Facts:

Rakesh Kumar Singla was initially appointed as an Assistant Engineer on an ad hoc basis in 1980. Later, he applied to the Haryana Public Service Commission for regular appointment in accordance with statutory rules and was selected and appointed regularly in 1982. Rakesh Kumar sought the grant of a selection grade based on 12 years of service, including his ad hoc service, according to a circular from the Government of Haryana dated June 2, 1989. The State Government argued that the period of service as an ad hoc appointee should not be counted for the purpose of earning benefits under the circular because it was not in accordance with the Recruitment Rules.

Issues:

Whether the services rendered by an ad hoc appointee, outside the Recruitment Rules, can be counted for earning benefits under Government Memoranda when the appointee is later appointed regularly?

When should the 12-year period for eligibility for the selection grade commence for Rakesh Kumar Singla?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that:

Services rendered on an ad hoc basis or as a stopgap arrangement, not in accordance with the Recruitment Rules, cannot be considered regular service for earning benefits under Government Memoranda, specifically a higher scale of pay.

The 12-year period for eligibility for the selection grade should commence from Rakesh Kumar's regular appointment date in 1982, and his prior service as an ad hoc appointee should not be counted.

Facts:

The appellants were accused of the murder of an advocate's clerk who was cremated in the presence of his widow and son.

The prosecution's case alleged that the appellants, including Hukam Singh, were involved in the murder.

Eyewitnesses, including the deceased's son and widow, provided testimony.

Issues:

The primary issues revolved around the credibility of the eyewitnesses and the role of the Public Prosecutor in selecting witnesses.

The defense argued that the Public Prosecutor should have examined certain independent witnesses.

Held:

The Court upheld the conviction of the appellants for the murder based on the evidence provided by eyewitnesses.

The judgment emphasized the role of the Public Prosecutor in selecting witnesses, stating that the Public Prosecutor has the discretion to choose witnesses and is not obligated to examine every witness cited by the investigating agency.

The Court also highlighted that the decision of the Public Prosecutor should be fair to the court and to the trust placed in them.

It was noted that the decision in this regard should be taken by the Public Prosecutor in a fair manner, and they can interview witnesses beforehand to understand their anticipated testimony.

Facts:

The case involves a criminal appeal against the conviction of the appellants under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The main appeal, Criminal Appeal No. 5/99, is pending before the VIth Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Secunderabad. The appellants had filed interlocutory applications, which were dismissed. A revision case was filed in the High Court against the order of dismissal. During the proceedings, a settlement was reached, and the appellants deposited a specific sum of money in the court.

Issues:

Whether the settlement reached between the parties during the appeal proceedings affects the conviction and sentence of the appellants.

Whether the interlocutory applications filed by the appellants hold any merit or should be set aside.

Whether the High Court's order in the interlocutory proceedings should be upheld or set aside.

Held:

The Supreme Court held as follows:

The order related to the interlocutory applications filed by the appellants was set aside.

The matter was remitted to the Appellate Court (VIth Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Secunderabad), where the appeal against the conviction was pending.

The Appellate Court was directed to consider the subsequent events, particularly the payment made by the appellants as part of the settlement, and dispose of the appeal in accordance with the law, which could include setting aside the conviction, convicting the appellants, or imposing imprisonment or a fine as deemed fit under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

The complainant (first respondent) was allowed to withdraw the deposited amount, and their statement regarding not pressing for a conviction or specific sentence before the Appellate Court was noted.

Facts:

The appellants, proprietors of certain land in Mehgaon, filed a suit for possession, claiming that they were dispossessed and were entitled to recover possession.

Appellants' possession was recorded in the annual village papers (khasra) for specific years, while respondents claimed the land had been possessed by Gayadeen.

The trial court and appellate court ruled against the appellants.

Issues:

Interpretation of Section 4(2) of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act.

The importance of entries in annual village papers (khasra) as evidence of possession.

Correct procedure for correcting entries in annual village papers.

Held:

Section 4(2) vests the right in a proprietor to remain in possession of khud-kasht land, recorded in annual village papers before the date of vesting. Entries in the khasra before the date of vesting are relevant.

The legislative policy aims to protect a proprietor's right to remain in possession if they personally cultivate the land. The entries in the khasra before the date of vesting are crucial for this determination.

The criteria for possession rights under the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act differ from the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (M.P. Act). While the language is similar, the Abolition Act relies on entries in annual village papers.

Entries in annual village papers create a rebuttable presumption in favor of the recorded possessor. Correcting wrong entries is possible under Section 50 of the Land Revenue Act. Subsequent entries, not corrected per the prescribed procedure, are inconsequential.

Decision: The judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside. The appellants are entitled to continue in possession as their names were recorded in the khasra for years before the date of vesting. The appellants can also seek recovery of possession from unauthorized occupants. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.

Facts:

The appellant, Karnail Singh, a truck driver, was apprehended on 21st August 1992 by a Preventive Party on the Kota-Bundi Road in Rajasthan. He was found to be carrying 96.600 kgs. of opium concealed in his truck. A case was registered under Sections 8/18 of the NDPS Act, and the appellant was subsequently convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. The appeal challenged the conviction.

Issues:

Whether the procedural requirements of the NDPS Act, particularly Section 42 and Section 55, were adhered to in the case?

Whether the appellant had discharged the burden of proof to rebut the presumption under Section 35 of the NDPS Act regarding possession of illicit articles?

Held:

The court clarified that the applicability of Section 42 of the NDPS Act depends on whether the officer has a reason to believe from personal knowledge or information regarding the movement of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. If the action is not based on personal knowledge or information, Section 42 does not apply. The court further explained the distinction between the officer in charge of the nearest police station and the officer empowered under Section 53, stating that Section 55's applicability depends on which procedure is followed.

The court noted that the appellant had not discharged the burden of proof to rebut the presumption under Section 35 of the NDPS Act. The appellant was found to be transporting the opium with a conscious mind and full knowledge, and all elements of the offenses were proven by the prosecution.

The appeal was found to be without merit, and the conviction and sentence of the appellant were upheld.

Facts:

The case involves Maharishi Dayanand University (the appellant) versus M.L.R. Saraswati College of Education (the respondent). The respondent college, a B.Ed. College affiliated with the appellant University, sought to increase its student intake beyond the authorized limit. This required appointing more lecturers. The college unilaterally appointed ten ad hoc lecturers on May 1, 1999, without the involvement of the University or the Director of Higher Education. The National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) subsequently sanctioned an additional 80 student admissions based on these ad hoc appointments.

Issues:

Whether the proposal in the NCTE's letter dated 13.6.1997 for ad hoc lecturer appointments, without following due procedure, remained a proposal or was accepted by the State of Haryana or the appellant-University.

Whether the college could legally select ten additional ad hoc lecturers on May 1, 1999, without the participation of a representative of the University and the Director of Higher Education.

Whether the University could be directed by the High Court to sanction admission of the extra 80 students based on the NCTE's letter.

Whether the University could be faulted for not releasing the results of the examination of these extra 80 students and whether the release of results should be directed.

Held:

The Court held that the proposal in the NCTE's letter dated 13.6.1997 remained a proposal and was not accepted by the State or the appellant-University. The assumption that this letter permitted ad hoc appointments outside the prescribed procedure was not accepted.

The Court determined that the selection of the ten ad hoc lecturers on May 1, 1999, was illegal as it violated the prescribed procedure, including proper advertisement and participation of University representatives. The High Court's direction to the University to permit admission of the extra 80 students based on these appointments was contrary to guidelines and procedures.

The Court, acknowledging its usual reluctance to intervene in educational matters, directed the University to release the results of the 80 students who had completed their two-year course and paid examination fees. This was due to the unique circumstances involving NCTE's orders and the students' completion of their course.

Facts:

The appellant entered into an Agreement to Sell a portion of land to the first respondent.

The agreement stipulated a specific date for the execution of the sale deed and conditions related to the transfer of property rights and possession.

A sum of Rs. 20,000 was paid as part of the agreement.

A legal dispute arose due to the appellant's inability to deliver possession because of a separate lawsuit regarding the property.

The first respondent filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement, while the appellant argued that she was willing to execute the sale deed but could not deliver possession due to the legal dispute.

Issues:

Whether specific performance of the agreement was possible, given the appellant's inability to deliver possession?

Whether the first respondent could elect to accept part performance of the contract at a later stage of the litigation?

Held:

The Court examined Section 12(3) of the Specific Relief Act, which governs specific performance of part of a contract. It noted that specific performance of part of a contract is possible if certain conditions are met, including the payment of full consideration without abatement and the relinquishment of all claims to the remaining part of the contract. However, the first respondent did not meet these conditions, as he had initially elected not to accept part performance. The Court emphasized that once such an election is made, a party cannot later change their stance and claim part performance.

The Court further clarified that readiness and willingness, at all stages, in cases where a contract cannot be performed in whole, means the readiness and willingness to accept part performance. If a party unambiguously refuses to accept part performance, there can be no specific performance of part of the contract at a later stage. The Court upheld the trial court's decision, which directed the refund of Rs. 20,000 with interest and awarded Rs. 20,000 as compensation. The Appeal stands disposed of.

Facts:

Harinder Pal Singh Shergill was detained by Customs Authorities on suspicion of possessing foreign currency at Sahar International Airport, Mumbai. He was subsequently granted bail but later detained under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act, with the aim of preventing future smuggling activities. Shergill's wife challenged the detention order through a writ petition filed before the High Court.

Issues:

The jurisdiction of the High Court in cases of preventive detention.

Whether the High Court had the authority to quash the detention order by examining the merits of the case.

The impact of the delay in executing the detention order on its validity.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision to quash the detention order based on an examination of the case's merits was not appropriate. Preventive detention is largely based on suspicion, and the court is not the appropriate forum to investigate suspicions that warrant restraining a person. The responsibility for making a detention order rests with the detaining authority, and the court should not substitute its judgment for the satisfaction of that authority unless the satisfaction is based on relevant grounds.

The Court emphasized that there had been a proper application of mind by the concerned authority when issuing the detention order in this case. Therefore, the High Court's decision to quash the order could not be sustained.

Regarding the delay in executing the detention order, the Court noted that the delay was due to legal actions taken by Shergill, including obtaining an interim order from the High Court. The Court stated that the nexus between the object of detention and the circumstances in which it was ordered had not snapped due to the delay. However, it was clarified that if the circumstances no longer existed, the government could revoke the detention order.

Facts:

In 1902, a widow named L mortgaged two houses ('X' and 'Y') and twenty trees to R. Following her death, several individuals claimed to be heirs of L's husband and initiated legal actions to assert their rights to the mortgaged properties. Over the years, third-party interests were created in the properties, including mortgages and sales.

In 1959, M and K filed a suit for redemption against H, the mortgagee, and obtained a decree for redemption. In 1960, six individuals claiming to be heirs of L sold their equity of redemption in the property mortgaged to R by L to the 1st Respondent. When Respondent 1 demanded redemption of the original mortgage executed by L, it was refused, leading to a suit for redemption.

Issues:

Whether the predecessors-in-title of Respondent 1 were heirs of L, which is a question of fact.

Whether the suit for redemption is barred by limitation under the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908.

Whether the knowledge of third-party interests in the properties affected the limitation period for filing the suit.

Held:

The question of whether the predecessors-in-title of Respondent 1 were heirs of L was a factual issue. Both lower courts had given concurrent findings that this relationship was not proved.

The suit was governed by the Limitation Act, 1908. Under Article 148 of the Act, a suit for redemption of a mortgage could be filed within 60 years. However, if the mortgagee had created an interest in excess of their right, a suit to recover possession against the third party had to be filed within 12 years of the transfer becoming known to the plaintiff, as per Article 134 of the Act. The 12-year period runs from the date of knowledge by the plaintiff, and the burden of proving the suit is within time lies with the plaintiff.

The predecessors-in-title of Respondent 1 were aware of the third-party transactions, and it was their responsibility to establish that their suit was within the 12-year limitation period from their knowledge of these transfers. The burden of proof rested on the plaintiff, and the Court criticized the High Court for not requiring the plaintiff to prove the suit was in time .

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, upholding the findings of the lower courts that the suit was barred by limitation and that the predecessors-in-title of Respondent 1 had not established their relationship with the original owner, L. The High Court's decisions were overturned due to errors in law and fact .