Plaintiff had sought withdrawal “with liberty to file fresh suit” and the court dismissed the suit “in view of statement of plaintiff” – Conjoint reading shows liberty was granted – Order 2 Rule 2 being a bar must be strictly construed – High Court and First Appellate Court erred in holding the subsequent specific performance suit barred – Second appeal restored for decision on substantial question of law under Section 100 CPC [Paras 3–7, 9].

Order 2 Rule 2 – Strict construction – Liberty to file fresh suit need not be couched in formulaic words – Court’s order referencing the plaintiff’s statement incorporates the liberty sought – Subsequent claim for specific performance not hit by O.2 R.2 merely because earlier suit sought only injunction and was withdrawn [Paras 3–6].

Second Appeal – Section 100 CPC – Duty to examine existence of substantial question of law – Matter remitted – High Court to hear and decide the second appeal in accordance with Section 100 CPC [Para 7].

Decision – Appeals allowed – High Court’s orders dismissing second appeal and review set aside – Second appeal restored to file for consideration under Section 100 CPC – No order as to costs – Parties directed to appear before High Court on 19/07/2004 [Paras 7–9].

NDPS Act – Acquittal Set Aside – Conviction Restored – Accused found transporting 73 bags of poppy husk (each 18 kg) in a tanker intercepted on highway by patrolling police – Trial court convicted under Section 15 of NDPS Act – High Court acquitted citing non-compliance with Sections 42 and 50 of NDPS Act – Held: High Court erred – Search was of a vehicle in a public place, not personal search – Hence, Section 50 not applicable – Section 42 also not applicable since search was not in a building or enclosed place and was conducted on a highway – Search falls under Section 43 which does not require recording of prior belief or warrant – Conviction and sentence restored [Paras 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12].

Search and Seizure – Applicability of Section 50 NDPS Act – Section 50 applies only to personal search – In the present case, poppy husk recovered from tanker and not from personal search of accused – Presence of gazetted officer (Superintendent of Police) at the time of search irrelevant under Section 50 – Constitution Bench ruling in State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh reiterated – Section 50 not attracted [Paras 5, 6].

Search in Public Place – Applicability of Section 42 vs. Section 43 NDPS Act – Section 42 applies to search in buildings, conveyances or enclosed places and requires prior information to be recorded and belief to be formed – Section 43 governs seizure in public places or in transit and does not require prior recording of belief – Present search was on a public highway and hence governed by Section 43 – No violation of procedural requirements under Section 42 – Presence of Superintendent of Police further obviates need to invoke Section 42 as he was empowered under Section 41 to search [Paras 7, 8, 9, 10, 11].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court’s acquittal order set aside – Conviction under Section 15 NDPS Act restored – Accused sentenced to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment and ₹1,00,000 fine each – In default of fine, additional 2 years’ rigorous imprisonment – Custodial sentence to be served subject to benefit of set-off under Section 428 CrPC [Para 12].

Criminal Law – Murder - Dying Declaration vs. Section 164 CrPC – High Court Acquittal Set Aside – Matter Remanded – Multiple murders reported on 14.07.1984; PW-4 (injured survivor) gave a statement recorded as a “dying declaration” but survived; trial court convicted five; High Court acquitted as respondents not named therein – Held: When the maker survives, the statement is not under Section 32 Evidence Act; it is a statement under Section 164 CrPC—usable for corroboration (Section 157) or contradiction (Section 155), not as substantive dying declaration evidence – The recorded statement related only to the assault on PW-4; absence of respondents’ names therein could not by itself negate the prosecution – High Court misread/overlooked evidence; acquittal set aside; matter remitted for fresh hearing [Paras 2, 5–6].

Evidence – Section 32 vs. Sections 155 & 157 – A “dying declaration” loses its Section 32 character if the declarant survives – Such a statement assumes the character of a Section 164 CrPC statement; it may corroborate or contradict but is not itself substantive proof of the entire occurrence – High Court erred in treating non-naming in the statement as fatal to the prosecution [Paras 5–6].

Appellate Review – Misreading of Evidence – Acquittal based solely on non-mention in a limited Section 164 statement is unsustainable – Appeals allowed; case remanded to High Court for comprehensive evaluation of all evidence; no opinion on merits otherwise [Para 6].

Decision – Appeals allowed – High Court’s acquittal set aside to the above extent – Matter remitted to High Court for fresh decision in accordance with law; observations confined to the legal characterization of the statement [Paras 6–7].

Land Acquisition – Invocation of Urgency Clause – Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act – Notification Quashed – The appeals arose from a composite notification dated 06/03/1987 issued under Sections 4 and 17 for acquiring 14 requisitioned properties – Respondents challenged the acquisition citing lack of urgency and denial of objection rights – Held: The urgency was unjustified; authorities had two years prior notice due to the lapse of the 1952 Act – Notification quashed for failure to comply with statutory safeguards [Paras 2, 5, 12, 15, 29, 31].

Requisitioned Properties – Delay and Administrative Lethargy – Misuse of Power – The Court held that the authorities were aware since 1985 that the requisition law would lapse – They had sufficient time to initiate regular proceedings – Invoking urgency to bypass objections was a misuse of power and amounted to a fraud on the statute [Paras 18-22, 27-28].

Right to Hearing – Section 5A – Article 14 of the Constitution – Denial of Fair Process – The right under Section 5A to object is not merely procedural but intertwined with Article 14 – Held: Dispensing with this right without real urgency was arbitrary – The emergency powers under Section 17 must be exercised with restraint and care [Paras 16, 30].

Binding Precedent – Banwari Lal and Shakuntala Gupta Cases – Common Notification – The Supreme Court held that the earlier judgments in Banwari Lal and Shakuntala Gupta concerning the same notification are binding precedents – Urgency clause being common, the notification cannot be partly valid and partly invalid – The appellants were bound by the prior decisions [Paras 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 36].

Maintainability – Tenant's Right to Challenge Acquisition – Section 5A(3) – The Court rejected the objection that tenants had no locus – Held: A tenant with a subsisting interest is an “interested person” under Section 5A(3) and can challenge acquisition – Delay not fatal where bona fide legal remedies were pursued [Paras 32, 37].

Appointment of Arbitrator – Valid Despite No Prior Agreement – The High Court had appointed an arbitrator to assess damages due to prolonged possession – Held: This was upheld in earlier cases and reaffirmed in Shakuntala Gupta – Appointments were valid in equity and to avoid further delay [Para 34].

Partial Quashing of Notification – Not Permissible – Composite Nature of Notification – The Court rejected the Union’s contention to uphold the notification under Section 4 while quashing Section 17 – Held: Doing so would cause an anomalous result – The entire notification must stand or fall as one [Para 35].

Final Decision – Appeals Dismissed – Notification Quashed – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s judgment – The urgency clause was wrongly invoked, and the acquisition was invalid – Appeals were dismissed with no costs [Paras 28, 38].

Writ – Territorial Jurisdiction - Article 226(2) – Cause of Action – Parliament’s Seat Irrelevant – Passing of Law Not Sufficient – Writ Jurisdiction Depends on Cause of Action – The Court held that territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) turns on where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises – the mere fact that Parliament is seated in Delhi or that a Parliamentary enactment is challenged does not, by itself, confer jurisdiction on the Delhi High Court – a constitutional question is not determined in vacuum and cause of action arises only when the statute’s operation visits civil or evil consequences – Held: Delhi High Court rightly declined jurisdiction [Paras 1, 6–8, 19–22, 23].

Section 20(c) CPC and Article 226(2) – Pari Materia – Integral/Material Facts Test – Though CPC does not apply to writs by force of Section 141, the phraseology in Section 20(c) and Article 226(2) being pari materia, precedents under Section 20(c) inform writ jurisdiction – only integral/material facts forming the basis of the relief sought constitute cause of action – mere correspondence/service of notice or situs of petitioner is insufficient unless integral to the grievance – Held: Only facts with nexus to the relief can found jurisdiction [Paras 9–14, 16–18].

Situs of Legislature/Rule-Maker or Union’s Office – No Jurisdiction per se – The situs of Parliament, State Legislature, or authority making subordinate legislation/executive instructions does not itself constitute cause of action or “cases arising” for Article 226 – Distinction drawn between legislative acts and executive/quasi-judicial orders – Where an original/appellate order is passed, part of cause of action arises at that place, but not merely because the law was framed there – U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mills view to the contrary overruled to that extent – Nasiruddin explained – Abdul Kafi Khan approved [Paras 20, 23–27].

Khajoor Singh Distinguished Post–Article 226(2) Amendment – After insertion of Article 226(2), even part cause of action suffices – pre-amendment view that jurisdiction depended on the location of the authority is inapplicable – present case governed by cause-of-action analysis under Article 226(2) [Paras 28–29].

Forum Conveniens – Discretion to Decline Even if Fraction of Cause Arises – Even where a small part of cause of action arises, High Courts may decline to exercise writ jurisdiction applying forum conveniens to prevent abuse and ensure appropriate forum is approached [Para 30].

Decision – Appeal Dismissed – Delhi High Court correctly held it lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ challenging the Act absent any part of cause of action within Delhi – no costs [Para 31].

Panchayat election by proportional representation via Single Transferable Vote (Hare/Clark) – Article 243C, Section 237 of the 1961 Adhiniyam, and UP Zila Panchayats Rules, 1994 (Rules 26, 33–35, 38, 40, 43, 47; Schedule II) – Appeal Allowed – Returning Officer’s declaration of “vacancy” held illegal – Quota under Schedule II is not mandatory at all stages in a single-seat STV – the rule of successive elimination must continue until one continuing candidate remains and that candidate is to be declared elected – High Court’s view set aside – Appellant declared elected as Adhyaksha, Zila Panchayat Champawat [Paras 3–7, 10–13, 21–27, 70–77, 89–92]

Election by Single Transferable Vote (Hare/Clark) – Quota under Schedule II not mandatory at all stages – “Continuing candidate” may be declared elected without attaining quota – In single-seat STV, if no candidate reaches quota, the rule of successive elimination applies until one continuing candidate remains – Held, Schedule II ¶¶4–6 are disjunctive; where only one continuing candidate remains, he is to be declared elected even if quota is not met [Paras 21–27, 70–73, 75–77]

Counting & Exclusion Mechanics – First-preference parity after elimination – Application of Schedule II ¶6 – Where candidates stand lowest with same totals, exclude the one with lowest number of first-preference votes; only if those are also equal, decide by lot – Illustration cannot curtail statutory text – Returning Officer erred in declaring vacancy instead of continuing exclusion process [Paras 70, 73–76]

Purposive Interpretation – Electoral rules to be construed to effectuate constitutional mandate of constituting Panchayats and to avoid deadlock and waste of votes – Literal construction leading to absurdity/uncertainty eschewed – Votes should not be rendered futile; social milieu and likelihood of ties must inform construction [Paras 52–63]

Constitutional Scheme – Part IX & Article 243C – Adhyaksha at district level to be elected by and from among elected members – Procedures must be read to ensure formation of District Panchayat; re-elections are not a necessary consequence of a tie when the rules themselves provide an elimination pathway [Paras 19–20, 52–53, 58–61]

Authoritative Precedent – University of Poona v. Shankar Narhar Ageshe (3-Judge) preferred over Jaidrath Singh (2-Judge) – Poona University affirms continuous elimination till candidates fill quota or successive eliminations leave one continuing candidate sufficient to fill the vacancy – High Court erred in preferring contrary approach [Paras 78–83, 85–88]

Maintainability of Election Petition – Ubi jus ibi remedium – Election petition maintainable even where Returning Officer declares no result or vacancy – Candidate may seek declaration that he or another is duly elected under Rules 33–35 – Right to challenge Returning Officer’s refusal to declare election recognized [Para 89]

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Appellant having obtained the highest number of first-preference votes and, on proper application of elimination, being the sole continuing candidate, ought to have been declared elected – High Court judgment set aside – Appellant declared elected as Adhyaksha, Zila Panchayat, Champawat [Paras 90–92]

Arbitration – Non-speaking award – Limited scope of interference under Section 30 – Interference set aside – Award recited consideration of pleadings and documents; absent proof of arbitrator’s misconduct, excess of jurisdiction, or error apparent, courts cannot probe reasons or re-appraise evidence – High Court erred in assuming arbitrator ignored conditional rebate letters and mobilization-advance correspondence in a non-speaking award [Paras 23, 25–29, 30–33, 34–35].

Construction of Contract – Arbitrator’s domain – Correspondence forms part of contract – Interpretation of conditional rebate offers linked to 10% interest-free mobilization advance and allotment of all six bridges as a whole is within arbitral province – Once dispute was referable and not barred by contract, arbitrator’s construction is final and not to be supplanted by court’s view [Paras 6–11, 24, 27–28, 32–34].

Excess of Jurisdiction vs. Error on Merits – Tests reiterated – Court may look at contract and reference only to see if claim was arbitrable or expressly barred; if arbitrable, merits are closed to review even if another view is possible – No contractual bar shown against claims on rebate or delay damages; hence award could not be pruned [Paras 32–34].

Precedents – Application – Sudarsan Trading; Allied Constructions; Rajasthan State Mines; Continental Construction; Pure Helium – cited to affirm that non-speaking awards withstand challenge unless jurisdictional excess or error apparent is demonstrated – High Court’s approach contrary to settled law [Paras 30–35].

Decision – Contractor’s appeal allowed; Union of India’s appeal dismissed – High Court judgment set aside; trial court order making the award rule of the court restored – No costs [Paras 36–37].