FEMA – Omission of Section 6(3)(b) – Impact on Pending Proceedings – The petitioners argued that Section 6(3)(b) of FEMA was omitted by the Finance Act, 2015, and thus, no proceedings could be initiated for alleged violations under this section – Held: Omission of a statutory provision is equivalent to repeal, attracting the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act – Proceedings initiated for past violations under Section 6(3)(b) remain valid despite its subsequent omission [Paras 18-23].

Show Cause Notice – Delay in Issuance – Reasonableness of Time – Petitioners contended that the impugned notice was issued after an unreasonable delay of nearly 10 years – Held: Though FEMA does not prescribe a limitation period for initiating adjudication, proceedings must be initiated within a reasonable time – Determination of what constitutes a "reasonable time" depends on the facts and circumstances and is within the adjudicating authority’s jurisdiction – No interference warranted at the show cause notice stage [Paras 31-36].

Natural Justice – Allegation of Bias in Adjudicating Authority – Petitioners argued that the Special Director had already made up his mind as the Enforcement Directorate had filed a counter-affidavit supporting the allegations – Held: The counter-affidavit was filed by a subordinate officer and not the adjudicating authority – Mere filing of a counter does not establish bias – Adjudication remains open for explanation and appeal, ensuring due process [Paras 24-27].

Alternative Remedy – Maintainability of Writ Petition – Petitioners challenged the show cause notice directly before the High Court, bypassing statutory appeal remedies – Held: Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should not be invoked when an effective alternative remedy is available, except in cases of fundamental rights violation, lack of jurisdiction, or breach of natural justice – Petitioners had the right to appeal under Sections 19 and 35 of FEMA – Writ petition dismissed on grounds of alternative remedy [Paras 12-15, 28-30].

Decision: The writ petitions are dismissed with liberty to the petitioners to file their objections before the adjudicating authority within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order – The adjudicating authority shall consider the objections in accordance with law – No costs – Miscellaneous petitions closed [Para 39].
 

Criminal Law – Murder - Appeal against Conviction - Murder vs. Culpable Homicide – Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC – Grave and Sudden Provocation – The accused, deceased, and their friend had been drinking alcohol throughout the day. The deceased misbehaved with the accused’s wife in the presence of her family members, leading to a confrontation. In the heat of the moment, the accused struck the deceased with firewood. Held, the accused did not have the intention to cause death, and the act was committed under grave and sudden provocation, bringing the case under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC. The conviction under Section 302 IPC was modified to Section 304 Part II IPC [Paras 21-23].

Intention vs. Knowledge – Application of Section 304 Part II IPC – The accused struck the deceased 2-3 times with firewood, causing fatal head injuries. The prosecution did not establish premeditation or intent to kill. Held, the accused could be imputed with knowledge, not intent, that his act was likely to cause death, warranting punishment under Section 304 Part II IPC instead of Section 302 IPC [Paras 29-33].

Sentence Modification – Reduction from Life Imprisonment to Seven Years – The Sessions Court sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC. Considering the circumstances of the offence, the High Court reduced the punishment to seven years rigorous imprisonment under Section 304 Part II IPC, along with a fine of Rs. 1,00,000, to be paid to the victim’s wife [Paras 34-35].

Decision: The appeal is partly allowed. The conviction under Section 302 IPC is set aside, and the appellant is convicted under Section 304 Part II IPC. The sentence is modified to seven years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000, failing which he shall undergo an additional six months rigorous imprisonment. The conviction and sentence under Sections 326 and 324 IPC remain unaltered. If the fine is realized, Rs. 1,50,000 shall be given to PW4, the victim’s wife.
 

Criminal Law – Quashing - Retaliatory FIR – Timing of Complaint – Malicious Prosecution Inferred – The husband filed a suit under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act on 18/10/2023, and the wife lodged the FIR shortly thereafter on 27/10/2023. No explanation was provided for the delay in filing the complaint, despite her claim of being driven out of the matrimonial home on 21/04/2023. Held, the FIR appears to be a retaliatory measure rather than a genuine grievance [Paras 6-7].

Omnibus Allegations – Lack of Specific Role Attribution – Quashing Justified – The FIR contained general allegations without assigning specific roles to the accused. Statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. were identical and lacked independent corroboration. The charge sheet also failed to establish the role of each accused, violating the principles laid down in Sharif Ahmed v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 726. Held, continuation of proceedings would be an abuse of process [Paras 7, 10-11].

Medical Evidence – Contradictions in Injury Report – The private opposite party alleged physical assault by the husband, but her medical report showed no external injuries. Despite this, the injury was classified as "simple" without any basis. Held, such contradictions cast doubt on the veracity of the allegations [Para 8].

Exercise of Inherent Powers – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – The High Court has the authority under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash proceedings where the allegations lack substance, and the prosecution appears to be an abuse of legal process. Held, in the absence of prima facie evidence, allowing the case to continue would be unjustified [Paras 9, 12].

Decision: The criminal revision petitions are allowed. The proceedings in G.R. Case No. 895 of 2023 before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dantan, Paschim Medinipur, are quashed. The petitioners are set at liberty and discharged from their bail bonds.

Bail under NDPS Act – Commercial Quantity – Conscious Possession – Applicant sought bail in a case involving seizure of 1880 grams of MDMA, well above the commercial quantity threshold of 10 grams – Prosecution established that the applicant inquired about the parcels containing contraband, attempted to collect them while concealing his identity, and fled upon sensing law enforcement presence – Held: Applicant’s conduct indicates knowledge and involvement, satisfying prima facie conscious possession under the NDPS Act [Paras 8-9] – Decision: Bail denied.

*Rigors of Section 37 NDPS Act – Twin Conditions – In cases involving commercial quantities of narcotics, bail can only be granted if the Court is satisfied that the accused is not guilty of the offence and is unlikely to commit another offence while on bail – Given the weight of the seized contraband and the ongoing investigation into a larger drug trafficking conspiracy, the Court found that the applicant failed to meet the twin conditions under Section 37(1)(b) of the NDPS Act [Paras 10-12] – Decision: Bail application dismissed.

Ongoing Investigation – Risk of Absconding – Co-accused absconding – The applicant’s brother-in-law and driver, key suspects, remain untraceable – CBI argued that releasing the applicant could compromise the investigation into an international drug trafficking syndicate – Held: Given the gravity of the offence and potential risk of absconding or tampering with evidence, bail cannot be granted at this stage [Paras 11-12] – Decision: Bail denied.

Duration of Incarceration – Speedy Trial – Applicant argued for bail on the ground of prolonged custody – Court held that while the right to a speedy trial is fundamental, the ongoing investigation into international drug trafficking justifies continued judicial custody – No indication of undue delay attributable to the prosecution [Paras 13-14] – Decision: Bail denied.
 

Constitutional Law – Challenge to Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978 & Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 – Not Considered – The Petitioners initially sought to challenge the constitutional validity of the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978, and the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 – However, no substantial arguments were advanced in this regard – Court restricted its analysis to the land acquisition dispute – Held: No findings recorded on constitutional validity due to lack of argumentation [Para 12].

Land Acquisition – Delay in Declaration Under Section 6 – Explanation to Section 6(1) Applies – Declaration Held Valid – The Petitioners contended that the Section 6 declaration made on 22 July 2014 was beyond the one-year period from the last publication of Section 4 notification on 31 May 2013 – The Court held that the statutory explanation to Section 6(1) excluded periods when proceedings were stayed by court orders – Since interim relief had been granted to the Petitioners, the delay was not fatal – Held: Section 6 declaration valid and not lapsed [Paras 28-34].

Land Acquisition – Lapse of Proceedings Under Section 11-A of the 1894 Act & Section 25 of the 2013 Act – Rejected – Petitioners argued that since the award was made on 16 July 2016, beyond the statutory period, acquisition proceedings lapsed – The Court applied the precedent in Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation v. Mahesh and held that delays due to judicial orders were to be excluded – Further, it was held that acquisition proceedings did not lapse under either the Old Act or the New Act – Held: Acquisition proceedings not vitiated by delay [Paras 35-45].

Land Acquisition – Public Purpose – Cooperative Sugar Factory – State’s Funding as Determinative Factor – Petitioners contended that the third Respondent, a cooperative sugar factory, was not a "corporation owned or controlled by the State" under Section 3(cc) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as its government shareholding was below 51% – The Court held that since the acquisition was partly funded by the government, it was deemed for a "public purpose" under Section 6(3) of the Act – Held: Acquisition valid, irrespective of state shareholding in the cooperative society [Paras 51-64].

Judicial Review – Conclusivity of Section 6 Declaration – Limited Scope for Challenge – The Court reiterated that a Section 6 declaration under the Land Acquisition Act is conclusive evidence that land is required for a public purpose – Petitioners failed to challenge the State’s financial contribution to the acquisition, which was a decisive factor – Held: Acquisition upheld as lawful and for a public purpose [Paras 58-60].

Land Acquisition – Procedural Compliance – Government Resolution of 14 June 2001 – Not Binding – Petitioners argued that the Government Resolution (GR) required Section 6 declarations to be made within six months – The Court held that such resolutions are internal guidelines and cannot override statutory provisions – Held: GR not enforceable against statutory timelines [Para 50].

Judicial Precedents – Lapse of Acquisition – Stay Orders & Exclusion of Time – Supreme Court Rulings Followed – The Court applied the principle established in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal, (2020) 8 SCC 129, which held that judicial delays must be excluded when calculating statutory limitation periods for acquisition proceedings – Held: No lapse of acquisition under statutory provisions [Paras 41-47].

Decision: The Court held that the land acquisition proceedings did not suffer from any procedural illegality or lapse under the provisions of either the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – The Section 6 declaration was made within the legally permissible period after excluding judicially imposed delays – The acquisition was for a public purpose as it was partly funded by the State, rendering the percentage of government shareholding in the cooperative society irrelevant – No fraud was found in the acquisition process – Petition dismissed – However, interim relief restraining possession was extended for eight weeks to enable the Petitioners to seek further remedy before the Supreme Court [Paras 66-67].
 

NDPS Act – Bail – Stringent Conditions under Section 37 – The accused was found in a passenger bus with a carton containing heroin concealed inside an inverter—Held: Under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, bail cannot be granted unless the Court is satisfied that the accused is not guilty and is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail—No prima facie material establishing that the accused had no knowledge or possession of the contraband—Bail denied [Paras 3-4, 9-12].

Conscious Possession – Prima Facie Evidence – Legal Precedents – Petitioner argued that the accused was merely a passenger and had no knowledge of the carton found under his seat—Held: Whether the accused was in conscious possession is a matter of trial—Court relied on Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab and Kishore Bira v. State of Odisha to highlight that passive presence alone does not establish possession—However, at this stage, the burden is on the accused to establish lack of knowledge—Bail cannot be granted on presumptive grounds without trial evidence [Paras 5-6, 10].

Public Interest – Drug Menace – Societal Harm – Court emphasized the severe impact of drug-related offences on youth and society—Held: NDPS offences must be dealt with stringently to deter drug trafficking—Referred to Shri. Khupliansum v. State of Meghalaya and Dataram Singh v. State of U.P. to highlight the need for judicial discretion in bail matters—Court refused to grant bail given the social and legal ramifications of drug crimes [Paras 7-8].

Trial Progress – Swift Disposal – No Unnecessary Delay – Prosecution submitted that only three witnesses remained to be examined—Held: Since trial is at the stage of charge consideration and is likely to be completed expeditiously, granting bail at this juncture is inappropriate—Accused has the right to defend himself during trial [Paras 10-12].

Decision: Bail application dismissed – Court not satisfied that the accused is not guilty – Trial to proceed expeditiously – No costs awarded [Paras 12-13].
 

Criminal Law – Dishonour of Cheque – Appeal Against Acquittal -  Validity of System-Generated Cheque Return Memo – Section 146 of NI Act – The trial court rejected the cheque return memo (Exhibit-2) on the ground that it did not bear an official seal or signature of the bank. However, Section 146 of the NI Act presumes a bank’s slip or memo denoting dishonour to be prima facie evidence unless disproved. The return memo contained the bank code, branch name, user ID, and reason for dishonour, fulfilling the statutory requirements. Held, the cheque return memo is valid even in the absence of a seal or signature [Paras 7-9].

Burden of Proof – Accused Did Not Dispute Dishonour – The accused did not reply to the statutory demand notice, did not deny dishonour during examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., and did not contest dishonour during his testimony. The trial court’s finding that dishonour was unproven was erroneous. Held, the accused failed to rebut the presumption under Section 146 of the NI Act [Paras 8, 11].

Interpretation of "Official Mark" – Trial Court's Narrow Interpretation Reversed – The trial court wrongly equated "official mark" with "official seal and signature." A coordinate bench of the Delhi High Court in Guneet Bhasin v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3967, held that a cheque return memo remains valid even if it lacks a seal or signature, provided it contains identifying bank details. Held, the trial court erred in acquitting the accused based solely on the absence of a bank seal [Paras 10-11].

Conviction and Sentencing – Quantum of Fine – The accused was convicted under Section 138 of the NI Act and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 12,00,000/- within three months, failing which he would undergo simple imprisonment for six months. The fine amount, if deposited, shall be disbursed to the complainant as compensation [Paras 12-13].

Decision: The appeal is allowed. The judgment of the trial court acquitting the accused is set aside. The accused, Ajit Chandra Mondal, is convicted under Section 138 of the NI Act and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 12,00,000/- within three months, failing which he shall undergo six months' simple imprisonment. The fine amount, if deposited, shall be disbursed to the complainant as compensation. The trial court is directed to take necessary steps to ensure compliance, including issuing a warrant if the convict fails to appear.
 

Service Law – Judicial Interference in Disciplinary Proceedings – Charge-Sheet Not a Punishment – Writ Petition Dismissed – Petitioner challenged the charge-sheet on the ground that he played no role in preparing the DPR and was relieved before the Revised Technical Sanction was granted – High-Level Inquiry Committee found that the collapse of the bridge was due to faulty DPR that failed to consider the catchment area and flood discharge from Sanjay Sarovar Dam – Petitioner signed and approved the PMGSY check-list, which formed the basis for technical sanction – Held: Courts should not interfere in disciplinary proceedings at the charge-sheet stage unless issued by an incompetent authority or in violation of natural justice – Writ petition dismissed [Paras 15-19].

Service Law – Negligence vs. Misconduct – Departmental Inquiry Necessary – No Interference by Court – Petitioner argued that mere negligence in signing a faulty DPR does not amount to misconduct – High-Level Committee found that the petitioner failed to notice major discrepancies in the DPR, including the omission of a 20 km upstream dam, affecting flood calculations – Held: Whether the petitioner’s role was mere negligence or misconduct is a matter of departmental inquiry – No interference warranted at the pre-mature stage [Paras 14-17].

Service Law – Retirement and Disciplinary Action – Proceedings Can Continue – No Mala Fide Found – Charge-sheet issued three days before the petitioner’s retirement – Petitioner argued mala fide intent to harass – Court held that since the incident occurred during petitioner’s tenure, inquiry was validly instituted – Held: Issuance of charge-sheet before retirement does not automatically establish malice – Writ petition dismissed [Paras 7-11].

Decision: Writ Petition Dismissed – Court declined to interfere in the departmental inquiry, holding that the petitioner’s role in checking the DPR, approving technical details, and signing project documents required proper examination in disciplinary proceedings – No costs imposed [Paras 18-19].

Service Law – Recruitment Rules – Exclusion of Degree Holders for Junior Engineer (Civil) Post – Validity of Rule 8(1)(ii) and (iii) of the 2023 Rules – Petitioners challenged the exclusion of B.Tech degree holders from applying for the post of Junior Engineer (Civil), arguing that a higher qualification (degree) should subsume a lower qualification (diploma) – Held: The prescription of diploma as the only eligible qualification is a policy decision of the State and cannot be interfered with unless manifestly arbitrary – Equivalence of qualifications is not a matter for judicial review but for the employer to decide – The exclusion of degree holders is justified, considering the functional requirements of Junior Engineers and available opportunities for degree holders in higher posts [Paras 46-50].

Recruitment Policy – Power of the State to Prescribe Eligibility Criteria – Judicial Review Limited – The employer has the discretion to prescribe qualifications for posts – Courts should not expand or alter the prescribed qualifications unless there is a clear violation of constitutional principles – Held: Judicial review does not extend to determining equivalence of qualifications unless there is a manifest illegality – The recruitment rules were framed after due deliberation and do not suffer from arbitrariness [Paras 44-50].

Higher Qualification Not Necessarily a Substitute for a Lower Qualification – Functional Differences Between Diploma and Degree Courses – The syllabus and training provided in a diploma course are distinct from those in a degree course – Held: A degree in Civil Engineering does not automatically subsume a diploma in Civil Engineering – The classification made by the State is rational and serves the legitimate purpose of defining the job role and ensuring level-playing field for diploma holders [Paras 44-46].

Precedent – Supreme Court Decisions in Jyoti K.K. v. Kerala Public Service Commission (2010) & Puneet Sharma v. HP Electricity Board (2021) Distinguished – Petitioners relied on Jyoti K.K. and Puneet Sharma to argue that higher qualifications should be considered valid – Held: Those cases involved specific rules allowing higher qualifications to be treated as equivalent to prescribed qualifications – In contrast, the Bihar Recruitment Rules do not mention "minimum qualification" but specify diploma as the only eligible qualification, thus excluding degree holders – Jyoti K.K. and Puneet Sharma do not support the petitioners’ claim in the absence of an explicit rule equating degree and diploma qualifications [Paras 17-20, 41-50].

Constitutional Law – Classification Based on Educational Qualification – Reasonable and Non-Arbitrary – The classification between diploma and degree holders for Junior Engineer posts is based on functional requirements and administrative policy – Held: The State is entitled to create a distinct cadre for diploma holders without violating Article 14 of the Constitution – Exclusion of degree holders does not violate the right to equality as they have access to higher posts [Paras 47-50].

Decision: – Writ petitions dismissed. The challenge to Rule 8(1)(ii) and (iii) of the Bihar Water Resource Department Subordinate Engineering (Civil) Cadre Recruitment Rules, 2023, fails.