Civil Writ - Provident Fund Dues – Director’s Liability for Recovery under Section 8B of the EPF Act – Petition Allowed – Petitioners sought to quash recovery proceedings initiated against them, including the issuance of a recovery certificate, show cause notice, and arrest warrants under Section 8B of the EPF Act, due to alleged non-payment of provident fund dues by the company where petitioner was a director – Held: The petitioner, though a director of the company, was not an ‘employer’ as defined under Section 2(e) and 2(k) of the EPF Act since he was neither the ‘owner’ nor the ‘occupier’ with control over company affairs; he was merely an employee receiving a salary and contributing to provident fund and ESI schemes – Consequently, he could not be subjected to recovery proceedings under Section 8B of the EPF Act – Petition allowed, and impugned orders set aside [Paras 7, 16, 17].

Civil Liability under Section 8B vs. Criminal Liability under Section 14A of the EPF Act – Distinction in Application – The Court distinguished between civil liability for provident fund recovery under Section 8B and criminal liability under Section 14A of the EPF Act – Civil liability requires the individual to be an ‘employer’ or ‘occupier’ with ultimate control over factory affairs, while criminal liability can attach to any director, manager, or officer in charge of the company’s conduct at the time of the offence – Since the petitioner did not meet the criteria for civil liability, recovery proceedings under Section 8B were invalid, though criminal liability could still be assessed independently in a separate trial [Para 17].

Interpretation of ‘Employer’ and ‘Occupier’ under the EPF Act – Employee Status of Director – Petitioner argued he was an employee without control over the company and was wrongly held liable as an ‘employer’ – Court held that the term ‘employer’ in the EPF Act refers to individuals with managerial or proprietary control, not mere nominal directors without operational responsibility – Since the petitioner was not listed as an ‘occupier’ in the company’s Form 5A and had no control over factory operations, he was exempt from liability for provident fund dues under Section 8B [Paras 12-16].

Decision: Petition allowed – The impugned recovery proceedings, including the recovery certificate, show cause notice, and arrest warrants against the petitioner, are set aside – The petitioner cannot be held liable under Section 8B of the EPF Act as he was not an ‘employer’ or ‘occupier’ with control over the company’s affairs – No grounds for invoking civil recovery proceedings against petitioner under the EPF Act.
 

Civil Law – Review Petition – Principle of Res Judicata – Satyadhyan Ghosal Case Applied – The petitioners sought review of a judgment dismissing their second appeal, arguing that under Mohammadan law, adoption and execution of wills are not recognized – Held: The petitioners were estopped from raising these issues, as the findings regarding adoption and will had attained finality in the first round of litigation – The principle of res judicata applies, barring re-litigation of issues already settled [Paras 12-18].

Application of Shariat Act – Non-retroactive Effect – The petitioners further contended that the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 2007, which mandates inheritance as per Mohammadan law, should apply to the present case – Held: The Shariat Act is not applicable retroactively, as the dispute pertains to events before its enactment [Paras 19-22].

Decision: The review petition was dismissed – The court found no error apparent on the face of the record to warrant review – The petitioners were precluded from re-agitating issues that had been settled in earlier proceedings.

Election Law – Disqualification for Defection – Petitioners challenged the order by the Kerala State Election Commission disqualifying them for defecting from the Revolutionary Marxist Party of India (RMPI) – The Election Commission found that the petitioners, who contested under the "Football" symbol allotted to RMPI, violated the party’s whip by voting against the official candidate for Panchayat President – Petitioners contended that they contested as independents under the Democratic Development Front (DDF) and were not RMPI members – Held: Petitioners, having contested using RMPI’s official symbol, were deemed RMPI candidates and bound by the party’s whip, leading to their disqualification under the Kerala Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1999 [Paras 1, 3, 6, 9, 28-30].

Election Symbols – Use of “Football” Symbol – Petitioners argued they were independents contesting under the DDF, not RMPI – However, the RMPI's State Secretary had officially recommended the "Football" symbol for them, and the Returning Officer allotted it based on RMPI's priority status – The Court held that even though the "Football" symbol is a free symbol, the petitioners, having used it as RMPI candidates, were bound by the party's instructions, leading to their disqualification [Paras 17-19, 27].

Judicial Review – Writ of Certiorari – Petitioners sought to quash the Election Commission’s decision, arguing that they were wrongly classified as RMPI members – The Court held that the Election Commission’s findings were based on clear evidence, including the use of RMPI’s symbol and the defiance of the party whip – No grounds were found to issue a writ of certiorari as the Commission's order was neither perverse nor based on erroneous application of law [Paras 18, 31-32].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – Disqualification of the petitioners for defection upheld.

Cheque Bounce – Section 138 of the NI Act – Dishonour of Cheque – Conviction Upheld – Accused convicted under Section 138 of the NI Act for issuing a cheque of ₹1,50,000 that was dishonoured due to insufficient funds – Trial Court found that the accused did not dispute his signature on the cheque, and failed to rebut the presumption of liability – Appeal to Sessions Court and revision to the High Court were both dismissed – Held: Cheque carries presumption of consideration under Section 139, and the accused failed to provide any credible defence to rebut the presumption [Paras 6, 7, 19, 28].

Presumption of Consideration – The High Court reaffirmed that under Section 139 of the NI Act, once the issuance of the cheque is admitted, a presumption arises that it was issued for a legally enforceable debt – The accused’s mere denial or assertion that the cheque was issued as security is insufficient without leading evidence to rebut the presumption – In this case, no defence evidence was led, and cross-examination of the complainant did not discredit his version [Paras 16, 17, 19].

Notice of Dishonour – Valid Service – The complainant served a notice of dishonour upon the accused, demanding payment within 15 days – The accused challenged the receipt of the notice, but the Court held that the address used was correct, and a presumption of valid service under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act applied – No evidence was led to rebut this presumption, and the accused failed to make payment despite receiving summons from the Court [Paras 32, 33].

Sentence and Compensation – Imprisonment in Default – Trial Court imposed a sentence of 7 months' simple imprisonment and ordered the accused to pay ₹1,80,000 in compensation, with a default imprisonment term of 2 months – The High Court found this sentence appropriate considering the legislative intent of Section 138 of the NI Act, which is both punitive and compensatory – The imposition of imprisonment in default of compensation payment was also upheld as legally valid [Paras 36, 38, 40].

Decision: Revision dismissed – Conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the NI Act upheld – Accused failed to rebut the statutory presumption of consideration or prove that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt [Paras 39, 41].

Taxation Law - Income Tax – Assessment of Amalgamated Entity – The appellant, Religare Enterprises Ltd. (successor of Religare Securities Ltd.), challenged assessment and reassessment orders issued in the name of the amalgamated entity, Religare Securities Ltd., which had ceased to exist post-amalgamation – The Court found that despite intimation of the amalgamation, the notices were issued in the name of the defunct entity, rendering the orders void – Held: Following the Supreme Court's decision in Maruti Suzuki, assessments in the name of a dissolved entity are a substantive illegality, not a procedural defect curable under Section 292B of the Income Tax Act [Paras 1, 36].

Reassessment Proceedings – Non-issuance of Notice to Amalgamated Entity – Notices under Sections 148 and 148A(b) were initially issued to Religare Securities Ltd., which had already merged with Religare Enterprises Ltd. – Petitioners contended that this omission was fatal to the reassessment – The Court noted that the reassessment was framed in the name of the dissolved entity, a defect that cannot be salvaged by mere participation in the proceedings or under Section 292B – The reassessment proceedings were quashed [Paras 5, 8].

Amalgamation and Tax Liability – Dissolution of Amalgamating Entity – The Court reiterated that upon amalgamation, the amalgamating entity ceases to exist, and all proceedings should be continued in the name of the amalgamated entity – The dissolution of the amalgamating entity by virtue of the sanctioned scheme meant any notice or assessment in its name was invalid ab initio – Cited Spice Entertainment Ltd. for the principle that an assessment against a non-existent entity is void [Paras 14, 15].

Decision: Writ petitions allowed – Notices and assessments framed in the name of the defunct Religare Securities Ltd. quashed – Reassessment proceedings declared invalid as they violated settled principles of law concerning amalgamated entities – Relief granted to the petitioner [Paras 38, 40].

Criminal Law - Section 210 CrPC – Clubbing of Complaint and Police Case – The petitioners sought quashing of orders, arguing that Section 210 CrPC mandates the clubbing of a complaint case with a police report where both pertain to the same offence – Held: Section 210 CrPC requires the Magistrate to stay the complaint proceedings when an FIR has been registered regarding the same offence. If the police report pertains to the same accused, the complaint case must be clubbed with the police case for a joint trial. The Magistrate must call for the police report and proceed accordingly [Paras 6-7].

Cross-Cases and Judicial Precedent – The petition involved cross-cases arising from the same incident – Held: As per the established practice in cross-cases, both cases should be tried by the same court, with the evidence in each case confined to that particular case. The Sessions Court was correct in declining to club the cases but erred in handling the cross-cases separately instead of following the procedure outlined in Nathi Lal vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1990 Supp SCC 145 [Paras 14-17].

Clubbing vs. Joint Trial – The Court clarified that while Section 210 CrPC mandates a joint trial of complaint and police cases, cross-cases should be heard separately, with judgments reserved and pronounced simultaneously. The evidence from one case cannot influence the outcome of the other [Para 12].

Decision: The petition is dismissed. The impugned orders do not suffer from illegality, and the procedure under Section 210 CrPC was correctly followed. The Sessions Judge’s approach in dealing with cross-cases is upheld, but the cases should be tried by the same Judge following the principles set out in Nathi Lal [Para 18].

Writ Jurisdiction – Request for CBI Investigation – Petition Dismissed – Petitioner, Geeta Gandhi, sought the court’s intervention under Article 226 to direct a CBI investigation into the alleged murder of her son, Kartik Gandhi, under mysterious circumstances in Leh – Held: The court found no compelling reasons to transfer the investigation from the Delhi Police to the CBI as there was no evidence to suggest any incompetency on the part of the local police – The petitioner failed to demonstrate any interstate or international ramifications of the case that would justify a CBI investigation [Paras 29, 30].

Allegations of Conspiracy – Lack of Substantive Evidence – The petitioner alleged that her son was murdered under a conspiracy involving several suspects, including Aditya Singh, who accompanied the deceased to Leh – Held: The court found that the petitioner’s claims of conspiracy were based on circumstantial evidence, and the investigation by the Delhi Police was already underway – The petitioner’s request for a CBI probe was rejected, as the allegations did not meet the threshold for transferring the case to a central agency [Para 28].

Judicial Oversight – Section 482 CrPC – Limited Scope – The court reiterated the principle that judicial interference in ongoing investigations should be minimal, especially when the investigation is being conducted by competent authorities – The petitioner had the option to approach the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC for further investigation if required – The court also observed that the petitioner’s claims of a larger conspiracy lacked material evidence to warrant CBI intervention [Para 27].

Decision – The petition was dismissed, with the court holding that the Delhi Police should continue its investigation – The request for CBI intervention was declined, with liberty granted to the petitioner to approach the Magistrate if further investigation is required [Paras 31, 32].

Civil Procedure – Interim Orders – Ex-Parte Status Quo – Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC – The respondent Trust sought an injunction to maintain access for devotees to offer prayers at a temple located on the disputed property – The trial court granted an ex-parte status quo order allowing prayers at the temple, despite pending applications for interim relief – Held: The ex-parte interim order was neither illegal nor perverse, as it aimed to protect the subject matter of the suit pending the disposal of interim applications – The High Court dismissed the appeal, directing the trial court to expedite the decision on the interim applications [Paras 14-20].

Res Judicata – Status Quo and Rights of Devotees – The appellants argued that the status quo order extended by the trial court was unwarranted since the dispute involved multiple suits concerning possession of the land – Held: The issue of devotees' right to offer prayers at the temple was previously addressed by the High Court, which had permitted prayers while directing maintenance of the status quo – The continuation of the interim order was a valid exercise of judicial discretion to safeguard the status quo [Paras 10-12].

Decision: The writ petition and appeal were dismissed – The trial court’s order to maintain status quo and allow devotees to offer prayers was upheld – The trial court was directed to expedite the disposal of the interim injunction applications.

Criminal Law - Confiscation of Vehicle – Lack of Hearing Opportunity – The petitioner, the owner of the confiscated vehicle, challenged the SDM's confiscation order, asserting that he was not granted a reasonable opportunity to be heard, as required by Section 17(2) of the Haryana Gauvansh Sanrakshan and Gausamvardhan Act, 2015 – Held: The SDM failed to comply with the statutory requirement of providing the vehicle owner an opportunity to present his case. The confiscation order was set aside on this ground [Paras 8, 10, 11].

Jurisdiction of Criminal Courts – Powers Under Section 482 CrPC – The petitioner directly approached the Sessions Court and the High Court instead of filing an appeal under Section 17(5) of the Act – Held: The Sessions Court and the High Court, exercising criminal jurisdiction under Sections 397, 401, and 482 CrPC, have the authority to review such orders if the competent authority failed to follow statutory procedures. The remedy under Section 17(5) does not bar the exercise of inherent powers of the criminal courts in such cases [Paras 15, 16, 17].

Violation of Principles of Natural Justice – The Court emphasized the duty of quasi-judicial authorities to follow statutory requirements, especially when confiscating property, and the failure to do so constitutes a violation of natural justice. The confiscation order was quashed, and the vehicle was ordered to be released to the petitioner [Paras 18, 19].

Decision: The petition is allowed, and the confiscation order dated 10.04.2024 is set aside. The petitioner’s vehicle is to be released upon furnishing an undertaking that it will be produced in court if required, and the petitioner is restrained from transferring the vehicle without prior permission from the competent authority [Paras 19, 20].