Real Estate Law – RERA – Locus Standi of Regulatory Authority – Person Aggrieved – Section 58, RERA 2016 – Preliminary objection raised that M.P. RERA, being an adjudicatory authority, cannot maintain appeals under Section 58 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 against orders of the Appellate Tribunal setting aside its decisions – Authority contended it discharges three distinct functions — administrative, regulatory and adjudicatory — and is covered within the inclusive definition of "person" under Section 2(zg) of the Act – Held: A quasi-judicial authority acting as an adjudicator is not an "aggrieved party" and lacks locus standi to challenge an appellate order setting aside its adjudicatory decision – However, where authority acts in a distinct statutory or regulatory capacity, it can maintain an appeal – Appeals held maintainable [Paras 3–4, 21–22].

RERA – Distinction Between Adjudicatory and Regulatory Functions – Locus to Appeal – The Act, 2016 confers three types of functions on the Authority — administrative, regulatory and adjudicatory — as mapped across its provisions – When exercising adjudicatory powers, the Authority decides disputes between parties and cannot maintain an appeal to defend its own decision – When exercising regulatory powers, the Authority has a vital interest in protecting public interest and can be impleaded and can maintain an appeal – A quasi-judicial authority must not be impleaded in an appeal against an order issued solely in exercise of its adjudicatory function but must be impleaded where the order was issued in exercise of its regulatory role [Paras 14, 19, 21].

Person Aggrieved – Meaning and Scope – Expression "aggrieved person" is an elastic and elusive concept that cannot be confined to the bounds of a rigid definition – Its scope depends on the content and intent of the statute, specific circumstances of the case, and the nature and extent of prejudice suffered – Expression does not include a person suffering from a psychological or imaginary injury – A person aggrieved must be one whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardised – Once the Authority was impleaded as a respondent before the Appellate Tribunal by the respondents themselves, it became an "aggrieved party" upon an adverse order being passed [Paras 16–18, 20].

Doctrine of Judicial Discipline – Quasi-Judicial Authority – Limits of Appellate Challenge – Judicial discipline ordinarily requires that an adjudicatory authority cannot challenge the order passed by the higher authority setting aside its decision – Legislature has not conferred upon the Authority under the Act, 2016 any specific power to defend its order before a higher forum in its adjudicatory capacity – Ratio decidendi and not the mere outcome of cited judgments is binding – Distinctions between regulatory and adjudicatory roles must be carefully maintained to avoid undermining judicial discipline and creating absurdity [Paras 6–7, 10].

Decision: All four miscellaneous second appeals (MSA Nos. 76/2025, 87/2025, 90/2025 and 09/2026) filed by M.P. Real Estate Regulatory Authority held maintainable – Matter listed for hearing on admission on 21.04.2026 [Paras 22–23].

Compassionate Appointment — Adopted Child — Validity of Unregistered Adoption Deed — Clause 2.5 of Compassionate Appointment Policy dated 29.09.2014 — Petitioner adopted by deceased government servant (Superior Field Worker, Malaria Department) and his wife in 2010 — Adoption deed executed on 15.06.2020 during lifetime of deceased, duly stamped, notarized and signed by necessary parties — Deceased died on 29.04.2021 — Application for compassionate appointment rejected by Respondent No. 4 on the ground that the registered adoption deed dated 23.10.2021 was executed after the employee's death and that no succession certificate was produced — High Court held: Registration is not a mandatory pre-condition for validity of adoption under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 — Adoption fulfilling substantive requirements of Sections 6 to 11 of the Act is legally valid irrespective of non-registration — Clause 2.5 uses the phrase "legally adopted" and does not stipulate a registered deed — Rejection order quashed — Respondents directed to grant compassionate appointment within sixty days — Writ petition allowed [Paras 3–5, 30, 36, 40–41].

Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 — Validity of Adoption — Registration not Mandatory — Sections 5, 6, 7, 10 and 11 — Statute places primacy on capacity of parties, consent of spouse, and the actual physical act of giving and taking the child with requisite intent — Nowhere in Chapter II does the Act prescribe registration of an adoption deed as a mandatory statutory pre-condition for validity — Section 16 of the Act creates only a rebuttable presumption in favour of a registered document and is a rule of evidence; it does not render an unregistered yet factually compliant adoption void or illegal — Deed of adoption not one of the documents mandatorily requiring registration under Section 17(1) of the Registration Act — Held: An adoption satisfying the conditions of Sections 6 to 11 is valid in law even in the absence of a registered deed [Paras 21–30].

Effect of Adoption — Section 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 — Adopted child deemed to be child of adoptive parent for all purposes from the date of adoption — All ties with the birth family severed and replaced by those in the adoptive family — Legal fiction created is absolute and complete — Adopted child acquires same legal status, rights and privileges as a biological child — Provisos to Section 12 merely restrict marriage within birth family and protect previously vested properties but do not dilute the parent-child relationship — Respondent's insistence on succession certificate or registered deed as mandatory pre-condition for compassionate appointment held to be addition of requirements not existing in law or policy [Paras 31–32, 36].

Compassionate Appointment — Governing Principles — Compassionate appointment is an exception to general recruitment procedure designed to enable family of deceased employee to overcome sudden financial crisis — It is not a vested right exercisable at any time in future — Must be provided immediately to redeem family in distress — Improper to keep such cases pending for years — In determining financial crisis, all relevant aspects including income, liabilities, terminal benefits, age and dependency of family members must be considered [Para 38].

Rejection Order — Arbitrary Exercise of Power — Respondent No. 4 acted mechanically and misdirected itself in law by insisting on registered adoption deed or succession certificate — Reliance on Jitendra Kumar Sen v. State of M.P. (W.P. No. 3156/2020) held misplaced as that case dealt with adoption initiated after death of employee, whereas present adoption was complete and documented in 2020 prior to employee's death in April 2021 — Held: Impugned order suffers from the vice of arbitrary exercise of administrative power based on flawed understanding of adoption laws [Paras 36–37, 39].

Decision: Writ petition allowed — Impugned order dated 10.12.2021 passed by Respondent No. 4 quashed and set aside — Respondents directed to treat adoption as valid and occurring during lifetime of deceased employee — Respondents directed to reconsider application for compassionate appointment in accordance with the 2014 Policy and pass appropriate orders granting appointment and consequential benefits within sixty days from receipt of certified copy of this order — No order as to costs.

Kidnapping — Section 363 IPC — Lawful Guardianship — Acquittal — The appellant was convicted by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 7, Calcutta under Section 363 IPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for four years — The conviction arose from an incident dated 03.11.2003 in which the appellant allegedly took a minor girl from the custody of one Chhanda Bibi on the pretext of purchasing garments and was found near a red light area — The Trial Court simultaneously acquitted the appellant of the charge under Section 373 IPC for want of evidence — No appeal was preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal — On appeal, the High Court sets aside the conviction under Section 363 IPC — Held: The prosecution failed to prove that Chhanda Bibi was the lawful guardian of the victim — The victim voluntarily accompanied the accused, was familiar with him prior to the incident, and never raised any protest or alarm — The charge under Section 363 IPC is therefore not established [Paras 18-23].

Lawful Guardianship — Inconsistencies in Evidence — Chhanda Bibi was neither a relative of the victim nor formally entrusted with her guardianship — The victim's mother had left her at the house of Chhanda Bibi where she worked as a maidservant without remuneration — Glaring inconsistencies were found between the testimonies of the victim and Chhanda Bibi regarding the duration of the victim's stay and the circumstances of her residence — Chhanda Bibi did not enquire about the victim for three days after she left and lodged no missing diary, indicating absence of custodial responsibility — Held: Chhanda Bibi cannot be described as a lawful guardian within the meaning of Section 363 IPC [Paras 18-19].

Voluntary Act — Acquaintance with Accused — No Protest — The victim was aged 16 to 17 years — She had acquaintance with the appellant prior to the incident — She did not raise any alarm or protest throughout the day — The Investigating Officer recorded that the victim disclosed the appellant's intention to marry her and that she was familiar with him — No allegation of sexual assault was made — PW2, a local witness, did not hear any weeping — Held: On the totality of evidence, the victim voluntarily went with the accused and no kidnapping was made out [Paras 21-22].

Prosecution's Case — Deficiencies — No GD Entry was made before the raiding party left the police station — The IO did not record statements of the lady constables — Superior officers of the raiding party were not examined — The seizure list did not bear the signature of the victim or the accused — The medical report's X-ray plate was misplaced and not produced — The raid itself remained insufficiently proved [Paras 15-16].

Decision: Appeal allowed — Judgment and order of conviction dated 06.06.2007 and 08.06.2007 under Section 363 IPC set aside — Appellant released from bail bond.

Contempt of Court – Civil Contempt – Breach of Solvent Surety – Implicit Undertaking to Court – Respondents furnished solvent surety in respect of Gat No. 775 as a condition for leave to defend the summary suit — Despite full knowledge of the subsisting surety condition reaffirmed by court orders dated 02.05.2011, 10.10.2011 and 07.04.2014, respondents executed a registered sale deed of the suretyship property in favour of a third party on 13.06.2023 — Held: A solvent surety furnished as a condition of leave to defend carries with it an implicit undertaking that the property shall remain unencumbered until disposal of the suit or further court order — Breach of such surety constitutes civil contempt within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — Respondents held guilty of contempt [Paras 15–18].

Contempt – Apology – Not Accepted as Bona Fide – Unconditional apology tendered by respondents accompanied by an offer to replace the solvent surety — Explanation offered that financial necessity compelled execution of the sale deed, and that the advocate handling the matter had expired — Held: Where contempt is committed with full knowledge and consciousness, the apology tendered is merely a legal device to wriggle out of responsibility and cannot be accepted as bona fide — Courts should not show compassion when disobedience of an undertaking or court order is committed with impunity — Apology is not just a word; a true apology requires introspection, atonement and self-reform — Mere expression of being sorry coupled with an offer to replace surety, made only after court recorded prima facie findings of breach, does not constitute a bona fide apology — Apology rejected [Paras 19–29].

Contempt – Sentence – Discharge on Undertaking and Settlement – Respondent no. 1 tendered an undertaking to pay the full suit claim of Rs. 4,60,00,000/- (principal of Rs. 2,30,00,000/- plus equivalent amount towards interest) — Consent terms signed by both parties — Held: In view of the undertaking and settlement, respondents discharged on payment of a fine of Rs. 2,000/- — Respondents directed to deposit principal amount of Rs. 2,30,00,000/- with the trial court on or before 08.05.2026, with interest payable in four equal monthly instalments of Rs. 57,50,000/- — Trial court to permit petitioners to withdraw the deposited amounts without condition and dispose of the suit in accordance with the consent terms [Paras 31–37].

Contempt – Solvent Surety – Breach – Third-Party Rights Created – Effect – Third-party purchaser of the suretyship property cannot be a necessary party to contempt proceedings — Beneficiaries of a contumacious transaction have no right or locus to be heard in contempt proceedings on the ground that they are bona fide purchasers for value without notice — Court exercising contempt jurisdiction may declare such transactions void or issue appropriate directions to nullify the advantage secured by the contemnor [Paras 20–24].

Decision: Respondents held guilty of contempt of court — Unconditional apology not accepted as bona fide — Respondents discharged on payment of fine of Rs. 2,000/- to be deposited before trial court within four weeks — Undertaking dated 04.05.2026 and consent terms dated 04.05.2026 taken on record and accepted as undertakings to the court — Trial court directed to permit petitioners to withdraw deposited amounts and to dispose of suit in accordance with consent terms — Contempt Petition disposed of accordingly.

Mines and Minerals – Seizure of Vehicle – AP Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966 – Rule 26(3)(iii) – Release of Vehicle – Payment of Penalty – Tipper lorry seized by Station House Officer for failure to produce valid transit permit – Petitioner challenged seizure as illegal and in violation of Rule 26(3)(iii) – Rule 26(3)(iii) provides only for levy of penalty of five times the normal seigniorage fee in addition to normal seigniorage fee along with DMF and MERIT amounts if driver or owner fails to produce valid transit permit – Held following Division Bench in Naganath v. State of A.P. (WA No.4 of 2021): Rule does not postulate that vehicle cannot be released unless penalty is paid; vehicle to be released upon levy of penalty and payment thereof by petitioner – 2nd Respondent directed to pass appropriate orders and collect due seigniorage fee and penalty; upon payment and production of ownership documents, 3rd Respondent directed to release the seized vehicle [Paras 5-8].

Decision: Writ petition disposed of at admission stage – District Mines and Geology Officer (2nd Respondent) directed to pass appropriate orders under Rule 26(3)(iii) and collect due seigniorage fee and penalty – Upon payment of penalty and production of receipt and ownership documents, Station House Officer (3rd Respondent) directed to release Tipper Lorry bearing No.AP 39 TJ 5859 – No order as to costs – Interlocutory applications closed.

Criminal Law – Murder – Robbery – Circumstantial Evidence – Last Seen Theory – Five Golden Principles – Panchsheel – Appellant, a former driver sacked by truck owner, was last seen travelling with deceased driver Munna Mishra and cleaner Mohan on truck from Kanpur to Lucknow on 12.10.2005 – Dead bodies of driver and cleaner found on 14.10.2005 near Thakurdwara, village Ghazia Kheda, Police Station Ganga Ghat, Unnao – Truck subsequently recovered in ownerless condition with all goods, jack, rope and tarpaulin missing – Jack recovered on 24.11.2006 on pointing out of appellant from a spot where he himself dug it out – Post mortem showed death by strangulation (Munna Mishra) and shock and haemorrhage (Mohan) with time of death corroborating last seen evidence – Chain of circumstances complete – Held: All five golden principles of circumstantial evidence as laid down in Sharad Birdichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra satisfied – Appellant is the only perpetrator of crime – Conviction and sentence confirmed – Appeal dismissed [Paras 10-12, 22, 42-43].

Criminal Law – Last Seen Theory – Short Time Gap – Where time gap between last seen and discovery of dead bodies is very short and there is no evidence of separation of accused and deceased in the intervening period, possibility of any person other than accused being perpetrator of crime becomes impossible – Appellant seen going with deceased on 12.10.2005 and dead bodies found on 14.10.2005; doctor opined bodies were 3-5 days old pointing to 12.10.2005 – Last seen alone not sufficient but forms a crucial link in chain of circumstances – Following Rambraksh alias Jalim v. State of Chhatisgarh and State of Karnataka v. Chand Basha [Paras 23-25].

Criminal Law – Recovery – Section 27 Evidence Act – Hostile Witness – Recovery of Jack – Jack recovered on pointing out of appellant from spot where he had buried it, corroborated by PW-1 (complainant) and PW-7 (Investigating Officer) – PW-3 turned hostile and denied recovery in his presence in cross-examination – Held: Even if panch witness turns hostile, evidence of Investigating Officer and complainant who witnessed the recovery is sufficient to prove recovery – Recovery pursuant to disclosure statement admissible under Section 27 of Evidence Act – Following Modan Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Mohd. Aslam v. State of Maharashtra [Paras 31-35, 37].

Criminal Law – Motive – Contradictions – Reasonable Doubt – Appellant admittedly sacked by truck owner about a month before the incident for fare irregularities and had quarrel for non-payment of 13 months' salary – Sufficient motive established – Minor inconsistencies in evidence of PW-3 (who partly supported and partly denied prosecution case) not elevated to status of reasonable doubt – Held: Where contradictions are of minor nature and not destructive of prosecution case, they do not entitle accused to benefit of doubt – Following Kalinga @ Kushal v. State of Karnataka and Tomaso Bruno v. State of U.P. [Paras 26, 38-41].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Conviction of appellant under Sections 394, 302/34, 201 and 411 IPC confirmed – Sentence of life imprisonment and fine of Rs.5,000/- under Section 302 IPC, 10 years rigorous imprisonment and fine under Section 394 IPC, 3 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 411 IPC and 5 years rigorous imprisonment and fine under Section 201 IPC, all running concurrently, confirmed – Appellant to serve remaining sentence – Trial court record to be transmitted within one week.

Criminal Law – Interim Custody of Seized Vehicle – Section 503 BNSS – Registered Owner Not an Accused – Petitioner-registered owner of Fortuner Car (MP16-C-6019) gave the vehicle to friend Shivam Rai on 05.08.2025 for travel to Bhopal – Without the petitioner's knowledge, Shivam Rai handed the car to accused Nitin Dubey who allegedly used it to commit murder of his wife – Vehicle seized on 14.09.2025 from Shivam Rai – Petitioner not arrayed as accused in ST No. 17/2026 – Trial court dismissed application for supurdagi on the ground that the vehicle was subject matter of evidence, charge had been framed, and prosecution evidence was yet to commence – Held: Court below failed to consider binding precedents on interim custody of seized vehicles – Where no allegation has been made in the charge sheet against the owner or his agent, vehicle should normally be released on supurdagi subject to the owner furnishing a bond to produce the vehicle as and when directed – Impugned order set aside – Matter remanded for fresh decision without being influenced by the impugned order – Trial court to decide afresh before proceeding further in the matter [Paras 2, 5–9].

Interim Custody – Principles – Vehicle as Evidence – Seizure of a vehicle amounts to entrustment to a government servant – Property should be restored to the original owner after the necessity to retain it ceases – It is no use to keep seized vehicles at police stations for long periods – Releasing seized vehicle on supurdagi with appropriate conditions including bond, undertaking to produce vehicle when required, prohibition on transfer or alteration, and photography to preserve evidentiary character serves the purposes of avoiding deterioration, misappropriation, and burdening of the court/police with custody – Court below was required to consider these principles and the coordinate bench decisions before dismissing the application [Paras 6–7].

Decision: Criminal revision partly allowed – Impugned order dated 10.02.2026 set aside – Matter remanded to the 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Gadarwara for fresh decision on the application under Section 503 BNSS without being influenced by the impugned order and without proceeding further in the matter in the meantime – Pending applications disposed of.

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 138 – Dishonour of Cheque – Enforceable Debt or Liability – Cheque as Collateral Security – Respondents supplied 1,393.105 MT of iron ore to the appellant against a contract for 40,000 MT — Cheque was presented for encashment on 24.05.2004 and dishonoured on 02.06.2004 — Analyst's report certifying inferior quality of iron ore is dated 09.07.2004, i.e., subsequent to the date of presentation — Held: As on the date of presentation of the cheque, the appellant was not aware that the iron ore was of inferior quality; no liability corresponding to the cheque amount was crystallised on that date — Cheque, being a collateral security not mentioned in the contract, could not have been presented for encashment when no enforceable debt or liability existed [Paras 14–17].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Sections 118 and 139 – Statutory Presumptions – Failure to Raise Foundational Facts – Statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 are triggered only upon establishment of the factual foundation necessary to make out the complainant's case — Contract between the parties made no mention of the subject cheque — Appellant filed contradictory complaints: in the Section 138 complaint it alleged that the cheque was handed over directly by the respondents, while in the cheating complaint filed on 01.08.2005 it alleged that the cheque was handed over to one Pandurang alias Bhai Naik who in turn gave it to the appellant — Pandurang alias Bhai Naik was never examined during trial, raising an adverse inference — Held: Appellant failed to raise the foundational facts required to invoke statutory presumptions; presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 not triggered [Paras 11, 16].

Appeal Against Acquittal – Scope of Interference – Presumption of Innocence Strengthened – An appellate court must bear in mind that the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is strengthened by an order of acquittal — Unless the conclusions of the trial court are palpably wrong, based on an erroneous view of law, or likely to result in grave injustice, interference is not warranted — Merely because the appellate court may be inclined to take a different view on re-appreciation of evidence, interference with acquittal is not justified if the view taken is a possible view — Reasoning of the Sessions Judge found to be in consonance with law; no infirmity made out [Paras 13, 17–18].

Decision: Appeal dismissed — Impugned order of acquittal dated 30.09.2015 confirmed — Miscellaneous applications disposed of.

POCSO Act — Section 15(2) — Child Sexual Abuse Material — Discharge of Accused — Subjective Satisfaction Test — Accused persons chargesheeted for storing, possessing, and transmitting Child Sexual Exploitation Material (CSEM) through mobile phones and WhatsApp groups — Sessions Court discharged accused under Section 15(2) POCSO Act solely on the ground that age of children depicted in pornographic videos could not be conclusively established through documentary proof or medical examination — High Court, on suo motu revision, holds that Sessions Court erred in applying rigid age-determination criteria to CSEM cases involving unidentified child victims — Impugned discharge order set aside — Sessions Court directed to frame charges under Section 15(2) POCSO Act and proceed to trial [Paras 2, 42–44].

Definition of 'Child' — Section 2(1)(d) vs. Section 2(1)(da) POCSO Act — Distinction in standard of proof — Section 2(1)(d) defines 'child' as any person below eighteen years — Section 2(1)(da) defines 'child pornography' to include visual depictions which 'appear to depict a child' — Legislature consciously departed from objective age-determination criteria under Section 2(1)(d) when enacting Section 2(1)(da) so as to prevent Section 15 from being rendered unworkable — Held: For offences under Section 15 POCSO Act relating to CSEM, courts are not required to conclusively establish age of depicted persons through objective means; it suffices if the material appears to depict a child to a prudent ordinary person [Paras 30–36].

Subjective Satisfaction Test — Expert Opinion — Application to Unidentified Child Victims — Two medical experts from Maulana Azad Medical College, on perusal of videos and photographs recovered from accused's devices, opined that some persons depicted therein were children below eighteen years based on physical development, genital development, and secondary sexual characteristics — Witnesses from Delhi Commission for Women similarly opined that material depicted children in sexually explicit manner — CFSL forensic report confirmed storage and transmission of CSEM by both accused — Held: Expert opinions and investigation material prima facie satisfy the test of subjective satisfaction; Sessions Court failed to properly appreciate such evidence while passing the discharge order [Paras 37–42].

Interpretation of POCSO Act — Purposive Construction — Section 15 and Section 2(1)(da) to be read conjunctly — Rigid application of age-determination procedure under Section 34 POCSO Act read with Section 94 JJ Act confined to cases where victim is identifiable and traceable — In CSEM cases involving unidentified victims, such procedure is wholly impractical and unjust — To discharge accused solely on failure to produce documentary or medical proof of age would defeat the object of the statute and leave countless unidentified child victims without protection — Held: Mandatory age-determination procedure under Section 34 POCSO Act and Section 94 JJ Act inapplicable where child victims are unidentified and cannot be produced before Court [Paras 27–36].

Relied upon: Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2611 — Held: For any offence under POCSO relating to child pornographic material, courts are only required to form a prima facie subjective satisfaction that the material appears to depict a child from the perspective of an ordinary prudent person; such satisfaction may be arrived at from FSL report, expert opinion, or court's own assessment of material.

Decision: Revision petition allowed — Impugned order dated 01.09.2023 set aside to the extent it discharged Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 under Section 15(2) of the POCSO Act — Sessions Court directed to frame charges against Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 under Section 15(2) POCSO Act, Section 67B IT Act, and Section 120B IPC, and to proceed with trial in accordance with law [Paras 43–44].