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by sayum
24 October 2026 1:11 PM
"The organizing and/or conducting of book fair by the Guild is, therefore, not a ‘public function’... [and] while conducting and/or organizing, the book fair, does not owe any ‘public duty’ to anyone." Calcutta High Court, in an intra-court appeal, held that the Publishers and Booksellers Guild, a private society, is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for its role in organizing the International Kolkata Book Fair.
A division bench comprising Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Sandip Kumar De observed that the mere benevolent or philanthropic objective of promoting literacy does not transform a private commercial event into a "public function" or create a "public duty" enforceable through judicial review.
The appellants, an organization engaged in social activities, challenged a single-judge order that dismissed their writ petition as not maintainable against the Guild. The appellants had sought judicial intervention after the Guild refused to allot them a stall in the 48th edition of the International Kolkata Book Fair. They contended that the fair serves as a vehicle for non-formal education and democratic enlightenment, thereby constituting a public function subject to constitutional standards of fairness.
The primary questions before the court were whether the functions performed by the Guild in organizing the book fair qualify as "public functions" and whether, consequently, the Guild is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The court was also called upon to determine if the internal allotment of stalls by a private entity is subject to judicial review.
The court emphasized the "right-duty" relationship as the fundamental yardstick for maintaining an action under Article 226. It held that for a writ to lie, the entity must be discharging a public duty that is either statutory in nature or involves a clear "public law element" where the State has delegated its own essential functions to the private body.
Distinguishing Education from Philanthropy
The bench clarified that while imparting formal education is a public function, the Guild's objective of "encouraging the spread of literacy" is a benevolent and philanthropic declaration that does not equate to the performance of a constitutional obligation. The court rejected the argument that a book fair is intrinsically linked to the right to education under Article 21-A or Article 51-A(h) of the Constitution.
"The concept of education, in our view, cannot be stretched that far, which would include conducting and/or organizing the book fair as imparting education. A book fair is a platform where large number of books from multiple disciplines are exhibited and the books are sold on commercial basis."
No Pervasive State Control
The court distinguished the Guild from the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI), noting that the BCCI exercises a de facto monopoly with pervasive control over a sport, a power that the Guild lacks. The court observed that the Guild does not enjoy any exclusive regulatory authority or delegated power from the State. The fact that the State may provide land or police support for the event was deemed a matter of "benevolence" rather than evidence of the State divesting its core functions to the Guild.
"If a public duty or public function is involved, any body, public or private, concerned or in connection with the duty or function and limited to that be subjected to judicial scrutiny under the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the Article 226 of the Constitution of India."
Rejection of Persuasive Value of Contrary Rulings
Regarding the reliance placed by the appellants on a decision by the Madras High Court in Kalachuvadu Publishers Pvt. Ltd., the bench remarked that the said judgment failed to consider the binding series of judicial precedents regarding the scope of public functions. Consequently, the court held that the decision in Kalachuvadu could not be considered good law or persuasive.
The High Court upheld the impugned order of the learned single judge, dismissing the appeal on the grounds that the internal affairs of the Guild, including stall allotments, fall within the private law domain and are not subject to judicial review under Article 226. The judgment reiterates the stringent test required to bring private entities under the writ jurisdiction of High Courts.
Date of Decision: 06 October 2026